fide holder.-BLACKMAN V. HOUSSELS, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 511.

184. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Indorsement Before Delivery. Where a negotiable promissory note, made payable to a particular person or order, is first indorsed by a third person, and then delivered to the payee, such third person is held to be an original promisor, guarantor, or indorser, according to the nature of the transaction and the understanding of the parties at the time; and this may be shown by parol proof.-ROANOKE GROCERY & MILLING CO. v. WATKINS, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 612.

185. NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTE.-The assignee of a note not negotiable can only recover from a remote assignor the consideration paid such assignor by his immediate assignee for such note.-GOFF V. MILLER, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 643.

186. NEGOTIABLE NOTE - Ownership.-An action on a note executed to the order of, and indorsed in blank by, the maker, may be maintained against the maker by one who indorsed the note for him, though the note had not been paid by said indorser, and was ob tained from the person beneficially interested therein merely for the purpose of suit.-BERNEY V. STEINER, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 806.

187. NEGOTIABLE NOTES-Bona Fide Holder.-There are circumstances which place the holder of paper in circulation upon inquiry, without direct notice of any infirmity of any title. The policy executed on the life of the deceased was a valid contract, and, as such, was assignable to the defendants, for the amount held due.-HAYS V. LEPEYRE, La., 19 South. Rep. 821.

18. PARENT AND CHILD-Emancipation of MinorWages.-Where an agreement of employment makes the wages payable to the employee, a minor, the father of the minor, by confirming and approving the agree ment, releases, in favor of the minor, his right to the wages earned under the contract.-PARDEY V. AMERICAN SHIP WINDLASS CO., R. I., 34 Atl. Rep. 737.

189. PARTNERSHIP-Conversion of Trust Property.Under Code, § 291, subsec. 2, authorizing arrest for the fraudulent misapplication of trust property, a partner who has only constructive knowledge of a firm trust is subject to arrest for joining in a firm assignment by which the trust property is conveyed to the assignee for other creditors.-DURHAM FERTILIZER CO. V. LITTLE, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 664.

190. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Duties and Liabilities.If an agent sells his own and his principal's goods in common, and collects enough to pay his principal, but not enough to pay both, and, as an act of his own, indulges the purchaser, he must pay his principal, and cannot apportion what he has collected between himself and his principal.-SIMMONS V. LOONEY, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 677.

AND

191. PRINCIPAL consigned goods to defendants, with instructions not to zell below a certain price without first advising him. Defendants sold at a price lower than that named, and without consulting plaintiff, but notified him immediately after the sale. Plaintiff was absent from home when defendants' letter arrived, but, after his return, made no objection to the sale, until several months had elapsed: Held, that plaintiff's failure to disavow defendants' acts immediately on the learning of the facts of the sale was a ratification precluding recovery of damages therefor.-KENDALL V. EARL, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 791.

AGENT-Ratification.-Plaintiff

192. NATIONAL BANKS-False Entries-Presumption. -If a president or cashier makes a false entry in a report of the condition of the bank to the comptroller of the currency, the jury are authorized to presume from the false entry itself, in the absence of any explanation or of any other testimony, that he knew it to be false. This presumption results from the fact that it is the duty of the officer who verifies the report to know the condition of the bank, and, if the report is false, there is a prima facie presumption that he knew

it.-UNITED STATES V. ALLIS, U. S. C. C. (Kan.), 73 Fed. Rep. 165.

193. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Appearance Bond.-The surety on an appearance bond is not released from liability because of the inexact language in the bond, dedescribing the offense; least of all when it contains the condition that the accused will not depart the court without leave.-STATE V. ARLEDGE, La., 19 South. Rep. 761.

194. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Clerk of Court.-The payment of money to the clerk in vacation is not equivalent to the payment of money into court, and if the clerk fails to return such money into court the sureties on his official bond cannot be held responsible for its loss.-STATE V. ENSLOW, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 679.

195. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Parties - Obligors in Joint Instrument. -Rev. St. 1895, art. 1203, providing that any "principal obligor in any contract may be sued either alone or jointly with any other party who may be liable thereon," applies not only as between a principal and those whose liability is secondary, but also as between joint principals, and one principal obligor is not a necessary party to an action against his joint principal.-MILLER V. SULLIVAN, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 363.

