CHAP. I. even if he has expended money on the improvements of the premises, that will not give him a term to hold till he is indemnified; (a) but if he subsequently pay rent under the agreement, he becomes tenant from year to year. (b) The payment of rent must be understood to mean a payment with reference to a yearly holding, such as payment by the quarter or some other aliquot part of a year. (c) In Richardson v. Langridge (d) a person who had paid rent under such an agreement, but had not paid it with reference to a year or any aliquot part of a year, was held, nevertheless, to be a tenant at will only. And the presumption of a yearly tenancy may be rebutted by the form of the agreement, although rent is payable quarterly; as where A agreed to become tenant to B, "henceforth at the will and pleasure of B, at the yearly rent of £35, payable quarterly," and it was held that there was nothing more than a tenancy at will, and that the occupation for two years and payment of rent did not make B a tenant from year to year. "This Court," said Denman, C. J., "is desirous of presuming a yearly tenancy in all cases where the express language of the parties does not exclude such a presumption. Here, however, the parties distinctly say, that the tenancy shall be at the will and pleasure of the lessors." (e) (N. R.), 61; Doe v. Wood, 14 (a) Richardson v. Langridge, (b) Doe v. Browne, 8 East, 165; Doe v. Amey, 12 A. & E. 476; Berry v. Lindley, 3 M. & Gr. 498; Tooker v. Smith, 1 H. & N. 735; Doe v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. 257. (c) Braythwayte v. Hitchcock, 10 M. & W. 497; Doe v. Wood, 14 ib. 687; see also The Marquis of Camden v. Batterbury, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 808; 7 C. B. (N. S.) 864. (d) 4 Taunt. 128; see also Doe v. Watts, 7 T. R. 85. (e) Doe v. Cox, 17 L. J. Q. B. 3; and see Doe v. Davies, 7 Exch. 89. In Doidge v. Bowers (a) three persons entered under a void lease; payments of rent were made; but, as it was not shown that they were made with the assent of one of the three, it was held that as against her there was no evidence of a tenancy from year to year, she not having resided a year on the premises. Parke, B., said, "Under the original contract no demise could be created, but a mere tenancy at will. Then, in order to constitute a new tenancy, it must be shown that all the three parties agreed to vary it by a new contract for a tenancy from year to year." (b) Thus, A tenancy from year to year may be implied from the circumstances under which the parties hold. where the defendants became the occupiers of land, and paid the year's rent in advance for many years, it was held, that as ordinarily speaking an occupation of premises for more than a year, and payment and acceptance of rent created a tenancy from year to year, the inference to be drawn from the above facts was, that the defendants were tenants from year to year. (c) And the presumption is the same against a corporation aggregate as against an ordinary person. (d) So where a tenant holds over after the expiration of a term, on payment of rent he will become a tenant from year to year. (e) It is open, either to the party receiving or paying rent, to show the circumstances under which the payment was made; as, for instance, that the rent was received in (a) 2 M. & W. 365. (b) See also Denn v. Fearnside, 1 Wils. 176; Goodtitle v. Herbert, 4 T. R. 680. (c) Hunt v. Allgood, 10 C. B. (N.S.) 253. (d) Doe v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998. (e) Thomas v. Packer, 1 H. & N. 669; Furnivall v. Grove, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 496. CHAP. I. Implied tenancy from year to year. Rebuttal of presumption. CHAP. I. ignorance of the death of a party upon whose life the premises were held; in order to rebut the presumption of a tenancy from year to year. (a) Void lease may enure as an agreement to grant a lease. A lease for a term, required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, may be collected from correspondence which has passed between the lessor and lessee, and the lessor will be entitled to distrain for rent. (b). An instrument containing words of present demise which is void as a lease under the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, as not being under seal, may nevertheless enure as an agreement to grant a lease for the term mentioned. Thus in Burton v. Reevell, (c) by a memorandum of agreement M agreed to let and B to take rooms in a house from a certain date, at a monthly rent of 368., to be paid every four weeks, and it was held that this was only an agreement to execute a lease, and was