59. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Sunday Closing Law.On trial for keeping a saloon open on Sunday, an instruction that it made no difference whether the defendant sold any liquor or not, that he had not the right to let persons into the saloon, is not open to objection on the ground that it assumes that defendant let persons into his saloon. -PEOPLE V. BOWKUS, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 319.

60. INSURANCE-Condition against Subsequent Insurance.-A fire policy conditioned to be void if other insurance is obtained without written consent of the insurer is not avoided by a subsequent policy obtained from another insurer, without such consent, which is void ab initio.-SWEETING V. MUTUAL FIRE INS. Co., Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 826.

61. INSURANCE-Scope of Risk.-A fire in a chimney, caused by the accidental ignition of soot, or the smoke issuing from such fire, is within the contract of insurance under a policy on goods contained in the building, which purports to cover all loss or damage by fire.-WAY V. ABINGTON MUTUAL FIRE INS. Co., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 1032.

62. INSURANCE — Vacancy of Building.-Where a policy of fire insurance provides that it shall be void "'if the building herein described be or become vacant or unoccupied, or not in use," the forfeiture and avoidance do not depend on the assured's knowledge of the fact of vacancy.-SCHUERMANN V. DWELLING-HOUSE INS. CO., Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1093.

63. LIFE INSURANCE-Death by Act of Insured.-The words of a condition avoiding a policy of life insurance if the assured shall die "by his own hand," or "by his own act," are equivalent to a proviso against suicide, or intentional self-destruction; and upon such issue the burden of proof rests upon the insurance company.-MUTUAL LIFE INS. Co. v. WISWELL, Kan., 44 Pac. Rep. 996.

64. LIFE INSURANCE-Insurable Interest.-An uncle living on his sister's place, and keeping his nephew, the child of his sister, has no insurable interest in such child.-PRUDENTIAL INS. Co. v. JENKINS, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 1056.

65. LIMITATIONS-Partnership.-In fixing the date at which the statute of limitations begin to run against a cause of action for an accounting of the affairs of a partnership, and especially of a so-called mining partnership, a court of equity will not always take the date of the actual dissolution of the partnership by the death of a partner or otherwise, but in a case where, of necessity or by consent, the surviving partner continues the management of the partnership affairs for the winding up of the business, will sometimes postpone the running of the statute until such management or winding up has been completed, or until such surviving partner has openly asserted an adverse claim to the partnership assets.-THOMAS V. HURST, U. S. C. C. (Mo.), 73 Fed. Rep. 372.

66. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Evidence. -In an action for malicious prosecution, a newspaper article, containing the details of the arrest, and other matter which was not shown to have been prompted by defendant or its agent, was admissible in so far as it stated the bare fact of arrest, but was inadmissible in so far as it stated what defendant intended to do in the matter.-FLETCHER V. CHICAGO & N. W. Rr. Co., Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 330.

67. MARRIED WOMAN-Exemptions.-Under Rev. St. $5319, which provides that a married woman may be sued, and judgment be enforced against her property, as if she was unmarried, "but she shall be entitled to the benefit of all exemptions to heads of families," she is entitled to such exemptions though she is not living with her husband, and has no child living with or sup ported by her.-KIMMEL V. PARONTO, Ohio, 43 N. E. Rep. 1040.

68. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contributory Negligence. --Plaintiff and other section hands were taken to and from their work on a train which was under the con.

trol of a conductor, who directed all the work done by them. While the train was bringing them from work, plaintiff was injured, in jumping from it to the plat form of the station at which he desired to alight. The train had slowed down, and was running between four and five miles an hour, and, three of the men having jumped down, plaintiff was told by the conductor to jump. The platform was about a foot below the car step, and it was still daylight: Held, that the question whether plaintiff was negligent in jumping was for the jury.-NORTHERN PAC. R. Co. v. ENGLAND, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 975.

69. MASTER AND SERVANT-Incompetency of Fellowservant. The master is liable for his negligence in re taining in his employ an habitually careless or neglectful fellow-servant, known to the master to be such, by reason of which negligence the plaintiff was in. jured.-SMITH V. E. W. BACKUS LUMBER CO., Minn., 67. N. W. Rep. 358.

70. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injuries.-In an action against a railroad company for the death of plaintiff's intestate, killed while uncoupling cars, plaintiff could show the kind of couplings used on the train on which intestate was working at the time of his death, for the purpose of showing the nature of the work he was obliged to do, even though there was no issue raised as to the kind and condition of the couplings.- SPAULDING V. CHICAGO, ST. P. & K. C. RY. Co., Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 227.

71. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence of Servant.While defendant's employees were constructing a foundation for a printing press under a contract be tween defendant and a newspaper company, such employees being paid by the hour for the time they were actually at work, plaintiff backed his van to the rear of the building to deliver paper to the company, and, it being necessary to suspend defendant's work during the unloading of the paper, one of the defendant's employees, at the direction of his foreman, but without the knowledge or request of plaintiff, got upon the van to assist in unloading, and carelessly set in motion a roll of paper, which rolled from the van and injured plaintiff: Held, that defendant was not liable.-BROWN V. JARVIS ENGINEERING Co., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 1118. 72. MECHANICS' LIENS-Actions to Enforce-Parol Evidence. In an action to establish a mechanic's lien for labor done and materials furnished under contracts with one L, and with him and others, all of whom were members of a certain corporation or firm, parol evidence was admissible to show that L held the legal title to the land in trust for such company or firm.SPRINGER V. KROESCHELL, Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1084.

73. MINES AND MINING-Location of Claim.-Under Rev. St. U. S. § 2320, providing that no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of a vein or lode within the limits of the claim located, it is the finding of mineral in rock in place that constitutes the discovery, and it is not necessary that the vein or lode should contain mineral of such nature that a practicable miner, if he encountered it, would feel justified in following it up, with the reasonable expectation of finding paying mineral.-MCSHANE V. KENKLE, Mont., 44 Pac. Rep. 979.

74. MINES-Claims.-Where a person has entered into a written agreement that he will convey to another a half interest in certain mining claims in consideration of the performance of certain conditions, he cannot, after the conditions have been performed, deny the existence of the claims or the validity of his title to them.-LARGEY V. BARTLETT, Mont., 44 Pac. Rep. 962.

75. MINING-Mineral Lands-Adverse Claims.-Rev. St. § 2326, providing that one filing an adverse claim during the period provided for publication of an ap plication for a patent for mineral lands shall "commence proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction" to determine the right of possession, authorizes either an action at law or a suit in equity, as may be most appropriate. PEREGO V. DODGE, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 971.

76. MORTGAGE—Acknowledgment-Defective Certifi cate. Although the statute requires the officer taking an acknowledgment to certify "the day and year when the same was made, and by whom," a mortgage will not be held invalid because the day is omitted from the certificate, where it clearly appears by evidence within the instrument itself, as when it is dated, executed and recorded on the same day.-IN RE DAHLEM'S ESTATE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 807.

77. MORTGAGE-Bill to Redeem.-An action to have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage, and for an accounting and other relief, is in the nature of a bill to redeem; and the decree should not be for foreclosure, but that on payment of the amount due within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the mort. gage shall be adjudged to be satisfied, and that if not so paid the action shall be dismissed.-CLINE V. ROBBINS, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 1023.

78. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Default in Interest.Where a mortgage authorizes the mortgagee, at his election, to treat the principal sum as due, in case of default in the payment of interest, the institution of foreclosure proceedings sufficiently indicates his elec tion, and previous notice thereof is not necessary.HAWES V. DETROIT FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 329.

79. MORTGAGE-Payment of Consideration.-Where the lender of money on a mortgage was given a writ ten order by the mortgagor, directing him to whom to pay the money, the taking of the receipt of such person therefor-the money to be retained subject to his order-was equivalent to its actual transfer, so far as concerned the mortgagor; and the right of the mortgagee to disburse the money as directed by the receiptor would not be affected by the mortgagor's death, where the receiptor was not an agent whose authority was revoked by such death.-IN RE DAHLEM'S ESTATE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 806.