196. PUBLIC LANDS When Subject to Location.Where claimants of land under a void patent appeal, without giving a supersedeas bond, from a decree in favor of the State declaring the patent void, the patent continues in existence and the land is "titled land," and not subject to location until such decree is made final by affirmance.-SANDERSON V. FAULK, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 409.

197. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Action for Stock Killed.Where a railroad company leaves its railroad unin. closed through a country where domestic animals are allowed to be at large, and thus exposed to the casualties of the animals getting upon the railroad track, it is the duty of the railroad company, through its agents, to use at least ordinary care to avoid unnecessary injury to the animals when found in the way of a train on the road.-KIRK V. NORFOLK & W. R. Co., W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 639.

198. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Failure to Erect Cattle Guards. Where a contractor engaged in building a railroad pulled down fences and allowed them to remain down without constructing proper cattle guards, the railway company was liable for the damages caused thereby.-CHICAGO, R. I. & T. Rr. Co. v. YARBROUGH, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 422.

199. RAILROAD COMPANY-Killing Stock.-Mill & V. Code, § 1298, subsec. 4, requiring every railroad company to keep a person on each locomotive on the lookout ahead, and to sound the alarm whistle and apply the brakes whenever any animal or other obstruction appears on the track, applies to a freight train running at full speed through the grounds of a station at which it does not stop.-MOBILE & O. R. Co. v. HOUSE, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 561.

200. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Negligence-Highway.The failure of a railroad company to remove a bank of earth on its right of way, consisting almost entirely of a natural hill through the base of which the bank was laid in a cut, and which obstructed the view of an ap proaching train from travelers on the highway, was not a failure to restore the highway to its former state of usefulness, as required by Rev. St., § 1836.-LEITCH V. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. Co., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 21.

201. RAILROAD COMPANY — Street Railways - Use of Streets Therefor.-The mere construction of a street railway does not impose on the street an additional servitude, so as to require therefor the condemnation of the rights of the abutting property owners in the street.-MERRICK V. INTRAMONTAINE R. Co., N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 667.

202. RAILROADS-Contributory Negligence.-The yard foreman of a terminal switching company operating over 40 miles of track and 70 switches, whose duty re

quired him to aid in and superintend the switching, seeing none of the crew on the approaching switch train, went between the cars to make a coupling when they were three feet apart and still in motion, and fell over a pile of ashes on the track. The ashes were partially covered by snow and ice, and the day was dark and sleet was falling: Held, that the foreman was not, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.KENNEDY V. LAKE SUPERIOR TERMINAL & TRANSFER RY. Co., Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 1137.

203. RECEIVER.-A receiver is not liable for the loss of cattle merely because he allowed them to remain on the range, or for property burned merely because he failed to insure it; ordinary care is the test of his responsibility.-HAMM V. J. STONE & SONS LIVE STOCK Co., Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 427.

204. RELEASE OF JOINT DEBTOR-Judgment.-An action was brought against two of three joint obligors in a bond, and the representatives of the third, who had died. One of the defendants defaulted, but no judgment was entered against him. The others defended, and separate Judgments in their favor were entered on different days. After the time for suing out a writ of error on the first judgment, which was against one of the surviving obligors, had expired, the plaintiff sued out a writ of error on the other judgment against the representatives of the deceased obligor: Held, that the failure of the plaintiff to sue out a writ of error on the first judgment within the time limited having made that judgment final, it operated as a release of the defendant against whom it was taken, and hence, within the rule that a release of one joint obligor is a release of all, it operated as a release of the defendants in the other judgment, and that the writ of error should be dismissed.-CONNECTICUT FIRE INS. Co. v. OLDENDORFF, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 88. 205. RELEASE AND DISCHARGE-Joint Debtors-Judg ment. Under statutory provisions for the discharge of one of the joint debtors without releasing the others from their ratable proportions of the debt, 2 How. Ann. St., § 7784, permits the clerk of the court to dis charge a judgment, as to the released debtor, upon filing the proper evidence: Held, that such filing and discharge are not a prerequisite to a release, and that a release may be shown on the trial of an action brought to enforce the judgment.-BEEKMAN V. SYLVESTER, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 1093.

206. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Diverse Citizenship.-An action by a county school board against an alien to cancel, for the benefit of the public schools, a deed to certain swamp lands, made by the county commissioner, was brought, by permission of a statute, in the name of the State of Missouri. The ground alleged was that the deed was invalid for want of a seal, and the county was made a defendant because it refused to join as a complainant: Held, that both the State and the county were merely nominal parties, and the alien defendant was entitled to remove the cause.-STATE OF MISSOURI, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY V. ALT, U. S. C. C. (Mo.), 73 Fed. Rep. 302.

207. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Local Prejudice.-An ap plication for the removal of a cause from a State to a federal court on the ground of local prejudice, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1887 (amended August 13, 1888), should not be granted without giving to the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard, though the court has power to grant the application ex parte.HERNDON V. SOUTHERN R. Co., U. S. C. C. (N. Car.), 73 Fed. Rep. 307.

208. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Separable Controversy.One W, a citizen of New Jersey, brought a suit in a court of that State against a railway company incorporated by that State, and against its officers and directors, to have the railway company declared insolv. ent and a receiver appointed under a State statute. About the same time one V, a citizen of New York, and trustee under a mortgage of the railroad, took posses. sion of the road under the provisions of the mortgage. Thereupon he was made a party to a suit brought by

W, and removed the cause to the federal court on the ground that there was a separable controversy be tween complainant and himself. Complainant moved to remand: Held, that there was no such separable controversy, and that the suit should be remanded.WATSON V. ASBURY PARK & B. ST. RY. Co., U. S. C. C. (N. J.), 73 Fed. Rep. 1.

209. RES JUDICATA-Criminal and Civil Suits.-The acquittal of a defendant under an indictment for making false and fraudulent returns, as postmaster, of the business done at his office for the purpose of increas ing his compensation, is not a bar to an action by the United States upon the bond of such defendant, as postmaster, to recover the amount found due to the government from defendant, upon the adjustment of his accounts, as shown by the same returns.-UNITED STATES V. JAEDICKE, U. S. D. C. (Kan.), 73 Fed. Rep. 100.

210. SALE-Conditional Sales of Personalty.-Where a conditional sale of personalty is made, the title to re. main in the seller until payment of notes given for the purchase money, a surrender of such notes and an ac ceptance of notes of a third person in their stead, with a proviso that the purchaser shall not be released from liability, does not divest the seller of his claim on the property.-HOLLENBURG MUSIC Co. v. MORRIS, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 396.

211. SALE OF PERSONALTY-Surrender.-The buyer of personal property may peaceably surrender possession to a third person, claimant thereof; but if he does so in an action between him and the seller, in order to sustain a claim on his part for damages for the loss of the property, he must prove that the third person had a title thereto, valid and paramount to that acquired by the buyer from the seller.-HANNA V. BUCKLEY, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 1122.

212. SALE - What Constitutes. -An arrangement whereby chattels are conveyed at a price certain, with a provision that the vendee may, if he fails to resell them, return them to the vendor, is a contract of sale, with an option to rescind, and not a contract of brokerage.-HOUCK V. LINN, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 1103.

213. SALE-Warranty.-To constitute a warranty it is not necessary that the word “warrant" should be used; it is sufficient if the language used by the vendor amounts to an undertaking or assertion on his part that the thing sold is as represented.-UNLAND V. GARTON, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 1130.

214. SALES-Mistake of Buyer.-That the buyer, in or dering goods by letter, ordered by mistake a larger quantity than desired, the goods to be put up in packages with his advertisement thereon, does not entitle him to refuse to accept all of the goods when delivered, the seller having been unaware of the mistake.-J. A. COATES & SONS V. BUCK, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 23.

215. SCHOOLS- Board of Education - Powers.- The board of education of a school district, composed of the president of the board of education and two com missioners, is a public corporation, created by statute (Code, § 7, ch. 45), with functions of a public nature expressly given, and having no other; and therefore it can exercise no power not expressly conferred or fairly arising by necessary implication, and it can exercise its functions in no other mode than in that prescribed or authorized by the statute.-HONAKER V. BOARD of EDUCATION, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 544.