admissible in evidence. So in Bond v. Rosling (d) the plaintiff by an agreement not under seal agreed to let and the defendant to hire certain premises for seven years; and it was further agreed that a good and sufficient lease embodying the terms of the agreement should be prepared at the joint expense of the parties; it was held in an action for not accepting a lease, that though the instrument was void as a lease under the statute it was good as an agreement. (e) (a) Doe v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90; Woodbridge Union v. Whien Union, 13 Q. B. 269; The Marquis of Camden v. Batterbury, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 808, 820; 7 C. B. (N. S.) 864. (b) Chapman v. Bluck, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 187; Jones v. Reynolds, 1 Q. B. 506. (c) 16 M. & W. 307. (d) 1 B. & S. 371; 9 W. R. 746. (e) And see Doe v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. 257; Drury v. Macnamara, 5 E. & B. 612; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 1163; Tidey v. Mollett, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 298; 12 W. R. 802; Hayne v. Cummings, ib. In Stratton v. Petitt (a) it was held that the intention of the parties was that the agreement in question should take effect as a lease, and was therefore void as such by the statute as not being by deed: but that case has not been followed and may be considered as over-ruled. (b) In Rollason v. Leon (c) an action was brought on the following agreement made in 1861:-"L agrees to let and R agrees to take the wood, mill, site, &c., with the houses and land adjoining, for the period of three years from Lady Day then next at the rent of £120 per annum. A lease for the same to be executed and signed as soon as possible, subject to the permission of the landlord of the mill, house, land, &c., from this date up to Lady Day then next, on the same terms and at the same rate of rent. R to have the sole use of the mill, houses, and land, &c., and all machinery and utensils therein contained." It was held that the agreement operated as an actual demise from its date up to Lady Day, and as an agreement for a lease from that time for a term of three years, and consequently was not void under the statute, not being under seal, CHAP. I. An agreement containing words of present demise, which Specific is void under the statute, may be decreed to be specifi- performance. cally performed. (d) Where A agreed in writing to let to B certain premises at a rent of £36 payable quarterly, 421; Stranks v. St. John, L. R. 2 C. P. 376. (a) 16 C. B. 420. (b) See Tidey v. Mollett, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 298; 12 W. R. 802; Stranks v. St. John, L. R. 2 C. P. 377. (c) 7 H. & N. 77. (d) Parker v. Taswell, 2 De Crook v. Corporation of Seaford, C СПАР. І. Terms of lease regulated. and not to raise the rent or give B notice to quit so long as he continued to pay the rent when due; and A (who had only a leasehold interest to expire in 1881) also agreed verbally with B to let him remain in the premises for such term of years (not exceeding A's term therein) as B might desire to continue tenant thereof: it was held that B was not a mere tenant from year to year, but had a right to retain possession as long as his landlord's interest existed, and to enforce that right in equity. (a) An agreement to let land at a yearly rent, determinable by six months' notice to quit (no term being mentioned) provided that in case A and B erected any buildings upon the land, they were to have the privilege of removing them at any time during their occupation, or otherwise they were to be allowed a beneficial interest in the same to the amount of the sum expended in the erection of the buildings, such beneficial interest to extend over a period of twenty years; that is to say, if A and B were required to give up possession of the piece of ground before the expiration of the term of twenty years, they were to be allowed one-twentieth part of the amount expended for each remaining year of the unexpired term of twenty years; it was held that this agreement conferred on A and B such a beneficial interest in the land as constituted them owners within the interpretation clause of the Lands Clauses Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, and that therefore the company was not entitled to enter upon the land till it had satisfied A and B's claim as provided by s. 84. (b) A lease, or an agreement for a lease, which is void as (a) In Re King's Leasehold Estates, L. R. 16, Eq. 521. (b) Rogers v. Hull Dock Co., 12 W. R. 1101, affd. 13 W. R. 217; 11 L. T. (N. S.) 42; ib. 463. |