Terry agt. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. years; that the land in question taken under the proceedings before the chancellor was only taken for the lifetime of the corporation; that the fifty years have now expired, and that the land reverts to the owner or his grantees. There is no dispute about the facts. The question presented is one of great importance, and is not free from difficulty. It involves the right to the possession to all the lands in the state taken under the right of eminent domain by the railroads originally chartered for fifty years. It is well settled that lands taken for railroad purposes are taken for a public use. It now becomes necessary to determine whether lands once appraised and devoted to a public use will revert to the owner so long as the public use is continued. Section 1 of the act of incorporation of the Tonawanda Railroad Company creates the corporation and provides that "it shall be, and for the term of fifty years from the passage of this act, shall continue to be a body corporate and politic." Section 16 of the act provides that "it shall be lawful for the said corporation to appropriate so much of such lands as may be necessary to its use for the purposes contemplated by this act on complying with the provisions of the six following sections." The six following sections provided for the presenting of a petition to the vice-chancellor for the appointment by the chancellor of appraisers, for the appraisal of the lands and for the confirmation thereof by the court. Section 22 provides that "on the payment of the damages thus ascessed, together with the expenses of the assessment, the said corporation shall immediately become entitled to the use of the said lands for the purposes aforesaid." Section 28 provides that if the legislature of the state shall at the expiration of ten and within fifteen years make provision for the re-payment of the company of the amount expended by it, etc., that then the railroad with all of its fixtures and appurtenances shall vest in and become the property of the people of the state. Section 30 provides that "the legislature may at any time alter, modify or repeal this act." Terry agt. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. The court of appeals in construing chapter 256 of the Laws of 1832, which is an act incorporating the Brooklyn and Jamaica Railway Company, and is substantially a copy of the act under consolidation, held that by the proceedings for the acquisition of lands for the railroad company the company became entitled to the use of the land for the purpose of operating its road; that the fee remained in the original owners, subject only to that use, and on the discontinuance of the use the owners were entitled to resume possession of the land (Heard agt. The City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y., 242; Strong agt. The City of Brooklyn, 68 N. Y., 1). In these cases the lands had been acquired by proceedings under the statute for railroad purposes. The railroad company subsequently conveyed a portion of the lands so acquired to the city of Brooklyn for the purpose of enabling the city to open and lay out a street thereon. The court further held that the railroad company having ceased to use the land for railroad purposes, that the owner was entitled to re-enter and regain possession. The reasons of these decisions will become apparent when we come to examine the provisions of section 20 of the act. It provides that "the persons appointed to assess the damages shall ascertain and assess the damages which each individual owner will sustain by the appropriation of his land for the use or accommodation of such railroad or its appendages, and in assessing such damages the appraisers shall take into the account the benefit which will accrue to such owner by means of the passage of the said railroad through his land." This act contemplates a benefit to be derived by the landowner by having a railroad constructed, and that the benefits to be derived therefrom are to be taken into consideration in determining the amount of damages that should be awarded to him. In this way the landowner is to pay for the benefits derived. Having paid for the same he is then entitled to have his lands used for railroad purposes. In other words, he is entitled to have the lands devoted to the public use for which they were taken, and as soon as that use ceases or is Terry agt. