help and protection of England. The letter reached Canning November 4, just at the moment when he was considering the Greek blockade. His reply, dated December 1, 1824, contained a paragraph which invited the Greeks to place their interests in his hands:

If they should at any time hereafter think it fit to solicit our mediation, we should be ready to tender it to the Porte; and, if accepted by the Porte, to do our best to carry it into effect, conjointly with other powers. This appears to the

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British Government all that can reasonably be asked of them.

The Greeks, whose military position was desperate, at length decided not only to act on Canning's suggestion, but to place themselves absolutely in the hands of Great Britain. This they did by a formal act in June, 1825. The trust was declined, but Canning, strengthened by this authority, was enabled to draw Russia away from Austrian influence, and to negotiate in St. Petersburg, in the form of a protocol, dated April 4, 1826, an agreement for a joint offer of mediation to Turkey for the pacification of Greece. Upon this protocol rests the diplomatic value of the subsequent intervention.

His Britannic Majesty, having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte, having in consequence offered his mediation to that power, and being desirous of concerting the measures of his Government with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty, on the other hand, being equally animated by the desire of putting an end to the contest of which Greece and the archipelago are the theater by an arragement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice and humanity, have agreed

1. That the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte, if that Government should accept the proffered mediation, should have for its object to place the Greeks toward the Ottoman Porte in the relation hereafter mentioned:

Greece should be a dependency of that Empire, etc.

*

*

Canning wished to save Turkey from Russian aggression, but Turkey refused to be saved. The Sultan would listen to no mediation between himself and his revolted subjects, least of all at a moment when his military position warranted him in feeling sure of success in subduing the revolt. Another year passed without bringing the issue to a point. Then France joined with England and Russia, and the three powers, on the 5th of July, 1827, united in a formal treaty signed in London, which committed them to armed intervention in case the Sultan should still reject their proffered mediation, within the space of one month.

The preamble to this treaty set forth the motives which led the three sovereigns to intervene:

Penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest which, by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the European States and gives occasion to piracies which not only expose the subjects of the high contracting parties to considerable losses, but besides render necessary burdensome measures of protection and repression, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, having besides received on the part of the Greeks a pressing request to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte, and being, as well as His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood and of arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have resolved to unite their efforts and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal treaty, with a view of reestablishing peace between the contending parties by means of an arrangement which is called for as much by humanity as by interest of the repose of Europe.

The treaty proceeded to bind the three parties to offer their mediation immediately on the basis of Turkish suzerainty and Greek selfgovernment, and in case Turkey should not accept within one month the proposed mediation the powers should prevent further hostilities by ordering their squadrons to interpose.

The Turkish Government August 30 reiterated its decided, unconditional, final, and unchangeable refusal to receive any proposition on behalf of the Greeks. The next day the ambassadors sent the necessary orders to their squadrons, and in attempting to carry out these orders the admirals, much to the regret of the British Government, brought on the battle of Navarino, October 20, 1827.

2. BELGIUM, 1830.

The next European nation that claimed its independence on the ground of the right of revolution was the Belgian.

By a provision of the general European settlement of 1815 Holland and Belgium were united in one kingdom, known as that of the Netherlands, over which was placed the son of the last Stadtholder of Holland, as King William I of the Netherlands.

When the French Revolution of July, 1830, occurred, it spread instantly to the Netherlands. Toward the end of August, 1830, disturbances began, and soon became so serious as to threaten grave complications abroad as well as at home.

King William sent a formal note, dated October 5, to the British Government, identical with notes to Prussia, Austria, and Russia, the four contracting parties to the treaty of 1815, calling on them to restore order, since all were bound "to support the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the actual state of Europe."

Representatives of the four powers, and with them the representative of France, met in London, November 4, 1830, and adopted a protocol: His Majesty the King of the Netherlands having invited the courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, in their quality of powers signatory to the treaties of Paris and Vienna, which constituted the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to deliberate in concert with his Majesty on the best means of putting an end to the troubles which have broken out in his states; and the courts above-named baving experienced, even before receiving this invitation, a warm desire to arrest with the shortest possible delay the disorder and the effusion of blood, have concerted.

This protocol at once set aside the King of the Netherlands, ignoring his exclusive claim to support, and "to deliberate in concert." Without concerting with or supporting King William, the five powers imposed an immediate armistice on both parties.

