"Undoubtedly an infant is responsible in damages for his torts and frauds. If he were to falsely allege himself to be of age, for the purpose of inducing another person to purchase and take a deed of lands, he would be liable to respond in damages for any injury which might result to the purchaser in consequence of the deceit."

This, however, cannot be said to be anything more than a dictum.

It is settled that in case of a misrepresentation, the defrauded party can rescind the contract and recover back the goods. Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 329; Neff v. Landis (Pa.), 1 Atl. Rep. 177; Kitchen v. Lee, 1 Paige, 107.

Just what the true rule is as to the right to maintain an action of deceit for fraudulent representations as to age, it is difficult to say, in view of the decisions. On the one hand, it can be urged that there was a material misrepresentation which induced the party to do something which he would not otherwise, and which has resulted in injury to him. On the other, it is to be remembered that the wise policy of the law has thrown around infants an immunity from contracts which they may enter into. It is a disability which they cannot remove. No declaration of theirs can give vitality to a contract. Whatever rights are sought to be enforced against them grow out of the contract. In the ordinary action of assumpsit, the infant is sued because he did not keep his contract. In the action of deceit, he is sued because he made a false representation which induced the plaintiff to make a contract with him. He exercised his legal right to break that contract, and because of that fact, the plaintiff is injured. Whatever damages have been suffered flow from this breach of contract-the exercise of a legal right. If there had been no breach there would have been no damages. It is but a roundabout way of reaching the same conclusion. When it is considered that the policy of the law, for the protection of the infant, forbids a recovery either on the ground of contract or estoppel, it seems somewhat anomalous that that same policy of protection should allow an action in ex delicto, when a judg ment in that form is followed by so much more serious consequences.-National Corporation Reporter.

THE SERVANT OF ONE MASTER AS THE SPECIAL SERVANT OF ANOTHER.

The CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL for October 26, 1894 (vol. 39, p. 341), contained an interesting article under the above title, by Mr. L. S. Metcalfe, Jr.,in which many decisions by various courts are collated and analyzed. When the servants of one master are temporarily, so to speak, farmed out to another, cases difficult of practical solution under the peculiar facts involved sometimes arise though the principle of law deter mining and governing the suspension of the old and the formation of the new relation is simple and well settled. Where the status of servant pro hac vice has been established, the temporary master steps into the shoes of the general master, and as far as the particular service is concerned, both as regards legal obliga tions to the servant himself and responsibility to third persons for his acts. The determinative circumstance as to the creation of the new relation is whether a mutual intention actually existed among the parties, as to the transfer of allegiance. Mr. Metcalfe cites as one of the important cases bearing on the subject, Wylie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, in which the original or general master was held not liable for a wrongful or negligent act of a servant resulting in personal injury.

"A local committee of a city by letter requested the defendants, manufacturers of fireworks, to send it their catalogue and ‘mark out a display for the Fourth of July' to cost a stated sum. Defendants did as requested, adding that 'we inclose printed sheet giving full instructions for firing the display. The committee, in reply, ordered the fireworks, and stated that 'we would like to have a man take charge of the display.' Defendants answered that 'we understand that we have your positive order for display to cost $400.00 net.' Under such contract the defendant shipped the fireworks ordered to such committee, and sent a man and a boy to aid it in discharging them. The committee had entire control of the display, and the man and boy acted under its directions. While such man was arranging the set pieces, the chairman of the committee ordered an associate and the boy to discharge rockets, one of which was fired horizontally by the boy and injured plaintiff. It was held that the boy was the committee's servant, and defendants were not liable. The court used this language: 'If the display was that of the committee, as I think it was, then both the man and the boy, though in the general employment of the defendants, were nevertheless servants of the committee, and, for the time being, under its direction and control."

In Morgan v. Smith, 35 N. E. Rep. 101, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts remarked: "There is no doubt that the general servant of one person may be come the servant of another by submitting himself to the control and direction of the other. In such a case the servant becomes the fellow-servant of the servants of the person under whose control he comes; and neither his general master nor his special master is liable if he is injured by the negligence of one of the other servants."

