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Jones, is working to the best of satisfac- posed. When these are established, and tion.

Municipal cemeteries have long been established in some localities, and now municipal crematories are seriously pro

the numerous lying-in hospitals are municipalized, the whole circuit of human life will seem to be within the field of municipal activities.

Popular Education and the Race Problem in North Carolina


By Joseph W. Bailey

N a recent letter on "Restricted Suffrage in Maryland," published in The Outlook, I read: “The most serious aspect of this Southern movement is the temptation to keep the negro in ignorance if he is thereby kept from voting."

Speaking as a citizen of North Carolina, I wish to offer some observations upon this statement.

It were futile to deny that there are political leaders in the South with no mean following who would keep the negroes in ignorance in order to keep them out of politics. Many even of the more intelligent and less partisan white men seriously doubt whether the ability to read and write will fit the average negro for citizenship, and are preparing in their minds to meet the exigencies of the situation when the negroes, having learned to read and write, are returning to the body politic proper. That is to say, they not only do not think the negroes will be fit to vote when they learn to read, but are ready to debar them by some other means when the present barriers shall have been overcome.

On the other hand, a large number of our white people, though perhaps not a majority, are in favor of educating the colored people. I think nine-tenths of the preachers and teachers are. Nevertheless, I should add that in North Carolina the preachers and teachers have little to do with politics; and the education of the negroes, since it must be derived from public schools supported by taxation, is a political question.

The Constitution of North Carolina requires that the education funds shall be so used that the schools of each race shall be maintained an equal length of time each year. The period of the free schools

for whites now is fourteen weeks, of the colored it is thirteen weeks.

The free schools are supported by a general tax of eighteen cents on the hundred dollars of property and fifty-four cents on the poll. This returns a gross income of about one million dollars, which maintains the schools as above. The Constitution requires that the schools shall all be maintained four months in the year. They have not been maintained this length of time throughout the State so long since the Civil War, though for years a number of counties have maintained their schools even longer. I have been told that nowhere in the United States has a public-school system succeeded when supported by a general State tax, as ours is.

At any rate, in 1897 a number of gentlemen persuaded the Republican-Populist General Assembly to enact a law requiring an election to be held in August, 1897, in every township in the State, to determine whether a special tax of ten cents on property and thirty cents on the poll should be levied for the purpose of prolonging the terms of the free schools. There are more than fifteen hundred townships in the State. In that election less than fifteen townships voted for the special tax!

In this campaign I had charge of the literature, and also campaigned. Our funds were pitifully meager. We had the support of perhaps fifty leading citizens who signed their names to an address in behalf of the tax. President Alderman, of the State University, President McIver, of the State Normal College, and other prominent educational leaders gave themselves freely to the cause of the special tax. Many papers that began as advocates


Education and the Race Problem in North Carolina

of the tax changed front. The present Governor of our State, then a leader of the people, undertook to campaign for the tax, but he found it impossible to make progress. The reason universally given for refusing to vote this tax was that it would help the negroes as much as the whites. I may cite the instance of one man with six children to educate, whose extra tax would not have amounted to fifty cents, who refused for this reason to vote for it.

Of course some did not understand the proposal; of course there were others who were "opposed to taxation on general principles;" undoubtedly many Democrats withheld their support and discouraged the movement on the ground that it was "fathered" by the Fusion parties, out of which no good thing should come, if they might prevent. But it was clear that, rather than bring about better schools for both races, thousands of white citizens would not vote for a small tax that should provide better schools as well for their children.

The local taxation campaign, however, was not without effect. From the day of that election until now a persistent advocacy of the cause of better schools has been maintained. When the Democratic party came in 1900 to offer the amend ment restricting the suffrage, it promised emphatically to provide four-months schools throughout the State, unequivocally pledging that no white child should be disfranchised for being illiterate because of want of opportunity to learn to read and write. The promise was made with especial regard to white children. With out this the amendment would have been defeated. The pledge of four-months schools must necessarily have included those for colored children-though little was said of that. Our present Governor, who led the campaign, all the while proclaimed the necessity of universal education. His adjective was peculiarly fortu


The party of the amendment came into power early in January, 1901. The General Assembly, elected in the campaign for the amendment, was overwhelmingly Democratic. In that body a few weeks ago a prominent member of the House from the eastern part of the State, where the negro population is large, proposed an amendment to the Constitution requir


ing the division of school funds to the races according to the property of the races, the negroes to receive the amount of their school taxes, the white people to receive theirs. This proposal was suppressed; but not until a score or more of members had made known their desire to vote for it. Shortly thereafter a substitute was proposed by a more prominent Senator providing that, while the present clause of the Constitution requiring fourmonths schools for either race should remain, either race might vote a tax upon itself exclusively for the schools of its children. This struck many of us favorably. We were aware that the general tax could never be adequate. We were, therefore, persuaded that we must have a local tax. But we knew that it would at best be many years before the people would vote a local tax whose benefits will be shared by the negroes. It is, indeed, true that in perhaps thirty towns in the State we have local taxes so shared; but to bring the rural townships to this point is quite another matter. A few towns have refused on this account to take a vote on the question of levying the tax necessary to establish graded schools. In view of these facts, many of us were disposed to urge this bill as the most practicable solution of the free-school question. But Governor Aycock made known his opposition to it; and to him, I have no doubt, is owed its sudden loss of advocates.

