Williams v. Williams, two children in the real and personal property, and comes within the description of remainderman under said limitation in said will. We do not think there is any error in holding that F. C. Williams is an heir-at-law of said Jos. Williams, deceased, and upon the theory of the decree that said heirs-at-law take under the will, the devise over is to his, Jos. William's, heirs-at-law, and F. C. Williams falls within that description. But in our opinion the devise in the will to trustees to hold for use and benefit of Jos. Williams for life, and at his death for the like use and benefit of his heirs-at-law, brings the devise within the rule in Shelly's case, and vests the estate absolutely in the first taker, and the heirs-at-law of Jos. Williams take the estate directly from him by inheritance. In this will the estate is given to trustees to hold for the use and benefit of Jos. Williams, and at his death the same trustees are to hold the estate for the like use of his heirs-at-law, both estates being of the same equitable character. The will was made and testator died before the passage of the act. of 1851-2, repealing the rule in Shelly's case. And it must therefore be construed by the law in force at the time it took effect as a will. In Polk v. Faris, 9 Yer., 231, the rule was defined as follows, adopting the definition of Preston on Estates, as approved by Chancellor Kent: "When any person takes an estate of freehold, legally or equitably, under a deed, will, or other writing, and in the same instrument there is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or without the in Williams v. Williams. terposition of an intervening estate, of a right of the same legal or equitable character, to his heirs, or heirs of his body, as a class of persons to take in succession, the limitation to the heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate." If, then, under this rule, the first taker, Jos. Williams, took the absolute estate, his heirs take directly from him, and whoever may be his heirs at the time of his death, take the estate. By formal petition and regular proceedings F. C. Williams was legitimated. "The effect of the legitimation is to create the relation of parent and child between the petitioner and the person legitimated, as if the latter had been born to the former in lawful wedlock": Code, sec. 3642. At the death of Jos. Williams, under the proceedings had, F. C. Williams was as much an heir and distributee of his estate as his other two sons, who were born in lawful wedlock. We hold, therefore, that in the conclusions of the chancellor and the Referees that F. C. Williams was entitled to share in the real and personal estate of his father, there was no error, and that the exceptions taken to this right must be overruled, and the chancellor's decree to this extent affirmed. As to the widow's right to dower, and to participate in the distribution of her husband's personal estate, we express no opinion, she not being before this court. The chancellor's decree and the report of the Referees will be modified, however, in so far as it is held that the estate devised by Etheldred Williams to his 42-VOL. 11. State v. Tarver. son Joseph is still held in trust for the benefit of the latter's heirs in conformity to the will of the said Etheldred Williams, and the exception taken to the Referees upon this point will be to this extent sustained. With the modifications indicated, the decree ordering an account will be affirmed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings. The costs of the court will be paid by appellant as guardian as aforesaid. THE STATE v. J. J. TARVER. 1. CRIMINAL LAW. Sale of whisky. Manufacturers of whisky or brandy out of the products of farms or orchards of the State cannot sell by retail within four miles of an incorporated institution of learning. 2. SAME. Retail dealers. Sales to persons or customers for the purpose of consumption constitute a retail dealer. FROM KNOX. Appeal in error from the Criminal Court of Knox county. M. L. HALL, J. ATTORNEY-GENERAL LEA for the State. J. C. J. WILLIAMS for Tarver. COOKE, Sp. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The indictment against the defendant in this case was as follows: State v. Tarver. "That S. J. Tarver, on the 9th day of June, 1883 in Knox county, unlawfully did sell an intoxicating beverage known as whisky, and an intoxicating beverage known as brandy, within four miles of an incorporated institution of learning, he, the said S. J Tarver, at the time being the manufacturer of the said whisky and brandy, and selling the same in quantities not less nor under a quart; and not to be drunk upon the the premises of the place of sale, which said sale, as aforesaid, was unlawful and contrary to the statute and against the peace and dignity of the State." The court below, on motion of the defendant, quashed the indictment, and the State has appealed. By the act of 1877, ch. 23, sec. 1, known as the four-mile law, it was enacted "That it shall not hereafter be lawful for any person to sell or tipple any intoxicating beverage within four miles of an incorporated institution of learning in this State, and that any one violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. By the second section of said act, it was provided "that this act shall not apply to the sale of such liquors within the limits of any incorporated town, nor to sales made by persons having licenses to make the same, at the date of the passage of this act, during the time for which such licenses were granted, nor to sales by manufac tories (manufacturers) of such liquors in wholesale packages or quantities." It is insisted for the defendant that the sale of spirituous liquors in quantities not less than a quart, State v. Tarver. and not to be drunk upon the premises where sold, is a sale in wholesale quantities within the saving of the statute. It was determined by this court in a case decided at Jackson during the last term, but not yet reported, that the distinction between a wholesale and retail dealer did not depend upon the quantity sold by either, but that sales to purchasers of packages or quantities for the purposes of trade or being resold, constituted a wholesale dealer; and sales to persons or customers for purposes of consumption constituted a retail dealer: Lowenhaught v. The State, 11 Lea, 13. We adhere to that distinction as there taken, and furthermore, are satisfied that while it was the intention of the Legislature to permit the manufacturers whose establishments were situate within four miles of incorporated institutions of learning, to dispose of their products, at the places of manufacture, by wholesale, it was not the legislative intention to grant to them a privilege of selling to customers for consumption which was denied to other persons. We, therefore, hold that manufacturers of spirituous liquors are not permitted to sell the same for purposes of consumption within four miles of an incorporated institution of learning, and are liable to the same penalties as other persons for so doing. But it is further insisted, that the indictment is bad for the reason that it does not sufficiently negative the idea that the defendant sold said liquors in wholesale packages or quantities. The language of this part of the indictment is: "The said S. J. Tar |