representation in the electoral college, or in the House of Representatives, is based on population; and population is the only basis on which it can be based. It is, therefore, evident that all expectation of making the small States equal to the large States should be abandoned as unwise and impracticable.

In the present system the advantage of the individual voter for electors is with the voters in the larger States. This is an inequality that should be remedied; for, while there is no good reason why a State like Rhode Island or Nevada, or some new Territory just coming into statehood, should have as much power in the choice of President as Pennsylvania or New York, there is no reason why the individual voter in the large States should have greater power than the voter in the small State. This contention is not for the equality of States as States, but for the equality of voters as voters. When the election takes place in the House of Representatives, and each State casts a single vote, that vote being determined by the majority of representatives from the State, the small State makes the nearest approach to equality with the large State that is possible under the Constitution. Then the relation of the vote to population is nearly disregarded. The justice of this near approach to equality is not apparent, and now that the more perfect union" is formed, and the Constitution is in force, which bears directly upon the rights of the people, as well as upon the States as organized bodies, it is not impertinent to assume that the primary reasons for this equality of States have passed out of existence, if they ever had any foundation or substance outside of State pride or local prejudice. The claim for equality which has reason in it is the equality of voters, or the claim that one man's vote shall count for as much as any other man's vote anywhere in the Union.

With the existing method of choosing electors for the State on a common ticket the equality sought is impossible, and yet the inequality is so subtle or so well hidden that some effort is necessary to bring it fully into view. In looking for it, the question to be pursued is not the right of the individual to cast his vote, for that is conceded; but it has reference to the relative power of a single vote when cast in a large State or in a small State. In other words, it is a question as to whether it is a larger privilege to vote for twenty or thirty electors than it is to vote for three or five. Does one vote cast for each of thirty electors have

a greater effect in the final count than does one vote cast for each of three electors? This is the practical question which deserves elaboration.

In the State of New York the voter casts a ballot for each of thirty-six electors. His vote is counted for each, and each elector chosen by that ballot votes for President; so that the vote of one man bears directly on thirty-six votes in the electoral college. In one respect the man has but one voice, but that one voice is potential in filling many seats in the body which decides the election. In another State each voter has a voice in selecting twelve electors, or one-third the number chosen in New York. His voice counts in determining twelve votes in the electoral college. His influence in the whole body is one-third as great as it would be if he could vote for three times as many electors, as does the vote cast in New York. In another State of still less population, the voter has a voice in the election of three electors, or onetwelfth as many as the voter in New York influences. In this condition of things it is pretty evident that the voter in New York has twelve times the power in the choice of President that he possesses who must exercise the right of suffrage in the smallest State. There is no unfairness in the fact that the larger State should have this preponderance of power, as a State, for the larger voting population justifies this; but that each voter should wield such an excess of power is scarcely compatible with equity and justice. The equality of the power of single votes is destroyed.

It will be alleged in reply to this that the inequality disappears when it is remembered that in the larger State more votes are required to make the majority which elects; but the reply is fallacious, for the trouble is not in the greater or less number of votes requisite to the majority in the large or small State, but it has reference to the power of the single vote. Is not that vote multiplied, or its power increased, in proportion to the number of electors it helps to elect? If so, the lack of equality in the power of the single voter in the different States is demonstrated. This question of majorities will illustrate the point. A single vote is as influential in determining majorities in a large State as in a small State. Suppose that in the great State of New York the electors are all chosen by a majority of eleven hundred-is not that a supposable case? A change of six hundred votes would

put the majority on the other side. That change of six hundred votes would take thirty-six electors from one side and add them to the other side. Then suppose that in Montana the electors are chosen by a majority of eleven hundred votes. A change of six hundred votes would put the majority on the other side. The change of six hundred votes in Montana would take three electors from one side and add them to the other side. Thus it is seen that the six hundred voters in New York have twelve times the power of six hundred voters in Montana. Then, if six hundred voters in New York can wield twelve times the power of six hundred in Montana, who will say that each individual voter does not wield twelve times the power in the former State that he does in the latter? Nor is it possible that twelve votes cast in Montana can equal the one vote cast in New York; for the one vote touches the election of thirty-six electors in New York, while the twelve votes in Montana can only affect three electors, even if they do swell the vote of the three more than the one vote swells the majority of the thirty-six. If the ballot for each elector were cast separately, he of Montana would vote three times, and he of New York thirty-six times. Say not, then, that the ways of this system are equal.