216. SET-OFF.-In an action upon a supersedeas bond, against the principal and sureties, thereon, a legal claim from the plaintiff to such principal may be pleaded as a set-off.-VAN ETTEN V. KOSTERS, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 1106.

posits, the indebtedness due the bank B from the bank A; nor was the trustee of the bank A entitled to set off, against the pro rata share of the bank B in the funds of the bank A, the indebtedness due from the bank B on account of the deposits; but each was only entitled to receive from the other a pro rata share with the other creditors.-AKIN V. WILLIAMSON, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 569.

218. SLANDER-Words not Actionable.-A statement by defendant in a public speech that plaintiff, a mem ber of congress, "had signed the 'alliance demands' and then went to Washington as congressman, and repudiated those demands," charges neither a crime nor a dereliction of official duty, and is not actionable per se.-CRAWFORD V. BARNES, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep.

570.

219. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Contract. Where a contract for an unexpired term of years imposes on complainant the rendition of continuous mechanical services demanding the highest degree of skill, and on defendant the duty of maintaining costly machinery, and the daily use of cars moved by electricity on the line of its railway, a court of equity will not decree a specific performance of the contract.-ELECTRIC LIGHTING CO. OF MOBILE V. MOBILE & S. H. RY. Co., Ala., 19 South. Rep. 721.

220. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Contract for Sale of Land.-A bill for the specific enforcement of a contract to convey lands is not demurrable because it fails to show whether or not a note which was to be executed by the purchaser for a part of the price was ever exe. cuted, or when such purchase money was payable, where the contract set out shows the purchase price and the rate of interest it is to bear until paid, and it is alleged that the original parties to the contract are both dead, and the complainant has no knowledge as to such omitted facts. Where a written contract for the sale of land does not fix the time for the payment of the purchase money, the legal construction is that it is payable presently.-PECK V. ASHURST, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 781.

221. SUBROGATION-Liens.-A lender of money to a debtor, to be used in paying claims for which the holders might have secured liens, in the absence of contract therefor, is not entitled to be subrogated to such liens.-MELLON V. MORRISTOWN & C. G. R. Co., Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 464.

222. SUBROGATION - - Dower - Priority. Where the owner of a tract of land has allowed the same to be incumbered by deeds of trust and judgment liens, and while it is in that condition he intermarries, and then he and his wife make a conveyance of the land to a third party, in which she did not effectively join, being then an infant, who, out of the purchase money, pays off and discharges said liens in order to relieve the property therefrom, he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the parties holding said liens, and such liens are paramount to said wife's right of dower on the decease of her husband.-BLAIR v. MOUNTS, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 620.

223. TAXATION.-Under act Feb. 17, 1885, § 84 (Code 1886, § 567), requiring the tax collector to append to the docket delivered to the probate judge an oath to the effect that he has in each case made "diligent search for personal property of the parties against whom the taxes are respectively assessed," does not invalidate a tax sale where the real estate in question was assessed to "owner unknown."-CARY V. HOLMES, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 723.

224. TAXATION.-The imposition of taxes and the law directing the mode of assessment and collection are the exercise of legislative power, to be exercised in conformity with the requirements of the constitution by general law.-STATE V. SOUTH PENN OIL CO., W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 688.

225. TAXATION-Ownership of Taxable Property.Where one owning a franchise for the erection of a bridge employed a bridge company to construct the same under a contract providing that the bridge com.

pany should advance the money and perform all the services necessary in the construction and maintenance of the bridge,in consideration whereof the bridge company should have forever exclusive possession and use of the bridge, such exclusive possession to be in liquidation of all sums advanced and services performed under the agreement, the grant of exclusive possession operates as an absolute conveyance, vesting the ownership of the bridge in the bridge company.-STATE V. MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE CO., Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 592.

226. TAX SALE-Invalid Tax Deed.-While the holder of a certificate of purchase at a tax sale may foreclose his lien when the tax deed issued pursuant thereto is invalid by reason of an irregularity in the proceedings leading up to such sale, this rule cannot be invoked when, in his petition, such purchaser alleges that the treasurer made the sale to him without authority of law, and without any jurisdiction in the premises.LEDWICH V. CONNELL, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 1108.

