certificate. Mr. Dickinson replied in the affirmative. Mr. Breese said that, if the applicant for naturalization should be called out of the United States, and remain abroad four years and eleven months, that time would not be counted. Mr. Berrien explained the law as it would stand after the passage of the bill, which required that the five years' residence should be completed. If the applicant for a certificate were absent any part of that time, it would remain for the court to decide whether that absence was sufficient to prevent the issuing of the certificate. As the law now stands, if any person, after notifying his intention to become a citizen, sets his foot out of the United States, he must go through the full term of five years' residence again. Under this bill, he may be called away for a short period by business, but, having filed his desire to become naturalized, the court may decide that there is no sufficient reason for his going again over the whole term of probation. The bill was then considered,

and read a third time, and passed." Ibid.

In the House, Mr. Birdsall, in explaining the object of the bill, stated that persons who had left the United States as volunteers for Mexico, after declaring their intention to become naturalized, had been thus prevented from obtaining the residence required by law. "Mr. McClernand said that those who had enlisted in the service of their country, and had been sent beyond its limits in the prosecution of the war, fell within the wording of the present law, and were forced to lose all the time they were thus absent, though they had previously notified their intention of being naturalized. The bill was then passed." Id. p. 864.

So far as it can be gathered from the foregoing, the intention of Congress in repealing the clause in question seems to have been to conserve to the applicant for naturalization, who, in good faith, temporarily absents himself from the United States after declaring his intention, only the benefit of the time which he has actually spent in this country.

But it is not believed that this apparent intention would justify the courts in disregarding what seems to be the plain and reasonable meaning of the language of the law. The great injustice of such a construction is well shown by the statement of Mr. McClernand, quoted above, that persons who had volunteered in the service of the United States, and been sent beyond its limits in prosecution of war against a foreign nation, would be "forced to lose all the time they were thus absent, though they had previously notified their intention of being naturalized."

Moreover, if the residence is interrupted by temporary ab sence, without change of intention on the part of the applicant, the logical consequence would be that he should be required, not merely to make up the time thus lost, but to begin de novo. For a residence which is once broken cannot be said to be a continued residence, such as the law requires.

The just rule, it is apprehended, is that suggested by Senator Berrien, supra: "If the applicant is absent any part of the time, it remains for the court to decide whether that absence is sufficient to prevent the issuing of the certificate." In other words, if the facts and circumstances of the absence, as shown in the particular case, indicate no change of intention on the part of the applicant, it is the duty of the court to issue the certificate, without requiring such time to be made up. If there is evidence showing abandonment of intention, the application should be refused, and the party should be required to begin de novo. This is believed to be the only construction consistent with the spirit of the law and with the plain import of the language employed. It is interesting, in this connection, to note the construction. given very similar language used in naturalization treaties. Our treaties of naturalization with Bavaria (15 Stat. at L. 661), and Württemberg (16 Stat. at L. 735), concluded in 1868, require that citizens of the one country shall have "resided

uninterruptedly" within the territory of the other for five years. This language is certainly as strong as "continued residence" in our naturalization law. Rev. Stat. § 2170 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1333). Yet in the protocol of each of these treaties, more exactly defining and explaining the contents of the treaties, it is declared: "The words 'resided uninterruptedly' are obviously to be understood, not of a continued bodily presence, but in the legal sense, and therefore a transient absence, a journey, or the like, by no means interrupts the period of five years contemplated by the 1st article." 15 Stat. at L. 664. See also For. Rel. 1901, p. 520.

30. Prerequisites to final admission to citizenship; in general.— Application to be admitted to citizenship may be made to any of the courts before which the preliminary declaration of intent may be made. Rev. Stat. § 2165 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329). It need not be made to the same court.

Naturalization is a judicial act, which must be performed by the court. Green v. Salas, 31 Fed. 106; note on Naturalization of Aliens; jurisdiction of state courts, Re Dean (Me.) 13 L. R. A. 229.

Although certain judicial powers are conferred on the minister of the United States to Turkey, he cannot naturalize aliens. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Terrell, November 2, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, p. 701. See also Instruction to Consul General at Shanghai, November 11, 1897.

An alien who has been living at the United States legation in Turkey, as its interpreter, for twenty years, cannot be considered as having been constructively in the United States during that time. The fiction of extraterritoriality cannot be carried to that extent. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Terrell, supra. No one can be lawfully naturalized outside of American jurisdiction.

The alien must prove that he has made the preliminary decla

ration required. This is ordinarily done by the production of a certificate of record of the court. Re Bodek, 63 Fed. 815.

In addition to proof of residence in the United States for the continued term of five years, it must be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the applicant has resided one year at least within the territory or state where the court to which he applies is held. Rev. Stat. § 2165 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329).

Rev. Stat. § 2165 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329), providing that the court naturalizing an alien must be satisfied that he has resided in the United States for five years, and within the state where the court is held for one year, does not require the last year of residence before the application for naturalization. to be in the state where the application is made, as it is sufficient that applicant has lived for any one year in that state. Chandler v. Wartman, 6 N. J. L. J. 301.

The residence of the applicant cannot be proved by his own oath, the statute providing that "the oath of the applicant shall in no case be allowed to prove his residence." This amounts to a prohibition against taking the oath of the applicant as proof of his residence, and does not merely render his oath insufficient. Such an oath, if taken, is extrajudicial. United States v.

Grottkau, 30 Fed. 672.

The practice is for the courts to require the testimony, under oath, of at least two citizens of the United States of good standing, who must be able to testify of their own knowledge that the applicant has been a resident of the United States for five years at least, and within the state or territory wherein the court is held for one year.

In proceedings instituted for naturalization, an alien's residence cannot be established by affidavit, but must be proved in court by the testimony of witnesses. Re An Alien, 7 Hill (N. Y.)

An alien cannot vouch for a person petitioning for naturalization. Com. v. Paper, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 263.

The law requires that some of the essential facts shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court by evidence other than the testimony of the applicant himself, and, to meet this requirement, a witness is usually produced, commonly called a "voucher." In the case of Re Lipshitz, 97 Fed. 584, where it appeared that the "voucher" presenting himself had been in the habit of appearing in the same capacity in such cases, and of making a charge for appearing and giving his testimony, the court held that "an applicant for naturalization should produce a voucher other than one who habitually, and for compensation, appears as such."

31. Moral character of applicant for final admission.The applicant must prove that during the five years of his probation he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. Rev. Stat. § 2165 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1329).

An alien who has been guilty of murder, robbery, theft, bribery, or perjury is barred from admission to citizenship. Re Spenser, 5 Sawy. 195, Fed. Cas No. 13,234.

An alien who lives in a state of polygamy, or believes that polygamy may be rightfully practised in defiance of the laws to the contrary, is not entitled to citizenship. Ex parte Douglas, and Ex parte Sandberg, 5 West. Jur. 171.

Habitual gaming or selling of liquors, when forbidden by statute, would be a bar to admission. Re Spenser, 5 Sawy. 195,

Fed. Cas. No. 13,234.

Whatever is forbidden by the law of the land ought to be considered, for the time being, immoral, within the purview of this statute. A person who violates the law manifests, in a greater