In 1697, a few months after the publication of this pamphlet, an answer to it appeared by Dr. Wake, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, maintaining the received opinion of the king's absolute control over the convocation. It elicited a reply the same year, written on a very different basis, by Hill of Kilmington, entitled, "Municipium Ecclesiasticum; or, the Rights, Liberties, and Authorities of the Christian Church asserted, against all Oppressive Doctrines and Constitutions." Waving the legal and constitutional question, the author asserts the divine right of synods in general, a right inherent in the church, and prior to civil institutions; and, accordingly, condemns the Act of Submission as inconsistent with the principles of ecclesiastical polity.

Wake defended himself (1698) by "An Appeal" "in behalf of the King's Supremacy" as established by the law, and sanctioned both by convocations and by our most eminent bishops and clergymen, among whom he enumerates Jewel, Whitgift, Bancroft, Bilson, Nowell, Hooker, Andrews, Laud, Heylin, Taylor, and Barrow. This tract was supported, in 1699, by an anonymous "Brief Inquiry into the Ground, Authority, and Rights of Ecclesiastical Synods, upon the Principles of Scripture and right Reason," in which the author of the "Municipium was met on his own ground, the abstract constitution of the church, Wake having argued from history and authority.

Lastly, in 1700, appeared Atterbury's work, the first edition of which was without his name, in which "The Rights, Powers, and Privileges of an English Convocation" were "stated and vindicated, in answer to a late book of Dr. Wake's, entitled 'The Authority,' &c." It is written on the legal and constitutional ground, contending that the statute of Henry is not inconsistent with ecclesiastical liberty; that the convocation had the legal right of meeting with every new parliament, and might frame and present canons to the king, and do any thing short of enacting them without his license.

So far the controversy had proceeded at the meeting of the new parliament of 1700, which was attended by an accession of some of the church party to the ministry. This occurrence was, of course, favourable to those who desired the restoration of the convocation to its ordinary powers; and the ground which had been openly taken by Wake's party, almost rendered its meeting necessary to allay the jealousy which the friends of civil liberty might conceive of the government from its continued suspension.

There was just so much prima facie similarity between parliament and convocation in the relation of each to the king, in their times of meeting, and their twofold internal structure, that to assert the king's absolute power over the latter seemed a preparation for a similar claim in civil matters. Politicians, of all classes and opinions, looked upon ecclesiastical councils as mere creations of the state,-such is Burnet's professed opinion; but the more entirely the spiritual character of the convocation was merged in its civil establishment, for that very reason the more ominous was the arbitrary conduct of the crown. As for the bishops, they, it might be said, were but the tools of the government,— fifteen had been made in the two first years of William's reign; but VOL. VI.-Nov. 1834.

3 x

the lower house of convocation, which alone represented the clergy at large, were not allowed liberty of speech. If such was the fortune of that high-spirited order, which had stood foremost, whether in the person of their prelates, in their universities, or in their churches, in resisting the encroachments of James, what was to be expected by the people at large?

And, farther, the ecclesiastical principles laid down broadly by Wake, were such as to have justified King James, had he proceeded of his own will, to have altered the liturgy and articles, and to have exacted obedience of the clergy, who would have been bound, not, indeed, legally, till parliament had confirmed the alterations, but, in foro conscientia, to concede it. In debating the question, "Whether the prince should be allowed a power to alter or improve what a synod has defined, to add to, or take from it," Wake remarks, "Sure I am that this princes have done, and so I think they have authority to do. For, since the legislative power is lodged in their hands, so that they may make what laws or constitutions they think fit for the church as well as for the state; since a synod, in matters relating to discipline, is but a kind of council to them in ecclesiastical affairs, whose advice having taken, they may still act as they think fit; seeing, lastly, a canon, drawn up by a synod, is but, as it were, matter prepared for the royal stamp, the last forming of which, as well as enforcing whereof, must be left to the prince's judgment, I cannot see why the supreme magistrate, who confessedly has a power to confirm or reject their decrees, may not also make such other use of them as he pleases; and correct, improve, or otherwise alter their resolutions, according to his own liking, before he gives his authority to them." This is spoken of the power of princes generally; yet, as Atterbury observes, he afterwards says that, "by our own constitution, the King of England has all that power over our convocation that ever any Christian prince had over his synods." In another place he asserts that this power exists, "not only in matters of discipline, but in matters of faith too;" and he cites the example of Henry VIII. in his modelling the articles, which, he says, "relate to doctrines of faith, and that in the most necessary points of it; and yet, see what liberty the king took in judging, as well as correcting, of what they [the synod] had done." If this be the constitutional power of the king over the church, it is plain that the clergy, who risked so much against James, are the only body of men who have not gained legal rights and liberties by his expulsion; and it curiously fulfils the words of the incensed monarch to the seven protesting bishops, that "they were raising a devil, which they would never be able to lay, and were the unconscious tools of men who aimed at the ruin of the church as well as of the throne." Kenn and Sancroft might have the simplicity of the dove in slipping between James and William; but the Comptons and Atterburys, who had not this character, should, at least, have had enough of the serpent's wisdom to have bargained for ecclesiastical liberties as the price of their changing their allegiance. But to return :—