227. TRESPASS-County Surveys.-The location by the county surveyor of the section lines under act 1890, ch. 35, which makes the survey presumptively correct, only makes such location prima facie evidence against the landowners. County officers trespassing upon land in the attempt to locate a section line highway on a line other than its proper location are personally liable for the trespass.-WEBSTER V. WHITE, S. Dak., 66 N. W. Rep. 1145.

228. TRIAL-Demurrer to Evidence.-A failure to incorporate the evidence demurred to, and, in unequivocal terms, to admit its entire truthfulness, with all legitimate inferences and deductions to be drawn therefrom, renders a demurrer to the evidence fatally defective.-ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. BROWN, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 560.

229. TRIAL-Setting Aside Verdict-Evidence.-The federal courts have no power to set aside a verdict because against the weight of evidence, however decided that weight may be, if any evidence has been given which would have rendered it improper for the court to direct a verdict.-SPIRO V. FELTON, U. S. C. C. (Tenn.), 73 Fed. Rep. 91.

230. TRIAL-Witness-Refreshing Recollection.-The rule allowing a witness to refresh his recollection by writings or memoranda is limited to matter reduced to writing contemporaneously with the transaction to which it relates, or so shortly afterwards that the facts were still fresh in his mind, so that he may with safety be allowed to refer to them to remove any subsequent weakening of memory. Held, therefore, that statements taken down as testimony before the grand jury, over four months after the occurrences to which they relate, could not be used for that purpose.-PUTNAM V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 923.

231. TRUST AND TRUSTEE-Creditors-Fraud of Trustee. One who borrows money for the use of another, giving his own notes therefor, becomes a creditor of the beneficiary for the amount, and where, in such case, after the debtor's death, the trustee of his estate, by false representations as to the insolvency of such estate, induces the creditor to pay a sum of money, and to assign his claim against the estate, in consideration of being protected from further liability on the notes given for such borrowed money, the creditor may, on discovery of the fraud, and that the estate is solvent (provided the trust on which it is held is for the benefit of creditors), repudiate the transaction, and recover from the estate the amount of which it was thereby defrauded.-BURLING V. NEWLANDS, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 810.

232. TRUST AND TRUSTEE-Usurious Note.-In a bill to recover of a trustee for creditors because of an alleged violation of his bond in ignoring the note of complain. ants as a legal demand against his trust, and his refusal to pay a pro rata thereon, it appeared that the trust conveyance described complainant's note as: "P, L & Co. Note, $542.68. Some credits to go on above note, but the exact amount is not known." It also ap

peared that the note on its face provided for the pay. ment of usurious interest: Held, that the trustee's refusal to pay a pro rata on the note was not a violation of his bond.-POWERS v. BIBEE, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 448.

233. TRUST ESTATES-Equitable Jurisdiction.-A court has no power to authorize a sale of land, and a reinvestment of the proceeds, where the land is held under a deed of trust creating contingent remainders, which renders it impossible for the court to know that all interests are before it.-SMITH V. SMITH, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 666.

234. TRUSTEES-Improvement of Trust Property.Where a trustee in good faith expends his own funds in improving the property of the cestui que trust, and the property is enhanced in value by such improve. ments to the extent of the expense thereof, such trustee is entitled to be reimbursed such expense out of the increased rents occasioned by such improvements. -DICKEL V. SMITH, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 564.

235. USURY-Commissions-Principal.-Where a principal furnishes money to an agent to loan, under a general agreement that the agent is to guaranty repayment of the money at a certain rate of interest, and shall look to the borrower for this compensation, a commission exacted from a borrower by the agent will be charged against the principal in determining whether the loan is usurious.-TEXAS LOAN AGENCY V. HUNTER, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 399.

236. USURY-New Promise.-Though a note given for a loan of money be usurious, and hence void, under the constitution, both as to principal and interest, there is a moral duty to pay the debt; and the parties may cancel the old contract, purge the consideration of usury, and make it the basis of a new obligation which will bind the borrower to repay the money actually received, with interest at the legal rate.GARVIN V. LINTON, Ark., 35 S. W. Rep. 430.

237. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Auction Sale of Lands -Crops.-Neither the notice of an auction sale of land, nor the deed made to purchaser, made any reference to crops or rents. The auctioneer modified his statement that possession would be given at once, by stating that certain persons (referring to renters) had corn on some of the land, and that would have to be removed or fed, and the purchaser could not get pos. session of that till the crops were cribbed or fed. The corn was then growing, and the rent, which was a share of the corn, was not due till some time after that: Held, that there was no reservation of the landlord's share of the corn, but that the right thereto passed to the purchaser.-HUDSON V. FULLER, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 575.

238. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Vendor's Lien.-A vendor's lien (as distinguished from a lien reserved by contract) can only be enforced where there is a fixed sum of money due from the vendee to the vendor for the land conveyed, and the right to such lien does not exist where the land and other property are sold for a sum in gross.-GRIFFIN V. BYRD, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 717.

239. WAREHOUSEMEN-Storage by Railroad.-Goods shipped over defendant's railroad, the consignee of which could not be found, or refused to take the same, were stored by defendant in plaintiff's warehouse, laintiff paying the freight, and giving non-negotiable receipts, reciting, in most cases, the receipt of the goods from defendant, the name of the consignee and the amount of freight charges paid by plaintiff to defendant: Held, that the receipts did not, as matter of law, make defendant liable for the storage charges, but that it could be shown by the conduct of the parties that the goods were stored for and on account of the owner.-PROVIDENCE WAREHOUSE Co. v. PROVIDENCE & W. R. Co., R. I., 34 Atl. Rep. 739.

240. WATERS - Riparian Owners.-The common-law doctrine of the rights of riparian owners to the waters of natural streams, being inapplicable to the requirement of the landowners of Wyoming, is not in force in

that State.-MOYER V. PRESTON, Wyo., 44 Pac. Rep. Rep. 845.

241. WILLS-Estates in Trust.-A devise to an executor in trust for testator's children, authorizing the trustee to manage the trust estate for the best interests of the beneficiaries, and to sell the same, or any part thereof, at any time, and on such terms as he may deem best, is a personal trust, which terminates on the trustee's death, vesting the estate in the beneficiaries as tenants in common.-BAKER V. MCADEN, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 531.

242. WILLS-Defeasible Fee.-A testator devised lands to two of his daughters, "to them and their heirs, forever," but, in a subseqnent clause, provided that, if "either one" of such daughters "should die without bodily issue, then such portion of my estate as is devised to them shall revert back to, and be equally di vided between, the rest of my children and the children of those who are dead:" Held, that the daugh ters took a defeasible fee.-CROZIER V. CUNDALL, Ky., 35 S. W. Rep. 546.

243. WILLS - Legacies.-Where a will provides that executors shall not be required to pay legacies "until such time as it may be practicable to do so, having regard to beneficial management of my said estate," the legacies become due, without regard to the provision, at the end of one year after the testator's death, by Civ. Code, § 1368, and draw interest thereafter by sec tion 1369.-WILLIAM'S ESTATE, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 808.

244. WILLS-Loss.-Under Rev. St. § 3791, authorizing the county court to take proof of the execution and validity of a will lost or destroyed by accident or design, and to establish the same, the legatees, devisees, and heirs are all parties.-IN RE VALENTINE'S WILL, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 12.

245. WILLS-Parties - Personal Estate.-Where a be quest is left in equal shares to certain persons, each of whom is described by name and by the nature of his kinship to testator, the presumption, in the absence of anything showing a contrary intention, is that such bequest is a gift in severalty to each of the legatees, not a gift to them as a class, and hence the share of any such legatee lapses on his dying without issue before testator.-ROCKWELL V. BRADSHAW, Conn., 34 Atl. Rep. 758.

-

246. WITNESS Credibility Contradictory Statements.-The rule that statements of the witness, out of court, contradictory of his testimony, cannot be proved unless he is first afforded the opportunity of denial, admission, or explanation, is enforced, whether the imputed contradictions are offered to impeach the credit of the witness, or to show his malice to the accused.-STATE V. GOODBIER, La., 19 South. Rep. 755.

