SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 295 In the case of the Territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable. As Congress derives its authority to levy local taxes for local purposes within the Territories, not from the general grant of power to tax as expressed in the Constitution, it follows that its right to locally tax is not to be measured by the provision empowering Congress "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," and is not restrained by the requirement of uniformity throughout the United States. But the power just referred to, as well as the qualification of uniformity, restrains Congress from imposing an impost duty on goods coming into the United States from a Territory which has been incorporated into and forms a part of the United States. This results because the clause of the Constitution in question does not confer upon Congress power to impose such an impost duty on goods coming from one part of the United States to another part thereof, and such duty besides would be repugnant to the requirement of uniformity throughout the United States. By Mr. Justice Gray. The civil government of the United States can not extend immediately, and of its own force over territory acquired by war. Such territory must necessarily, in the first instance, be governed by the military power under the control of the President as commander in chief. Civil government can not take effect at once as soon as possession is acquired under military authority or even as soon as that possession is confirmed by treaty. It can only be put in operation by the action of the appropriate political department of the Government, at such time and in such degree as that department may determine. In a conquered territory, civil government must take effect, either by the action The government and disposition of territory so acquired belong to the Govern- If Congress is not ready to construct a complete government for the conquered Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Gray, Shiras, White, McKenna, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Affirmed. This is one of the "insular tariff cases." The right to collect duties on goods coming into the United States from Porto Rico after the Foraker Act took effect is involved in this case. The circuit court, Southern district of New York, upheld the validity of that part of the Foraker Act and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the contention, holding that the island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. In announcing the conclusion and judgment of the court in this case, Mr. Justice Brown delivered an opinion. Mr. Justice White delivered a concurring opinion, which was also concurred in by Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice McKenna. Mr. Justice Gray also delivered a concurring opinion. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brewer, and Mr. Justice Peckham dissented. Thus it is seen that there is no opinion in which a majority of the court concurred. Under these circumstances I (the reporter) have, after consultation with Mr. Justice Brown, who announced the judgment, made headnotes of each of the sustaining opinions and placed before each the names of the justices or justice who concurred in it. Supreme Court of the United States. CARLOS ARMSTRONG, A BRITISH SUBJECT, A MERCHANT CARRYING ON BUSINESS BETWEEN PORTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT, V. THE UNITED STATES. Appeal from the Court of Claims. (182 U. S. 243.) No. 509. October term, 1900. Argued January 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901. SYLLABUS. Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S., 222, followed. Opinion by Brown, J. No dissenting opinion. The judgment of the Court of Claims is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. This is one of the so-called "insular tariff cases," also. Goods were imported from this country (United States) into Porto Rico while Porto Rico was under military occupation. The goods were imported partly before and partly after the ratification of the treaty of peace. This case is controlled by the case of Dooley v. U. S. The court held that duties exacted prior to the ratification of the treaty (April 11, 1899) were properly exacted. So far as they were imposed after that date and prior to December 5, 1899, the plaintiff was entitled to recover them back. Supreme Court of the United States. FOURTEEN DIAMOND RINGS, EMIL PEPKE, CLAIMANT, V, THE UNITED STATES. Error in the district court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. (183 U. S. 176.) No. 153. October Term, 1901. Argued December 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1900. Decided December 2, 1901. SYLLABUS. 1. The ruling in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1, reaffirmed and applied. 2. No distinction, so far as the question determined in that case is concerned, can be made between the Philippines and the island of Porto Rico after the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, and certainly not (a) Because of the passage by the Senate alone, by a majority, but not by twothirds of a quorum, of a joint resolution in respect to the intention of the Senate in the ratification ; (b) Or, because of the armed resistance of the native inhabitants, or of uncivilized tribes, in the Philippines, to the dominion of the United States; (c) Or, because one of the justices who concurred in the judgment of De Lima v. Bidwell, also concurred in the judgment in Downes v. Bidwell. (182 U. S. 244). Opinion by Fuller, C. J. Concurring, Brown, Harlan, Peckham, Brewer, JJ. Dissenting, Gray, Shiras, White, McKenna, JJ. Decree reversed and cause remanded with directions to quash the information. In this case, one of the "insular tariff cases," the question was raised as to the validity or right to collect duties on goods imported into the United States from the Philippine Islands after the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. The decision in the case of De Lima v. Bidwell, (182 U. S., 1) is controlling. Supreme Court of the United States. HENRY W. DOOLEY ET AL., ENGAGED IN TRADE AND COMMERCE BETWEEN PORTO RICO AND NEW YORK UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF DOOLEY, SMITH & COMPANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE UNITed States. Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. (183 U. S., 151.) No. 207. October Term, 1901. Argued January 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1901. Decided December 2, 1901. SYLLABUS. The act of Congress taking effect May 1, 1900, and known as the Foraker Act, which requires all merchandise going into Porto Rico from the United States to pay a duty of 15 per cent of the amount of duties paid upon merchandise imported from foreign countries, is constitutional. The Constitution, in declaring that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, is limited to articles exported to a foreign country, and has no application to Porto Rico, which, in the case of De Lima v. Bidwell (182 U. S., 1), was held not to be a foreign country within the meaning of the general tariff law then in force. The fact that the duties so collected were not covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but held as a separate fund to be used for the government and benefit of Porto Rico, and were made subject to repeal by the legislative assembly of that island, shows that the tax was not intended as a duty upon exports, and that Congress was undertaking to legislate for the island temporarily, and only until a local government was put in operation. Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, White, McKenna, Shiras, Gray, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Affirmed. In this case, an insular tariff case, the constitutionality of the Foraker Act, so far as it fixes duty to be paid on goods imported into Porto Rico from New York, was raised. The Supreme Court of the United States held the act constitutional. Supreme Court of the United States. TERRITORY OF HAWAII, APPELLANT, V. OSAKI MANKICHI, APPELLEE. Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii. (190 U. S., 197.) No. 219. October Term 1902. Argued March 4 and 5, 1903. Decided June 1, 1903. SYLLABUS. In interpreting a statute the intention of the law-making power will prevail even against the letter of the statute; a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, though not within its letter. Smythe v. Fisk (23 Wallace, 374). In inserting in the Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii, a provision that municipal legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States should remain in force until Congress otherwise determined, Congress did not intend to impose upon the islands every clause of the Constitution, and to nullify convictions and verdicts which might, before the legislature could act, be rendered in accordance with existing legislation of the islands but not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, nor was such the intention of Hawaii in surrendering its autonomy. The conviction of one who, between August 12, 1898, and June 14, 1900, was tried on information and convicted by a jury not unanimous, in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Hawaii existing at the time of the annexation, is legal notwithstanding it is not in compliance with the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth amendments of the Constitution. Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. The decree of the District Court for the Territory of Hawaii must be reversed and the case remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the petition. The application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution to Hawaii after annexation but before the passage of the act providing a form of Government for the Territory was involved in this case. Supreme Court of the United States. CZARNIKOW, MACDOUGALL & COMPANY (LTD.), PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. GEORGE R. BIDWELL, COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. (191 U. S., 559.) No. 14. October Term, 1903. Submitted December 4, 1903. Decided December 14, 1903. The question here involved was the constitutionality of the Foraker Act-duty on goods brought into the United States from Porto Rico. No opinion was written in this case; the judgment was affirmed with costs, on the authority of Downes v. Bidwell (182 U. S., 244, 287.) Per curiam. Concurring, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Supreme Court of the United States. WARNER, BARNES & COMPANY (LTD.), PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR v. NEVADA In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. (191 U. S., 560.) No. 331.. October Term, 1903. Argued December 4, 1903. Decided December 14, 1903. The question here involved was the constitutionality of the exaction of duties on importations into the United States from the Philippine Islands after the passage of the Philippine Act. No opinion was written in this case. The judgment was affirmed with costs on the authority of Downes v. Bidwell (182 U. S. 244, 287). Per curiam. Judgment affirmed. Concurring, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Supreme Court of the United States. ISABELLA GONZALES, APPELLANT, v. WM. WILLIAMS, U. S. COMMIS- (192 U. S., 1.) No. 225. October Term, 1903. Argued December 4, 7, 1903. Decided January 4, 1904. SYLLABUS. The immigration act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, relates to foreigners as Opinion by Fuller, C. J. No dissenting opinion. Final order reversed and cause remanded with a direction to discharge Gonzales. |