In Johnson v. Lindsay, L. R., App. Cas., 371, Lord Watson used this language: "I can well conceive that the general servant of A might, by working towards a common end along with the servants of B, and submitting himself to the control and orders of B, become pro hac vice B's servant, in such sense as not only to disable him from recovering from B for injuries sustained through the fault of B's proper serv ants, but to exclude the liability of A for injury occasioned by his fault to B's common workmen. In order to produce that result the circumstances must, in my opinion, be such as to show conclusively that the servant submitted himself to the control of another person than his proper master, and either expressly or impliedly consented to accept that other person as his master for the purpose of the common employment."

The subject has something of a timely interest because of two recent decisions. Delaware, etc. Ry. Co. (N. J.), 34 Atl. Rep. 986; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ferch (Tex.), 36 S. W. Rep. 487. Each of these actions was brought by a servant for damages or personal injuries, and in both of them the necessity of showing knowledge of and consent by the servant to the alleged new and special relation of master and servant is emphasized. In the New Jersey case a railroad corporation endeavored to escape liability for the negligent act of its servant on the ground that the plaintiff, although primarily the servant of a rolling mill company, had become the servant pro hac vice of the railroad company, and therefore, the fellow-serv ant of the employee causing the injury. It was held that no prejudicial error had been committed in submitting to the jury the question whether plaintiff, at the time, was in the employ of the railroad company, the court, indeed, strongly intimating that, under the

evidence, a positive instruction in plaintiff's favor on this point might have properly been given.

In the Texas case, the plaintiff, who was primarily the servant of the defendant, a railway corporation, had been injured through alleged defective apparatus originally supplied by defendant, and it was held that error prejudicial to defendant had been committed in not submitting to the jury the question whether the service of plaintiff, with his knowledge and consent, and the control of the apparatus, had or had not been transferred to a construction company, being an inde pendent contractor for the defendant. The following extract from the opinion discusses the test as to a transfer of service, as well as states the position of the court upon the conflicting evidence at the trial.

"A railway company is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor engaged in doing work on its road. Burton v. Railway Co., 61 Tex. 535; Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 51 Tex. 509. If the facts stated above are taken as true, it would appear that plaintiff, and the crew he was with, knowingly went from the service of the appellant into the service of the construction company, and for the term of his service there, became removed from the service, control and orders of appellant, and was subject to the construction company alone. In this view of the case, appellant would not have been their master, while they were so engaged, so as to owe them the wellknown duty in regard to providing safe machinery and keeping the same in repair. On the other hand, there was testimony going to show that plaintiff was not aware of the existence of said construction company, and was not informed that they were going to work for such company; that this crew and machine would go where ordered by the officers of appellant, sometimes to work on the roads, but always remain. ing in the employ of appellant; that he went with the machine crew and foreman to this work under orders of appellant's engineer; that when the work was completed they were ordered back by appellant. In brief, there was evidence that would sustain a finding that plaintiff did not know of or assent to any change of masters, but in doing this work was performing the customary service for which he was engaged by appellant without any act of his own, or any circumstances, to indicate to him that he was serving any other person. While it cannot be doubted that if the machine and crew went into the independent service of the contractor, and subject to its sole direction and control, with knowledge on the part of the crew of the change, appellant could be absolved from the duties that apply to the relation of master, still we think it equally clear that the employer cannot relegate his employee to the service of another, under circumstances that do not charge the employee with notice of any change, and thereby escape the obligation of master. The servant cannot be held to have ceased being such where he is continued in his ordinary work, and no knowledge is imparted to him of any change in the relations between him and his employer, See Ward v. Fiber Co. (Mass.), 28 N. E. Rep. 300; Morgan v. Smith (Mass.), 35 N. E. Rep. 101, cit

machinery at which he worked. The court erred in holding that the evidence conclusively showed that plaintiff was appellant's servant when injured, and in withdrawing that question from the jury."-New York Law Journal.

TRADES UNIONS-MALICIOUSLY INDUCING THIRD PERSONS TO BREAK THEIR CONTRACTS.

