of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 61, chap. 126, § 14, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333), in order to prevent such naturalization, and to remove all doubt, provided "that hereafter no state court, or court of the United States, shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed."

In the case of Re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 164, 24 Pac. 156, it was held that a certificate of naturalization showing the naturalization of a person of Mongolian nativity by the judgment of a court is void. To the same effect is Re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274.

And in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 716, 37 L. ed. 914, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016, the United States Supreme Court said: "Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws."

And in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, Chief Justice Fuller said: "They (the Chinese) have never been allowed, by our laws, to acquire our nationality."

13. Indians.

The general statutes of naturalization do not apply to Indians. 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 746.

In Re Camille, 6 Sawy. 541, 6 Fed. 256, the United States circuit court held that a person of half white and half Indian blood is not a "white person," within the meaning of this phrase as used in the naturalization laws, and, therefore, is not entitled to be admitted to citizenship thereunder.

14. Hawaiians. In Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah, 259, 4 L. R. A. 726, 21 Pac. 993, the supreme court of Utah denied the application of a native Hawaiian for admission to citizenship, holding that the applicant was neither a white person nor a person of the African race. The court said: "We are of opinion that the law authorizes the naturalization of aliens of the Cau

casian or white race and of the African race only, and all other races, among which are the Hawaiians, are excluded." This was prior to the annexation of Hawaii.

15. Japanese. In the case of Re Saito, 62 Fed. 126, the United States circuit court held that a native of Japan (of the Mongolian race) is not included within the term "white persons," in Rev. Stat. § 2169 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333), and hence is not entitled to naturalization. See also Re Yama

shita (Wash.) 59 L. R. A. 671, 70 Pac. 482.

In the latter case, a native of Japan applied for admission, as an attorney, in the courts of the state of Washington, whose laws preclude the admission of any person who is not a citizen of the United States. Yamashita had obtained from the superior court of Pierce county, Washington, an order admitting him to citizenship. It was held that the judgment upon its face showed that Yamashita was of the Japanese race; that Japanese are not entitled to become citizens of the United States; that, as the court was without authority to pronounce the judgment, its determination was void, and must be disregarded. It was decided that he could not be admitted.

16. Burmese. And the city court of Albany, New York, decided against the naturalization of a dark yellow native of Burmah, although he was an educated physician. Re San C. Po, 7 Misc. 471, 28 N. Y. Supp. 283.

17. Mexicans.-But in the case of Re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, the United States district court for the western district of Texas held that a native citizen of Mexico, whatever might be his status viewed solely from the standpoint of the ethnologist, is embraced within the spirit and intent of our naturalization laws. In this case it was contended that Rodriguez was excluded from the privilege of naturalization under Rev. Stat. § 2169 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333), because of his color, the authorities

1

relied upon being: Re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155, Fed. Cas. No. 104; Re Camille, 6 Sawy. 541, 6 Fed. 256; Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah, 259, 4 L. R. A. 726, 21 Pac. 993; and Re Saito, 62 Fed.

126.

The court analyzes the decision in Ah Yup's Case, which is termed the leading one. It says that the opinion of Judge Sawyer is by no means decisive of the present question, as his language may well convey the meaning that the amendment of the naturalization statutes referred to by him (the amendment striking the word "white" therefrom) was intended solely as a prohibition against the naturalization of members of the Mongolian race. The court refers to the act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 61, chap. 126, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333), expressly forbidding the naturalization of Chinese, and asks why, if the Chinese were denied the right to become naturalized citizens, under laws existing when Re Ah Yup was decided, did Congress enact this prohibitory statute? Says the court: "Indeed, it is a debatable question whether the term 'free white person,` as used in the original act of 1790, was not employed for the sole purpose of withholding the right of citizenship from the black or African race and the Indian then inhabiting this country." Continuing, the court says: "It is not deemed material to inquire to what race ethnological writers would assign the present applicant. If the strict scientific classification of the anthropologist should be adopted, he would probably not be classed as white. It is certain he is not an African nor a person of African descent. According to his own statement he is a 'pure-blooded Mexican,' bearing no relation to the Aztecs or original races of Mexico. Being, then, a citizen of Mexico, may he be naturalized pursuant to the laws of Congress? If debarred by the strict letter of the law from receiving letters of citizenship, is he embraced within the intent and meaning of the statute? If he falls within the intent and meaning of the law, his

application should be granted notwithstanding the letter of the statute may be against him." The court then quotes from the Constitution of the Republic of Texas and the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, which, he says, disclose that both that Republic and the United States have freely, during the past sixty years, conferred upon Mexicans the rights and privileges of American citizenship, not individually, but by various collective acts of naturalization. He also quotes Rev. Stat. § 1999 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1269), recognizing the right of expatriation, and reciting that this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship. He concludes: "When all the foregoing laws, treaties, and constitutional provisions are considered, which either affirmatively confer the rights of citizenship upon Mexicans, or tacitly recognize in them the right of individual naturalization, the conclusion forces itself upon the mind that citizens of Mexico are eligible to American citizenship, and may be individually naturalized by complying with the provisions of our [naturalization] laws." The applicant was admitted to naturalization.

This decision is unique. The fact that the United States has by collective acts conferred upon Mexicans the rights and privileges of American citizenship affords no basis for the argument that Mexicans are eligible to naturalization under our general naturalization statutes. See Re Yamashita (Wash.) 59 L. R. A. 671, 70 Pac. 482. This decision stands alone in another particular, also. The applicant was ignorant, and was unable to read or write, and did not understand the principles of the Constitution, yet the court held, in the face of several decisions. to the contrary, that he was entitled to be naturalized, inasmuch as it appeared that he was peaceable, industrious, of a good moral character, and law-abiding.

18. Women; in general.

The naturalization laws include

females as well as males. Brown v. Shilling, 9 Md. 82.

It is apparent that, from the commencement of legislation upon naturalization, alien women could be made citizens by naturalization. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627. 19. Married women.- And it has been held that an alien wife might be naturalized without the concurrence of her husband. Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617; see also Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L. R. A. 148, 56 Fed. 556, holding that the relation of husband and wife is not inconsistent with one being a citizen and the other being an alien.

A feme covert was admitted to be naturalized by the United States circuit court for the District of Columbia. Ex parte Pic, 1 Cranch, C. C. 372, Fed. Cas. No. 11,118.

20. Declaration of intention; in general.-The first step in the process of naturalization is the declaration of intention.

The applicant shall declare on oath, before a court of record, at least two years prior to his admission, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce the allegiance he then owes. Rev. Stat. § 2165 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329).

It

As to the time of making this declaration, it may be made immediately after the arrival of the alien in this country. must be made at least two years before he is admitted to citizenship.

When an alien declares his intention to become a citizen he is entitled to a certificate, a certified copy of such declaration, duly attested by the clerk and the seal of the court.

In Hawaii.-For the purposes of naturalization under the laws of the United States, residence in the Hawaiian islands prior to the taking effect of this act shall be deemed equivalent to residence in the United States, and in the territory of Hawaii;