to the Constitution provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. It is not disputed that petitioner was by birth an alien. Unless in some appropriate way she has since been naturalized, she is still an alien. There is no suggestion that she was ever naturalized under the general laws prescribed by Congress regulating the admission of aliens to citizenship. The treaty of Paris, unlike earlier treaties which dealt with the Louisiana and Florida purchases, with California, and with Alaska, did not undertake to make the nativeborn inhabitants of Porto Rico citizens of the United States. It expressly provided that 'the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.' In conformity with this provision of the treaty it was provided in act April 12, 1900, chap. 191, § 7 [31 Stat. at L. 77], 'that all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States (excepting such as had preserved their allegiance to Spain), and they, together with such citizens of the United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of "The People of Porto Rico," with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred and with power to sue and be sued as such.' This legislation has certainly not operated to effect a naturalization of the petitioner as a citizen of the United States. Being foreign born and not naturalized, she remains an alien, and subject to the provisions of law regulating the admission of aliens who come to the United States."

The writ was dismissed.

In the case of Mercado, a native of Porto Rico, who, in 1901, sought the intervention of this government to present for him a claim against the government of Venezuela, where he had been residing for fourteen years, it was held that as he was not an "inhabitant" of Porto Rico at the time of its cession to the United States, and was not a citizen of Porto Rico within the definition of the act of Congress of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77), he was not entitled to the protection of the United States. Mr. Adee to Mr. Loomis, August 10, 1901, MSS. Inst. to Venezuela.

In the case of Marrero, a native of Porto Rico, who had resided in Chile since 1884, but who proposed, in 1901, to return to Porto Rico to perform the duties of citizenship there, it was held by Acting Secretary Hill that the language of § 7 of the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191), was to be construed in its general legal sense, in which continued personal presence is not necessary to constitute continuous residence; and that a native of Porto Rico who makes it his permanent domicil does not, therefore, lose the benefits of this law because he was temporarily abiding elsewhere when it went into effect. Acting Secretary Hill to Mr. Lenderink, April 29, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, p. 32. And Attorney General Knox (24 Ops. Atty. Gen. 40) held that a native Porto Rican temporarily living in France, who was not in Porto Rico on April 11, 1899, is, under § 7 of the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 79), a citizen of Porto Rico.

At the date of the passage of the act of April 12, 1900, the law of the United States (Rev. Stat. § 4076, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2765) prohibited the granting or verification of passports to or for any persons other than citizens of the United States. The act of June 14, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 1088), however, amended this section so as to make it read: "No passport shall be granted or issued to, or verified for, any

other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States." Under this law as amended passports are now issued to citizens of Porto Rico and the Philippine islands.

Seamen born in the Philippine islands, being persons whose civil and political status is, by the treaty of peace with Spain, declared to be a matter for future determination by Congress, are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of any statute concerning seamen er any other statute or law of the United States. 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 400.

70. Treaties with Indians.- Certain Indian tribes, or such members thereof as chose to remain behind on the removal of their tribes westward, have been declared to be citizens, and individuals of the particular tribes have been authorized to become citizens on application to a court of the United States for naturalization, and satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life. See treaties in 1817 and 1835 with the Cherokees (7 Stat. at L. 159, 483); and in 1820, and 1830, with the Choctaws (7 Stat. at L. 211, 335); in 1855 with the Wyandotts (10 Stat. at L. 1159); in 1861 and 1866 with the Pottawatomies (12 Stat. at L. 1192 and 14 Stat. at L. 763); in 1862 with the Ottawas (12 Stat. at L. 1237), and the Kickapoos (13 Stat. at L. 624). See also treaties with the Stockbridge Indians in 1848 and 1856 (9 Stat. at L. 955, and 11 Stat. at L. 603).

The act of Congress of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat. at L. 566, chap. 120, Rev. Stat. § 2079), required that the Indian tribes should be dealt with for the future through the legislative, and not through the treaty-making power. The provision is as follows: "Hercafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."

CHAPTER V.

NATURALIZATION BY CONQUEST.

71. General doctrine.

72. American ante-nati.

71. General doctrine. By the general principles of the law of nations, every sovereign government has, as an inherent attribute, the power to acquire territory by conquest. In the absence of stipulations upon the subject, wherever a government acquires territory by conquest the relation of the conquered territory to the new government is to be determined by the conquering state.

"The Constitution [of the United States] confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty. The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose." Ameri can Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. ed. 242.

In the absence of express treaty stipulations or legislation by the conqueror, the relations between the conquered and the conqueror are determined by the law of nations, which establishes

the general rule that the allegiance of the conquered is transferred to the new sovereign. 2 Halleck, International Law, 485.

Upon the conquest of a country the allegiance due by birth from its citizens or subjects to its sovereign passes, by operation of law, to the conqueror; who, as sovereign de facto, has a right to the allegiance of all who are subject to his power and submit to the protection of his arms. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 156, 7 L. ed. 637.

As is clearly indicated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Insular Cases (Naturalization by treaty, chapter Iv., ante), the acquisition of territory by conquest by the United States does not operate to incorporate the inhabitants of the conquered territory as citizens of the conquering state; and where the treaty of cession, which follows the conquest, contains provisions against such incorporation, incorporation does not take place until the legislative power deems it wise to provide for it.

(See previous chapter for a full discussion of the question.) 72. American ante-nati.-It is universally admitted, both in English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the colonies of North America while subject to the Crown of Great Britain were natural-born British subjects, and it must necessarily follow that that character was changed by the separation of the colonies from the parent state, and the acknowledgment of their independence.

The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati ceased to be British subjects differs in this country and in England, as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace, in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the Declaration of Independence. The settled doctrine of this country is that a