the treaty, his claim to be a citizen of the United States under them cannot be sustained; and he stood at the execution of the treaty, and now stands, where his acts and declarations and original status have placed him,—an alien, and subject of Great Britain."

A subject of a foreign state, residing in the state of Texas at the time of its admission to the Union, did not thereby become a citizen of the United States. Coutzen v. United States, 33

Ct. Cl. 475.

A person born in Texas, and removing therefrom before the separation from Mexico, remains a citizen of Mexico, though a minor when the separation took place. Jones v. McMasters, 20 How. 8, 15 L. ed. 805.

In the case of Masson v. Mexico (American and Mexican Claims Commission, Convention of 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 679) claimant stated that he emigrated from France to the Republic of Texas in 1844, and continued to reside there until the annexation of that Republic to the United States and its incorporation into the Union. He asserted that he thereby became a citizen of the United States. The umpire held that, to have become a citizen of the United States by virtue of the annexation of Texas, the claimant must have first been a citizen of the Republic of Texas, and, as it was not found that he went through the forms required to acquire that citizenship, his claim to American citizenship was not established. Moore, International Arbitrations, pp. 2542, 2543.

66. Treaty of December 30, 1853, with Mexico (Gadsden Treaty). Article 5 of the Gadsden treaty, signed December 30, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 1031), declared that the provisions of article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (9 Stat. at L. 929), relative to the inhabitants of the ceded territory, should apply to the territory ceded by the Gadsden treaty. The Mexican

inhabitants of the territory referred to (Arizona), who adhered to and remained in the United States, thereby became citizens of the United States.

67. Treaty of 1867 with Russia. The treaty of 1867 with Russia, ceding Alaska to the United States, gave the inhabitants of the ceded territory the privilege of reserving their Russian allegiance and returning to Russia within three years. It was provided that those remaining there (with the exception of uncivilized native tribes) should be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.

The treaty provision (art. 3) reads as follows: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia within three years; but, if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country." 15 Stat. at L. 542.*

*The following report from Moore's International Arbitrations of an interesting case which came before a claims commission to which the United States was a party, is given herewith:

Henriette Levy, widow of Jacob Levy, and a native of Alsace, filed, in her own right, and as tutrix of her six minor children, a memorial before the commission under the treaty between the United States and France of January 15, 1880 (21 Stat. at L. 673), for damages for the seizure of cotton by the United States forces in Louisiana in 1863. The cotton in question belonged to the firm of Isaac Levy & Co., then doing business in Louisiana. This firm was composed of Jacob Levy and Isaac Levy, citizens of France, and Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil, citizens of the United States. In 1866 Jacob Levy purchased the interests of Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil in the

68. Treaty of 1898 with Spain. The treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 1754), which terminated the late war between the United States and Spain, and by which Spain ceded Porto Rico and the Philippine islands to the United States, provided (art. 9) that Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory ceded, might preserve their allegiance to Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the said treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance. The treaty declared that, in default of such declaration, they

property and assets of the firm, and subsequently removed to Strasburg, in Alsace, then in the jurisdiction of France, where he died March 1, 1871. The memorial filed by Henriette Levy embraced both the original and the acquired interest of Jacob Levy in the property and assets of the firm.

On this state of facts, counsel for the United States demurred to the memorial on the following grounds: "1. As to the whole case: That it ap pears that the claimant and her children, about the year 1871, became citizens or subjects of Germany, and have ever since remained, and are now, such citizens or subjects, and have not, since that year, been citizens of the Republic of France, and that this claim is therefore not presented by or on behalf of the citizens of that Republic. 2. As to the interest alleged to have been assigned by Benjamin Weil : That, as it appears that said Weil was, at the time of the acts complained of, a citizen of the United States, the claim is not one arising out of acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of France."

In support of so much of the demurrer as related to the claim derived from Benjamin Weil, counsel for the United States referred to the case of Archbishop Perché.

In support of the demurrer to the whole case, counsel for the United States invoked the treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, by which Alsace was ceded to Germany. By article 2 of this treaty it was provided that French subjects, born in the ceded territory and actually domiciled therein, who desired to preserve their French nationality, should be allowed till October 1, 1872, to declare their intention to do so, before competent au thority, and to remove their domicil to France.

