tain from the words of this chapter, the apostle speaking of men that were carnal, sold under sin,' which is the character of the greatest sinners, (1 Kings xxi. 20. Isaiah 1. 1,) and even of revolters from the true religion; (1 Maccab. i. 15;) and this is represented as the cause of all that follows from verse 14th to the 24th.

Lastly, They conclude this from those words of the apostle, (chap. viii. 6, 7, 8,) "to be carnally minded (GREEK "the wisdom of the flesh,") is death, because the carnal mind (GREEK "the wisdom of the flesh") is enmity to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be; so that they that are in the flesh cannot please God,' they therefore can do nothing that is truly good, nothing that is not evil, and displeasing to him."

1 answer, First, that this was another of the texts abused by the ancient Heretics, to prove that the flesh was by nature evil, imagining that these words tended, is diaboλnv tñs oapnis, to the condemnation of our flesh,' or mortal bodies, we learn from Epiphanius and St. Chrysostom upon the place; who therefore well observes, that "by flesh here we are not to understand the body, or the substance of the body, ἀλλὰ τὸν σαρκικὸν βίον καὶ κοσμικὸν καὶ τρυφῆς, καὶ ἀσωτίας γέμοντα τὸν ὅλον σάρκα ποιόντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, but a worldly carnal life, full of luxury and riotous living, and turning the whole man into flesh'," as is evident from the phrase; 'the wisdom of the flesh' engaging us to mind only the things which belong to the flesh, and to be of the flesh, as the true christian is of the Spirit, being led by, and walking in the Spirit. And, saith Methodius, "were this said of them that are in this body of flesh, that they cannot please God, they who commit theft, whoredom, or any other like sin, could not on that account be subject to reprehension by a just Judge, it being impossible for the fesh to be subject to the law of God; πῶς γὰρ ἂν μεμπτέον ἐδύνατο, τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὴν προσᾶσαν αὐτῷ φύσιν βιῶν εἶναι; 'For how can it be blame-worthy in the body that it lives according to the condition of its nature?' Nor could then the intemperate person be reduced to chastity and virtue, the body lying under a natural necessity not to be subject to the law of God."

Secondly. The apostle doth indeed say, that they who thus mind carnal things, while they continue so to do, 'cannot please God;

o Har. 61, n. 49, 51.

Apud Epiphan' ibid. n. 51.

e Note, that siya seems dislocated.

283

this being only in effect to say, in the words of St. Chrysostom, ἀδύνατον πονηρὸν μένοντα, that whilst men go on in their sinful courses they cannot please God,' or live in subjection to his laws; but then," saith he, "as Christ only saith an evil tree, whilst it continues such, cannot bring forth good fruit; but doth not say, an evil tree cannot be made good;" but on the contrary saith, 'Make the tree good that the fruit may be good,' so is it here. For this apostle (by his frequent exhortations to these carnal men to 'crucify the flesh, and mortify the flesh with its lusts,' or the deeds of it, and to put off the old man with its deeds;' by his threats that if they live after the flesh they shall die;' and by his promise, that if through the Spirit, they do mortify the deeds of the flesh, they shall live;') plainly shews that men may cease to live according to the flesh, and may obtain that assistance of the Spirit by which they shall mortify the deeds of the flesh, and live after the Spirit. "God," saith Chrysostom, "hath put this,èv λevlegia πgoxigéσews, in our free choice, so that, ἐν σοὶ λοιπόν ἐςι καὶ τᾶτο γένεσθαι nanɛwo, since the vouchsafement of the gospel, it is in thy own power to be carnally minded or spiritually;' and now, woλaǹ ñ ἐπίτασις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ' there is greater strength and inducement from the gospel so to be than ever'."

VIII. To proceed to the SECOND PARTICULAR,

sense,

and

That these new notions of liberty are contrary to the repugnant to the common reason of mankind, will be evident by the rules laid down by them who were guided only by the light of nature, viz.

1. 'That "a lawgiver must act absurdly in commanding that which it is not in the power of his subjects to perform."

2. That "vice and virtue must be, và q'ui, things which we are free to do,' or to abstain from, because they are worthy of praise or dispraise, neither of which agree to things done unwil

«Ατοπος ἂν ἔιη ταυτα νομοθετῶν ἃ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἑσι πράττειν.

Arist. in Moral. L. 1. c. 9.

b

ὁ Ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόροι ἐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκεσίοις. Arist. ibid. Τὴν γὰρ ἀνάγκην ἀνεύθυνον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρ ̓ ἡμῶν ἀδέσποιον ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολυθειν πέφυκεν. Epictet. apud Diog, Laert. L. 10. n. 135.

Non

sunt igitur assensiones, neque actiones in nostra potestate, ex quo efficitur ut neque laudationes justæ sint, neque vituperationes, nec honores,, nec supplicia. Cic. de Fato, n. 50, vid. Sen, Ep. 70. Sim cium in Epict. p. 27, 29, 183.

lingly, necessity rendering things unblameable, that being only to be blamed which is in our power:" and therefore that "fate or necessity which leaves not our assent or actions in our power, takes away praise or dispraise, honour or reward."

с

3. That "that only is voluntary which we lie under no necessity to do or to forbear; and what we do, being unwilling, we do out of necessity, liberty being a power of acting from ourselves, or doing what we will:" whence they infer that "vice and virtue must be voluntary, and that there can be no necessity of doing evil, and that on this account only is vice worthy of dispraise."

4. That " man can be guilty of no crime in doing that which he could not avoid; for what is evil is a fault," saith Cicero, "there can be no fault in not doing that which we have no power to do."

