People v. Tice, 131 N. Y., 651. 545; State v. Witham, 72 Me., 531; State v. Ober, 52 N. H., 450.) The cases in this state were those where exception was taken to rulings permitting questions affecting the credibility or the moral character of the accused. But if the constitutional protection can be interposed at any point in the examination, we do not perceive any logical reason why it may not be invoked to protect the accused against answering questions affecting his credibility, and also to prevent an examination as to relevant facts, or indeed as to any fact, whether pertaining to his testimony in chief or not. This broad view of the scope of the constitutional exemption seems to be the one entertained by Judge COOLEY (Const. Lim., p. 317), but it is not in harmony with the decisions in this state and does not seem to us to be sound in principle. The statute permits the accused to be a witness. This must mean, a witness generally in the cause, and not that he may be a witness as to such matters only as to which he may choose to testify. This being the construction. put by our courts upon the statute, there is no constitutional right infringed, if the accused having elected to take the stand as a witness, is subjected to the ordinary rules of examination. The range and extent of the cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge, provided only that it relates to relevant matters or to matters affecting credibility. The trial judge may properly restrict the cross-examination of accused persons within narrower limits than in ordinary cases, but the latitude allowed is a matter for the trial judge. The questions put to the defendant to test his memory were relevant to his defense of insanity and were plainly competent. The questions tending to show the unpleasant relations between the witness and the deceased at or about the time of the homicide, were relevant on the question of inducement and motive. This was a part of the case of the people, but it is the constant practice in civil and criminal trials to permit the plaintiff or the people to fortify their own case by facts elicited on crossexamination of the witnesses for the defense. The matter is subject to the regulation and discretion of the trial judge. There was no error, therefore, in permitting these questions People v. Tice, 131 N. Y., 651. to be asked. That the answers to the questions respecting the interview between the defendant and his wife on the day preceding the homicide, in fact did him no harm, is evident since the same transaction had been brought out by the defendant's counsel on a prior examination of a witness for the defendant. There is no ground for interfering with the judgment and it should be affirmed. All the judges concurred. Abolition of Common-law Rule. NOTE ON INCOMPETENCY IN CIVIL CASES, BECAUSE OF INTEREST. The interest, which would disqualify one as a witness at common-law, was only a direct and certain interest in the event of the cause, or an interest in the record for the purpose of evidence. The interest in the event of the cause might be of three varieties: 1st. Where actual gain or loss would result directly from the verdict and judgment. 2d. Where the situation of the witness was such that a legal right or liability would result directly from the verdict and judgment. 3d. Where the witness would be liable over to the party calling him in respect to some breach of contract or duty on the part of the witness involved in the issue. An interest in the question as distinguished from an interest in the event of the cause, did not disqualify. This common-law disqualification of witnesses on account of interest in civil cases has generally been abolished in this country, both in federal and state courts.* Although this disqualification does not now exist as to his general competency, the question of interest does nevertheless arise in determining a witness' competency to testify on a particular subject-concerning personal transactions or communications with a deceased person or lunatic, as against the executor, administrator or committee of such, or as against one deriving title or interest under such deceased person or lunatic. [This existing disqualification will be considered later. See p. 137.] *The reinstatement of the disqualification in the U. S. Court of Claims by the enactment of June 25th, 1868 (Rev. Stat., §1079), under which the case of United States v. Clark (96 U. S., 37), was decided, has been reconsidered by Congress, and by the Act of March 3d, 1887, the disqualification by interest, again abolished. Commonwealth v. Lynes. COMMONWEALTH v. LYNES. Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1886. [Reported in 142 Mass., 577.] If where it appears to the judge that a child of tender years offered as a witness does not sufficiently understand the nature and obligation of an oath, he may permit the child to be properly instructed for the purpose, if of sufficient age and intellect to be properly instructed. If at the time of testifying a child sufficiently understands the nature and obligation of an oath, it is not ground of objection to competency that he had been instructed on the point during a recess of the trial.* On the trial of an indictment, Lillie Lynes (thirteen years of age) was called as a witness for the prosecution; and defendant objected to the administration of the oath to her, on the ground that she was ignorant of the nature and obligation of it, whereupon the presiding judge asked her some questions, to which she replied that she understood that the oath was to teli the truth, and that she would be punished if she did not tell the truth after taking it, but she did not know how or by whom she would be punished. The judge then asked the district attorney if he desired to call her at that time, to which he replied no; whereupon the judge said he would postpone the decision of her competency, and she could be instructed if necessary. The next day she was offered again as a witness, and upon examination was found competent and was permitted to testify, against the objection and exception of the defendant on the ground that it appeared, as it did in her examination, that she had been instructed by a Christian minister since the last adjournment of the court. On cross-examination, she testified that the minister told her that God would punish her if after taking the oath she testified what was not true; and that she did not know that before. The Supreme Court overruled the exceptions. *To same effect McAmore v. Wiley, 49 Ill. App., 615. Commonwealth v. Lynes, 142 Mass., 577. GARDNER, J. [After stating the facts]: The practice has not been uniform upon this question. In Rex v. Williams, 7 C. & P., 320, the defendant was indicted for the murder of her husband, and her daughter, eight years old, was called as a witness. It appeared that before the death of her father, which took place about sixteen weeks before the trial, the child had never heard of God, or of a future state of rewards and punishments; and that she had never prayed, nor knew the nature of an oath; but that since the death of her father she had been visited twice by a clergyman, who had given her some instruction as to the nature and obligation of an oath. She said she should go to hell if she told a lie, and that hell was under the kitchen gate; but she had still no intelligence as to religion or a future state. Mr. Justice Patterson refused to allow the girl to testify, and stated his reasons therefor, as follows: "I must be satisfied that this child feels the binding obligation of an oath from the general course of her religious education. The effect of the oath upon the conscience of the child should arise from religious feelings of a permanent nature, and not merely from instructions, confined to the nature of an oath, recently communicated to her for the purposes of this trial; and as it appears that, previous to the happening of the circumstances to which this witness comes to speak, she had had no religious education whatever, and had never heard of a future state, and now has no real understanding on the subject, I think that I must reject her testimony." In the course of the trial, the counsel for the king stated that it was every day's practice to put off a trial in order that a witness might be instructed as to the nature of an oath, citing Rex v. Wade, Ry. & M., 86. The oath, however, was refused the witness. The reasons first given by the learned justice have been criticised, and have not generally been followed. In Regina . Nicholas, 2 C. & K. 246, Pollock, C. B., refused to put off the trial in order that a child of six years of age might receive instruction, but said: "There may be cases where the intellect of the child is much more ripened, as in the cases of children of nine, ten or twelve years old, for example, where |