much of the beneficial interest as is not exhausted results to the grantor or to his heir or legal personal representatives. But where the whole legal interest is given for a particular purpose, with an intention to give to the grantee of the legal estate the beneficial interest, if the whole is not exhausted by that particular purpose, the surplus goes to the grantee and there is no resulting trust. Thus, a devise to A and his heirs charged with the testator's debts is a beneficial devise, subject to a particular purpose, and there will be no resulting trust; but if the devise is upon trust to pay debts, that being a devise for a particular purpose only, a trust will result for the heir. (a) Where estates are devised to executors upon trust, to sell and to invest part of the proceeds of the sale for a particular purpose, but no trust is declared of the sum so reserved, after the purpose is satisfied there will be a resulting trust for the heir. (b) The fact that a trust given for a particular purpose has lapsed will not prevent a trustee from taking beneficially under the rule in King v. Denison. (c) CHAP. XII. Under a devise of all the residue of the testator's Devise of residue. estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, of what nature or kind so ever, to trustees upon trusts applicable only to personal property, the real estate will pass with a resulting trust for the heir. (d) (a) King v. Denison, 1 V. & B. 272, per Lord Eldon; and see Wood v. Cox, 2 M. & C. 684; Rogers v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms. 193. (b) Stonehouse v. Evelyn, 3 P. Wms. 252; Watson v. Hayes, 5 M. & C. 125; Page v. Leap But if the trusts may ingwell, 18 Ves. 463; Mariott (c) Supra; Tregonwell v. Sy- (d) Dunnage v. White, 1 Jac. & W. 583; Lloyd v. Lloyd, L. R. 7 Eq. 458; Longley v. Longley, L. R. 13 Eq. 133. CHAP. XII. Trusts vague, lapsed, unlawful. No trust declared. Purchases made in the names of strangers. be applicable to real estate then the real estate will pass. (a) If the trusts declared are so vague that they cannot be executed, (b) or if they lapse (c) or are void because of unlawfulness, (d) they will result. So also a trust will result when the instrument creating the trust shows that it was not intended that the grantee should take beneficially, as where the conveyance, devise, or bequest is to A "upon trust," and no trust is declared.(e) Where property is bought by one person in the name of a stranger, to whom the conveyance is made, there will be a resulting trust for the person who paid the purchase money. "The clear result of all the cases," said Eyre, C. B., in Dyer v. Dyer, (f) "without a single exception, is, that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold; whether taken in the names of the purchasers or others jointly, or in the names of others without that of the purchaser; whether in one name or several; whether jointly or successivé, results to the man who advanced the purchase-money. This is a general proposition supported by all the cases, and there is nothing to contradict it; and it goes on a strict ana (a) D'Almaine v. Moseley, 1 Drew, 629; Coard v. Holderness, 20 Beav. 147. (b) Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, 255; 3 M. & C. 507; Williams v. Kershaw, 5 C. & F. 111. (c) Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. C. C. 503; Williams v. Coade, 10 Ves. 500. (d) Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 V. & B. 294; Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463; Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 Dow. 194. (e) Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 254; Penfold v. Bouch, 4 Hare, 271 Attorney-General v. Dean and Canons of Windsor, 24 Beav. 679; 8 H. L. C. 369; Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; Barrs v. Fewkes, 2 H. & M. 60. (f) 2 Cox, 93. logy to the rule of the common law, that where a feoffment is made without consideration, the use results to the feoffer." (a) CHAP. XII. wish. No resulting trust will be created by the mere ex- Expression of pression of a wish, on the part of the grantor, that the purchase-money may be applied in a certain way.