Naturally the Belgian rebels then declared themselves independent. With such encouragement their safety was guaranteed almost beyond the possibility of risk. The claim of independence was made November 18, 1830, and was recognized one month later by the powers in their seventh conference, December 20. The representatives of the five powers, whose names were among the most famous in diplomacy-Talleyrand, Lieven, Esterhazy, Palmerston, Bulow-adopted, without the adhesion or even an invitation to be present of the Netherlands minister, a protocol which announced intervention pure and simple, beginning with the abrupt recognition of the revolutionary government: The plenipotentiaries of the five courts, having received the formal adhesion of the Belgian Government to the armistice proposed to it, and which the King of the Netherlands has also accepted, the conference will occupy itself in discussing and concerting the new arrangements most proper to combine the future independence of Belgium with the interests and the security of the other powers, and the preservation of the European equilibrium.

The Netherlands minister immediately recorded, December 22, a formal protest, and a reservation of King William's right to decide on "such ulterior measures as should be taken in the double interests of his own dignity and the well-being of his faithful subjects."

A few days later, January 4, 1831, Holland entered a still more

formal protest. In this strong and dignified paper the King's Government pointed out to the five powers the extreme importance of the new precedent they had established in international law.

As King, called to guard the well-being of a fraction of the European population, His Majesty has been deeply concerned to remark that the complications arisen in Europe have appeared so grave that it has been thought proper, as the only remedy, to sanction the results of a revolt which was provoked by no legitimate motive, and thus to compromise the stability of all thrones, the social order of all States, and the happiness, the repose, and the prosperity of all peoples.

Independent of the solidarity established between the different members of the European system, His Majesty, as sovereign of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, has seen in it an attack directed against his rights.

If the treaty of Paris of 1814 placed Belgium at the disposition of the high allies, these, from the moment they fixed the lot of the Belgian provinces, renounced, according to the law of nations, the faculty of returning on their work, and the dissolution of the bonds formed between Holland and Belgium under the sovereignty of the House of Orange Nassan, became placed beyond the sphere of their attributes. The increase of territory assigned to the united provinces of the Netherlands was, moreover, acquired under burdensome conditions, for valuable consideration, requiring the sacrifice of several of their colonies, the expense required to fortify several places of the southern provinces of the Kingdom, and other pecuniary charges.

The conference assembled, it is true, at the request of the King, but that circumstance did not confer on the conference the right to give its protocols a direction at variance with the object for which its assistance had been asked, and, instead of cooperating in the establishment of order in the Netherlands, to make them tend to the dismemberment of the Kingdom.

Without noticing this protest, the conference proceeded on January 27, 1831, to fix the boundaries and other conditions of the new State. The Belgians, on the 4th of June, elected a king who was instantly recognized by the powers. On the 26th of June the conference adopted another series of eighteen articles. The King of Holland replied, July 12, that these new articles were very important changes, wholly in the interests of Belgium and to the injury of Holland.

The Belgians meanwhile continued to organize their Government on a basis, diplomatic and territorial, that assumed in their favor all the points in dispute. The King of Holland, therefore, put an end to the armistice and marching forward routed the Belgian forces, August 11, and moved on Brussels. Belgium was then at his mercy. The King of the Belgians meanwhile wrote directly to the King of France requesting the immediate succor of a corps of French troops, and without waitng for concert with other powers the French Government marched 40,000 men across the frontier. (Granville to Palmerston, August 4, 1831. British State Papers, 1833.)

Thus within less than a year, after rebellion had broken out and without waiting for evidence of the right or the military force of the insurrection, every sort of intervention took place-diplomatic and military, joint and separate. Nor did the intervention stop with the measures taken for the succor of Belgium. As King William of Holland continued to reject the conditions imposed by the powers and held Antwerp as a pledge for more favorable conditions of peace, the Governments of France and England, abandoning the European concert, announced that they should put their naval and military forces in motion, and accordingly the British Govervment, November, 1832, embargoed Dutch ships and blockaded the Dutch coast, while the French army, November 14, formally laid siege to Antwerp.

3. POLAND, 1831.

While the Belgian revolution was going on a rebellion broke out in the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and on January 25, 1831, the Polish Diet declared the Czar Nicholas no longer King of Poland, and elected

a regency of five members, with Prince Adam George Czartoriski at its head.

The Czar instantly gave notice to the minister of the new French King, Louis Philippe, that he would tolerate no intervention in Poland. Louis Philippe, who owed his own crown to the right of revolution, was the only sovereign in Europe who could be supposed likely to interpose; but, for the moment, his interest in France and Belgium absorbed all his energy. Much popular sympathy was felt for the Poles, and Lafayette, then near the end of his life, founded a Polish committee, and raised money for their assistance. Before the question could acquire diplomatic importance by establishing a claim founded on the power of the rebels to maintain themselves, the Russian armies crushed the rebellion, and on September 8 regained possession of Warsaw. The entire struggle lasted barely nine months, and from the first its result was universally regarded as inevitable, or in the highest degree unpromising to the success of the revolution. As a diplomatic precedent, it seems to have no value, except as far as it offered an example of the power of Russia as the Belgian insurrection had shown the power of England and France when in union.

