without incorporating it into the United States, if there be obligations of honor and good faith which, although not expressed in the treaty, nevertheless sacredly bind the United States to terminate the dominion and control when, in its political discretion, the situation is ripe to enable it to do so. Conceding, then, for the purpose of the argument, it to be true that it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution for the legislative department, in the exercise of its discretion, to accept a cession of and permanently hold territory which is not intended to be incorporated, the presumption necessarily must be that that department, which within its lawful sphere is but the expression of the political conscience of the people of the United States, will be faithful to its duty under the Constitution, and therefore, when the unfitness of particular territory for incorporation is demonstrated, the occupation will terminate. I cannot conceive how it can be held that pledges made to an alien people can be treated as more sacred than is that great pledge given by every member of every department of the government of the United States to support and defend the Constitution.

"But if it can be supposed—which, of course, I do not think to be conceivable that the judiciary would be authorized to draw to itself by an act of usurpation purely political functions, upon the theory that if such wrong is not committed a greater harm will arise, because the other departments of the government will forget their duty to the Constitution and wantonly transcend its limitations, I am further admonished that any judicial action in this case which would be predicated upon such an unwarranted conception would be absolutely unavailing. It cannot be denied that, under the rule clearly settled in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 45 L. ed. 448, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302, the sovereignty of the United States may be extended over foreign territory, to remain paramount until, in the discretion of

the political department of the government of the United States, it be relinquished. This method, then, of dealing with foreign territory, would in any event be available. Thus, the enthralling of the treaty-making power, which would result from holding that no territory could be acquired by treaty of cession without immediate incorporation, would only result in compelling a resort to the subterfuge of relinquishment of sovereignty, and thus indirection would take the place of directness of action,a course which would be incompatible with the dignity and honor of the government."

69.-Status of Porto Ricans and Filipinos.-In conformity with the provision of the treaty which declares that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the ceded territories shall be determined by the Congress, Congress, by the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191), establishing a civil government for Porto Rico, provided that "all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain on or before the 11th day of April, 1900, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain entered into on the 11th day of April, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. 1754); and they, together with such citizens of the United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of The People of Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred, and with power to sue and be sued as such." (Section 7.)

And by the act of July 1st, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 691, chap. 1369), providing for the administration of the affairs of civil

government in the Philippine islands, Congress declared that "all inhabitants of the Philippine islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine islands, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December 10th, 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 1754]." (Section 4.)*

From a despatch of the United States consul at Amoy in August, 1903, it appeared that Buenaventura Chuntianlay, a Chinese merchant, born at Amoy, emigrated to the Philippines thirty years ago, and had been domiciled there since that time. In 1899 he married a native of the Philippines, and, as the result of the marriage, a son was born in the Philippine islands

*In 1901, before the passage of this act, Antonio Gisbert y Bayot, a native inhabitant of the Philippine islands, who went to Barcelona, Spain, from Manila in May, 1900, was enrolled by the Spanish military authorities for service in the Spanish army, notwithstanding he exhibited a certificate of registration issued to him in January, 1900, by the United States military authorities at Manila, and also a certificate issued by the United States consul general at Barcelona, stating that he was a native inhabitant of the Philippines, and under the protection of the United States. It appeared that the Spanish authorities did not contest the citizenship of Gisbert, but claimed that they were not obliged to exempt him from service as he was not registered at the consulate as an American citizen. The consul general protested to the local authorities, and the United States minister, under the instructions of the Department of State, brought the case to the attention of the Spanish government, and pointed out that, while Gisbert could only be regarded as a native inhabitant of the Philippines, under the protection of the United States, he could not, in view of the terms and stipulations of the treaty of peace, be regarded as a subject of Spain, liable for military service. The Spanish authorities subsequently informed the consul general that Gisbert had been exempted from military service. For. Rel. 1902, pp. 949-9-4

CIT. 15.

December 5, 1902. Chuntianlay, who was then with his family on a temporary visit in Amoy, wished to be registered in the consulate, or, failing that, desired to have either his wife or child registered. The consul stated that Chuntianlay had considerable property interests in Amoy, and that his object in trying to register a member of the family in the consulate was to enable him to transfer the property to the member so registered, thus putting it under American ownership, to avoid the assessments of the Chinese officials, which are said to be quite heavy on property owned by nonresidents. The consul inquired whether any one of his family was entitled to registration, and, if so, whether it would be proper for him to record a transfer of property from Mr. Chuntianlay to such member of his family.

In reply, the Acting Secretary of State said: "Upon the facts stated, neither of the Chuntianlays appears to be entitled to registration in the consulate.

"Section 4 of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 692, chap. 1369), provides that 'all inhabitants of the Philippine islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine islands, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December 10th, 1898.' [30 Stat. at. L. 1754.]

"While Mr. Chuntianlay comes within the language of the statute, 'inhabitants of the Philippine islands,' he is not included within the description, 'who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899.' According to the statement in your despatch, he is a Chinese merchant who emigrated to the Phil

ippine islands thirty years ago and has been domiciled there since that time.' If he had acquired Spanish citizenship it is inferred that that fact would have been stated.

“Assuming, then, that Mr. Chuntianlay is, as stated in your despatch, a Chinese subject domiciled in the Philippine islands, upon his marriage to a native of the Philippines, under the general rule that the nationality of the wife follows that of the husband, she became a Chinese subject.

"The son, born in the Philippines December 5, 1902, is not a citizen of the Philippine islands within the meaning of the statute, as that only applies to the children of inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899." Asst. Secy. Adee to United States Consul at Amoy, September 5, 1903.

The treaty provision and the act of Congress of April 12, 1900, were construed by the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in October, 1902, in the case of Re Gonzalez, 118 Fed. 941, upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, Lacombe, Judge: "Petitioner, an unmarried woman, is a native of Porto Rico, twenty years of age, who arrived here from that island on August 24, 1902. She was detained at Ellis island immigrant station, was duly examined by a board of special inquiry, and was excluded from admission into the United States upon the ground that she was liable to become a public charge. The only question open for discussion on this application is whether or not petitioner is an alien. Upon ali other questions the decision of the appropriate immigration officers, when adverse to the admission of the alien, is made final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. Act August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 390, chap. 301 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1303]). The 14th Amendment