CONCLUSION. CHAPTER XXX. CRITICISM. By means of comparison, we arrive at the result through circuitous routes; judge the subject rather as it is, with its own inward reasons and counter-arguments.-Schumann. But they measuring themselves by themselves, and comparing themselves among themselves, are not wise.-Paul. AN art-product has its final test in a discerning criticism. The art student should himself become a capable critic. The spontaneity which has been insisted upon is not antagonized by proper criticism. It is rather regulated and directed by the principles of criticism, to which art is naturally amenable. We say, "You should render the thought," "You must not be declamatory," etc., but what is declamation? What is it to interpret the thought? Unless we can find the processes of the thought and tell what is truly manifestive, what basis have we for criticism? Criticism ought to mean intelligent, thorough, and candid judgment. Practically it too often means mere fault-finding. Criticism may be divided into two classes: 1. Popular, expressing a general approval or disapproval, with no well defined or scientifically determined judgment as to the merits of the work. It is a sort of feeling that the effect is right or wrong because it agrees with or differs from a preconceived standard, or simply because it pleases or displeases the critic. 2. Technical or scholarly, the expression of a specific judgment from which personal taste and feeling are largely eliminated. Such judgment is based upon definite knowledge of the laws of thought and of expression, and upon a trained ability to discern whether the expression justly embodies the thought. It studies the thought from the writer's and speaker's point of view, rather than from the critic's personal view, recognizing the individuality of the speaker as an important element in the problem. Just here arises the question: What and how much in expression is legitimate subject of criticism? Broadly we may answer: All that has to do with the manifestation of purpose is amenable to scientific criticism, because it employs physical means which are subject to observation, classification, and generalization-in a word, to law; and because men do recognize certain forms of expression as symbolizing certain forms of thought, feeling, and purpose. On the other hand all that has to do with the formation of purpose on the part of the speaker belongs to his individuality, and is outside the pale of criticism. The view of fact or truth that one is able to obtain depends upon his temperament, his habits of mind and associations, his constitutional or accidental limitations-his personality; and the use of fact or truth which he chooses to make depends upon his ethical and æsthetical disposition. These qualities of the man, however, while not strictly subject to rhetorical criticism, may yet receive much of suggestion from a broad study of the properties of thought as related to utterance. Individuality in reading and speaking.—In what has been said in this book it has not been intended to erect any absolute or mechanical standard of expression. The elements that have been treated are always to be adapted to the individual, and always to be modified by personal properties, as temperament,. natural voice, form, etc.; and also by special circumstances, as relations of speaker and audience, occasion, and especially by the purpose in the utterance. Moreover, all the elements of expression represent relative effects, not absolute. People differ in their conception of thought, and consequently must differ in utterance. One is naturally calm, simple, and unimpassioned; another naturally sees things in sharp contrast; while a third inclines to state fact or argument with great energy; and a fourth can never dissociate thought from emotion. To say that all these must speak alike, would be an attempt to destroy the very charm of speech, which is the expression of the individual's apprehension of the thought, or, the thought as measured by the communicating mind. Scarcely less absurd would it be to assume that a person naturally deliberate needs no quickening of the other elements; or that one naturally intense and energetic should always employ force; or that a naturally emotional person should forever be showing his feelings. Every one needs such broadening and symmetrizing as may be gained from a discerning study of the moods and means of utterance. Some need this much less than others. Such are naturally versatile, responsive, and well balanced. But this very versatility —a special gift to the few-is to be sought by the many through broad culture. The same is true in matters of physical endowments and acquirements, as voice, bodily bearing, action. No one can gain much by imitating another, or by seeking to acquire the same flexibility or elasticity of vocal action, the same volume of tone, or the same grace or fullness of gesture. But while not to be imitated, all these may be emulated, provided only that one follow nature, and carefully preserve his own individuality. The same is true of the special elements of expression. There is no absolute length of pause, or degree of quantity; there is no arbitrary scheme of inflections or melodies which all are to use alike in all cases; nor is the degree of quickness of impulse, or intensity of pressure, or fullness of swell, the same for all. One may express feeling sufficiently with very slight variation of quality, while another will need to make the differences quite marked. In one, the least gesture is sufficiently expressive, while the same amount would render another speaker stiff and constrained. Then, too, men will always differ as to the amount of deliberation needed in a given case; as to what may be assumed, and what needs to be insisted upon; as to when and how feeling may properly be expressed. Yet within the limits of the most jealous individuality, there are to be found these relative measurements of thoughtproperties, and their corresponding exponents in elements of tone and action. All these may be studied, not only without detriment to individual freedom, but even with positive gain; for through these each one may find his own way into the fullest, most varied, most natural expression of which he is capable. We may notice, first: Objective Properties of Delivery.—These will be, first of all, the Mood, as deliberative, discriminative, emotional, or energetic. One must judge whether the speaker or reader has apprehended rightly the general purpose of the article or passage, and must sustain his criticism by specific reasons. These reasons will be based upon the recognized laws of thought as related to delivery. After judging of the moods in general, and of the means by which they are expressed, as movement, key, melody, interval, general quality, general force, notice particular applications of pause, quantity, inflection, quality, and stress. If pauses are too frequent or too infrequent, too long or too short, show why. If a rhetorical pause is overlooked, point it out, suggesting |