80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Negligence.-Where a city extends its drain from the street into an abutting lot, and its agents in charge of the improvement carelessly leave it insufficiently covered, it is liable for personal injuries resulting therefrom, in the absence of contributory negligence by the person injured.— WILLIS V. CITY OF NEWBERNE, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 706. 81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liability for Negli. gence. St. 1889, ch. 167, creating the board of public works of a city, and transferring to such board all the rights, powers and duties theretofore vested in the city council, as public officers or otherwise, in relation to streets, does not change the rule as to the liability of the city for negligence whereby a street employee was injured.-NORTON V. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 1034.

82. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Negligence.-Where a municipality adopts and uses a stream as an open sewer, and fails to keep its channel open and to remove accumulations which obstruct the flow of water and throw it out of its banks upon the adjoining land, the landowner has a right of action for such injury, though the stream has been used as a sewer for thirty years.-BLIZZARD V. BOROUGH OF DANVILLE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 846.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Vote of Council.-The fact that resolutions declaring it necessary to improve several streets are voted on together in council, without any separation or division of the question as to each, does not invalidate the assessments levied thereunder.-CITY OF CINCINNATI V. ANDERSON, Ohio, 43 N. E. Rep. 1040.

84. MUTUAL. BENEFIT SOCIETIES-Contract-Attachment.-The holders of matured certificates of a mutual benefit society are creditors of the society, and as such may secure their claims by attachment, and are entitled to a preference over holders of unmatured certificates, the holders of such unmatured certificates being still members of the society.-FAILEY V. FEE, Md., 84 Atl. Rep. 839.

85. NATIONAL BANKS-Deposits of Postmaster.-A national bank, not designated as a depository of public moneys, which receives, under the permissive authority of law and the regulations of the post-office department, deposits of money made by postmasters in their official capacity, thereby assumes a fiduciary relation to the government, and becomes a bailee of the gov ernment, so as to become directly responsible to it for any moneys which it knowingly or negligently allows the postmaster to withdraw by private check, or otherwise appropriate to his own use; and where, after the removal of the postmaster, he deposits a sum to make good a shortage in his balance the bank cannot apply it in discharge of a debt due it from him personally.UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL BANK OF ASHEVILLE, U. S. C. C. (N. Car.), 73 Fed. Rep. 380.

86. NEGLIGENCE-Contributory Negligence of Pedestrian.-A pedestrian on a sidewalk, injured by falling into an open manhole, left guarded only by a barrel partially covering the same, by a person excavating under the walk with authority from the city, whose attention was attracted by men working in a trench beside the walk, and who therefore wholly failed to look out for obstructions in his general course, cannot, as a matter of law, be said to be free from contrib. utory negligence.-LE BEAU V. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CONST. Co., Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 339.

87. NEGLIGENCE-Fires Set to Prairie Land.-A tract of land two to four miles wide and five to six miles long, covered with wild grass which has never been cultivated, is prairie land, within Code, § 3890, making it a misdemeanor for any one to set fire to prairie land, and allow the fire to escape from his control.-LEWIS V. SCHULTZ, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 266.

88. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note - Extension of Time of Payment.-A contract to extend the time of the payment of a note need not be an express one, but may be implied. Therefore the payment and reception of interest in advance on a past-due note by the act and assent of the holder and maker thereof, constitute, in the absence of any contrary understanding or agreement, an implied contract to extend the time of payment for the period for which the interest is paid in advance.-ST. PAUL TRUST CO. V. DRISCOLL, Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 350.

89. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Checks-Collection.The remitting of a check to the drawee for collection does not amount to an extinguishment or payment, but devolves on him the duty and liability of an agent in addition to the duty of payment, if he has funds of the drawer in his hands.- LOWENSTEIN V. BRESLER, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 860.

90. NEGOTIABLE NOTE-Bona Fide Purchaser.-When the payee of a negotiable promissory note transfers it by indorsing thereon a guaranty of payment, the purchaser is an indorsee, within the rule protecting an innocent purchaser of such paper for value, and before maturity, against defenses good between the original parties.-DUNHAM V. PETERSON, N. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 293.