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. determined he is entitled to re-enter and regain his lands. The case under consideration, however, is distinguishable from these cases decided in the court of appeals. In those cases the public uses for which the lands were taken had ceased and the railroad company had abandoned the land. In this case the public use for which the lands were originally taken is still continued. It thus becomes necessary to determine whether or not the use for which the lands were originally taken was limited in time. The corporation was at first created only for the term of fifty years. The legislature, however, reserved to itself by section 30 the right at any time to alter, modify or repeal the act. It thus had power to shorten or extend the term that the corporation should exist. The legislature has seen fit to authorize its consolidation with other corporations and to extend its corporate term for the period of 500 years. If, therefore, the lands were taken under this act for the lifetime of the corporation, subject to the power of the legislature to shorten, discontinue or extend such corporate life, then I fail to see how the plaintiff can recover. Were the lands so taken? In determining this question the act must be construed as a whole. The purpose and intent of the legislature must be determined by reading the various sections of the act in connection with each other. Section 1 creates the corporation for fifty years, but by section 30 the time may be lengthened, shortened or the corporation at any time discontinued. So that it is the same as if section 1 read, that the corporation shall be, and for the term of fifty years from the passage of this act, or such other term as the legis lature shall provide, shall continue to be a body corporate and politic. Section 16 in giving authority to acquire and appropriate lands provides that it may do so " for the purpose contemplated by this act." And section 22 in providing that the railroad company may take possession of the land after payment of the damages as appraised, provides that it shall be entitled to the use of the said lands for the purposes aforesaid. The purposes aforesaid are the purposes contemplated Potter agt. Frail. by this act, and the purposes contemplated by this act are to construct and maintain a railroad from the village of Rochester, in Monroe county, to the village of Attica, in the county of Genesee, for the term of fifty years, or for such other term as the legislature shall provide. My conclusion is, that whilst I find the plaintiff to be the owner in fee of the lands in question, it is subject to a public use by the defendant for railroad purposes, and that the time that that use shall continue is within the discretion of the legislature; that such use has not as yet ceased and determined, and, consequently, the plaintiff cannot recover. Judgment ordered for the defendant. SUPREME COURT. DIANA POTTER agt. ELMER FRAIL and ARTHUR Burns. Answer-Denial in, when insufficient· Code of Civil Procedure, section 500. A denial in an answer as follows: "Defendant denies each and every allegation, averment and statement of the complaint, except such as are hereinafter admitted, qualified and explained," is bad whenever the objection is raised by demurrer or special motion. Cortland Special Term, May, 1884. Edwin D. Wagner, for defendant. FOLLETT, J.-The plaintiff moves for an order correcting the answer upon the ground that the denials interposed are not authorized by Code of Civil Procedure (sec. 500). The answer "denies each and every allegation, averment and statement thereof, except such as are hereinafter admitted, qualified and explained." If any rule of pleading can be settled by legislative enactment, and by a long line of judicial decisions, it must be regarded as settled that a denial in this form is bad whenever Potter agt. Frail. · the objection is raised by demurrer or special motion (Code Civil Pro., sec. 500; People agt. Northern R. R. Co., 53 Barb., 101-122; affirmed, 42 N. Y., 217; People agt. Snyder, 41 N. Y., 400; Chamberlin agt. The American National Life and Trust Co., 5 N. Y. W. Dig., 128; Hammond agt. Earle, 5 Abb. N. C., 105; McEncroe agt. Decker, 58 How., 250; Bixby agt. Drexel, 9 Reporter, 630; Miller agt. McClosky, 1 N. Y. Civil Pro. R., 252; S. C., 9 Abb. N. C., 303; 13 N. Y. W. Dig., 51; Clark agt. Dillon, 4 N. Y. Civil Pro. R., 245; S. C., McCarty, 73; Leary agt. Boggs, 3 N. Y. Civil Pro. R., 227; Scott agt. Royal Exc. Shipping Co., 5 Monthly L. B., 64; Luce agt. Alexander, 4 N. Y. Civil Pro. R., 428; Pomeroy's Remedies and Remedial Rights, secs. 633–636; Moak's Van Santvoord's Pleadings, chap. 5, sec. 2). People agt. Northern Railroad Company, Clark agt. Dillon, Bixby agt. Drexel and Luce agt. Alexander arose on judgments ordered for the plaintiffs on the ground that such a denial did not put in issue the allegations in the complaint. The other cases arose on special motions, applications for injunctions, receivers, &c. In justification for this form of miscalled general denial the following cases are often cited, but they do not sanction the practice when the objection is raised before trial (Allis agt. Leonard, 46 N. Y., 688, reported in full 22 A. L. J., 28; Hallan agt. Calhoun, 25 Hun, 155; McGinnis agt. The Mayor, 13 N. Y. W. Dig., 522; also reported, but not on this point, 26 Hun, 142; Burley agt. German American Bank, 5 N. Y. Civil Pro. R., 172). In these cases the objection was raised on the trial on motion. for judgment, or by objecting to evidence, and they are in accordance with Greenfield agt. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (47 N. Y., 430). In Haines agt. Herrick (90 Abb. N. C., 379) the distinction between the cases was not observed. The Code seems to be so plain in this respect as not to require elucidation. A general denial is proper only when the whole complaint, or if the |