Apperson v. Pattison. cided. He was afraid it might make against that some way, I did not understand exactly how." This testimony was objected to as being incompetent and irrelevant. The objection was overruled by the court and the testimony admitted, and this is assigned as error. evant. The ruling of his Honor, upon this exception was correct. The testimony was both competent and relThe question as to Its sufficiency was a matter for the jury, under proper instructions by the court. This is more clearly shown to be so by a subsequent statement of the witness in her testimony, that they had reference to the suit between Dickens and Bolton, and that Pattison did agree to wait. There are similar exceptions taken to the testimony of other witnesses in reference to the same matter, and which were properly overruled. Upon the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the last will and testament of defendant's testator, Wade H. Bolton, which was objected to by the defendant, and the objection overruled by the court, and said will permitted to be read to the jury as evidence. It was not stated on the trial for what purpose this document was offered, but it is now insisted that it was competent, as tending to show that the defendant's testator, Bolton, had the litigation greatly at heart, in which it was alleged he had employed the plaintiff to attend him in its preparation for trial. It is very clear, however, that it was not competent for this or any other purpose, as it contained no reference either to the plaintiff or the subject of his demand in any Apperson v. Pattison. way. On the other hand it did contain large bequests to other parties on condition that they remained faithful to him, and aided him all they could in said litigation with Dickens. And we can readily see how these bequests may have had an improper influence upon the jury, as the plaintiff was setting up a very large demand for alleged services connected with the same litigation. Again, the plaintiff offered in evidence the answer of said testator, Bolton, to the bill filed in said Bolton and Dickens litigation, which seems to have been for the purpose of settling up the business of a partnership, with which the plaintiff or his demand was in no way connected. This was objected to and the objection overruled by the court. It was a very lengthy document, containing about seventy-five pages. No specific purpose was specified for which said answer was offered, but it was permitted to be read to the jury as evidence in the cause. It is now insisted that it was competent to show the fact that large amounts were involved in said litigation. In the first place, we are unable to see how the amount involved in that suit could affect the value of the services claimed to have been rendered said Bolton by the plaintiff in this suit, as he was not a lawyer or employed, if at all, on account of any knowledge or skill he possessed in regard to the conduct or management of litigation, but merely as it seems for the protection of the testator, Bolton, from apprehended personal violence by Dickens and his henchmen. The contents of said answer were wholly Apperson v. Pattison. irrelevant and immaterial to the matters in issue in this cause, and obnoxious to the besides, if that were not so, it was objection that it was only a part of It con the record in that case, and could not be introduced without the entire record unless by consent. tained a great many statements and allegations about various things, and although wholly unimportant to the matters involved in this cause, as it was permitted to go to the jury as evidence without any specific directions, we are unable to tell what conclusions they drew from it, or what effect it had upon their deliberations. The admission over the objection of the defendant of each of these papers was erroneous, and may have, and most likely did affect the defendant injuriously. The defendant requested his Honor to instruct the jury in regard to the statute of limitations, that the burden of proof of facts necessary to remove the bar of the statute, which prima facie existed, was upon the plaintiff; which the court declined to do. This was error, as the charge was proper, and was not contained, nor any equivalent to it, in the general charge: Cook v. Cook, 10 Heis., 464. For the errors above indicated the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted. Lippman v. Boals. NANNIE LIPPMAN v. J. C. BOALS et al. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. Construction. Marriage settlements must be construed in the light of surrounding circumstances, and in view of the object and purpose of the contract; and when such settlement expresses that its object was " to secure the wife from want," an absolute right of disposition in the husband must be made to appear by express provision or necessary implication. FROM TIPTON. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Covington. H. J. LIVINGSTON, Ch. SIMONTON, YOUNG & BLACKWELL for complainant. HUMES & POSTON and SMITH & LAUDERDALE for defendants. FREEMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. In 1874, complainant and Alexander Lippman, in contemplation of marriage, entered into a marriage contract, by which certain real estate, together with a number of notes and evidences of debt due to Alexander Lippman, were transferred and conveyed to Jno. W. Calhoun, of Tipton county, Tennessee. The real estate is specifically described, and likewise the notes and evidence of debt, amount and date when due, together with the name of the parties owing said debts. The main question in the case depends on the true construction of the contract, and grows out of the fol 11L 489 16L 286 Lippman v. Boals. lowing alleged state of facts: The husband after the marriage, assigned a portion of the notes to a firm in Memphis, in payment of debts due by him, averred to have been contracted after the contract-at any rate, not to have been a charge in any way on these notes or property held by the husband at the date of the marriage. The defendants, purchasers, are charged to have had actual notice of the settlement, and as the notes are specifically described, were put on inquiry, at least as to these notes, and therefore took subject to the provisions of the contract. The bill having been demurred to, these facts are substantially stated and admitted. This bill is brought by Mrs. Lippman, after the death of the husband, to have an account of the proceeds of these notes, so far as collected by the assignees, and to reach some of the evidences of debt remaining intact in Tipton county, in the form of a judgment, perhaps. The stipulations of the contract, so far as necessary to the decision of this case, are as follows: It is first agreed that the property should "remain at the absolute disposal of said Lippman until the solemnization of the intended marriage." It is then added: "But this conveyance is made in trust for for the following uses and purposes herein declared and set forth, forth, and no other, that is to say, the said Calhoun, trustee, shall permit the said Lippman and wife to have and hold the undisturbed and peaceable possession, use and enjoyment of said property during their natural lives, or during the continuance of the marriage between them, without molesta |