91. OFFICE AND OFFICERS - Appointment. - Under Const. art. 4, § 13, providing that no act shall take effect, unless specially provided for, till July 1st after its passage, and article 5, par. 16, providing that a bill passed by the assembly, being approved and signed by the governor, shall thereupon become a law, a valid appointment to an office created by an act which has been signed by the governor, and is therefore a law, may be made before it takes effect, though the officer appointed can do nothing under his appointment till the law takes effect.-PEOPLE V. INGLIS, Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1103.

92. PARTITION- Injunction. Complainant brought suit against defendant for the partition of certain coal lands owned by them in common, and defendant, in its answer, conceded the right to demand partition. Pending the suit, complainant extended the workings from certain mines owned by him on adjoining land,

and began mining coal from the common land. Defendant then filled a cross-bill to enjoin such mining, alleging that the same was causing irreparable injury to the defendant in its part ownership: Held, that the court had the power to enjoin such mining during the pendency of the suit, and in view of the complications which would result from it, in the adjustment of the respective interests of the parties, and the possible injury to the common property, such power should be exercised.-RAINEY V. H. C. FRICK COKE Co., U. S. C. C. (Penn.), 73 Fed. Rep. 389.

93. PARTNERSHIP. Where a merchant employs a person in his business, and agrees to pay him a stated salary, and, in addition, a certain percentage of the profits of the business,the contract does not constitute such merchant and the person so employed copartners, as a matter of law.-STOCKMAN V. MICHELL, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 336.

94. PAYMENT - Unliquidated Accounts - Estoppel.Defendant, in settlement of an account due plaintiff, sent him a check for the amount, less certain commissions claimed by defendant, the check reciting on its face that it was in full of all demands to date. The check was received, indorsed, and collected by plaintiff: Held that, plaintiff's account being unliquidated, he was estopped, by the acceptance and collection of the check, from afterwards demanding the amount deducted by defendant on the ground that he had not accepted the check in full payment.-OSTRANDER V. SCOTT, Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1089.

95. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Powers.-Where plaintiff knew that the alleged agent of defendant had no gen. eral power, and that his powers were limited, he was bound to ascertain the extent of his authority before he made a contract to bind defendant.-FERGUSON V. DAVIS & RANKIN BLDG. & MANUF'G Co., N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 710.

96. QUIETING TITLE-Jurisdiction.-A district court has jurisdiction of an action to quiet title brought by the holder of a tax deed after expiration of the period of redemption from the tax sale.-LIGHT V. PRESSEY, Mont., 44 Pac. Rep. 983.

97. RAILROAD CROSSINGS-Travelers-Duty to Stop.Where the evidence shows that the view of a railroad track is so obstructed by sunflowers, negligently permitted to grow on the depot grounds of the railway company, that a traveler driving a team along the highway could not see an approaching train until nearly on the track, but it does not appear that he could not have heard the whistle if it had been sounded at suitable distances from the crossing, it cannot be declared, as a matter of law, that it was the duty of such traveler to stop before driving upon the track.CHICAGO, ETC. RY. Co. v. HINDS, Kan., 44 Pac. Rep.

993.

98. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Arrangements for Through Billing. There is no principle of common law which forbids a single railroad corporation, or two or more of such corporations, from selecting, from two or more other corporations one which they will employ as the agency by which they will send freight beyond their own lines, on through bills of lading, or as their agent to receive freight, and transmit it on through bills to their own lines, and without breaking bulk; and the right to make such selection is not taken away by the interstate commerce law.-PRESCOTT & A. C. R. Co. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co., U. S. C. C. (N. Y.), 73 Fed. Rep. 438.

99. RAILROAD COMPANY-Injuries - Trespasser on Train.-A yardman in the employ of a railroad, whose duty it was to deliver freight cars from his own company to defendant company, and to receive cars from defendant company to his own, and who at the most had only an invitation from defendant to visit its yard from time to time to see if there were cars for plaintiff's road, cannot recover of defendant for injuries received from getting on the side of defendant's train, without invitation, and without the knowledge of any of the crew, for the purpose of going to defend

ant's yard; plaintiff being a trespasser.-GRUNST v. CHICAGO & W. M. RY. Co., Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 335.

100. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railway Companies -Grade.-Where a city has by ordinance established a new grade for a street, but has done nothing towards raising the street surface to conform to it, a street railway company, which is granted the right to construct a track through the street, is liable to abutting property owners for damages resulting from laying the track at the later grade, in the absence of an express provision authorizing the act.STRITESKY V. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 271.

101. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railways-Injuries. A street car has the right of way in case of meeting a person or vehicle, but each party, in order to avoid accident, must exercise ordinary care and such reasonable prudence as the surrounding circumstances require; and what may be considered ordinary care in one case may amount to culpable negligence in an. other. The existence of negligence in each case must depend on the circumstances peculiar to it.HALL V. OGDEN CITY ST. RY. CO., Utah, 44 Pac. Rep. 1046.

102. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railways-Occupancy of Tracks.-In order to authorize one street railway company to occupy the tracks of another, there must result be legislative permission for the same, or it must from such necessary implication from the grant that an abandonment of the grant would necessarily result from the non-occupancy of the roadbed of the street railway first occupying the street.-CRESCENT CITY R. Co. v. NEW ORLEANS & C. R. Co., La., 19 South. Rep. 868.

103. RAILROADS-Receivership - Negligence.-Under Code, § 1289, making "any corporation operating a railway" liable, under certain circumstances, for stock killed on its right of way, a railroad company, while its property remains in the hands of a receiver, cannot be held liable for stock killed during the receivership.-SCHURR V. OMAHA & ST. L. RY. Co., Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 280.

104. REAL ESTATE AGENT-Exchange of PropertyCompensation.-One who was employed to effect an exchange of property complies with the contract by procuring a person with whom a contract of exchange is made, and who is able and willing to make the exchange.-BROWN V. WILSON, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 251.

105. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Jurisdiction.-If a case brought in a State court is such that it might have been brought originally in a court of the United States, then it may be removed to the federal court of the district wherein it is pending in the State court, when the facts bring it within the second section of the act of August 13, 1888, though neither of the parties resides in such district.-LONG V. LONG, U. S. C. C. (Iowa), 73 Fed. Rep. 369.

106. REPLEVIN-Goods Fraudulently Purchased-Evidence. The vendor of goods sold on credit brought replevin for them, on the claim that they were purchased by the vendee corporation when it was insolv. ent, and knew it was, and that it purchased them with intent not to pay for them. At the close of the trial, the court, without objection or exception by either party, struck out all of the evidence of the insolvency of the vendee, and found for defendant: Held, the remaining evidence would sustain no other finding.— ERB V. YOERG, Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 355.

107. REPLEVIN - Pleading.-In an action to recover personal property taken under execution, where the petition first alleges that plaintiff is the absolute and unqualified owner of said property, but it clearly ap pears from the whole petition that she claims under chattel mortgages only, the mortgages are admissible in evidence.-DARNALL V. BENNETT, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 273.

108. RES JUDICATA.-Judgment in replevin for plaintiff for the recovery of certain hotel furniture, claimed

by him as head of a family, is not a bar to an action for the value of the use of similar furniture in the hotel, as to which defendant had wrongfully deprived plaintiff of the use.-MATHEWS V. HERRON, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 226.

109. SALE-Implied Warranty.-When, in response to an order for an article described in a particular way by the purchaser, the seller delivers an article of that general nature, but not fully corresponding with such description, the law regards his act as equivalent to a sale of such article by the particular description set forth in the order, and he is therefore considered to have warranted that it corresponded to such description. Accordingly, held, that where the purchaser had ordered pure Manilla twine, and the seller assumed to fill the order, he must be deemed to have warranted that the article delivered was in fact pure Manilla twine.-NORTHWESTERN CORDAGE CO. v. RICE, N. Dak., 37 N. W. Rep. 298.

110. SALE-Warranty.-The plaintiff agreed to manufacture for the defendant 500 iron bedsteads, to be (except in some particulars not here material) in every respect like a sample furnished by the defendant. It was also agreed that the beds should be inspected and approved by defendant at plaintiff's factory: Held to be a qualified warranty that the beds should be like the sample, and that the defendant's right to recover damages for breach after acceptance of the beds was limited to defects not existing in the sample, which were not obvious on a reasonable inspection of the beds.-LEITCH V. GILLETTE-HERZOG MANUF'G CO., Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 352.

112. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Marketable Title.-The possession and use by a church corporation for many years of property, the title to which had been conveyed to trustees upon a trust for religious and educational purposes, the deeds being also in the possession of the church, in the absence of proof that such possession and use have been actually adverse to the rights of the trustees, will not give the church a title to the property sufficiently free from reasonable doubt to justify a court of equity in compelling a purchaser to accept it.-TRUSTEES, ETC. V. ROTHER, Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 843.

113. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Will as Contract to Convey. It is not error to refuse to enforce a will (revoked by the subsequent marriage of testator) as a contract to convey land to a devisee, on account of his having made improvements relying on the promise of the testator to devise to him the land, where the only evidence to show such a contract was statements by testator of his intention to devise the land to such devisee, and it appeared that the testator remained in possession of the land during his life, exercising all acts of ownership over it-at one time negotiating for its sale.-SLONIGER V. SLONIGER, Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1111. 114. TAXATION Taxes Voluntary Payment.-Payment of taxes, accompanied by a protest and notice of reservation of right to sue to recover the sum, is not voluntary, though made six months before the time the warrant commands the collector to take proceedings to enforce payment.-RUMFORD CHEMICAL WORKS V. RAY, R. I., 34 Atl. Rep. 814.

115. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES - Negligence.-The failure of a telegraph company to exercise due diligence in the transmission and delivery of a telegram presented and paid for by commission merchants, notify. ing the owner of cattle that recent heavy receipts had made the market bad, and advising him not to ship his cattle that week, renders the company liable for the direct damages resulting from its negligence.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. WOODS, Kan., 44 Pac. Rep. 989.

116. TRIAL Witness - Impeachment.-Where a wit ness is questioned on cross-examination as to ir relevant and collateral matters not brought out on direct examination, the cross-examining party is bound by the witness' answer, and cannot prove unsworn statements made out of court to contradict him.WILLIAMS V. STATE, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 826.

117. TRUST-Variance of Terms.-The terms of a trust declared in writing, on which real estate is conveyed to a trustee, cannot be changed by subsequent directions of the grantor; and where the declaration provided that the land should be sold, and the proceeds devoted to the payment of two notes, such proceeds, if insufficient to pay the notes in full, should be applied pro rata.-WALES V. GRAY, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 334.

118. USURY What Constitutes.-Where in the notes given for a loan of money and the mortgage securing the same the rate per cent. of interest agreed to be paid for such loan is not separately stated, such fact alone will not make the transaction usurious and void, under section 4, ch. 184, Laws N. D. 1890. Nor can a court declare such notes and mortgage void for that reason, under the provisions of section 10 of said statute, as said section was not intended to create any new penalty, or to make any contract void that was not declared usurious by the other sections in the act.-FOLSOM V. KILBOURNE, N. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 291.

119. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Contract.-Defendant wrote plaintiff, offering a certain sum for certain land. Plaintiff, instead of writing an unqualified acceptance, wrote, accepting the offer, "provided" defendant pay the taxes on the land, and plaintiff receive the rent; defendant to take possession as fast as he could, subject to existing leases: Held, that the correspondence did not constitute a contract.-MIDDAUGH V. STOUGH, Ill., 43 N. E. Rep. 1061.

120. WATER COMPANY Duty to Furnish Water.-A water company, required to furnish the inhabitants of a city with water for general use at prices specified in its charter, cannot refuse to furnish a tenant of a house with water on tender of payment in advance, because it has adopted a rule that it shall deal only with the owner or his agent of the property to which water is to be supplied.-STATE V. BUTTE CITY WATER CO., Mont., 44 Pac. Bep. 966.

121. WILL.-Testatrix, in an olographic will, after bequeathing certain personal property, gave "to E, my large mirror. He has been a good young man to us;" and then specified certain other articles to be given to him, such bequest being followed by the words, "I reserve the right to sell any article if we need the money." Following this clause, and separated there. from by a large space, were the words, "Common bed. steads and all the rest of the furniture and all money in whatever shape he will have full control after all expenses is paid of my sickness and death," after which came the signature of testatrix, and at the left, lower down, was written, "My husband, Thomas Stratton:" Held, that the husband, not E, was the residuary legatee.-STRATTON'S ESTATE V. MORGAN, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 1028.

