a question often most difficult of solution." Nationality, p. 122. Mr. Cockburn's opinion of the Koszta case is given in a brief note at the bottom of the page just given, as follows: "Both parties were equally in the wrong. The Austrians had no pre

tense of right for seizing Koszta on Turkish territory. On the other hand, the American authorities had no right to claim Koszta as an American subject, as he had not become naturalized. The party really entitled to complain was the Ottoman government, which refused the application of the Austrians for leave to arrest Koszta, and protested against the outrage offered to their authority, but whose protest does not appear to have been heeded."

Just prior to, and during the Cuban insurrection of 1869. many Cubans declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, and after doing so returned to Cuba. The United States consul at Trinidad interfered in behalf of several of these persons, claiming that they were American citizens, and asked the Department to approve his action. This the Department declined to do, in the following instruction, dated May 12, 1869, in the course of which Mr. Marcy's note in the Koszta case was explained and qualified: "The late distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, was very careful in his elaborate letter concerning the case of Martin Koszta not to commit this government to the obligation, or to the propriety, of using the force of the nation for the protection of foreignborn persons who, after declaring their intention to become at some future time citizens of the United States, leave its shores to return to their native country. He took special care to insist that the case was to be judged, not by the municipal laws of the United States, not by the local laws of Turkey, not by the conventions between Turkey and Austria, but by the great principles of international law. It is true that

Το

in the concluding part of that masterly despatch he did say that a nation might, at its pleasure, clothe with the rights of its nationality persons not citizens, who were permanently domiciled in its borders. But it will be observed by the careful reader of that letter that this portion is supplemental, merely, to the main line of the great argument. extend this principle beyond the careful limitation put upon it by Secretary Marcy would be dangerous to the peace of the country. It has been repeatedly decided by this Department that the declaration of intention to become a citizen does not, in the absence of treaty stipulations, so clothe the individual with the nationality of this country as to enable him to return to his native land without being necessarily subject to all the laws thereof. In the present unhappy state of things in Cuba the Secretary of State can see no reason for departing from so well-established and so wise a rule. . . He earnestly exhorts you, and all other consuls of the United States, to spare no effort to protect the lives, the property, and the rights of American citizens in this emergency, and he will see with satisfaction any unofficial efforts you may make to shield the persons of those who have declared their intention to become citizens from the barbarities of the Spanish Volunteers, but he desires me to direct you hereafter in your official action to observe the rule laid down for your guidance in this instruction." Mr. Davis, Asst. Sec'y to Mr. Fox, U. S. Consul Trinidad, S. Ex. Doc. 108, 41st Cong. 2d Session, pp. 202, 203.

And Secretary Olney in an instruction to the United States minister in China, January 13, 1897, said: "The somewhat extreme position taken by Mr. Marcy in the Koszta case, that the declarant is followed, during sojourn in a third country, by the protection of this government, has since been necessarily regarded as applying particularly to the peculiar circumstances

in which it originated, and to relate only to the protection of such a declarant in a third country against arbitrary seizure by the government of the country of his origin.

It is established by the practical interpretation and application of domestic statutes, and by various treaties of naturalization concluded with foreign states, that a mere declaration of intention to become a citizen cannot clothe the declarant with any of the international rights of citizenship." Mr. Olney to Mr. Denby, MSS. Dip. Inst. to China, For. Rel. 1896, p. 92. Secretary Hay to Mr. McKinney, March 20, 1899.

See also

Persons who have merely declared their intention to become citizens of the United States are not entitled to passports, as Rev. Stat. § 4076 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2765) provides that "no passport shall be granted or issued to, or verified for, any other persons than citizens of the United States."*

25. Merchant seamen.- An exception is made in our laws in the case of a seaman who declares his intention to become a citizen and serves upon a merchant vessel of the United States. Section 2174, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334), provides that every seaman, being a foreigner, who declares his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States in any competent court, and subsequently serves three years on a merchant vessel of the United States, may, on application to a competent court and the production of his certificate of discharge. and good conduct during that time, together with the certificate of his declaration of intention, be admitted a citizen of the United States. This section declares, further, that "every seaman, being a foreigner, shall, after his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, and after he shall

*This section of the Revised Statutes was amended by the act of June 14, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 1088), so as to permit the issuance of passports to residents of the insular possessions of the United States.

have served such three years, be deemed a citizen of the United States for the purpose of manning and serving on board any merchant vessel of the United States, anything to the contrary in any act of Congress notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for all purposes of protection as an American citizen, be deemed such after the filing of his declaration of intention to become such citizen.”

This section of the Revised Statutes is § 29 of the act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. at L. 268, chap. 322, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p 1334), which was entitled "An Act to Authorize the Appointment of Shipping Commissioners to Superintend the Shipping and Discharge of Seamen Engaged in Merchant Ships Belonging to the United States, and for the Further Protection of Seamen."

In the case of Gustav Richelieu, a native of France, who, in 1872, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and subsequently served as seaman and steward on American merchant vessels for more than twenty years, it was held that he was entitled, under the provisions of § 2174 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334), to the protection of the United States, and a claim in his behalf for arbitrary arrest and imprisonment by the Spanish authorities in Cuba was presented to the government of Spain by the Department of State. Acting Sec'y Rockhill to Mr. Taylor, August 31, 1896, MSS. Dip. Inst. to Spain. The Spanish treaty claims commission, before which this claim subsequently came, made an award of $5,000 in favor of Richelieu.

This does not extend to the naval service.

The act of June 9, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 64, chap. 260, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3064), provides that none of the provisions of the act of 1872 (§ 2174, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334) "shall apply to sail or steam vessels engaged in the

coastwise trade, except the coast wise trade between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, or in the lake-going trade touching at foreign ports or otherwise, or in the trade between the United States and the British North American possessions, or in any case where the seamen are by custom or agreement entitled to participate in the profits or result of a cruise or voyage." 26.

· Decisions of international claims commissions as to effect of declaration of intention.- International claims commissions to which the United States has been a party have universally decided, whenever the question has been presented, that mere declaration of intention gave the person no standing before a commission as a citizen of the United States.

In a case coming before the commission under the convention of 1839 (8 Stat. at L. 526), between the United States and Mexico, that of Santangelo against Mexico,-the claimant, a native of Italy, in 1824, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. In the following year he went to Mexico, where he discussed in the press certain questions of public interest. On July 1, 1826, he was informed that he must leave Mexico within twenty-four hours, and a few days afterwards he was sent under escort to Vera Cruz and banished from the country. He was not finally admitted to citizenship in the United States until 1829. The American commissioners contended that he was entitled to an award as "an inchoate citizen of the United States in the year 1826," as well as by virtue of his full citizenship subsequently acquired, which, they argued, conferred upon him a right to the support of the United States in obtaining redress from Mexico for an injury done him prior to his naturalization. The Mexican commissioners holding a contrary view, the case was referred to the umpire, who decided that the claim was not within the competence of the commission, thus rejecting the theory of the American com missioners. Moore, International Arbitrations, 2549, 2550.