any religious organization puts upon its own powers over the subordinate judicatories and individual members of the same is final, and the civil tribunals will not inquire into the correctness of the same. The court appears to limit the scope of this wide-reaching principle somewhat by enumerating the subjects to which it is applicable, namely, faith, discipline, ecclesiastical rules, custom or law; but these are very general and indefinite terms, and we must not forget that the very case to which the court applied the principle was one directly involving the rights of property. The court did not say that, if the constitution of the Presbyterian Church vests the supreme and final interpreting power in regard to these things in the General Assembly, then the civil courts will not interfere. This would have been sound, for then that clause of the constitution would have been part of the original contract between the organization and all individuals entering the same. But the court refused to investigate the constitution altogether, and thus attributed to one party to the contract the power to bind the other by its own ex parte and possibly unconstitutional interpretation of the same. We submit that this is a civil power, and that it stamps the organization which has the legal right to use it as a public corporation. The learned counsel for the appellants in this very case, Mr. T. W. Bullitt, indicated this to the court. He pointed out to them the English law upon the subject in reference to the free churches of that country, as laid down by Lord Eldon himself, which holds that the civil courts must themselves examine and interpret the constitutions of the religious bodies, and determine from their own interpretations the rights and duties agreed upon under them; and that the claim that submission to the judicatories of such bodies is one of the original principles of their constitutions is fact to be proved to the court, and that there is no presumption of law in favor of such a claim. But our Supreme Court, in this case, with true American Chauvinism, waved aside the wisdom and experience of "abroad." In the important case of Chase v. Cheney,1 decided but a little while before in the Supreme Court of Illinois, the only judge upon that bench at the time who had the knowledge necessary to deal with the questions involved, the late C. B. Lawrence, told his brethren plainly of the error into which they were falling by making a spiritual court in this country the final judge of its own jurisdiction; but they regarded the criticism as a European notion, and preserved the character of true Philistines in their decision. The justice who 1 Illinois Reports, vol. lvii., pp. 541, 542.

rendered the opinion in Watson v. Jones knew well the case of Chase v. Cheney, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Lawrence. He was aware that there was another side to the question, but he evidently had no appreciation of its meaning or force.

We contend, therefore, that the religious organizations in this country, in spite of the fact that they are named in the language of the law and of the day private associations, are recognized by the law as in possession of powers which give them more the character of public corporations, and of public corporations of the most dangerous nature to the sovereignty of the state and the authority of the government, namely, of the nature of immunities. It is, no doubt, the intention of our lawgivers to confine them to the purely religious sphere, where such immunity would be harmless; and there is no doubt that the most of them imagine that they have done so, but they deceive themselves with the sound of words.

Evidently there is an inherent difficulty in the way of assigning religious organizations to the category of mere private associations, and we think it is this: These organizations hold that they rest upon revealed truth, that is, upon infallible divine truth, and this, in the close relation existing between religion, ethics and law, inspires them with the feeling that they possess the norms of a better law than any fallible human power can give. Why, then, should they be made subject to this human law? If these associations should or could take the view that theology was a human science, and that its postulates were the results of human experience, reflection and speculation, this difficulty might disappear; for as the national consciousness is wider and fuller than that of any religious confession, it could then be conceded that it would be clearer and purer. We would not be considered as offering this suggestion as our solution of this difficulty. We are not even willing to say that we desire to see the difficulty removed. We are only endeavoring to explain how it happens that, while the language and the theory of our law profess one view upon this subject, the facts and the practice reveal a different and a contradictory view. We are more inclined to regard religious organizations as quasi-public bodies, and advocate the readjustment of their legal relations upon that theory. If, however, they be recognized as in possession of fuller powers over their members than private associations may legally exercise, then must the government, in the modern state, hold a veto over their acts and a control over their administration, so far as it may regard

these as necessary to protect the civil and political rights of the individual members and secure the peace and welfare of the state. We pronounce it an utter confusion in political and juristic reasoning and language which terms religious organizations private associations, and then seeks to relieve them of the judicial supervision pertaining to the same by attributing to them immunity and powers of a public character, without asserting the more stringent control of legislature and administration over them. Really we do not comprehend how a true interpretation of our constitutional law can recognize to the courts the power to create these ecclesiastical immunities. The constitutions of the United States and of the several commonwealths vest the whole judicial power in courts created by the constitutions, or by the Congress and the several legislatures. No constitution vests in the judicial department the authority to delegate judicial powersurely not final judicial power. We do not, therefore, understand how the courts have any more right to accept the decisions of an ecclesiastical judicatory as final and unrevisable than those of the board of directors of a stock exchange, or of a bank or a railway, or those of the council of a club, unless specially empowered thereto by constitutional or statute law; and we do not think that this can be successfully claimed. Moreover, we think that the vesting of ecclesiastical tribunals with judicial power, or permitting them to exercise the same, is a question of polity, not of rights, and the Supreme Court of the United States has decided against its own power to determine questions of polity. (Georgia v. Stanton, 6th of Wallace's U. S. Supreme Court Reports.)

