Within the meaning of the act of June 6, 1900 (c. 793, 31 Stat., 656), providing for the surrender of persons committing defined crimes within a foreign country occupied by or under the control of the United States, and fleeing to the United States, or any Territory thereof, or the District of Columbia, Cuba is foreign territory which can not be regarded in any constitutional, legal or international sense as a part of the territory of the United States; and this is not affected by the fact that it is under a military governor, appointed by and representing the President in the work of assisting the inhabitants of the island in establishing a government of their own.

As between the United States and Cuba that island is territory held in trust for its inhabitants, to whom it rightfully belongs, and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered when a stable government shall have been established by their voluntary action. The act of June 6, 1900, is not unconstitutional in that it does not secure to the accused when surrendered to a foreign country for trial all the rights, privileges and immunities that are guaranteed by the Constitution to persons charged with the commission in this country of crime against the United States.

The provisions of the Constitution relating to writs of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, trial by jury for crimes, and generally to the fundamental guarantees of life, liberty and property embodied in that instrument have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States, against the laws of a foreign country.

When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he can not complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.

The contention that the United States recognized the existence of an established
government, known as the Republic of Cuba, but is now using its military
or executive power to overthrow it, is without merit.
The act of June 6, 1900, is not in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and this case comes within its provisions; and, the court below
having found that there was probable cause to believe the appellant guilty
of the offenses charged, the order for his extradition was proper, and no
ground existed for his discharge on habeas corpus.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.
Judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed.

Briefly stated, this was a habeas corpus proceeding to test the constitutionality of an act-act of June 6, 1900-providing for extradition of persons charged with offenses committed in territory under the control of the United States.

Supreme Court of the United States.

Charles F. W. Neely, Appellant, . Wm. Henkel, United States Marshal, etc., Appellee (No. 2).

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

No. 406. October term, 1900.

(180 U. S. 126.)

Argued December 10 and 11, 1900. Decided January 14, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

The record in this case, it is admitted, shows the same state of facts as in the case just decided (No. 387, 180 U. S. 109). This was a second application for a writ of habeas corpus, upon substantially the same grounds as were

urged in the other case.

The additional allegations in this application for

the writ did not materially change the situation.

For the reasons stated in the opinion just delivered, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.

Affirmed.

This case was argued with, and the decision follows that in, No. 387, (180 U. S., 109), by the same counsel.

The Supreme Court of the United States.

ELIAS S. A. DE LIMA, ELIAS A. DE LIMA, AND EDWARD DE LIMA, COMPOSING THE FIRM OF D. A. DE LIMA & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, . GEORGE R. BIDWELL, COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S. 1.)

No. 456. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

By the customs administrative act of 1890 an appeal is given from the decision of the collector "as to the rate and amount of the duties chargeable upon imported merchandise" to the Board of General Appraisers, who are authorized to decide "as to the construction of the law and the facts respecting the classification of such merchandise; and the rate of duties imposed thereon under such classification;" but where the merchandise is alleged not to have been imported at all, but to have been brought from one domestic port to another, the Board of General Appraisers has no jurisdiction of the case, and an action for money had and received will lie against the collector to recover back duties assessed by him upon such property and paid under protest.

With the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. April 11, 1899, the island of Porto Rico ceased to be a “foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff laws.

Whatever effect be given to the act of March 24, 1900, applying for the benefit of Porto Rico the duties received on importations from that island after the evacuation by the Spanish forces, it has no aplication to an action brought before the act was passed.

Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, McKenna, Shiras, White, and Gray (in a separate opinion), JJ.

The judgment of the circuit court for the southern district of New York is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.

This is one of the "Insular tariff cases. The question was raised whether territory acquired by the United States by cession from a foreign power remains a foreign country' within the meaning of the tariff laws." The circuit court, southern district of New York, held it was "foreign country," which decision, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

This case arose through the importation of sugar from Porto Rico into the United States (at New York) in the summer of 1899, after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before the taking effect of the Foraker Act for the government of Porto Rico.

Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 340. JOHN H. GOETZE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF JOHN H. GOETZE & COMPANY, APPELLANT, V. THE UNITED STATES.

No. 515. GEORGE W. CROSSMAN AND HERMANN SIELCKEN, COMPOSING THE FIRM OF W. H. CROSSMAN & BRO., APPELLANT, v. THE UNITED STATES.

Appeal from the Circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 221.)

October term, 1900. No. 340 was argued December 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1900; No. 515 was argued January 14 and 15, 1901. The two were decided together May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1 (case No. 456), followed by reversing the action of the general appraisers.

Opinion by Brown, J. No dissenting opinion.

With the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, the island of Porto Rico ceased to be a "foreign country " within the meaning of the tariff laws.

The judgments of the circuit court are therefore reversed and the cases remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the action of the board of general appraisers.