The Governor's motives were the very highest. He argued that if such a provision should be enacted, an early General Assembly would reduce the general tax from eighteen cents to ten cents, and another from ten cents to five cents, and in a little while the negroes should have no schools, and it should be a question if the white people in many communities would have any. Of course the reader recalls that this is to argue that the clause of the Constitution requiring four-months schools would be disregarded. But why not argue that a clause that has been disregarded ever since it was written may remain of no force! The Governor's position, I may say, is that the two races are bound together in this matter, and that they both must have schools. There are many of us who believe that not a few people in North Carolina would be indifferent to the education of the white

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is against these that the Governor now declares that he stands, as he has stood, for "universal education."

In him and in his position rests largely the hope of good schools for the colored people. And yet he was elected on the platform-indeed, he made possible the platform and the amendment-restricting the suffrage. So, then, here is one man who, though very much in favor of depriving the illiterate negro of the suffrage, is equally strong in his demand that the negroes shall have schools maintained as long as those of the whites. And his position appears to rest upon conviction that there must be universal education or none. It is my opinion that he will hold off every effort to readjust the division of the funds. Whether any one will be in a position to oppose such an effort five years hence is open to question, but I think by that time the poorer white people will have perceived that the hope of schools for their own children lies in maintaining the present article of the Constitution and the present basis of dividing the funds.

I have stated that many of the more intelligent white citizens are opposed to the use of money derived from the common taxes to maintain schools for negroes. It is desirable to explain that this opposition does not by any means rest solely upon the knowledge that to educate the negroes will enfranchise them. Indeed, it has existed from the time when educational qualifications were not thought of. In my opinion, this attitude has support from four or five points of view.

First: From the frequently held conviction that to educate a negro is to "ruin a good farm hand," without getting an equivalent in other capacities.

Second: From the widely held conviction that our school funds are altogether inadequate to the needs of the white children, and that it is folly to spend them on colored children when the opportunities of the white children are so limited.

Third: From the fear in some quarters that the negro children, not being deterred by poor clothes, etc., will go to school in larger numbers than the white children, and will thus acquire ability to read and write more rapidly.

Fourth: From the general race prejudice, arising in part from the old antipathy of the poor whites, who, to a degree, are in competition with the negro in the labor market now, in part from the old attitude of master and slave, and in part from the political divergence created by the negroes' attitude of consistent opposition to the whites, and their persistent ambition for office as well as sporadic efforts to obtain social equality.

I have stated that there are those who are impressed that the present means of limiting the suffrage of the negroes is inadequate and will rapidly become more


Some of these hope for the abrogation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Others are considering the wisdom of instituting a property qualification in some fashion so soon as the negroes in large numbers have overcome the present barrier.

Finally, I submit that, in the solving of this very important problem, the South must have the sympathetic co-operation of intelligent men in the North. Southern plans are likely to be wisest. The South has the best opportunity to understand. She is more likely to find the best way out. Mere partisan policy will be ruinous. The Northern view may help restrain the South. But I maintain that, on the whole, the Nation ought, so far as possible, to give to the better class of Southern men its support in measures looking to the solution of the problem; and, at any rate, that a policy of interference or unfeeling criticism cannot but result in ill to both North and South. North and South. It is for this purpose that I have written this frank estimate of public opinion in the South and cited recent legislative proposals bearing upon the race problem and its relation to popular education in the South.

A Study in Twentieth Century Problems

By Lyman Abbott

Chapter VI.—The Industrial Rights


of Man

HE industrial rights of man: what are they and how are they to be secured in a democracy?

Every man has a right to the product of his own industry, because it is a part of himself; into it he has put a portion of his life. His life is his own, therefore this portion of his life is his own. The artist paints a picture; the musician composes a symphony; the author writes a book; into this picture, this symphony, this book, the artist, musician, author, has gone. Because the artist has projected himself into the picture, the musician into the symphony, the author into the book, this product of himself belongs to him. And what is true of the artist, of the musician, of the author, is true of every laborer. The shoemaker projects himself into the shoes; the carpenter into the house; the loomworker into the cloth. These also are a part of the man. Into them he has put his brainwork or his handiwork; there fore they are his. This right of every man to the product of his own labor is a natural right. Society did not confer it; society cannot take it away. Society may fail to protect it, or may violate it; but the right itself is absolute. Whenever organic law violates this right it is unjust; whenever it fails to protect this right it is inefficient.

