dangerous assumption of executive power, in opposition to the spirit of the Constitution. Since Jackson's time, however, the veto has been used upon the theory which he exemplified,-to defeat any measure which the President may deem pernicious or impolitic. President Cleveland vetoed over three hundred private pension bills, and President Johnson, during the struggles on Reconstruction, used the veto constantly against important measures of Congress in their plan of Reconstruction. The twothirds majority, however, against Johnson were able to pass all desired measures over his veto; and the Presidency, raised to such heights of power under Jackson and Lincoln, sank under Johnson to the lowest degree of political importance,-so much so that Johnson's period has been spoken of as marking the "degradation of the Presidency." The Veto and Thus the veto in America, against a mere majority in Congress, has come to be a real power, while in England it has come to be only a nominal one, illustrating, as Mr. Bryce expresses it, "the tendency Constitutions. of unwritten or flexible constitutions to depart from, and of written or rigid constitutions to cleave to the letter of the law." That is, while in both countries the theory of the veto is the same,-"whereas it is now the undoubted duty of an English king to assent to every bill passed by both Houses of Parliament, however strongly he may personally disapprove its provisions, it is no less the undoubted duty of an American President to exercise his independent judgment on every bill, not sheltering himself under the representatives of the people, or foregoing his own opinion at their bidding.' The decline of the veto power in England, is due, first, to the decline in the power of the sovereign, and, second, to the fact that, generally, since the Revolution of 1688, the Crown has acted only on the advice of responsible ministers. 'Bryce's American Commonwealth, vol. i., p. 60. Decline of England. In America the people vest more power in one man than in England, where the government is more that of a representative body. Or, we may say, that in America the people appoint a popular repre- the Veto in sentative, the President, to restrain their popular representatives in Congress; from which it appears that the people are not quite willing to trust themselves to the government of their own representatives in a single body. This leads to conflicts and deadlocks between the two branches of the Government and to consequent governmental inertia and inability to act, as the people have no immediate and direct means of deciding in a dispute between the two branches of their Government. Popular Opposition The Whig It would seem that under representative government in such cases power should be lodged in the representative body. For this reason the question has been repeatedly raised whether the veto power is desirable; whether it can be reconciled with to the Veto. popular government; whether it would not be well to limit, or abolish it. Jackson's unprecedented use of the veto, followed by its similar use by Tyler in the defeat of the bank charters and other Whig measures, gave rise to party, if not popular, opposition to the veto, and from 1832 to 1843 frequent propositions were made to limit this power by allowing a majority of all the members of each House instead of two thirds of a quorum, to repass a vetoed measure. One of the most notable propositions in this direction was that of Henry Clay, January 24, 1842, who pro- Clay on posed a constitutional amendment providing that the veto of the President might be overruled by a second majority vote of the two Houses. In behalf of such a proposition as Clay's, it may be noticed that to-day, with a Senate of ninety-six members, and a House of, approximately, four hundred and thirty-five members it might require forty-nine votes in the Senate and two Opposition. the Veto. hundred and eighteen in the House to pass a measure. If the President then vetoes it, it will require fifteen more Senators and seventy-two more Representatives to pass the measure against him. Thus the veto in the hands of the President makes him equal, in his power over legislation, to seventy-two Representatives and fifteen Senators, or to eighty-nine representatives of the people and the States. This considers merely his numerical weight and disregards entirely his influence from appointments and from the prestige and éclat of his office. Mr. Clay saw that the veto, as Jackson and Tyler wielded it, had become a greater power than the framers of the Constitution had ever intended; that, whereas it had been given to protect the Constitution and to defend the Executive from legislative encroachment, it was now being used to defeat party policies approved by the people; and that, owing to the extreme difficulty of mustering two-thirds votes in both Houses against a President, the veto had practically become absolute. Clay warned the country that, if the veto power was not arrested, or limited, the time would come when the whole legislation of the country would be prepared at the White House and would come down to Congress in the shape of bills to be registered. Then "the question that Congress would have to decide would be, not what is the proper remedy for the existing grievances of the country, not what will restore the national prospects; no, but what measures will be sanctioned by the chief magistrate. The question was the old one, whether we should have in this country a power tyrannical, despotic, absolute, the exercise of which must, sooner or later, produce an absolute despotism; or a free representative government with powers clearly defined and carefully separated." One of the duties which the Whig 1 Cited in H. C. Lockwood's The Abolition of the Presidency, p. 90. In this volume Mr. Lockwood advocates the reduction of the presidential office to purely ministerial functions and the government of the country by party felt itself called upon to perform, "conspicuously and prominently above all others," was "a reduction of the Executive power by a further limitation of the veto so as to secure obedience to the public will as expressed by the immediate representatives of the people and the States, with no other control than that which is indispensable to avert hasty or unconstitutional legislation.' The Whigs proposed to place upon their party banner, "The will of the people uncontrolled by the will of one man.” But these proposals to reduce the veto came to nothing. After the passing of the party issues of the time and after the control of the presidential office through popular party machinery, all agitation in this direction ceased. Proposals to Limit the Veto. On the other hand, proposals have been made for the extension of the Executive veto and for more frequent application of its use. It has been proposed to require two thirds of all the members elect to each House instead of two thirds of a quorum, to avail against the President; also, to allow the President to veto single items in an Appropriation Bill without having to defeat the whole bill containing appropriations necessary for carrying on the Government.' The latter demand has arisen from a desire to enable the President to defeat grants for purely local purposes inserted by Congressional jobbery and log-rolling. This would enable the President to defeat "pork barrel" legislation, that is, the practice of appropriating money from the national treasury in the political interests of members of Congress to be a representative assembly of the two Houses of Congress. the veto would be a necessary step to accomplish this. Works, edited by Colton, vol. vi., p. 318. The abolition of 'Address to the People by Whig Members of Congress, Niles's Register, vol. lxi., p. 36, Sept. 3, 1841. See also Benton's Thirty Years' View, vol. ii. See the topic, "Riders." spent in the Congressional districts of the members. This would materially increase the power of the veto and "practically destroy the only power which Congress has over the President apart from impeachment. But, as a remedy against log-rolling jobs, and raids on the treasury, it might prove effectual. The Veto and a Constitutional Amendment. The signature of the President is not essential to the passage of a constitutional amendment. In 1794, objection was made that the Eleventh Amendment had not been constitutionally adopted, because it had not been presented to the President for approval. Neither had this been done in the case of the first ten amendments. It was argued, in defence of adding amendments without the assent of the President, that an amendment is a substantive act, an act in Constitution-making, and it does not come within the provisions of the Constitution investing the President with a negative. The Supreme Court unanimously sustained this view and declared the amendment a part of the Constitution.' However, the proposed Douglas amendment guaranteeing slavery against congressional interference was sent to President Buchanan, who approved it, March 2, 1861; and the Thirteenth Amendment was presented to President Lincoln, who signed it, and notified Congress to that effect, whereupon the Senate immediately passed a resolution declaring that the President's signature was not necessary." While the President's signature is essential to make effectual a Joint Resolution it is not necessary to the Joint and operation of a Concurrent Resolution. A Concurrent Resolution has not the effect of law, but is merely an expression and an announcement to the country of the sense of Congress, a statement of the opinion of Congress upon a public question or of the policy that body would like to pursue. It is used instead Mason's Veto Power, p. 138. ⚫ See Hollingsworth vs. Virginia; Hinsdale's American Government, p. 192. 3 Mason's Veto Power, pp. 117–118. |