As there was no allegation in the memorial that Henriette Levy had availed herself of this privilege, counsel for the United States maintained that it was a reasonable presumption that she had omitted to do so, and had, in consequence, become a German subject. Counsel cited in this rela

should be held to have renounced such allegiance, and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they resided.

The treaty (art. 9) further provided that "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."

It will be observed that this treaty, unlike previous treaties of cession to which the United States has been a party, makes no provision for the incorporation of the inhabitants of the ceded territory as citizens of the United States. It expressly declares that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants shall be determined by the Congress.

tion the case of Archbishop Perché, and moved that the memorialist be required to amend her memorial and state whether she had availed herself of the privilege secured by article 2 of the treaty of Frankfort. He further moved that, in default of such a statement, the case be dismissed.

Special counsel for the memorialist contended (1) that the case was not analogous to that of Archbishop Perché, since in that case the claimant had voluntarily renounced his allegiance to France and become a citizen of the United States, while Jacob Levy, the husband of Henriette Levy, was born in France, lived in France, and died a citizen of France, and (2) that, as Jacob Levy was a citizen of France when the loss was sustained, and continued to be a citizen of France during his life, the claim was by a citizen of France, and that the commission should take and maintain jurisdiction. In support of this position the 1st, 2d, and 4th articles of the treaty were quoted. The attention of the commission was also called to the 7th article of the treaty of February 23, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 996), between France and the United States, in which it is provided that "Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal and real property by the same title and in the same manner as the citizens of the United States. They shall be free to dispose of it as they may please, either gratuitously or for value received, by donation, testament, or otherwise, just as those citizens themselves; and in no case shall they be subject to taxes on transfer, inheritance, or any others different from those paid by the latter."

It was also contended that any change in the nationality of the country of their nativity could not affect the rights acquired by the heirs of Jacob Levy while the country was an integral part of France and they were citizens thereof; that the repeal of a law, or change of a treaty, or a cession of territorial domain subsequent to the date when the right of inheritance attached, could not affect any right acquired under the treaty, or such law

CIT. 11

The contention was advanced by those who were opposed to the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippine islands, that the United States has no power, in acquiring and governing territory, to provide against the incorporation of the inhabitants of the acquired territory as citizens of the United States. They contended that the inhabitants of the territory ceded to the United States by Spain became, immediately upon annexation, citizens of the United States.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Insular Cases, 182 U. S. 1-391, 45 L. ed. 1041-1146, 21 Sup. Ct.

or cession of territory. Several authorities were cited in the brief in support of these positions, and especially the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dawson v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch, 321, 2 L. ed. 634. It was also claimed by counsel for the memorialist that the nationality of the father was transmitted to his minor children; that neither the mother nor guardian could change it during their minority; that, when the minors attained their majority, they had the right to elect whether they would adhere to the country to which their father owed allegiance at the date of his death, and that until that period arrived they continued citizens of France. The cession of Alsace, it was alleged, did not affect in any particular the private rights of the citizens to property, or claims for injuries committed prior to the cession.

Counsel for the United States, in reply to the contention of private counsel that there was no analogy between the case of Perché and the case at bar, maintained that the question for the commission to consider was one solely of the fact of citizenship; that the motive, or reason, or the attending circumstances, in the case of a change of nationality, ought not to be considered, and could properly have no weight; that, assuming the position of counsel for the claimant to be a tenable one, it was true that she had the option tendered to her by the treaty of 1871; but that she was then called upon to make her choice, either to remain in Germany and become a subject of the German Empire, or to accept the privileges of the treaty and retain her citizenship in France. She chose to remain in the German Empire, and thus voluntarily fixed her character as a German subject.

The commission sustained the demurrer in these words: "The commission, in this case, judges well-founded, and admits, the demurrer interposed by the agent of the United States to the claim or memorial. In its opinion, it is beyond doubt that the claimant and her children, being natives of Alsace, and having always resided there, and not having made choice of the French nationality during the interim granted by the treaty of May 10th, 1871 (which applied to persons of full age as well as to minors), are in