dence of experts in regard to the law of France. M. Harrisse, speaking of the French law, said: "Citizenship is conferred in the forms given in my first cross-interrogatory. It is evidenced by public notoriety and enjoyment and practice of certain political rights which are conferred on French citizens only, such as the registry of voting at elections or inscription on the electoral lists. But, as the law does not prescribe the rules of evidence for such cases, it springs from circumstances." The certificate of the minister of the interior was also relied upon. He said, in substance, that Louis Frederick Foucher, Marquis de Circé, born at New Orleans, had been, in view of the evidence produced, considered to be French and inscribed on the electoral list of the seventh arrondissement of Paris for the years 1864 to 1869, and that his inscription on that list established, until the contrary was proved, that he was French. M. Jason, a French lawyer, who was examined as an expert, said: "I consider the French nationality of Louis Frederick Foucher, Marquis de Circé, as proved, first, by the judgment of the tribunal of the Seine of April 11, A. D. 1851, ordering the rectification of the birth certificate of his son, and the addition of the name of Circé, which had been omitted, an addition which the tribunal could order only after the Marquis de Circé had established his quality of French citizen; second, by the inscription of L. F. Foucher de Circé on the electoral lists of the seventh arrondissement on presentation to the competent municipal officers of documents establishing his quality of French citizen."

The commission unanimously awarded $9,200. Counsel for the United States in his final report, referring to this award, said: "This act was a recognition of the citizenship of Foucher in France; but whether the conclusion was reached upon the ground that the father of Foucher was a citizen of France and that the son, although born in the territory of Louisiana, then a

province of Spain, followed the condition of his father, or whether the commission were of opinion that the removal of Foucher to France in 1836, and his continuous residence there for a third of a century and during his life, coupled with the fact that he was recognized as a citizen of France, although formal proceedings, as required by articles 9 and 10 of the French Code, had not been complied with, justified the conclusion, legally, that he was a citizen of France, does not appear.' Arthur Denis, Testamentary Executor of L. F. Foucher, Marquis de Circé v. United States, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2512 et seq.

63. Case of De Baca.- Neither the treaty of 1800 between Spain and France, nor that of 1803 (8 Stat. at L. 200), between France and the United States, ceding "the colony or province of Louisiana," definitely fixed the boundaries of that colony or province. A dispute arose between the United States and Spain on this subject. The United States contended that the Rio Grande river was the western boundary of the territory ceded, but Spain controverted this. After a lengthy correspondence, the differences between the two governments were settled by the treaty of February 22, 1819 (8 Stat. at L. 252), by which the United States acquired East and West Florida, and renour.ced all its rights, claims, and pretensions to the territories. lying west and north of a line beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river and running north and west in the manner described in the treaty.

In the case of De Baca v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 482, it appears that Sandoval, claimant's decedent, was born of Spanish. parents in 1809 in Sante Fé, in the territory of New Mexico (within the territory described above to which the United States renounced all its rights, claims, and pretensions), and continued to reside there until his death in 1862. It was contended by

the claimant that decedent acquired citizenship in the United States under article 3 of the treaty of 1803, between the United States and France, which entitled inhabitants of the ceded territory to "be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." The court held that the disputed territory was not acquired by cession from France, citing in support of that view the provision of article 6 of the treaty of 1819, between the United States and Spain, which provides that the inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States by this treaty shall be "incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States." "There is no provision in the treaty," says the court, "with reference to the citizenship of the inhabitants in the disputed territory, thus indicating to our minds that such territory had not, up to that time, ceased to be Spanish territory, and for that reason no provision was necessary concerning their citizenship under the Spanish government."

The court's conclusion was that it could not regard these treaties as affecting or changing the citizenship of any person dwelling within the limits of the disputed territory; that Spaniards continued to be Spaniards, and Americans continued to be Americans, and their children were of the citizenship of their parents. The court called attention to the fact that the inhabitants of Santa Fé were universally regarded as Spaniards or Mexicans, until the United States acquired that territory by treaty; and that the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo recognized all of these inhabitants as Mexican citizens, and made provision

for their remaining such or becoming citizens of the United States at their own election.

The decision of the court was that claimant's decedent was born a subject of Spain, and did not become a citizen of the United States until the expiration of the year prescribed by the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,—that is, one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, which took place May 30, 1848 (9 Stat. at L. 922).

64. Treaty of 1819 with Spain. The treaty of 1819 (8 Stat. at L. 252), art. 6, with Spain, ceding Florida to the United States, provided that the inhabitants of the ceded territory "shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States."

In the case of American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. ed. 242, Chief Justice Marshall said: "This treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not their condition, independent of stipulation. They do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share in the government, till Florida shall become a state."

In Tannis v. Doe ex dem. St. Cyre, 21 Ala. 449, it was held by the supreme court of Alabama, in 1852, that a free negro, who was an inhabitant of Florida at the date of the treaty by which Spain ceded that territory to the United States, lost the character of an alien by the operation of that treaty.

65. Treaty of February 2, 1848, with Mexico.-The treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, signed February 2, 1848 (9 Stat. at L.

Article 8

922), effected a collective naturalization of all (Mexicans) inhabitants of California and other territory ceded by that treaty who remained in and adhered to the United States. of the treaty provided that "Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico," and which were to “remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty," should, if remaining in such territories, elect within a year from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty whether they would "retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States," but that those who remained "in the said territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of Mexicans," should "be considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States."

The 8th section of the treaty is inapplicable to persons who. before the revolution in Texas, had been citizens of Mexico, and who, by that revolution, had been separated from it. McKinney v. Saviego, 18 How. 235, 15 L. ed. 365.

Two claimants, natives of Mexico, who had remained in New Mexico after the ratification of the treaty without having indicated an election to "retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens," complained of acts committed by the authorities of the United States prior to the date of the conclusion of the treaty. It was held by the commissioners, without reference of the question to the umpire, that the claimants in question had no standing as Mexicans before the commission. Melquiades and Josefa Chavez v. United States, United States and Mexican Claims Commission, Convention of July 4, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 679, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2510.

A., a native of Mexico, where he was born in 1833, was taken by his father, in 1851, to California, whither the latter had gone