While one trade union case is waiting judgment in the House of Lords, another was recently decided in Chancery. In the former case, Allen v. Flood, a firm of ship-builders employed two shipwrights to repair the wood work of a ship, and iron-workers to repair its iron work. The iron-workers were members of a trade union, and objected to working in the same yard with the wood-workers, because the latter had previously worked at iron work on other ships in another yard. The district delegate of the union was called in by the iron-workers, and he informed the employers that the iron-workers would leave off work, unless the two wood-workers were discharged that day. In consequence of that threat they were discharged at the end of the day. What the iron. workers objected to was the perfectly legal act of the wood-workers in having on some former occasion done iron work, which the ironworkers were pleased to think a kind of poaching on their preserves; and, on the other hand, what the employers were induced to do was not to break any contract with the wood-workers, but to pay them off at the end of their day's work, they being employed by the day. The wood-workers brought an action against the district delegate, and the chairman and secretary of the union, for maliciously and with intent to injure them inducing the employers to discharge them, and refuse to engage them again. The jury found that the district delegate had acted maliciously, and that the wood-workers had been thereby injured, and assessed the damages at £20 to each; but that the chairman and secretary of the union had not authorized the delegate's acts. The validity of the verdict depended on whether the delegate's act was malicious. Knowing that they could not afford to let the iron-workers go, he put that screw on to induce the employers to pay off the wood-workers and thereby injure them. The court held it to be clear that merely to persuade a person to break his contract gives no cause of action; and similarly that one has a perfect right to advise or persuade another not to make a contract. But they further held that if, in either case, this was done maliciously for the purpose of injuring the person to whom the advice is given, or some one else, the person against whom the malice is directed and carried out has a cause of action, not on the ground of persuasion, but on the ground of the malice directed against him. Accordingly it was held, in conformity with prior decisions, that if one uses persuasions for the indirect purpose of injuring another, or of benefiting himself at the expense of that other, "it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act, if injury ensues from it." Per Lord Justice Brett, now Lord Esher, in Bowen

which the court held that the jury had rightly characterized as malicious. This judgment lately afforded material enough for keen discussion in the House of Lords, raising the question, on the one hand, whether trade unions have any right to interfere, by intimi dating employers, with the right of non-union men to earn their livelihood; and on the other hand, the diffi culty of holding that the acts of interference which are not themselves unlawful become so by the motive which prompts them. Is that a question of morals or also of law? and, besides, is the motive malicious when the acts are done, as here, from no animosity to any individual, but from self-interest, and for the greater good, as the unions believe, of the workmen generally? These are some of the questions which the House of Lords will require to deal with.

was

cease

The other case, Lyons v. Wilkins, decided in Chancery by Lords Justices Lindley, Kay, and Smith, and reported last month (1896), 1 Ch. 811, raises two ques tions, one resembling that already referred to, the other touching the statutory offense of picketing. Messrs. Lyons were manufacturers of leather goods, and the officials of the union of workers in that trade desired them to raise the wages and alter their system of employment. As this refused, the union works picketed their in the manner after mentioned, and also endeavored to get one Schoenthal, a sub-manufacturer who made goods for Messrs. Lyons, to to work for them, and failing in this ordered a strike of his workers. There was no complaint of the wages Schoenthal gave nor of his system of working, and the object of ordering a strike of his workers was to hit Messrs. Lyons through him. The object was to injure Messrs. Lyons and their trade, if they would not give in to the demands of the union; and the court held that here also there was evidence of malice. But there in the ship case the malice was directed against the two woodworkers the obnoxious employees-while here it was directed against Lyons, the obnoxious employers. Similar considerations, however, apply in both cases, and it would have been well if both cases had been under review in the House of Lords at once. Another difference is the remedy sought and obtained. In the later case an injunction or interdict was granted, restraining the union from preventing Schoenthal working for Lyons by withdrawing his workmen from their employment.

