In the claim of John Ehlers against Mexico, which was presented to the commissioners under the act of 1849 (9 Stat. at L. 393, chap. 107), the commissioners said: "The claimant filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States in 1818, but was not in fact admitted as a citizen according to the act of Congress until the year of 1846. A mere declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States does not vest in the party any political rights. The responsibility of a government to protect a citizen is founded on the right which a government has to his services; and, until a party has gone through the forms of law required to establish his character as a citizen, the latter cannot be said to owe allegiance to the government he has signified his intention to obey, nor can such government claim his services. The Congress of the United States has pointed out the only mode by which an alien can become a citizen, and until he has complied with the law he is not entitled to its benefits. The claimant was not a citizen of the United States when the claim he now presents had its origin, and the board has decided in several cases that a claimant must have been a citizen at the origin of the claim to entitle him to the benefits of the treaty of the 2d of February, 1848" (9 Stat. at L. 922). Moore, International Arbitrations, 2551, 2552.

In the case of George Adlam v. The United States, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2552, 2553, before the claims commission under the treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, between the United States and Great Britain (17 Stat. at L. 863), it appeared that the claimant, who was born in London in 1827, emigrated to the United States in 1850, that he had since continuously resided in the latter country, and that, in 1859, he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. The United States demurred to the memorial on the ground, among others, that the claimant was not a

British subject within the meaning of the treaty; that the declaration of intention was, "of itself, a complete renunciation of all claim upon the intervention or protection of the sovereign" whose allegiance he had announced his intention to abjure; that this declaration, by the laws of many, if not all, of the United States, gave him, of itself, many of the rights of a citizen; that it certainly put him, so long as he remained in the United States, under the protection of that government for international purposes; that in the case of Koszta it was asserted by the United States as a sufficient ground for protection even while abroad; and that it subjected the claimant, by the laws and usages of the United States, to conscription and enrollment for military service. Counsel for Great Britain replied that the claimant's declaration of intention worked "no change in his status under the law of nations;" that the intention so declared might be abandoned at pleasure; that, while it "might furnish to his sovereign a sufficient reason to decline interference in his behalf," it "did not purport to bring him under any new obligation to the country which he then intended to adopt;" that the British government had not declined to protect him, but, on the contrary, presented his claim for indemnity; that the declaration gave him no rights "as a citizen of the United States;" that the rights which might result under state laws did not affect his condition as an alien; that he could not so much as claim from the United States a passport for his protection abroad; that the case of Koszta was without precedent, and had been repudiated by the United States itself, so far as it had been appealed to as recognizing the right of persons, by virtue of a declaration of intention, to be considered as citizens of the United States; that the statute of the United States authorizing the conscription of such persons did not pretend to change their allegiance, and gave them no rights or privileges in consequence

of the conscription.

Similar facts and arguments were presented in other cases. The commissioners unanimously rendered the following opinion: "The question is raised as to whether, in consequence of the claimants having declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and to renounce their allegiance to Her Britannic Majesty, they have ceased to be British subjects within the meaning of the treaty. We are of opinion that, notwithstanding the claimants having expressed this intention, they still remain British subjects until, the necessary formalities having been completed, they acted upon the intention so expressed."

In the case of Wilson v. Chile, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2553 et seq., United States and Chilean claims commission of 1892, the claimant was a native of Sweden, who, in 1869, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. He was not admitted to citizenship, however, until 1893. His claim arose from the destruction of property at Iquique, Chile, in 1891, during the conflict between the Balmacedists and the Congressionalist party. The Chilean government demurred to the memorial. The commission said: "We are of opinion that, according to the showing made by the memorialist himself, this commission cannot take jurisdiction of his claim. By the express terms of the convention under which this commission has been created, its jurisdiction is confined to claims on the part of the citizens of the two governments, respectively. The wrongs and injuries complained of were committed on the 19th of February, 1891. At that time

the claimant was not a citizen of the United States, and did not become such until the 11th day of October, 1893. It is true that on the 23d of July, 1869, he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, but that declaration did not make him a citizen. It was only an incipient step in that

direction.

According to the plain and explicit provi

sions of law, both constitutional and statutory, the claimant was not a citizen of the United States at the time he sustained the damages and losses complained of. Nor could the United States recognize him as such without violating a solemn treaty stipulation made with the government of Sweden. The last clause of article 1 of the convention, relative to naturalization, between the President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, proclaimed January 12, 1872 (17 Stat. at L. 809), reads as follows: 'The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of the one or the other country has not for either party the effect of citizenship legally acquired.' It also appears from the diplomatic correspondence of the State Department that the government of the United States has uniformly held that a mere declaration of intention to become a citizen is not sufficient to clothe a person with the rights of citizenship in the United States. Inasmuch as the memorial does not show that the claimant was a citizen of the United States on the 19th day of February, 1891, when the alleged losses occurred, we decide that the demurrer should be sustained, and the claim disallowed for want of jurisdiction."

27. Widow and children of deceased declarant.- Where an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized, the widow and children may become citizens by taking the oaths required by law. Rev. Stat. § 2168 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1332). 28. Status conferred upon minors by declaration of intention of parent. Section 2172, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1334), declares that the minor children of persons duly naturalized in the United States shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof. The United States Supreme Court in the case of Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 178,

36 L. ed. 115, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, declared that minors acquire an inchoate status by the declaration of intention on the part of their parents; that this status is not necessarily lost if the father fails to complete his naturalization before the son attains majority, but the son may elect to hold fast to the citizenship which the act of the father has initiated for him, and apply for admission as a citizen, or repudiate the status impressed upon him, and determine that he will accept allegiance to some foreign potentate or power.

*29. Continued residence of applicant for naturalization.Before an alien can acquire citizenship in the United States he must have resided here at least five years. Section 2165 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329) provides that "it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting such alien that he has resided within the United States five years at least." The reason for the requirement of such preliminary residence is obvious. It enables the applicant to become acquainted with the character of our institutions. It tests the sincerity of his desire for citizenship.

As Secretary Fish said in 1871: "The law, justly regarding a change in his allegiance by a foreigner as an act of grave importance, wisely provides that there shall be two steps in the process. By the first, the purpose of change is announced. Between this and actual naturalization the lapse of a considerable interval is required, in order that the final step may be taken with due deliberation. Persons who may have declared their intention to become citizens often change their minds, and fail to carry that intention into effect. They have seen occasion to avail themselves of the locus penitentia which the law allows." For. Rel. 1871, p. 254.

This residence must be continuous. Section 2170 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333) declares that "no alien shall be ad

*See article on this subject by the author in 29 American Law Review, 52.