The impeaching power is provided for in the State constitutions as in that of the United States, and it usually operates after the same fashion. The removing power is vested either in the Governor or legislature, or in the Governor upon an address of the two Houses of the legislature. The State Each State has its judicial system. There are local County and Circuit Courts and a final Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. There is in some States Judiciary. an intermediate Appellate Court for the disposition of certain cases on appeal. In earlier days the judges were generally appointive by the governors. Through the growth of the democratic spirit, notable in America from 1815 to 1860, the constitutions formed in that period took the appointment of the judges from the governors and made the judicial office elective by the people. The judges are now elective in thirty-four States. Judicial The judicial tenure in the States has also become more democratic. Formerly the tenure was for life or during good behavior. Judges could be removed only when condemned on impeachment, or upon an address requesting their removal presented by both Houses of the legislature. It is in this latter way that the judges are still removable in a majority of the American States. This also is the process of judicial removal in England. In the States a two-thirds vote of the two Houses is usually required. The terms of the judges now vary in the States from twenty-one years in Pennsylvania to two years in Vermont, averaging about eight years. The judges' salaries are usually low, on an average about four thousand or five thousand dollars. They Judicial range from $2000 in the State of Oregon to Salaries. $17,500 in the State of New York. Such low pay will make it impossible to secure for the bench firstrate legal ability, or it will tempt the judge to seek to supplement his salary by other and questionable means. It is frequently asserted that popular elections, short terms, and low salaries have had a very positive tendency to lower the character of the State judiciary; that popular elections have thrown the choice of judges into the hands Terms. of political wire-pullers, and have led to the use Effects of of judicial places for party purposes; that short Popular Electerms compel the judge to keep on good terms tion and Short with the political manipulators, and he cannot, therefore, administer the law without fear or favor; that small salaries prevent leading lawyers from offering themselves for judicial office, when the office promises not one tenth the pay that they can make in their practice; and that the consequence of all these influences is that the judges in many States are much inferior to the lawyers who practise before them. But it is generally not true that the most astute and money-making lawyer would make the best judge, and in most of the States good men can be induced to take the judicial offices at a fair salary. Upon their transfer to the bench they administer their office without reference to politics, and they prove to be judges incorruptible and above reproach. No doubt political influences do in a measure affect the conduct of some of the judges of the county and circuit courts, but this detracts from rather than adds to their popularity with the people, and if the fact be generally recognized it may decrease rather than increase the judge's chance for renomination and reelection. Popular election, too, may have its compensating advantages, in restraining autocratic and political conduct on the part of the judge. State Judges The State courts have the same power to declare acts unconstitutional, and therefore null and void, that the national courts have. State judges are sworn to support both the Constitution of the State and of the United States and they may declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. Such decision is not final, of course, for it is subject to review in a national court. It may be reversed, but it may also be Pass on the Constitution ality of Acts confirmed. It may be not only the right but the duty of a State judge to declare a congressional act unconstitutional that may be called into litigation before him. It is, however, the special function of a State court to expound the State constitution, and if an act of the State legislature be not in harmony therewith it is the court's duty so to declare. As in the United States courts, the State judges pass on constitutional questions only as cases arise in suits at law. This may cause great delay in determining officially the validity of a statute, and some States, in order to meet this difficulty, require the Supreme Courts to deliver an opinion on the constitutionality of an act immediately upon its passage, or as a condition to its passage. Such opinions, however, cannot have the same weight nor binding effect as a final official decision following litigation, and a judge may not be bound in his final decision on a case by his previously expressed opinions. In the later decision of the case the judge may be influenced by the practical working of the act in experience and by the able arguments of capable attorneys in the case in which the act is involved. Citizenship, like suffrage, is chiefly a State matter. There was no clear nor generally accepted definition of Citizenship a American citizenship until after the Civil War, State Matter, when the Fourteenth Amendment declared: Subject to the Fourteenth "All persons born or naturalized in the United Amendment. States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This amendment recognizes two separate citizenships: a citizenship of the States and a citizenship of the United States, and it makes State citizenship derivative from national citizenship. The prevailing view formerly was that national citizenship was dependent on and derived from State citizenship; that one could become a citizen of the United States only as a consequence of being a citizen of some State or Territory of the Union; that State citizenship was the primary fact while National citizenship was only secondary and consequential. Calhoun gave clear expression to this view: "A citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local citizenship in some State or Territory, a sort of citizen of the world, would be a nondescript;-not an individual of such description can be found in the whole mass of our population. Every citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and as such, under an express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and it is in this and in no other sense that we are citizens of the United States.' This was the State rights's view. It received judicial sanction in the Dred Scott decision. Each citizenship, State ship. and national, had its separate privileges and The Dred immunities. While all national citizens must Scott Decision first be State citizens it did not follow accord- on Citizening to this view that State citizenship necessarily carried with it the privileges of national citizenship. This was one of the main points at issue in the Dred Scott case. Was Dred Scott a citizen of the United States, entitled to sue in the national courts? Could one of African descent and slave birth become a citizen of the United States merely by his being made a citizen of one of the States? The Supreme Make a Man a Court in the Dred Scott case denied the privi- Citizen of the leges of national citizenship to negroes. The fact that they had been made citizens in some of the States did not bring to them national citizenship. Chief Justice Taney asserted that the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits should not be confounded with the rights of citizenship as a 'Calhoun's speech on "The Force Bill," Works, vol. ii., p. 242. May a State United States ? member of the Union. One may have all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State, or to the rights of United States citizenship. Each State may confer its civic rights and privileges upon an alien or on any one it thinks proper, but these rights will be restricted to the State which gave them. No State since the adoption of the Constitution can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges of Federal citizenship. The black man could not be made a citizen of the United States through the action of a single or of several States; it had to be done, if done at all, through the Constitution. The dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis agreed in the view that each State was free to determine for itself what persons born or naturalized within its limits should be citizens of such State. It differed in asserting that State citizenship resulted in National citizenship. If the negro were made a citizen in any State he thereby became a citizen of the nation with all the privileges of Federal citizenship. Both Taney and Curtis held that citizenship of the United States was dependent upon and proceeded from citizenship of the State; the difference was as to the power of the State to invest persons, like negroes, not generally conceded the rights of citizenship, with the citizenship of the United States. Taney denied that National citizenship was a necessary consequence of State citizenship. Curtis's Dis- The Fourteenth Amendment has removed all ground of dispute and doubt. It tells who are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside,"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The Fourteenth Amendment then goes on to say, "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any |