247. WITNESS-Criminal Prosecution-Fees.-One who is committed to custody by an examining magistrate in a criminal proceeding for failure to give security for his appearance as a witness for the prosecution, if such failure is not due to contumacy, or to his bad character, but solely to inability through no fault on part, will be considered as in attendance on the court, and entitled to his per diem as a witness, for the term of his detention.-HALL V. COMMISSIONERS OF SOMER SET COUNTY, Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 771.

248. WITNESS-Impeachment.- Where, in a prosecu tion for slandering prosecutrix by accusing her of unchastity, she goes upon the stand as a witness for the State, defendant may show her reputation for morality as of the time of the trial, to discredit her testimony.STATE V. SPURLING, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 533.

249. WITNESS Transactions with Decedent.-In a suit brought by a creditor to set aside a deed for fraud as to his debt, the grantee is not incompetent to testify in support of his title and the good faith of his conveyance for the reason that it necessarily involves transactions and communications had with a deceased grantor, whose personal representatives or heirs are made parties defendant to the suit.-FARMERS' BANK OF FAIRMONT v. GOULD, W. Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 547.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 10, 1896.

It is not often that appellate courts are urged to reverse a conviction of homicide upon the ground of undue haste, on the part of the trial court, in bringing the accused murderer to trial. The law's delay is proverbial and expedition in legal proceedings is seldom made a ground of complaint. But such complaint was made in the recent Nebraska case of Hoover v. State. The court held that "there must, to show prejudicial error, be made to appear something more than that, within three weeks after a homicide had been committed, there was a conviction of the accused, in respect to such homicide, of the crime of murder." Two members of the court, however, take direct issue on that point, stating, in a dissenting opinion, that in their judgment the case should be reversed "for the sole reason that the accused was put on trial over his objections, within so brief a period after the offense with which he was charged was committed, that he had no reasonable time to prepare his defense, and was not permitted the assistance of counsel within the proper meaning of the term. The offense was charged to have been committed December 13th. The defendant was held to answer December 18th. The information was filed December 24th. He was arraigned December 26th. He was put on trial December 27th, less than two weeks after the offense was committed. It is true that there was no showing, by evidence preserved in the record, of public excitement or prejudice, preventing a fair trial. It is also true that a motion for a continuance for the purpose of properly preparing for trial must be supported by proof of the occasion therefor. But there is a difference between the continuance of a cause and its mere postponement to a future day. The same strictness is not required in order to procure a temporary postponement that is required for a continuance over the term; and especially in a criminal case, although the application be for a continuance, if the proof be insufficient, the court should postpone the trial if it would be unjust for any reason to proceed at once. This was a capital case. The life of the accused was at stake.

We

cannot shut our eyes to well known truths. Counsel, no matter how learned, no matter how experienced, require in all cases some time for preparation. Where his client's life is at stake, any lawyer with a proper sense of the responsibility resting upon him requires a considerable time for the examination of the case, for reflection and for preparation for trial."

Many will be apt to indorse the view of the dissenting judge. It is true that a reasonably speedy enforcement of the criminal law is necessary. But the court should not permit the clamor of newspapers or of the public to so far hasten prosecutions as to substantially deprive the accused of their constitutional privilege of a fair and impartial, as well as a speedy trial, and to the real assistance of counsel that is, the assistance of counsel who have had a reasonable opportunity to investigate the case and prepare a defense.

In

By treaties and statutes of the United States the right of the Cherokee Indian nation to exist as an autonomous body, subject always to the paramount authority of the United States, has been recognized. And from this fact there has consequently been conceded to exist in that nation power to make laws defining offenses and providing for the trial and punishment of those who violate them when the offenses are committed by one member of the tribe against another one of its members within the territory of the nation. accordance with this principle the Supreme Court of the United States recently held, in the case of Talton v. Mayes, that the crime of murder committed by one Cherokee Indian upon another within the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation is an offense, not against the United States, but against the local laws of the Cherokee Nation, and that necessarily the statutes of the United States which provide for an indictment by a grand jury, and the number of persons who shall constitute such a body, have no application, for such statutes relate only, if not otherwise specially provided, to grand juries impaneled for the courts of and under the laws of the United States. The question, therefore, suggested by the court was, Does the fifth amendment to the constitution apply to the local legislation of the Cherokee Nation so as to require