The other part of this case, picketing, rests on the express though somewhat limited words of the statute of 1875, which, however, were found strong enough to support an injunction. The act provides that every person who, with a view to compel another to do or abstain from doing any lawful act, watches or besets the house or premises where he resides, works, or happens to be, or the approaches thereto, may be convicted, and fined or imprisoned; but it is added, that attending such places, that is, the premises or approaches, "in order merely to obtain or communicate information," is not to be held illegal. Here, however, more than information was in view, for the pickets accosted workers, entering and leav ing the premises, tried to persuade them not to work, and distributed cards containing that request. But for the statute all this, which did not go beyond persuasion, would have been quite legal, and indeed would still be legal if carried on at a distance from the premises and their approaches. Worked, however, as the picket was, it clearly came within the penalties of the statute; and malice did not require to be established; it is enough if the art is done con

trary to the statute. A further important point was ruled-viz., that though the act says nothing about it, the civil remedy of interdict may be granted against picketing. This is valuable, because prevention is generally better than cure, and penalties do not go to the aggrieved parties but to the public exchequer; besides damages cannot always be recovered from such wrong-doers.-J. C. L. in Juridical Review (Edinburgh).

CORRESPONDENCE.

MORTGAGED PROPERTY IN CASE OF DAMAGE SUITS. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

A made a chattel mortgage to B, which covered property sufficient in value, to many times pay the debt, secured. After default in the payment of said debt, and while all the property was in the possession of the mortgagor, one piece of the property was destroyed by a railroad company. The mortgagee brought action against the company for damages for destroying the property, to satisfy his debt. Was he the real party in interest before reducing the mortgaged property to possession? Should he have not exhausted the other property before bringing action H. against the company?

ILLEGAL SALE OF LAND.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: Farmer owning land by grant from the State by will devised only life interest to his widow. She sold said land and also by will devised it to the purchaser. Query: Suppose the legal heir of farmer brought suit against present presumed owner, would the courts cancel those two illegal instruments or deal with them as if they were not fraudulent, i. e., would long lapse of years and statute of limitations be a bar A. W. to any action?

FALSE REPRESENTATIONS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

In the last number of the JOURNAL appears a note appended to the case of Swift v. Rounds decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, reported on page 266 of the JOURNAL. At page 268, right hand column, the second paragraph of the note begins with the following statement: "The law of false representations received a very considerable extension in England from the decision of Ward v. Hobbs, Law Reports, 2 Q. B. D. 331," and the case is then set out somewhat in extenso. The "considerable extension" made by this case did not remain extended for any considerable time, for the judgment was promptly reversed by the court of appeal in 3 Q. B. D. 150, and the judg ment of reversal was affirmed by the House of Lords in 4 Appeal Cases, 13. It is misleading to persons not familiar with the subject, to find cited as a leading case, a decision long since overruled and condemned by the highest tribunal of England.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

G. W. W.

Handbook on the Law of Real Property. By Earl P. Hopkins, A. B., LL. M. Author of Problems and Quiz on Criminal Law, Contracts, Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, etc. St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co., 1896.

Studies in the Civil Law, and its Relation to the Law of England and America. By William Wirt Howe, of the Bar of New Orleans; Sometime a Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and W. L. Storrs, Professor of Municipal Law in Yale University for the year 1894. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1896.

Commentaries on American Law. By James Kent. Vols. I-IV, Twelfth Edition, Edited by O. W. Holmes, Jr. Fourteenth Edition. Edited by John M. Gould, Ph.D., Author of the "Law of Waters," Joint Author of Gould and Tucker's "Notes of the U. s. Revised Statutes," etc. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1896.

A Digest of the Decisions of the Courts of. Last\Re. sort of the Several States, from the Year 1892 to the Year 1896. Contained in the American State Reports, Volumes 25 to 48 Inclusive, and of the Notes Therein Contained, to which is Prefixed an Alphabetical Index to the Notes. By W. S. Church. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company, Law Publishers and Law, Booksellers. 1896. Handbook on the Law of Torts. By William B. Hale, LL.B. Author of "Bailments and Carriers," "Damages," etc. St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. lishing Co. 1896.

The Law of Passenger and Freight Elevators. By James Avery Webb, of the St. Louis and Memphis Bars. Editor of the last editions of Burrill on Assignments, Pollock on Torts, and Smith on Negligence. St. Louis. The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1896.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A coroner's jury in Maine reported that "deceased came to his death by excessive drinking, producing apoplexy in the minds of the jury.

"We propose to show, gentlemen of the jury," said counsel for the defense, "that it is impossible for the defendant to have committed this crime.

"In the first place, we will prove that the defendant was nowhere near the scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed.

