"than at its surface1." But, did Newton require the earth's homogeneity to be admitted as a fact? Clairault might have spared his pains, so far as they related to the refutation of Newton. Newton indeed supposed, that is, proposed the case of the earth's homogeneity, as a philosophical hypothesis in order to a particular demonstration; but, where did Clairault discover, that he supposed it, that is, assumed it as a geological fact? or, that he supposed the earth to have really flattened itself into an ellipsoid? Such conceptions, never held a place in the intellect of Newton. After rectifying Newton's alleged error, however, by the sagacity of Clairault, the mineral geology thus proceeds to draw out the consequence of Newton's alleged supposition.

"We have seen, that the flatness of the earth "is such as is indicated by the laws of hydro"statics; that is, that the earth has exactly the same figure which it should have, if it had been originally fluid. By what singular CHANCE2, if it

'D'AUBUISSON, i. 17.

2" Par quel singulier HASARD, si elle eut été toujours solide, aurait"elle eu une forme si extraordinaire, &c. ?"—I am tempted to introduce here, a remark from a former work: "It is deserving of our most serious "consideration, though it is not adequately pointed out for attention, "that Homer recognised no such agency in the universe as ruxn, "Chance; and, that the word run does not once occur, either in the "Iliad or in the Odyssey. Eustathius informs us, that the ancients had "made the same observation; and Macrobius, who also points it out, "and observes, that Homer ascribed the government and direction of all “things to GOD ALONE-SOLI DEO omnia regenda committit;" adds: "Virgil, on the contrary, acknowledges Chance, or Fortune, therein

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"had always been solid, could it have had so extraordinary a form; which is a necessary consequence of the properties of fluids, and which seems to pertain to them exclusively? The fact is, it has moulded itself into this singular form: and, in order to have been able to do so, its “molecules must, in all necessity, have been originally independent of each other, that is, they "must have formed a fluid mass1."

This example, therefore, demonstrates how widely the mineral geology stands apart from the philosophy of Newton. We have no need to proceed further to shew, that it has failed under its own test; and, therefore, that its conclusions, with respect to the MODE of first formations, are fundamentally erroneous by that rule: the proof of its essential discordance with the test, being technical conviction of its error. So far, therefore, is "the happy revolution effected by Newton in the "studies of the natural sciences" from having been experienced "late in the science of mineral

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geology," that it is evident, that it has not been experienced in it at all. It may have been experienced in some of its subordinate arguments;

"departing, either casually or intentionally, from the Homeric sect." (Exam. of the Prim. Arg. of the Iliad, p. 226.) But, between the times of Homer and Virgil, Epicurus had speculated, and Lucretius had chanted his speculations; and, as these tinctured the philosophy of Virgil, so do they still tincture our physical philosophy. How else can we explain, the essential opposition of the extraordinary question above asked, to the great principle of Newton's philosophy?

D'AUBUISSON, i. 23.

but, subordinate arguments are here very subordinate considerations. In philosophy and science, we have regard first, to first principles; and, certainly, there is no savour of the philosophy of Newton, in the first, fundamental principle, or root of the Mineral Geology.

But it will be highly important that we should proceed further with this subject, and that we should investigate the cause of this extraordinary discordance; in order that we may ascertain, precisely, how it has come to pass, that the mineral geology, whilst it professed, and whilst it really intended to follow the method of analysis and induction taught by Newton, should nevertheless have concluded in direct contradiction to him.

It will probably say, that it draws its conclusions from a series of facts and observations which were wholly unknown to the age of Newton; that, if Newton had lived to witness the vast progress that physical science has made in mineralogy and chemistry since his time, and to see the phenomena that determine its conclusions, he would have changed in toto, or, at least, would have very materially modified, his own conclusion. But, I reply; that it could only urge that plea, by continuing under the same fatal misapprehension of Newton's principles, which has already caused it to conclude in contradiction to him. Those principles, with relation to the great question with which we are engaged, are not alterable by any possible contingency, any facts or observations,

any sensible phenomena that can occur, in the progress of the physical sciences. They are derived from a far higher science; a paramount science, which must ever govern and control them all. His

rules of philosophising," though prefixed and immediately applied by himself to the mathematical science, are not, therefore, exclusively mathematical; they are general rules, deduced from that universal science which Bacon denominates prima philosophia," viz. the science of universal logic, that is, of universal and immutable REASON1. The mineral geology, confidently reposes on its delusive error, that he who sees most, judges best; and it expects, by that rule, to secure the palm in every geological contest. As if judgment, were the necessary product of vision. two faculties have no such necessary ordination and dependence; he who sees enough, with a more instructed judgment, will better apprehend the fundamental truths of geology, than he who sees more than enough, with a judgment less instructed.

But, as the

1 Regula philosophandi :- Reg. 1. “More causes of natural things "ought not to be admitted, than are true, and sufficient for explaining "their phenomena.

Reg. 2. "Therefore, to natural things of the same kind, the same << causes ought to be assigned, as far as it is possible.

Reg. 3. "Qualities of bodies which cannot be increased or lost, and "which pertain to all bodies that we can subject to our experiment, << are to be accounted qualities of all bodies, universally.

Reg. 4. In experimental philosophy, propositions, drawn from phenomena by induction, are to be accounted as true, either strictly, or "nearly approaching to it, until other phenomena occur, by which they 66 may be rendered either more accurate, or open to exceptions."

It is one thing to accumulate data, and another thing to reason soundly upon them when accumulated as will be frequently exemplified in the progress of this work. There is occasion for the ne quid nimis in geology, as well as in morals. There is a mental habit of prosecuting sensible details, which discapacitates the mind, in the same proportion, for the exercise of intellectual generalisation. Certainly, he who has read numerically most books, is not necessarily the best critic; and, by the same principle, he who has seen numerically most rocks, is not necessarily the best geologist. The mental eye, like the corporeal, must find the just point of visual distance, before it can embrace the whole of the object on which it looks, and apprehend the relations of its parts; and, the mineral geology is constitutionally averse to remove itself to that necessary distance from the inspection of its mineral phenomena. Although, then, it is undeniably true, "that those who have con"tributed most to the advancement of Natural

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Philosophy, have had, at the same time, a tenIdency to generalise, and an accurate knowledge "of a great many particular facts1;" yet, it was not the tendency, but the sound ability, that enabled them to contribute to that advancement.

The science of mineralogy, valuable as it is within its own proper sphere, is, in itself, only a physical science-viz. the science of mineral characters

1 HUMBOLDT, Superp. of Rocks, p. 32.