Political science requires that we should class these organizations according to their natural and actual character, and juristic logic then demands that we should attach to them the legal relations pertaining to their class. John W. Burgess.

COLUMBIA COLlege, New YoRK.

CHRISTIAN WORK IN LONDON.

II. DISSENTING CHURCHES.

OTHER MOVEMENTS.

IN discussing the work of the dissenting churches in London we shall find many of the methods employed by them so similar to those already outlined in a previous article that they need no further description. It should not, however, be inferred that they are practiced with less earnestness and success by Nonconformists than by Churchmen.

The dissenting churches have about seven hundred places of worship, of all sorts, in London. Three hundred and thirty of these, most of which are quite small, belong to various bodies of Wesleyans and Methodists; one hundred and twelve to Independents or Congregationalists; ninety-nine to Baptists; sixtyseven to Presbyterians; and eighty or ninety to a variety of smaller sects and to undenominational missions.

The ordinary services of these churches are arranged and conducted in all essential respects like those of our own country. There are, however, some slight differences between their ways and ours. Their religious meetings are, if we are not mistaken, considerably more frequent than is usual among us. It is common to have two prayer-meetings on Sunday, besides two regular church-services and Sunday-school. Not a few of the churches have two sessions of the Sunday-school, the first coming before church in the morning, the second in the afternoon, and even have the same officers, pupils, and teachers at both sessions. Their Sunday-schools, as a rule, have the character of mission schools, and are usually not attended by the children of the best families in the church. Yet some schools are conducted on the American plan. It is a common plan to hold two prayer-meetings on weekdays: one, perhaps, on Monday and one on Saturday evening; and a more formal service, with preaching, on Wednesday or Thursday evening. There is almost always more singing in the course of the service than is common with us. Morning service in most of the churches includes, at least, four hymns and a chant, or three hymns, an anthem, and a chant. It was noticed in two prominent Congregational churches in London that, during a morning service, followed by a brief communion service, there were sung, always by choir and congregation together, an anthem, two chants, and five hymns.

The celebration of the Lord's Supper is frequent, the event occurring as often as once, and even twice, each month. In the latter case there is usually one celebration after a morning and one after an evening service, in order that it may suit the convenience of all to be present at least once every month. There is also a system of tickets by which the members of the church indicate their presence at the sacramental service. Each member present deposits a dated and numbered ticket in the collection-box with the offering for the poor. This does not mean that no member can commune without a ticket; the ticket is simply an indication of his presence, and enables the church clerk to keep a roll of attendance, a very useful thing, especially where the congregation includes a large number of poor and obscure persons.1 Most of the methods of evangelistic work carried on by the dissenting churches closely resemble our own. They have prayermeeting inquiry-rooms, gospel services, and protracted meetings precisely like ours. Although the music used for regular church services is somewhat unfamiliar, in evangelistic meetings of all kinds one invariably hears the well-known songs introduced by Mr. Bliss and Mr. Sankey; and, much as these simple melodies may be despised on artistic grounds, they certainly have a remarkable adaptation to the work for which they were designed, — that of evangelistic services among common people. They are used in such meetings, not only in London and all over England and Sectland, but at the McAll Mission in Paris, and the Young Men's Christian Association in Berlin.

Having premised thus much in general, brief description will be given of the work of two or three dissenting churches which deal directly with the problem of evangelizing the masses.

The first example is that of the Highbury Quadrant Congregational Church, of which Dr. Llewellyn D. Bevan, formerly of New York, and lately removed to Melbourne, Australia, was pastor at the time it was visited by the writer. This church stands in the midst of a rather prosperous district in one of the newer parts of London. The comfortable-looking houses about it are occupied by people of the middle and upper middle classes. There are poorer neighborhoods, however, within a few minutes' walk, inhabited by working-people. The church has two thriving missions. The relation of one of these missions to its parent gives

1 I cannot say that this is a universal custom, but only that it is a common one. I trust my readers will not forget that I claim in none of these matters to speak with authority, except within the range of a very limited experience.