These were petitions for a review of two decisions of the board of general appraisers, holding subject to duty certain merchandise, imported, in one case from Porto Rico, and in the other, from Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands (p. 221).

No. 340. Goetz v. U. S. The importation in this case consisted of tobacco which was imported from Porto Rico into the United States (at New York) on June 6, 1899, after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before the taking effect of the Foraker Act for the government of Porto Rico.

No. 515. Crossman v. U. S. This importation consisted of liquors, imported from Hawaii into the United States in April, 1900, after the passage of the resolution of annexation (July 7, 1898) and before the taking effect of the act of April 30, 1900, which provided a government for that Territory.

There was no decision of these cases on the merits, the Supreme Court holding that the Board of General Appraisers had no jurisdiction of the cases. Both of the cases are among those known as the 66 Insular Tariff Cases."

Supreme Court of the United States.

HENRY W. DOOLEY ET AL., ENGAGED IN TRADE AND COMMERCE BETWEEN PORTO RICO AND NEW YORK UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF DOOLEY, SMITH & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 222.)

No. 501. October Term, 1900. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

The Court of Claims and the circuit courts, acting as such, have jurisdiction of actions for the recovery of duties illegally exacted upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported from a foreign country.

Duties upon imports from the United States to Porto Rico, collected by the military commander and by the President as Commander in Chief, from the time possession was taken of the island until the ratification of the treaty of peace, were legally exacted under the war power.

As the right to exact duties upon importations from Porto Rico to New York ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace, the correlative right to exact duties upon imports from New York to Porto Rico also ceased at the same time.

Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, White, Gray, Shiras, McKenna, JJ.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.

This, too, is one of the cases commonly known as the insular tariff cases. (The question here raised was the validity under the Constitution of duties collected on goods imported into Porto Rico from the United States during the military occupation by the United States, but after the cession of Porto Rico by the ratification of the treaty of peace and before the taking effect of the Foraker act. It was held that these duties were improperly exacted, the decision in the De Lima case being followed.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

SAMUEL B. DOWNES, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF S. B. DOWNES & COMANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,

V.

GEORGE R. BIDWELL, COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT

IN ERROR.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 244.)

No. 507. October Term, 1900. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

By Mr. Justice Brown, in announcing the conclusion and judgment of the court.

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The circuit court have jurisdiction, regardless of amount, of actions against a collector of customs for duties exacted and paid under protest upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported.

The island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions of the Constitution as go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout the United States, or among the several States.

A long continued and uniform interpretation put by the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government, upon a clause in the Constitution should be followed by the Judicial Department, unless such interpretation be manifestly contrary to its letter or spirit.

By Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice McKenna concurred.

The Government of the United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or by implication from that instrument. Even then, when an act of any Department is challenged, because not warranted by the Constitution, the existence of the authority is to be ascertained by determining whether the power has been conferred by the Constitution, either in express terms or by lawful implication, to be drawn from the express authority conferred or deduced as an attribute which legitimately inheres in the nature of the powers given, and which flows from the character of the Government established by the Constitution. In other words, whilst confined to its constitutional orbit, the Government of the United States is supreme within its lawful sphere.

Every function of the Government being thus derived from the Constitution, it follows that that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential in so far as its provisions are applicable.

Hence it is that wherever a power is given by the Constitution and there is a limitation imposed on the authority, such restriction operates upon and confines every action on the subject within its constitutional limits. Consequently it is impossible to conceive that where conditions are brought about to which any particular provision of the Constitution applies its controlling influence may be frustrated by the action of any or all of the Departments of the Government. Those Departments, when discharging within the limits of their constitutional power, the duties which rest on them, may of course deal with the subjects committed to them in such a way as to cause the matter dealt with to come under the control of provisions of the Constitution which may not have been previously applicable. But this does not conflict with the doctrine just stated, or presuppose that the Constitution may or may not be applicable at the election of any agency of the Government.

The Constitution has undoubtedly conferred on Congress the right to create such municipal organizations as it may deem best for all the Territories of the United States whether they have been incorporated or not, to give to the inhabitants as respects the local governments such degree of representation as may be conducive to the public well-being, to deprive such territory of representative government if it is considered just to do so, and to change such local governments at discretion. As Congress in governing the Territories is subject to the Constitution, it results that all the limitations of the Constitution which are applicable to Congress in exercising this authority necessarily limit its power on this subject. It follows also that every provision of the Constitution which is applicable to the Territories is also controlling therein. To justify a departure from this elementary principle by a criticism of the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sanford (19 How., 393) is unwarranted. Whatever may be the view entertained of the correctness of the opinion of the court in that case, in so far as it interpreted a particular provision of the Constitution concerning slavery and decided that as so construed it was in force in the Territories, this in no way affects the principle which that decision announced, that the applicable provisions of the Constitution were operative.

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