to file the bill to take the opinion of the Court: and he referred to Turner's Chancery Practice (a), Griffiths v. Wood (b), Wood v. Dyneley (c), Kirkby's Rules and Orders of Exchequer (d); and particularly relied on the case of Orme v. Crockford (e), where the order finally made was similar to that sought.

The CHIEF BARON said, that according to his recollection, it was meant to leave the order in that case to the course of the Court.

Martin, H. opposed the motion, insisting that the order made was conformable to a long course of practice in this Court; and that the solitary instance mentioned to the contrary was the result of an arrangement between the parties, without the attention of the Court having been drawn to it. To the defendant it was immaterial by whom the bill had been filed.

Ordered, with costs according to the usual practice.

(a) 1, 491.

(b) 1 Ves. & B. 307.

(c) 1 Madd, Rep. 32.

(d) Order 10, pp. 6-7.

(e) Ante, p. 185.

1824.

BOWYER

and another

v.

BRIGHT.

1824. Exchequer of Pleas, June 25th.

A letter from the tenant claiming title as son of the last yearly tenant, at his death, and re

questing leave

to keep posses-
sion for two
years, which

was granted, is
not an agree-
ment to found
a motion for
security for

costs, within

the 1 G. 4. c.

87. s. 1.

CASES AT LAW.

REES dem. STEPNEY, Bart. v. THRUSTOUT.

CHILTON moved for a rule, calling on the under-tenants in possession to shew cause, pursuant to the statute 1 G. 4, c. 87, why they should not undertake, in case a verdict should pass for the plaintiffs, to give judgment against the real defendant, of the term next preceding the time of trial; and also why they should not enter into a recognizance by themselves, and two sufficient sureties, in a reasonable sum, conditioned to pay the costs and damages which might be recovered by the plaintiff in the action. The late tenant from year to year of the premises, at a the meaning of rent of 6l., had paid the rent up to Ladyday, 1821, and died in the September following, leaving several children. In the next month, his eldest son addressed a letter to the agent of the lessor of the plaintiff, first claiming to receive the rents in future from the under-tenants on behalf of the infant children toward their support, and engaging to be answerable for the rent to the landlord; but afterwards requesting as a favour to be allowed to keep quiet possession for two years; and he was in consequence permitted to receive the rents from the tenants in possession till Michaelmas, 1823, but had been served with regular notice to quit at that time. The letter was annexed to the requisite affidavit; and on the authority of the cases Doe dem. Phillips v. Roe (a), Doe dem. Sampson v. Roe (b), it was submitted, that under the circumstances, it was a sufficient agreement in writing within the first section of the act.

(a) 5 B. & A. 766. 1 Dow. & Ryl. 433.

(6) 6 Moore, 54.

But the Court was of opinion that the letter did not amount to an agreement within the statute, and therefore

Refused the rule.

1824.

REES

v.

THRUSTOUT.

Ex parte WILLIAMS.

OWEN, Sir W. moved to discharge the recognizance of

June 26th.

A person of the age of sixteen is competent to

cognizance conditioned to

prosecute on a

this petitioner, which had been forfeited for non-attendance to prosecute an individual at the assizes at Maid- enter into a restone, according to the condition, and estreated; on the ground, amongst others, that he was only of the age of sixteen at the time of entering into the recognizance about four years ago, and that being an infant he ought not to be held bound by it.

But the Court was of opinion that a person of that age did not come within that privilege of infancy, and that it was due to the justice of the country to enforce the performance of the obligation: and thinking that the affidavit did not disclose a sufficient cause for relief,

They refused the order.

criminal
charge; and if
and estreated,

it be forfeited

the Court will
not discharge
it, unless a suf-

ficient case for
relief be made

out.

MILNER V. HORTON.

and

July 7th.

gument on a

A The Court will not hear an ardemurrer, on the last day of term.

THIS was a demurrer to a declaration in covenant.
rule for a concilium had been drawn up for this day,
counsel were now about to enter on the argument; but
they were stopped by the Court, which declined to hear
them.

And per Curiam. It ought to be understood that there should be no argument on a demurrer in this, any more than any other Court, on the last day of term (a).

(a) In this case demurrer-books had not been delivered to the Chief, or the Senior Baron; but before this appeared, the Court had decided to proceed on the other ground.

1824.

THE following are the Entries in the Minute-Book relating to this point in ie case referred to p. 483 :

Tuesday, 13th June, 1780.

RUSSELL v. RUSSELL.

Mr. Price, for leave to re-hear, petition read.

Ordered.

14th June, 1780.

RUSSELL v. RUSSELL.

Mr. Kenyon against Mr. Price's motion yesterday for re-hearing.

Ordered to shew cause at the sittings.

Friday, 23d June, 1780.

RUSSELL V. RUSSELL.

Mr. Kenyon, for plaintiff, to discharge order for the rehearing, petition for the same not having been presented within six months after the entry of the decree.

The general Order of Court, made in the year 1731, read.

Mr. Ambler, for defendant.

Mr. Price, for defendant.

Order for the re-hearing discharged.

(IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.)

(Before the Lord Chief Baron.)

1824. June 29th.

CUPIT V. JACKSON. S.C./3. Price, 721.

created by deed

parol.

The stat. of

limitations does

not bar the de

mand of a rentcharge.

There is no distinction be

tween the re

medies for re

covering the
corpus of a
rent-charge,
and the arrears.

Therefore, bill

By the marriage settlement of Thomas Brailsford the An annuity younger, and Elizabeth Jackson, dated the 6th and 7th of cannot be disSeptember, 1773, John Jackson the elder, in consideration charged by of the intended marriage, and for other considerations, conveyed certain estates of the yearly value of 1067. to trustees, to the use, intent, and purpose, as to part of the premises, that he the said J. Jackson the elder and his assigns, should and might, yearly and every year, during the term of his natural life, have, receive, and take by and out of the same premises, one annuity, clear yearly rent, or sum of 457., free and clear from all taxes, charges, and deductions whatsoever, parliamentary or otherwise howsoever, to be paid to him the said J. Jackson the elder and his assigns by two equal half yearly payments, that is to say, on the 25th day of March, and the 29th day of September in every year. And to this further use, intent, and purpose, that Hannah, the wife of the said J. J. the elder, and her assigns, in case she should happen to survive him, should and might, yearly and every year, during the term of her natural life, have, receive, and take by and out of the said messuages, &c. one annuity, clear yearly rent, or sum of 301., clear of all deductions whatsoever, accordingly; the same to be accepted and taken by her as the residue of her jointure, and in lieu, bar, and satisfaction of her dower and which said annuity should be paid and payable to her the said Hannah, and her assigns, on the two days before mentioned in every year, by even and equal

by an executrix for payment of nine years' ar

rears of an an

nuity, charged by deed upon

real estate, due

to her testator, the grantee, to be raised by

sale or mort

gage, well

brought, and

relief decreed

notwithstand.

ing an alleged verbal dis

charge support

ed by loose defendant's sister, herself

evidence of the

originally a de

fendant; and

although by the provisions of the deed the plaintiff might have distrained, or probably have had an action of debt, or distress, under the stat. 32 H. 8. c. 37.