Fitch v. New York, Providence & Boston R. R. Co.,

414

Francis v. Deming,

108

Hart v. Tiernan, .

521

Hartford (City of) v. New York & New Eng. R. R. Co., 250

Haussman v. Burnham,

Hine, State ex rel. Walsh v.

Hollister, Town of Rocky Hill v.

Holt, Huntley v.

Hooker, State Comptroller v.

117

50

434

102

332

455

112

Huntley v. Holt, .

102

Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Versailles Woolen Co., 347

New Haven (Town of) v. Sheffield Scientific School,

163

New Haven (Town of), Smith v.

New York & Eastern R. R. Co., Stanton v.

Page

203

272

New York & New Eng. R. R. Co., City of Hartford v. 250 New York & New Eng. R. R. Co., Woodruff v.

63

New York, Providence & Boston R. R. Co., Fitch v. 414 New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., Rowen v. 364

Rowen v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 364

Sheffield Scientific School, Town of New Haven v.

Stanton v. New York & Eastern R. R. Co.,

272

Versailles Woolen Co., Mechanics' & Traders' Bk. v.

347

Woodruff v. New York & New England R. R. Co.,

63

CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS

OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT.

JACOB BROSCHART vs. HENRY TUTTLE.

New Haven & Fairfield Cos., Jan. T., 1890.

CARPENTER, LOOMIS, TOR-
RANCE, FENN and PRENTICE, JS.

The statute (Gen. Statutes, §§ 2689, 2690), requires the drivers of vehicles meeting on the highway to turn to the right, and gives treble damages to any person injured by the neglect of another to do so. Held that the proper mode of applying the statute is for the jury to bring in a verdict for single damages and for the court to render judgment for treble the amount.

Whether, to recover treble damages, it is necessary to refer to the statute in
the complaint: Quære.

If it be not, yet it must appear upon the record that the verdict was neces-
sarily founded upon a violation of the statute by the defendant.
Where the plaintiff obtained a verdict for an injury from a collision of
teams on the highway, and the complaint alleged that the plaintiff
was driving on the right hand side of the road and that the defendant
was driving from the opposite direction a horse that was, and that he
knew to be, untrained, balky and vicious and liable to sudden starts in
which he became unmanageable, and that when they were nearly oppo-
site each other the defendant carelessly drove, or permitted his horse
to go, across the highway against the horse of the plaintiff, it was held
that it did not sufficiently appear that the verdict was founded upon a
violation of the statute by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the threefold damages under the statute.

The plaintiff at the time of the collision, which occurred within a city, was
driving at a rate of speed forbidden by a city ordinance. Held that he
was not, by this mere fact, debarred from a recovery.

The violation of the ordinance on the part of the plaintiff, to defeat his recovery, must have contributed to the accident.

VOL. LIX.-1

(1)

Broschart v. Tuttle.

There is no ground for a distinction between a plaintiff's illegal act as a contributing cause of his injury, and his negligence as such a contributing

cause.

Proposals made for a compromise between parties in controversy cannot be received in evidence; but admissions of an independent fact made in the conversation may be shown.

After a negotiation for a settlement had failed and the parties were about separating, and continued in conversation, it was held that declarations of one party to the other were clearly admissible against the party making them.

[Argued January 28th-decided April 15th, 1890.]

ACTION to recover for the loss of a horse killed by the negligence of the defendant in a collision upon the highway; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Andrews, J.

The declaratory part of the complaint was as follows:1. On the 14th day of January, 1884, the plaintiff was driving a mare attached to a sleigh, along a highway known as the Boulevard, and leading into New Haven from Hamden.

2. Said sleigh and mare were then the property of the plaintiff.

3. The mare was sound, well broken, gentle, of great speed, and of great value.

4. On said 14th day of January the defendant was riding along the same highway, in an opposite direction from the plaintiff, in a sleigh drawn by a horse belonging to the defendant.

5. Said horse so belonging to the defendant was badly broken, untrained, balky, and subject to sudden starts of more or less unmanageable action; all of which the defendant well knew before he drove upon said highway that day.

6. The plaintiff was driving entirely on the west sidę or right hand side of the highway, and while he was so driving he met the defendant and his said horse, and when the plaintiff and defendant were nearly opposite each other, the defendant carelessly and negligently drove, or permitted his said horse to go, across said highway, and to strike violently against the said mare of the plaintiff, and with such force

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