fessional soldiers. The citizen is a safer lawmaker when he may be called upon to assist in the enforcement of the laws, and legislation is more likely to be just when the Government relies largely upon volunteers, because the support is surest when the Government is so beneficent that each citizen is willing to die to preserve its blessings to posterity. The readiness with which the American people have always responded to their country's call is a guarantee as to the future.

I have suggested some of the reasons (not all, by any means) why the regular army should not be increased, unless such increase be actually necessary. I now ask whether there is any such necessity for increasing that branch of the army which is held for service in the United States. There may, from time to time, be need of small additions to man new coast fortifications; but what is there in the domestic situation to justify or excuse the demand for more soldiers?

An army of occupation for service in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines is made necessary by the conditions growing out of the war. But such an army is temporary in character, and should not be made. a pretext for an increase of 200 per cent in our standing army.

The President assures us, in his last message, that the only purpose our Government has in taking possession of Cuba is to assist the Cubans in establishing a stable government. When that is accomplished our troops are to be withdrawn.

The number needed in the Philippines will depend largely upon the course pursued by the Government in regard to those islands. It will require fewer soldiers and less time to give self-government to the inhabitants of the Philippines than it will to give them a military government or a "carpet-bag" government

Since our standing army was sufficient for all domestic purposes prior to the war, and since there is much uncertainty in regard to the army of occupation, it would seem the part of wisdom to separate the two branches of the service and make provision at once. for the latter, leaving the friends and opponents of a large standing army to settle that question after the volunteers are mustered out.

Most of the volunteers have no taste for military life; they left peaceful pursuits and enlisted, at a great sacrifice to themselves and their relatives, because their country needed them. Now that the war is over they desire to return home, and their desire should be gratified at the earliest possible moment. They were willing to fight when fighting was necessary; they were ready to lay down their arms as soon as hostilities ceased. If an attempt be made to secure a large increase in the army at home, merely because of a temporary need for an insular army, a prolonged Congressional debate is inevitable. Is it fair to keep the volunteers in the service while this question is being disposed of?

Unless Republican leaders desire to hold the volunteers as hostages to compel Congress to consent to a large army, they ought to be willing to postpone the consideration of the Regular Army bill and accept a substitute authorizing the President to recruit an army of occupation for service outside of the United States. The soldiers can be enlisted for two or three years, and before their term expires the nation's policy will be defined and conditions so settled that provision can be made for the future with more intelligence.

In recruiting the army of occupation opportunity should be given for the re-enlistment of such volunteers as desire to continue in the service. And I may add that it will encourage re-enlistment if a company

or battalion formed from a volunteer regiment is allowed to select its officers from among the members of the regiment.

The pay of enlisted men serving in the army of occupation should be considerably increased over the present rate to compensate for greater risk to health incurred in the islands.

When the time arrives for the deliberate consideration of the permanent military establishment it will be found safer and more economical to provide complete modern equipment for the State militia, together with liberal appropriations for instruction and for annual encampments, than to increase the regular army. Soldiers in the regular service are withdrawn from productive labor and must be supported the year around, while members of the State militia receive military training without abandoning civil pursuits. and without becoming a pecuniary burden to either State or nation.

To recapitulate: There is no immediate necessity for the consideration of the proposition to permanently increase the military establishment; there is immediate necessity for the relief of the volunteers.

Let the army of occupation be recruited at once; let the size of the regular army be determined after the volunteers have been released.

The people are united in the desire to muster out the volunteers; they are divided in opinion in regard to the regular army.

Let each question be decided upon its merits.

RATIFY THE TREATY. DECLARE THE NATION'S

POLICY.

I gladly avail myself of the columns of the Journal to suggest a few reasons why the opponents of a colonial policy should make their fight in support of a resolution declaring the nation's purpose rather than against the ratification of the treaty.

The conflict between the doctrine of self-government and the doctrine of alien government supported by external force has been thrust upon the American people as a result of the war. It is so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided, and, since it deals with a question now before Congress, it must be considered immediately. It is useless to ask what effect this new issue will have upon other issues. Issues must be met as they arise; they cannot be moved about at will like pawns upon a chess board.

The opponents of imperialism have an opportunity to choose the ground upon which the battle is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification of the treaty?

First, because a victory won against the treaty would prove only temporary if the people really favor a colonial policy.

That a victory won against the treaty would depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct action for a time, but a minority, so long as it remains a minority, can only delay action and enforce reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a policy.

When there seemed some probability of the rejection of the treaty the friends of the administration began to suggest the propriety of withholding the treaty until the new senate could be convened in extra ses

sion. As the new senate will have a considerable Republican majority it would be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an effort to prevent the ratification of the treaty would be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us suppose it possible to defeat ratification in both the present and the next senatewhat would be the result? Would the imperialists abandon the hope of annexing the Philippines so long as they could claim the support of the President and a majority of both houses? Could a minority of the Senate prevent the annexation of Hawaii? As we are now in possession of the Philippine Islands the advocates of a colonial policy might secure an appropriation sufficient to pay the twenty millions agreed upon and leave the rest of the treaty for future consideration. In other words, if the opponents of imperialism have a majority in both houses they can declare the nation's policy; if the imperialists have a majority in both houses they cannot be permanently thwarted by a minority in the Senate.

A resolution declaring the nation's policy recognizes that the destiny of the United States is in the hands of all the people and seeks to ascertain at once the sentiment of the people as reflected by their representatives.

If that decision is in harmony with the policy which has prevailed in the past the question will be settled and the people will return to the consideration of domestic problems. If, however, the advocates of imperialism either postpone consideration or control the action of Congress an appeal will be taken to the voters at the next election. So great a change in our national policy cannot be made unless the authority therefor comes directly and unequivocally from that source of all power in a republic-the people.

In answer to those who fear that the question of