by an inaccurate statement in the recitals respecting the residence in the United States of the applicant. The recitals constitute no part of the judgment. Where, on an application for renaturalization, it appeared that the applicant, who had been admitted to citizenship upon his statement which he then believed to be true, but which he subsequently became satisfied was incorrect, to the effect that he had resided in the United States for three years preceding his arrival at the age of twentyone years, the court said: "Undoubtedly, the court might, in a proper case, set aside its judgment admitting a party to citizenship if the party was not at the time entitled to admission and the court had reason to believe that it had been intentionally deceived. But in this case there is no ground to suppose any deception was intended, or for any imputation upon the motives of the applicant. He was at the time entitled to be admitted as a citizen on other grounds. He had declared his intention to become a citizen in one of the courts of record in the city of New York seven years before, and had resided in the United States for five years. This latter fact was established at the time before the district court, and is stated in the record. Upon these facts and the other matters as to character and attachment to the principles of the Constitution, proved by the witnesses present, he could have been as readily admitted as upon the grounds stated." The court held that renaturalization was Re McCoppin, 5 Sawy. 630, Fed. Cas. No. not necessary. 8,713. CHAPTER II. NATURALIZATION BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 47. In general. 48. Mode of parents' naturalization immaterial. 47. In general.- The naturalization of an alien also confers citizenship upon his minor children dwelling in the United States. Section 2172, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334), provides that "the children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United States, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof; and the children of persons who now are, or have been, citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens thereof." The use of the qualifying phrase, "if dwelling in the United States," makes the meaning of this law somewhat uncertain. Does the law mean that minors become citizens if they are residing in the United States at the time their parents are naturalized? or does it mean that they are to be considered as citizens only while they are residing in the United States? The naturalization of an alien naturalizes his minor children born abroad but residing in the United States at the time of his naturalization. Children born abroad of aliens who subsequently emigrated to this country with their families, and were naturalized during the minority of their children, are citizens of the United States. 10 Ops. Atty. Gen. 329; State ex rel. Carey v. Andriano, 92. Mo. 70, 4 S. W. 263; Gumm v. Hubbard, 97 Mo. 311, 10 Am. St. Rep. 312, 11 S. W. 61. This statute applies also to children who come to the United States after the father's naturalization, but before they reach majority. In the case of Henry Huber and family and Frederick Huber and family, who, in 1881, applied to our legation in Vienna for passports, the facts were as follows: Henry Huber was born in Switzerland in 1823, married there in 1846, and had five children born in that country. He came to the United States with his family in 1854, was naturalized in 1859, and returned with his family to Europe in 1860. His eldest son, Heinrich, returned to this country in 1864, and continued to reside here. His son Frederick married an Austrian subject in Austria in 1876. The latter stated that he intended, "in course of time," "to return to America." Minister Kasson granted a passport to Henry Huber, accompanied by his wife and minor children, and to Frederick Huber, accompanied by his wife and infant child. In reporting the matter to the Department, he said: "My difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory decision in these cases arises from the language of our statute. "Section 2172 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334] intendminors living with their parents at the time of naturalization, but employs as to these the dubious expression 'shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof.' Does that mean that our laws make them citizens by virtue of the father's naturalization while they are minors living with him? or does it mean that the law considers them to be citizens only during their residence in the United States, and withholds protection from them outside of the domestic jurisdiction? or that they are not to be considered our citizens at all, anywhere be yond their minority? Are they thrown back, on arriving in Europe, upon their born allegiance?" In a despatch dated October 13, 1884, Mr. Kasson inquired: "Does the phrase, 'if dwelling in the United States'-(Rev. Stat. § 2172 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334])-refer to the date of naturalization, or to the duration of residence within the United States, and excluding any foreign residence? In other words, which of these readings is correct: 'Sec. 2172 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334]. The children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United States, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if [at the time] dwelling in the United States [or while dwelling in the United States] be considered as citizens thereof? The former construction would allow a young man to join his father in the United States a week before his naturalization, and return to his native land a week after, a full-fledged American citizen, while still in his minority, and without renunciation of old allegiance or swearing to the new." For. Rel. 1884, p. 202. In reply, Secretary Frelinghuysen stated that Mr. Kasson's query was hypothetical, and that no such case had, so far as he knew, been presented for the decision of the Executive or the courts of the United States. He said, however, that in the light of Rev. Stat. § 1999 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1269), declaring any decision of any officer of the government tending to restrict the right of expatriation to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic, and of § 2000 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1270), declaring that all naturalized citizens of the United States while in foreign countries are entitled to receive from this government the same protection which is accorded to native-born citizens, it was difficult to see how any branch of the government could well maintain that the children of persons duly naturalized in the United States, and therefore also citizens by law, should lose that status by the mere act of passing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, especially if they passed within the limits of a third state not of the original allegiance, which could under no circumstances lay claim to their subjection. "It can be seen," said he, "how such an interpretation might regard a citizen of the United States as a citizen of no country whatever, through the sole fact of setting foot outside of our territory, and how, by again setting foot within our borders, his right of citizenship might be deemed to revive unimpaired." Referring to Mr. Kasson's remark that the construction of the phrase as meaning that the minor children who become citizens through the naturalization of the father must be, at the time of the father's naturalization, dwelling in the United States, would allow a young man to join his father in the United States a week before his naturalization, and return to his native land a week after, a full-fledged American citizen, Secretary Frelinghuysen said: "That such a thing is possible is a defect in our existing naturalization laws." For. Rel. 1885, pp. 395, 396. Jacob Lenzen, Jr., was born in Germany in 1881, and in |