The mode in which Wake attempted to anticipate the objection which the jealousy of the friends of liberty made against his statements, was to

maintain that, in "an extreme case," resistance to the royal authority would be justifiable. "Whenever," he says, "the civil magistrate shall so far abuse his authority, as to render it necessary for the clergy, by some extraordinary methods, to provide for the church's welfare, THAT NECESSITY WILL WARRANT THEIR TAKING of them," Further, both he and Dr. Kennett, who wrote against Atterbury in 1701, candidly lament the tyrannical character of the Act of Submission, and are manly enough to protest against what, at some future day, though not under their then gracious sovereign, might be an instrument of deplorable mischief to the highest interest of the church. Dr. Wake, says Kennett, "does not dwell so much upon the equity of the Act; but he proves the obligation, and then in law leaves it." Because, perhaps, he might think this submission was a little hardly obtained by a prince of excessive power, and in a time of some ill designs; and, however safe and expedient for us, under princes of our own faith and communion, yet, under the government of heretics and heathens, it may lay too hard a yoke upon the church, when the archbishop shall have no power to assemble the bishops and clergy of his province, nor they any liberty to attend him, (without a præmunire,) let the necessities of the church be never so urgent, and Christianity itself in utmost danger. Dr. Wake, who pleads for present submission, seems aware of ill consequences that might arise in future times of trial.

The odiousness, then, of that constitutional right in the crown, by which alone the suspension of the convocation could be defended when assailed, seems to have forced the late bishops to give way; and the two houses were accordingly opened, in duc form, in February, 1700. The clergy, having now gained one victory (so to call it) over the crown, proceeded, in the next place, to attack the authority of the archbishop. They maintained that the lower house had the independent right of debate when they would (as fully as the house of commons), without reference to the meetings of the house of bishops; or, (as it was worded,) they contended for the right of "adjournments," which now became the great question in dispute. The mode of reasoning adopted was as before, the asserted analogy between the parliament and convocation; and they contended that, if even the king had no constitutional power to hinder their meetings, much less had the archbishop, the president of the convocation, whose rights, at least, were certainly destroyed by the Act of Submission in the reign of Henry VIII. And thus we have three main inquiries before us,—the nature of the convocation as compared with the parliament; the power of the king over convocation and other synods of the church; and the power of the lower house to transact business independently of the upper. These shall be discussed in due order. Before proceeding, however, it is natural to consider seriously the anomalous state of the different parties in the dispute, and to ask the question, "Whether the church had not, somehow or other, got into some wrong position, which put all its parts out of order, and made them work in perverse and fantastic ways? ?" On the one hand, the Tory and (so called) high-church party were in opposition to authority, resting on law rather than ecclesiastical principles, assailing