"Next, we will offer the indisputable testimony of persons who saw the defendant upon the spot, and who did not see the defendant commit the crime. "We will show that no poison was found in the body of the deceased.

"Not only that, but we will prove that it was put there by the prosecution in this case.

"We will, furthermore, show that the deceased committed suicide.

"And last, but not least, we will prove, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the deceased is not dead.

"In view of all which corroborative facts, gentlemen of the jury, we respectfully ask for an acquittal." -Journal, New York.

"I will not deny that I am acquainted with these mysteries," replied the adept.

"Then, sir," cried the judge, triumphantly, "tell me, upon your oath, will threes beat two pairs? Answer, sir."

"Judge," answered the adept, "you are too hard for me, but in my humble opinion it depends upon the fellow holding the two pairs."

Only Son-I don't believe I'll ever amount to much as a lawyer, father.

Father-Keep right on climbing the ladder, rung by rung, my son, and you'll get to the top.

Only Son-That advice is all right, father, but the trouble is there are so many young fellows in the profession that I can't get within a mile of the ladder. The society young man was under discussion. "I don't believe he knows what work is," said the doctor.

"Oh, yes, he does," replied the lawyer.

"I mean real hard work. Did you ever see him at anything in that line?

"Why, of course. I've seen him play golf."

"How's your son, the lawyer, getting on?"
"Badly, poor fellow. He is in prison."
"Indeed!"

"Yes; he was retained by a burglar to defend him, and he made so good a plea in the burglar's behalf that the judge held him as an accessory."-Buffalo Sunday Times.

An eccentric lawyer thus questioned a client: "So your uncle, Dennis O'Flaherty, had no family?" "None at all, Your Honor," responded the client. The lawyer made a memorandum of the reply, and thus continued: "Very good. And your father, Patrick O'Flaherty, did he have chick or child?"

The Lawyer-I am sorry that I cannot take your case against your manager, but I have been retained by the other side.

The Actress-Oh, well, it dosen't matter. So long as you are in the case we will be sure to have good press notices.-Up to Date.

Young Lightpayte-How long does a man have to study if he wants to be a good lawyer?

Lawyer Sharpe-Why do you ask that question? "Because I am thinking of studying law myself." "Five hundred years."

Lawyer-So Mrs. Youngwild refused utterly to pay that bill?

Clerk-Yes. When I told her that we would have to press her for the payment of it, she just said: "Bring on your pressure."

1. ACCOUNT-Splitting Causes.-Where one sold to another, on credit, two bills of merchandise on different days, in two consecutive months of the same year, the presumption, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, was that the demand arising upon the two sales constituted one entire and indivisible account in favor of the seller against the purchaser; and, this be ing so, the former could not divide the same into two separate accounts, predicated, respectively, upon the two sales, so as to bring actions thereon within the jurisdiction of a justice's court.-PARKS V. OSKAMP, Ga., 25 8. E. Rep. 369.

2. APPEAL-Law of the Case.-The principle of the law of the case on a second trial does not apply to determinations of fact on conflicting competent evidence, especially where there is additional, though cumulative, evidence.-WALLACE V. SISSON, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 1000.

3. ATTACHMENT-Bona Fide Purchaser.-The lien of a creditor acquired by attachment of real estate, the title to which is in his debtor, although the attachment is made without notice that his debtor has conveyed it to a bona fide purchaser, is defeated by actual notice of such conveyance, received before he levies his execution thereon, or has lawfully applied it to the satisfaction of his debt.-REYNOLDS V. HASKINS, Vt., 35 Atl. Rep. 349.

4. ATTORNEY-Reinstating Disbarred Attorney.-Disbarment of an attorney does not preclude his reinstatement on good cause shown.-IN RE TREADWELL, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 993.

5. BASTARDY-Res Judicata.-In bastardy proceedings, a dilatory plea, setting up the failure to file a recognizance, merely alleging that "no proper recogni zance" was filled, without setting it out, is insufficient. A judgment in bastardy proceedings in favor of defendant, on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution. -LYNN V. STATE, Md., 35 Atl. Rep. 21.

6. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Failure to Keep Open Ticket Office.-When a railroad company fails to keep its ticket office open as required by paragraph 1325 of the General Statutes of 1889, it cannot demand, charge, or receive from a passenger more than the regular fare of three cents per mile, and the company or its em ployees have no right to expel him from the train for refusing to pay more.-ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. DICKERSON, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 975.

7. CERTIORARI-Estoppel.-Where the common council acts in good faith for the benefit of the public in the vacation of a street, certiorari will not lie at the instance of a member of the traveling public to review such proceedings, where such member, being aware of such proceedings, and that large expenditures were being made by a railroad company in furtherance of the change, fails to invoke the aid of any court to restrain such action. - BAUDISTEL V. RECORDER AND COMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF JACKSON, Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 292.

8. CONDITIONAL SALE-Recording Contract.-A contract by which chattels are sold with provision that title remain in the seller till payment of the purchase money is not within Act 1889, requiring "all chattel mortgages or other instruments of writing having the effect of a mortgage or a lien on personal property" to be recorded; and the seller can therefore claim as against an attaching creditor of the buyer, though he

instrument be not recorded.-MAXWELL V. TUFTS, N. Mex., 45 Pac. Rep. 979.

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equality of Rights.-Section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States, places citizens of each State upon the same footingwith citizens of other States so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned, and inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States. It insures to citizens of one State the same freedom possessed by citizens in other States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and pursuit of happiness, and guaranties to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. The privileges and immunities thus secured to citizens of each State in the several States are those which are common to the citizens in other States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their status as citizens.-STATE V. BOARD OF INSURANCE COM'RS OF FLORIDA, Fla., 20 South. Rep. 772.

10. CONTRACT-Conditions Precedent-Performance. -By the express terms of the contract in this case, the performance of each stipulation on the part of the plaintiff below is a condition precedent to the continuing obligation of the contract. Where a written agreement, by its terms requires a daily and continuous performance of the conditions by one party, and, when he performs the conditions, he is entitled to the compensation at the end of each month, as specified in the agreement, the refusal or neglect on his part to perform each condition of the contract day by day, continuously produces a breach of the conditions of the agreement, and the other party is relieved from the performance of the agreement on its part, and may refuse to thereafter continue the contract.-CITY OF OSAWATOMIE V. MILLS, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 937.

11. COVENANTS OF SEISIN-Breach.-L. Bolinger and Rosa Bolinger conveyed, by deed with full covenants of seisin, four lots in block 40, and all of block 39, in the town of Mapletown, to L. A. Brake, for the consid eration of $1,100. At the time of the execution and delivery of the deed, the Bolingers were only seised of an undivided five-ninths of the four lots in block 40, and of an undivided four-ninths of block 39: Held, that the covenants of seisin were broken as soon as the deed was made.-BOLINGER V. BRAKE, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 950.

12. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Bigamy-Marriage.-While a presumptive marriage, based on cohabitation and repute, cannot be established to defeat a subsequent marriage in fact, yet cohabitation and reputed mar. riage are facts receivable in the proof of a marriage in fact, and a man charged with bigamy is entitled to show that the woman to whom he was first married had previously claimed, and was reputed, to be married to another man, with whom she lived and cohabited for a number of years, and who was still living at the time of her marriage to defendant, as evidence in support of his claim that his first marriage was void.-STATE V. SHERWOOD, Vt., 35 Atl. Rep. 352.

13. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Evidence in Mitigation.-Evidence of intoxication of defendant at the time of the murder is inadmissible in mitigation of the penalty; he having pleaded guilty, and it appearing from his confession and other testimony that the crime was deliberate and premeditated, and in accomplishment of a pre-existing plot, and that he at the time knew, and afterwards confessed in detail, the part he took in it.-PHOPLE V. MILLER, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 986. 14. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Self-defense.-An instruction that "no man by his own lawless acts can create a necessity for acting in self-defense, and thereupon, killing the person with whom he seeks the difficulty, interpose the plea of self-defense. The ples of necessity is a shield for those only who are without fault in occasioning it and acting under it," is not erroneous, when immediately followed by the statement: "Undoubtedly the defendant can show in justification that, although he brought upon himself an im. minent danger, he, in the presence of that necessity,