4. HUNGARY, 1849.

The next European people who claimed recognition as an independent member of the family of nations seems to have been the Hungarians. On the 14th of April, 1849, the Hungarian Diet formally declared Hungary an independent State, and the Hapsburg dynasty forever deposed from the throne. The next day the Diet elected Louis Kossuth provisional president.

In regard to history, geographical importance, population, and military resources, this people had no occasion to excuse or explain their claims or their rights. Hungary was not a new country. Its government existed from time immemorial, and its right to change its sovereign was as complete as that of England or of France. The provisional government had nearly 150,000 men in arms at that moment. The Austrian Emperor could hardly dispose of a larger force for the purpose of conquest.

The young Emperor (Francis Joseph) instantly appealed for aid to the Czar (Nicholas) of Russia, who instantly intervened. The Czar issued a manifesto April 27, stating the facts and the grounds on which his intervention was believed to be legitimate. This paper founded the right of intervention, not on the weakness of the belligerent, but on his strength. Russia asserted as a principle that she must intervene because if she did not intervene Hungary would establish her independence:

The insurrection in Hungary [began the manifesto of April 27, 1849] has of late made so much progress that Russia can not possibly remain inactive. Such a state of things endangers our dearest interests, and prudence compels us to anticipate the difficulties it prepares for us. The Austrian Government being for the moment unable to oppose a sufficient power to the insurgents, it has formally requested His Majesty the Emperor (Nicholas) to assist in the repression of a rebellion which endangers the tranquillity of the two Empires. It was but natural that the two cabinets should understand one another on this point of common interest, and our troops have consequently advanced into Galicia to cooperate with Austria against the Hungarian rebellion. We trust the Governments that are equally interested in the maintenance of tranquillity will not misunderstand our motives of action. The Emperor (Nicholas) is sorry to quit the passive and expectant position which he has hitherto maintained, but still he remains faithful to the spirit of his former declarations, for, in granting to every State the right to arrange its own political constitution according to its own mind and refraining from interfering with

any alterations of their form of government which such States might think proper to make, His Majesty reserved to himself his full liberty of action in case the reaction of revolutions near him should tend to endanger his own safety or the political equilibrium on the frontiers of his Empire.1

This precedent tended to establish the right of every Government to intervene in the affairs of foreign States whenever their situation should "tend to endanger its own safety or the political equilibrium on its frontier." As far as is known, every other Government in the world tacitly acquiesced in the establishment of this precedent.

If any Government recorded a protest, it was that of the United States, but even the United States protested only by inference from the acts and language of the President. On March 4, 1849, the administration of President Taylor began, and the Russian intervention in Hungary took place a few weeks aftewards, before the new President had time to consult other Governments in regard to possible action in European affairs. Without alliance or consultation, President Taylor instantly appointed an agent to inquire into the situation in Hungary. Secretary Clayton signed his instructions June 18, 1849, six weeks after the Russian troops had been ordered to enter Hungary. The language of these instructions was as emphatic and as decisive as that of the Czar's circular:

Should the new government prove to be, in your opinion, firm and stable,

you might intimate, if you should see fit, that the President would, in that event, be gratified to receive a diplomatic agent from Hungary to the United States by or Before the next meeting of Congress, and that he entertains no doubt whatever that, in case her new government should prove to be firm and stable, her independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body.

The Russian intervention brought the Hungarian war so quickly to an end that before October all resistance was over, and when Congress met, early in December, 1849, President Taylor's annual message could only proclaim what would have been American policy:

During the late conflict beween Austria and Hungary there seemed to be a prospect that the latter might become an independent nation. However faint that prospect at the time appeared, I thought it my duty, in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, who deeply sympathized with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations. For this purpose I invested an agent, then in Europe, with power to declare our willingness promptly to recognize her independence in the event of her ability to sustain it. The powerful intervention of Russia in the contest extinguished the hopes of the struggling Magyars.

To this paragraph, and to some expressions in the instructions, the Austrian minister was ordered to take exception. He protested accordingly. Daniel Webster had then become Secretary of State, and replied to the protest in a paper known as the Hulsemann letter, in which he declared what he believed to be the American policy and the law in regard to new nationalities claiming recognition:

Of course, questions of prudence naturally arise in reference to new States brought by successful revolutions into the family of nations; but it is not to be required of neutral powers that they should await the recognition of the new government by the parent State. No principle of public law has been more frequently acted upon within the last thirty years by the great powers of the world than this. Within that period eight or ten new States have established independent Governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain on this continent, and in Europe the same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The existence of all these Governments was recognized by some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as by the United States, before it was acknowledged by the States from which they had separated themselves. If, therefore, the United States had gone so far as formally

'Annual Register, 1849, p. 333.