It was for this reason that slavery was unjust. The injustice of slavery did not lie in the fact that the slaves were ill fed, ill clothed, or ill housed. If it had been true that they were better housed and fed and clothed in slavery than in freedom, still slavery would not have been justified. The evil of slavery was not that families were separated. If the law had provided explicitly that slaves' families

not be separated, still slavery would have been unjust. The injustice was not in specific acts of cruelty. If there had never been a Legree, still slav

ery would have been unjust. It was not

that the slave was denied education. In Rome the slaves were educated, and authors and copyists and literary men were held in slavery, and slavery was not just. The wrong of slavery lay in this: that personality was invaded; the product of the man was taken from him; he had put a part of his life out into the world and he was robbed of it. Whenever and however society does this, it does injustice.

So, again, if society is so organized that men cannot engage in productive industry, it is unjustly organized. The command, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread," involves a prerogative even more than a command. If society is so organized that there are large masses of men who cannot, by the sweat of their brow, earn their daily bread, it is unjustly organized. "Enforced idleness," says Carlyle, "is the Englishman's hell." There have been times in the past, in the history of this country-and if the industrial organization of to-day remains unchanged there will be such times in the future-when thousands of men have been driven into that enforced idleness which is the Englishman's hell. Any organization of society which prevents masses of the people from earning their daily bread by the sweat of their brow, or which fails to enable them so to earn it if they will to do so, is an unjust organization of society. So any organization of society which, allowing men to work, still fails adequately to remunerate their work, fails adequately and rightfully to adjust the relations between the workers, and takes so much for the one class that it leaves practically nothing for the other class, or leaves them but a mere pittance and bare subsistence, is an unjust organization of society. The man who has put his life into his labor has a right to the product of that life. If, in the complexity of modern society, he is combined with others in that production, he has a right to a fair, just, and equable share in the product of the combined

industry. If society fails to secure it for him, society is inefficient and in so far unjust.

If any section of society endeavors to prevent any man from working and from enjoying the product of his work, that section of society is unjust. If any organization undertakes to prevent any man from working when he will, where he will, for whom he will, and at what wages he will, that organization violates the essential right of labor. It is not primarily the enemy of capital; it is primarily the enemy of labor; for every man has a right to work, and every man has a right to the product of his industry. Imagine, for a moment, that any man should propose to place a law on our statute-books providing that no man should work in any special industry unless he belonged to some special guild; not for one instant would he have the support of the people; not for one instant would he have the support of any free people. But such a law is not better, but rather worse, if it be enacted by an irresponsible body and enforced by violence.

The right of every man to work, and the right of every man to the product of his work, are fundamental rights. There is enough to be done, and the world is fruitful enough, to make it possible for every man, in the present stage of civil ization, to earn enough to support himself, his wife, and his children in comfort. Any organization, political or industrial, capitalistic or laborers', which impugns this right, prevents this work, or takes from the laborer the product of his industry, whether it be industry of the brain or industry of the muscles, without adequate compensation, is unjust. The first industrial duty of society is to protect every man in his right to labor and in his own ership of the fruits of his labor.

But there are large values in the world which are not the fruits of labor. There are, therefore, large values in the world, the individual right to which is not a natural right.

The ocean is not the product of industry. It belongs to no man and to no body of men. We may call a nation mistress of the seas, but we do not thereby concede that she owns the seas. By in ternational law it is generally agreed that the water extending from the shore out to

a line three miles from the coast shall belong to the nation whose coast that water adjoins; but this right to the three miles of water is not a natural right. It does not belong to the nation by any law of nature. It belongs to the nation because the nations have, for mutual convenience, agreed that it shall possess it. It is a purely artificial right, and that it is an artificial right is evident from the fact that the artificial boundary has been settled by international agreement.

The great navigable rivers are not the subjects of private property, according to any natural law. They belong to the community, not to any individual in the community, nor to any group of individuals in the community. In the early part of this century the State of New York gave to Robert Fulton and his heirs the exclusive right to navigate the harbor of New York and the waters of the Hudson River. Daniel Webster contended before the Supreme Court of the United States that no State had the right to confer an exclusive right to navigate the rivers within its own boundary lines that a navigable river was not the subject of private property, and could not be made so by any act of legislation whatsoever. No one service that Daniel Webster ever rendered to this country, except perhaps his reply to Hayne, was so great and so lasting as this service. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed what he had claimed. It declared that no State could give a right to a navigable river within its boundary line; and to-day all navigable rivers in our country flow unvexed by toll or personal intervention, or monopoly of any kind, because the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a navigable river is not the subject of private property.

Streams that are not navigable are not the subjects of private property, except in so far as they are made so by artificial arrangement. The brook that flows through a man's land is not his to do what he pleases with. He cannot pollute its waters and make it a nuisance to his neighbor below. He cannot dam its waters and make it a nuisance to his neighbor above. He cannot deflect its waters and prevent his neighbor below from having the benefit of them. He has simply the right to use the waters as they flow through

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