122. WILL-Bequest for Life.-A will contained the following provision: "I give and bequeath to my wife the sum of $2,000, the interest on said sum of $2,000 at the rate of seven per cent. to be paid to her annually each year during her natural life; and in case the $140 per year shall not be sufficient for her comfortable support and maintenance, or if, in case of sickness or feebleness of health, she shall need more than the interest on said sum of $2,000, then she shall use so much from the principal thereof as is necessary for her support and maintenance, and the payment of her needed medical attendance and funeral expenses:" Held, that the bequest was for the use of the wife during her life only, and that, on her death, the part remaining became a part of the residuary estate of the testator.-GODSHALK V. AKEY, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 336.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 24, 1896.

The

The financial controversy, which this year gives life and vigor to the presidential contest, makes such cases as Blanck v. Sadlin, 38 N. Y. Supp. 817, decided by the Supreme Court of New York, of more than ordinary interest. It appeared in that case that a purchaser at a receiver's sale of real estate found that there was a mortgage resting upon the property, payable "in gold coin of the United States of America, of the present standard of weight and fineness." plaintiff objected to the title tendered to him by the receiver, upon the ground that this provision in the mortgage as to payment imposed an additional burden upon the property, which entitled him to refuse to complete his purchase. The court, after holding that the receiver's title is a title in a judicial proceeding, and that the receiver was acting as the officer of the court, touched upon the financial question by holding that it was not proven that the purchaser of the property would be put to any additional expense or burden in obtaining such kind of money, or that the value of the property subject to a mortgage, specifically payable in gold, would be affected, or that such an incumbrance upon the property would be more onerous than that of a mortgage which did not specify any particular kind of money as necessary to discharge the lien. "The laws of the United States," said the court, "make gold and silver legal tender, but only such gold and silver as has been coined into money by the United States. Since the resumption of specie payment by the United States in 1878 it has been declared to be the policy of the government to maintain at an equality all of the various kinds of money-gold, silver and legal tender notes made by the laws of the United States legal tender for the payment of debts. Such having been the declared policy of the United States, and all contracts made having been based upon such declared policy-that the various kinds of money which have been made legal tender for the payment of debts are of equal value-a court can hardly assume that the government of the United States will reverse its policy, and by a debasement of its

currency, or repudiation of its notes and obligations, justify and approve a repudiation of obligations and contracts entered into in pursuance of its laws relying upon its declared policy. This plaintiff was entitled to a conveyance of the property purchased, subject to a mortgage of $16,000. Whether that mortgage was specifically payable in silver dollars of the United States, gold dollars of the United States, or legal tender notes of the United States, imposed no additional burden upon the owner of the property, so long as each was maintained by the government at an equality. And although the relative value of the amount of metal coined, under the laws of the United States, in silver and gold dollars, may have changed, such change has not affected, and cannot affect, the real value of the dollar, so long as the government, in which, by the constitution, is vested the power to coin money, preserves them at an equality and gives to each the equality that has been maintained since the government of the United States assumed to coin money.

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that gold coin is of greater value than any other of the various kinds of money made a legal tender by law, there is absolutely nothing upon which a court can base a finding that the fact that this mortgage was payable in gold coin imposed any greater obligation upon the purchaser of the property, or exposed the property to any greater incumbrance, than would a mortgage simply payable in money, without specifying the particular kind of money." The court held that the purchaser was not justified in rejecting the title, but Van Brunt, P. J., dissented, holding that when a man contracts to pay for property, he may pay in any legal tender, and when he takes the property subject to an obligation, he may discharge it in any kind of legal tender; that the purchaser therefore would be relieved because the obligation of the mortgage is to pay in gold coin.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF MINOR— ACTION FOR LOSS OF SERVICE-DANGEROUS EMPLOYMENT.-The father has the right to the custody of his infant child, with the corelative duty of maintenance, from which there results a right to the child's services.