(b) The rights of a purchaser may be barred by negligence or delay. (c) A custom of a manor inconsistent with the doctrine of resulting trusts, as that a person named by the purchaser of a copyhold estate as the second life according to the custom, shall take beneficially, is unreasonable, and will not be supported. (d) In The rule that a trust results from the person who pays the purchase-money applies to the case of a joint purchase in the name of one. In Crop v. Norton, (e) Lord Hardwicke seemed to think that the application of the rule was confined to an advance by one individual. Wray v. Steele, (f) however, Sir P. Plumer decided that a resulting trust arose upon a joint advance, the purchase being taken in the name of one. "Lord Hardwicke," said his Honour, "could not have used the language attributed to him. What is there applicable to an advance by a single individual, that is not equally (c) Delane v. Delane, 7 Bro. P. C. 279. (a) As to conveyance taken 300. jointly see Ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves. 253; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 367; and as to several successivé, see Howe v. Howe, 1 Vern. 415; Withers v. Withers, Amb. 151; Smith v. Baker, 1 Atk. 385; Prankard v. Prankard, 1 S. & S. 1. (b) Wheeler v. Smith, 1 Giff. (d) Lewis v. Lane, 2 M. & K. 449; overruling Edwards v. Fidel, 3 Madd. 237; and see Jeans v. Cooke, 24 Beav. 513. (e) 2 Atk. 74; 9 Mod. 233; Barn. 184. (f) 2 V. & B. 388. Purchaser's rights barred by delay. Custom con trary to rule. Rule applies to first purchase. CHAP. XII. applicable to a joint advance under similar circumstances?" To personal as well as real estate. Purchase in fictitious name. Parol evidence admissible on The foregoing doctrines apply as well to personal as to real estate, (a) even though, when the property consists of shares in a company, the rules of the company provide that there shall be no benefit of survivorship. (b) Where money has been invested in the purchase of stock in a fictitious name, for the purpose of defrauding creditors, the Court will order the fictitious name to be erased and the stock to be transferred to the person who paid the purchase-money.(c) Where an intestate had executed transfers of railway shares and stock to a fictitious person, the Court, on a bill filed by his administrator, declared that the intestate used the fictitious name as another designation of himself, and that the plaintiff, as administrator, was entitled to transfer the shares and stock in question, and to receive the dividends thereof. (d) Parol evidence is admissible on behalf of the person part of person paying the purchase-money to show that it belonged to paying purchase-money. him. In Sir John Peachey's case, (e) Sir Thomas Clarke, M.R., laid it down, that, if A sold an estate to C, and the consideration was expressed to be paid by B, (a) Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Ca. 26; Loyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 607; Mortimer v. Davies, 10 Ves. 363; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447; Soar v. Foster, 4 K. & J. 152; Beecher v. Major, 2 Dr. & Sm. 431; Batstone v. Salter, L. R. 19 Eq. 250; affd. L. R. 10 Ch. 431. (b) Garrick v. Taylor, 29 Beav. 79; affd. 4 De G. F. & J. 163. (c) Green v. Bank of England, 3 Y. & C. Exch, 722. (d) Arthur v. Midland Railway Co. 3 K. & J. 204. (e) Rolls E. T. 1759, M. S. Sugd. V. & P. and the conveyance made to B, the Court would allow CHAP. XII. parol evidence to prove the money paid by C.(a) But such proofs must be very clear. (b) Parol evidence is admissible on behalf of the person to whom the conveyance is made, to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the person paying the purchase-money. In Beecher v. Major,(c) where A purchased and transferred £1,000 stock in the name of her niece, and wrote her a letter stating that she had done so, and that she intended it for the niece's benefit, and in the letter A inclosed a bank power, which she stated was to enable her to receive the dividends for her life, which power she requested the niece to execute and return to her and also to destroy the letter, both of which the niece accordingly did, it afterwards turned out that the bank power authorized A to sell out the stock as well as receive the dividends. It appeared that A had always been very kind to the niece, and by her will made before the transfer had given her an annuity of £30. It was held that parol evidence of the contents of the letter was admissible to rebut the general presumption that the stock still belonged to A. Parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of a resulting trust as to a part, as well as to the whole, of the property.(d) (a) See also Ryall v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59; Amb. 413; Willis v. Willis, 2 Atk. 71; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Eden, 516; Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409; Groves v. Groves, 3 Y. & J. 163. (b) Newton v. Preston, Prec. Ch. 103; Gascoigne v. Thwing, FF 1 Ver. 366; Willis v. Willis, 2 (c) 2 Dr. & Sm. 431; and (d) Bellasis v. Compton, 2 Vern. 294; Benbow v. Townsend, 1 M. & K. 506; Deacon v. On behalf of person to whom convey ance made. To rebut prepart of pro sumption as to perty. |