5. That "what is natural to all men, cannot be evil to any man; for no man is angry," saith Seneca,f" ubi vitium natura defendit, where nature defends the vice';" "nor can that be evil" saith Cicero, "quod à naturâ parente omnium constitutum, 'which owes its original to nature;' seeing that Being which consults the good of mankind, would neither produce nor nourish that, quod cum exantlavisset omnes labores incideret in mortis malum sempiternum, 'which, when it had done its utmost, must be subject to eternal death'."

6. That "there can be no consultations or deliberation about things which are not in our power, nor any rational persuasion to

• Ἐκέσιον ὃ πράττομεν μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. Aristot. in Moral. l. 1, c. 15. Καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἐκόνιες πράτίομεν, ἀναΓκαζομενοι πράττομεν. ibid. Εἶναι γὰρ ἐλευ θερίαν ἐξεσίαν αὐτοπραγίας. Zeno apud Diog. Laert. 1. 7, n. 121. Ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄραθον, καὶ τὸ κακὸν. Epictet. c. 50.

d Τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκέσιον είναι, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκῖον ἡ κακία, καὶ ἡ ἀρεθὴ ἐπαίνεῖον.

Aristot. Eudem. 1. 2, c. 11.

e Tusc. Quæst. 3, n. 31.

f Ep. 94.

• Τὸ ἀδύνατον προαίρεται δ' ἐδεὶς, ἐδ' ὅλως ὁ δυναῖόν μὲν μὴ ἐφ ̓ αὐτ τῷ δ' διεται πρᾶξαι, ή μή πράξαι ὥςε τῦτο μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη το προαιρεῖὸν τῶν ἑφ' αυτῷ τὶ εἶναι. Aristot. Eudem. 1. 2, c. 10, and M. Moral. l. 1, e. 18. Ἡ δὲ πέθω βια καὶ ἀνάκη ἀντιτίθεται. Eud. 1. 2, e. 8. Ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν Tgòs To TÉλ, de Morib. 1. 2, c. 1.

do them, because these actions can only be performed in order to that end; and therefore when the end cannot be obtained, must be done in vain." And hence it clearly follows, that if this be a doctrine of christianity,-that men not yet converted, or in their lapsed state, can do nothing which is truly good, and also lie under a necessity of doing evil, they ought not to think or deliberate how they may do good, or may avoid the doing evil, or pray for the divine assistance, or be sorry for their sins. Nor ought any man to persuade them so to do; for if they ought not to do evil that good may come, and whatsoever they do, whilst they continue in that state, though it may be materially good, is formally sin, they ought not to do it to obtain the divine assistance, or any other good.

To this may be added the arguments of the Heathen Philosophers against fate, produced Chapter the Fourth, Section the Third.

Nor ought these arguments to be slighted as being only the sayings of Philosophers guided by the dim light of reason, when they deliver only that in which the common notions of mankind have long agreed; for that would be of dreadful consequence to the whole christian faith. For our belief of it must bottom upon some rational inducements, and common principles of reason, which if they may be false, christianity may be a false religion; if they be evident and certain truths, whatsoever contradicts them must be false. If therefore any article of our faith should to the best of our judgments plainly contradict them, it must shock the foundation of our faith by engaging men to believe that false which alone engaged them to believe that faith was true. That this would also render us unable to convert Jew, Heathen, or Mahometan, to confute the Tritheite or such like hereticks, or to reject any interpretation of scripture as absurd and contrary to reason, I have fully proved in the appendix to the Idolatry of Host Worship, Chapter II, from Section First to the Sixth.

As for the THIRD PARTICULAR, that the christian Fathers for four whole centuries condemned these new notions as destructive of true liberty, of the nature of vice and virtue, of rewards and punishments, of the equity of the divine precepts and of a future judgment, and also as contrary to the plain declarations of the holy scriptures, will be fully proved in the Sixth and last chapter of this discourse.

CHAP. II.

Proposing arguments to prove the freedom of the will, as well from necessity as from co-action.

THE question being thus fully stated, let it be observed that the liberty or freedom of the will we contend for, is,

FIRST. Plainly delivered in the holy scripture, and may abundantly be confirmed by arguments grounded upon scripture.

SECONDLY. That it is demonstrable from reason, and hath been constantly asserted both by Heathens and Christians in their discourses against fate.

THIRDLY. That it hath the constant suffrage of all the ancient writers of the church, by whom it is delivered, as a fundamental article, or as a truth on which all good or evil, piety or virtue, praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments depend. And,

I. FIRST. The scripture affords us express declarations, or plain intimations, that the liberty of the will, even in christian virtues of the highest nature, is opposite not only to co-action, but necessity. Thus in the case of chusing that high state of virginity, that they might serve the Lord without distraction,' the apostle determines that 'he that hath no necessity, but, soiav éxa të idis Eλnuaтos, HATH POWER OVER HIS OWN WILL, let him retain his virginity: Where freedom is declared to be a power over our own will,' to chuse or not to chuse, and stands opposed to necessity. See Ecumenius and Theophylact upon the place. Again, in the case of his working with his own hands, and receiving nothing of the churches of Corinth, and throughout the regions of Achaia, which he thought of so great importance to the promotion of the gospel as to say, 'It was better for him to die than vary from it;' he yet asserts his liberty by these enquiries, × έ 'λɛúlegos; AM I NOT FREE! Have I not power to eat, and to drink,' (on the church's cl arge, without labouring thus?) clearly

& 1 Corinthians vii, 57, Μὴ ἔχων ἀναγκὴν ἀντὶ τὸ αὐτεξέσιο ὢν. Theod.

• Ilaving no necessity being put in opposition to having power over his own will.' Theodoret. ED h1 Corinthians ix, 1, 3, 4.