the past ecclesiastical conduct of Laud and his sovereign, and rising up against the rulers of the day, while aiming thereby a blow at the low theology of the school of Burnet,-a position they never can again occupy, considering the dependence of the lower house, as regards their appointment, on the crown and the bishops. On the other hand, the superior clergy were the advocates of episcopal rights, and conducted themselves with the temper which became their station, yet had confined, unchurchmanlike views, and were more or less the creatures of the court. Some of them, as Burnet, were open Erastians, and willing to admit presbyterian ordination. Others, with Wake, made the historical precedents of the country, of whatever nature, the law of the church, so that one tyrannical act of the civil power in former ages had only to be producable, in order to its being honoured as an ecclesiastical principle. And others, with Hody, seemed to allow that the revolution was attended with encroachments on ecclesiastical liberty, but maintained that the church must ever submit to an irresistible necessity, as if sanctioning a cowardly surrender of the trusts committed to her. Meanwhile Kenn and his company stood by on dry land, far removed from the scene of confusion into which the politics of the time had precipitated their hapless brethren. Whether they were right or wrong in declining the oaths of allegiance to William, still they, at least, had a compensation for their worldly losses. They had not to reconcile their duty to the faith with their duty to their church; to obey the authority of its rulers while they resisted their doctrines,-a more grievous conflict than that which they themselves had encountered once between loyalty and conscience. At length, they dropped off, one and one, from this troublesome stage, and their race is long extinct; but the English church, my mother, is still encompassed with the waters into which she then was plunged. (To be continued.)

ON MARRIAGE OF UNBAPTIZED PERSONS.

MY DEAR ——————,—You will oblige me by giving admittance to the following observations on a subject which has lately been much discussed,--I mean the propriety of a clergyman's refusing to perform the rites of the church af the marriage of a couple, one of whom is unbaptized. It is a question of very great importance in every point of view, not least in that which regards the quieting the consciences of the clergy, and removing scruple and doubtfulness from their minds in the exercise of their ministrations. For as it cannot be denied that, for the ministers of religion to obstruct lawful matrimony is not only an act of cruelty towards the parties concerned, and an abuse of their office, as though they were "Lords over God's heritage," but has been, and is, severely censured by the church;†

1 Pet. v. 3.

+ Leg. Const. Othobon. 13. A.D. 1248. Peckham Const. 3. 1279. Note 7 in Table of Degrees, 1563, confirmed by 99th Canon, 1603,

so that he who offends in this matter renders himself liable to ecclesiastical punishment: so it seems equally undeniable that, for a minister of God and of the church to assist at unlawful matrimony, and to declare that blessed which is prohibited by the laws of both, is a still more heinous offence, being a mockery of the Divine Majesty, and a prostitution of the clerical office, and injurious to the souls of men, as leading them to think that indifferent or approved of God, which is really offensive in his sight.

If it be allowed, as I suppose it will, that they who have not been admitted by baptism to the Christian covenant are to be reckoned among "them that are without," "strangers from the covenant of promise,Ӡ then there can be no question but that, where both of the parties are in this unhappy state, it is a profanation of the ministerial office to give the blessing of the church, a participation in holy things, to such persons, the privileges of the covenant to those who are strangers to it. But it seems to be a matter of doubt with some, whether, when one of the parties is within the church, and admitted to the covenant, the case is altered, and the clergyman obliged to celebrate the rites of the church. The chief inquiry, then, must be, whether the laws of God and of the church allow the intermarriage of those who are within the church with those that are without-of the children of the covenant with those who are strangers to it. For if they do not-if such intermarriages are discountenanced by those laws, then certainly the clergy are, at least, free to refuse their assistance, and cannot be censured for declining to sanction that which there is reason to believe is contrary to the intention of the church, and the directions of the Holy Ghost.

From the records of the antediluvian church, where the sins which caused the deluge seem primarily attributable to the intermarriage of the sons of God with the daughters of men, of those who held the true faith and worship of Almighty God with those who had departed from it; from the records of the patriarchal church, in the instances of Abraham § and Isaac; from the injunctions of the Mosaical law, and the opinions of the people under it,** so manifestly did such alliances seem contrary to the will of God, that upon the institution of the Christian dispensation, a question not unnaturally arose, as to whether it was lawful for those who were converted to the Christian faith to retain the wives or husbands (who were still unbelievers) which they had before their conversion. St. Paul's decision was, that they might be retained. "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away,"++ and the same of the woman. But though he gives this permission for the continuance of the connexion previously formed, so long as the unbelieving party were willing to abide by it, what he adds clearly shews that he considered the connexion to stand upon a totally different footing from the marriages between Chris