How can equality be secured? It cannot be till voters throughout the country vote for the same number of electors. This requires the election of presidential electors by districts instead of by States. Slight alterations in State constitutions will authorize this, and nothing oppressive would result if the National Constitution should be made to require it. In this way the voice of the people can have free expression and a voter in one part of the Union will become equal to a voter in any other part of the Union. It gives to every one the right to vote for the elector of his choice, with the assurance that his vote will be as influential in determining the composition of the electoral body as will the vote of any other man.

When one of the States adopted this plan, the innovation appeared to be serious enough to elicit comments upon it by President Harrison in his annual message to Congress. His objections to it were as weighty as can be made, but they were not formidable. The dangers arising from the possibility of unfairness in arranging the districts, in the interests of one party at the expense of another party, were emphasized. What is

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known in political parlance as the "gerrymander" is an evil that ought to be suppressed, whether electors are elected by districts or not. Members of Congress are so elected, and must be. It is a humiliating confession of weakness to recognize the gerrymander" as too formidable to be overcome. If the States provide that districting laws shall be enacted only by a concurrent vote of two-thirds of both Houses of the Legislature, the obnoxious gerrymander will be next to impossible, as it will seldom occur in any State that two-thirds of both Houses will consent to palpably unfair legislation. It is simply absurd to refuse to do the fair thing with all the voters of the United States because political tricksters may take advantage of equitable laws to promote partisan ends.

There are other advantages in the district method which existing peculiarities in certain sections render important enough to call forth the profoundest thought. In the State of New York, for example, it is known that the entire electoral vote is frequently determined by the foreign vote in the cities of New York and Brooklyn. In those cities there are hundreds of thousands of voters whose knowledge of this country and its needs has been gained by a brief sojourn in that dense population. They "vote the ticket," of course, and swell the majority of one of the parties, while the other citizens of the State struggle in vain to gain representation in the electoral body, and fail to have a single voice even when they elect many representatives to Congress. Hundreds of thousands of voters have no representative in that body, who choose their own representatives in the State Legislature and the Congress. The great cities overslaugh them, and decide for them, in opposition to their wishes, who shall represent them in the election of President. These rural populations and the voters of the villages and towns of the State, outside of the great city, are as intelligent and as patriotic, and in every respect as well qualified to select their own representatives as are the controlling elements in city populations; yet it so happens that the worst elements in city life give such a preponderance to one of the political parties, that the majority which represents the intelligence of the great State is overborne, and compelled to accept the situation determined on any other than patriotic grounds. The same thing is liable to occur in Illinois, and in Ohio, and in any State in which there is a large city, with a large population of

unassimilated foreign-born voters. The objection is not to allowing legal voters of this class the right to vote, and to choose their own representatives; but it is to a system which makes it possible for them to determine the representation of the entire State. If the electors were chosen by districts, so that each one should vote only for his own representative, the State would have its full number in the electoral body, and yet the great cities and the rural districts would alike choose their own, and all would be fairly represented, and stand on equal grounds. This would be just to the State, and just to the several districts of the State, and to the nation as a whole. In this arrangement no one would be deprived of voting for this choice of electors; no one would vote for a larger number of electors than every other one, while every section would be represented by the choice of its majority, whether in the great city or in the rural districts.

Under a system of this kind a division of the electoral vote of the State would often occur; but that is possible under the present plan, and has occurred without disaster to any interest. The outcome, on the whole, might not be greatly altered, as the change contemplated would be as advantageous to one party as to another; but then every voter would have an equal voice in the result and a more direct representation and a more satisfactory relation to the choice of President. Besides this, every elector would have a distinct constituency of his own and a more direct personal responsibility, which would enhance the value of his office and clothe it with something like the character originally designed for it.

There are other changes which, if made, would add to the dignity of the office of elector, and adapt the provisions of the system itself to the changed conditions of our times. The requirement calling the electors of each State to the State capital, to cast the ballot of the State, and the provision for reporting the result to Congress through the Vice-President, evidently grew out of conditions which no longer exist. This is now the sheerest formality, while the necessity of sealing up the report of the ballot and conveying the document to Washington by special messenger, or otherwise, is not only an arrangement in pursuance of the relations of the States under the Articles of Confederation, but it belongs to the condition of the country with reference to mail and travelling facilities prior to the advent of railroads and