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years of age), when he applied for naturalization and obtained a decree. "If he had voted and held office [said the court], and performed all the duties of citizenship in the active and unequivocal manner of the respondent in Boyd v. Nebraska, there would be good reason to say, as his counsel says, that obtaining naturalization in 1892 was for the purpose of obtaining some precise evidence of naturalization so that his status as a citizen could not be questioned. But, taken with the negative facts of this case, the facts that he was not born a citizen of the United States, that his father was not a citizen of the United States, that his father is not shown to have become a citizen of the United States, that the claimant owed no natural allegiance to the United States, and that he apparently chose to remain a subject of a foreign power after attaining his majority,—it must be held that this application for naturalization was the first manifestation of an intent to become a citizen, and that it negatives the presumption of an earlier election."

44. Effect of judgment of naturalization.-In Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 7 L. ed. 897, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The various acts upon the subject [of naturalization] submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry, and, like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity."

In Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176, 3 L. ed. 190, Washington, J., said: "But, if the oath be administered, and nothing appears to the contrary, it must be presumed that the court before whom the oath was taken was satisfied as to the character of the applicant. The oath, when taken, confers upon him the rights of a citizen, and amounts to a judgment of the court for his admission to those rights."

And in Stark v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. 7 Cranch, 420, 3 L. ed. 391, the Supreme Court held that it need not appear by the record of naturalization that all the requisites required by law for the admission of aliens tc citizenship have been complied with. The judgment of the court admitting the alien to citizenship is conclusive that all the prerequisites have been complied with. Parol proof may be received in and of the record. In this case it did not appear from the record that the plaintiff had made the preliminary declaration of intention required by law.

In Ex parte Cregg, 2 Curt. C. C. 98, Fed. Cas. No. 3,380, Mr. Justice Curtis said: The importance and value of this privilege of citizenship, which is conclusively and finally bestowed by the act of the court having jurisdiction, "should prevent us from allowing less than its full weight to any requirement by Congress which tends to restrict this power to those tribunals which may be supposed most competent to exercise it. And certainly, there would seem to be no propriety in intrusting to a court which, in the exercise of its common-law jurisdiction, cannot pass finally on any matter of law or fact, affecting property to the amount of one dollar, to make a final decision upon all questions of law or fact involved in an application for this great right, so as to make an absolute and unimpeachable grant of it."

45. Setting aside naturaliza ́ ́on.-"A private individual has no standing in court to institute a proceeding to set aside an order admitting an alien to citizenship." Re McCurran (N. Y.) 23 L. R. A. 835.

Where a decree of naturalization has been fraudulently obtained in a state court, the United States can sue for its cancellation in the Federal courts. United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417.

*See, however, Sec. 39, act of March 3, 1903, post.

-.

Though the decree or order of naturalization cannot be impeached collaterally (State ex rel. Brown v. Macdonald, 24 Minn. 48), it may, if fraudulent, be repudiated by the government. 2 Wharton, International Law Dig. § 174a.

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In United States v. Gleason, 78 Fed. 396, it was decided that the administration of the oaths and issuing of a certificate of naturalization, by a competent court, showing the satisfaction of the court that the statutory requirements had been complied with, constituted a judgment of admission to citizenship, with the force of such a judgment upon the status of the applicant. The court declined to cancel the certificate upon the ground that it had been obtained by false representations. In referring to the case of United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417, the court said: "Thayer, J., in United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417, seems to treat the liability of a judgment of naturalization to be set aside for fraud like a patent as conceded, and to have considered only the power of courts of the United States to set aside such judgments of state courts, and to intimate that the relief would be accomplished by setting aside the certificate, or by injunction against exercising the right. Such would seem to be the only modes of relief, if any could be granted, for technically no court not authorized by law to review a judgment could directly set it aside. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 25 L. ed. 407. And a court of equity can affect a judgment only by decree to prevent carrying it out or enforcing it. 2 Story, Eq. § 885. The surrender of the certificate, which is only evidence of the judgment, would not affect the citizenship established by the judgment; and an injunction which could only run against further exercise of the rights of citizenship would not affect past acts."

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The court said that an attempt to carry out such a decree against the defendant would produce great confusion and mis

chief. "The defendant became," said the court, "a citizen of the state of New York, as well as of the United States. Other citizens became entitled to vote for him for such offices as citizens could hold, as well as he became entitled to vote, hold office, hold lands, or do what else citizens can do. Neither the state, nor any citizen of New York or of the United States, is a party to this suit; nor do they hold their right to vote for him, or to have him hold office, under him, and no decree against him here could affect their right." Ibid.

And in Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Bergin, 84 Fed. 140, where a woman had been admitted to citizenship, and there was no irregularity or defect apparent on the face of the record, the court refused the petition of a private party to cancel the decree at a subsequent term on the ground that for the greater part of the two years immediately preceding her admission she had been under the disability of marriage. The court held that this proposition involved mixed questions of law and fact, which were presumably passed on by the court before it admitted her to citizenship. The view was expressed that only the United States, or some person acting by their authorization, can institute proceedings to set aside a judgment of naturalization.

But in United States v. Kornmehl, 89 Fed. 10, where it was made to appear to the court that the court issuing a naturalization certificate had been deceived by material false statements of the applicant as to his age and length of residence in this country, the court directed that the letters of naturalization be revoked as having been improvidently issued. The proceedings in this case were instituted by the immigration commissioners, in behalf of the United States.

In Re Yamashita (Wash.) 59 L. R. A. 671, 70 Pac. 482, where a naturalized Japanese was denied admission as an attorney at law, on the ground that he was not a citizen of the United

States, the court held that the judgment admitting him to citizenship could be collaterally attacked, for the reason that it showed on its face that Yamashita was of the Japanese race, and not entitled to citizenship.

46. Right of foreign governments to impeach American certificate of naturalization denied.-The Department of State declines to recognize the validity of a certificate of naturalization when it appears that it was obtained by fraud or granted by mistake. But this government denies the right of a foreign government to impeach a certificate of naturalization issued by an American court. American Passport, p. 156.

It has been uniformly held by the Department of State that while, on the application of a foreign government, it will cause inquiries to be made as to whether a judgment of naturalization was improvidently granted, and while it will never permit itself to grant protection based upon a naturalization decree which is shown to it to be fraudulent, it will not recognize a foreign government's right to impeach such decrees. When set up by it as the basis of its action towards a foreign state, it cannot recognize the right of any foreign executive or court to determine as to their validity. That determination must be made, so far as concerns foreign governments, exclusively by itself. Bayard to Mr. McLane, February 15, 1888, For. Rel. 1888, pt. 1, p. 511.

Mr.

It was held by Secretary Blaine that a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the United States cannot be impeached for fraud before an international commission. Mr. Blaine to Mr. Durant, August 22, 1881, MSS. Dom. Let.

But international claims commissions have frequently impeached certificates of naturalization. See Moore, International Arbitration, 2583 et seq.

The validity of a judgment of naturalization is not impaired

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