June 19, 1878,

involving claims against the Government.' upon a motion of Mr. Conger of Michigan, the House suspended the rules and passed by the vote of 145 to 61 a resolution so to amend the Constitution that the payment of claims to disloyal persons for property taken, used, injured, or destroyed during the war of the rebellion should be prohibited. This amendment the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate reported in an amended form, but although the Senate devoted some time to its consideration, it failed to be brought to a vote.

The large number of claims lodged against the Government, besides calling forth the amendments referred to in the previous paragraph, suggested also the desirableness of fixing some limitation in the time for the presentation of claims against the United States. Several propositions of this character have been presented in the form of amendments to the Constitution.3 The first of these was introduced as early as 1874, by Senator Wright of Iowa, even before any amendment in regard to the payment of Southern war claims had been suggested. This resolution stipulated that all claims must be presented within ten years at least next after they accrue. Later amendments reduced the time to six years. The last of these resolutions was presented in 1886. In this connection it may be suitable to mention two other resolutions; one proposed by Mr. Springer of Illinois, in 1881, which provided that all claims against the United States shall be determined by such tribunals as Congress may establish; the other, presented by Mr. Seymour of Connecticut, in 1886, proposed to empower Congress to make provision by a general law for bringing suits against the Government, and forbade all special acts.

5

4

145 PAYMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

Several of the amendments just treated, prohibiting the pay. ment of the Confederate debt, contained also a clause guaranteeing the payment of the national debt. The first of these were suggested by Charles Sumner (January 5, 1866) and Senator Lane of Kansas (March 13). The original resolution, which was the basis of the fourteenth amendment, as reported by the

1 App., No. 1471.

2 App., No. 1477.

App., 1383, 1392, 1461, 1468, 1497, 1608, 1654.

4 App., No. 1529.

6 App., No. 1675.

6 App., Nos. 1066, 1120.

House had, however, no clause guaranteeing the national debt. Propositions to insert such a clause were made by Messrs. Wade of Ohio, Howard of Michigan, and Clark of New Hampshire. The last gentleman's amendment was accepted and now appears as a part of section 4 of the amendment.1

In 1873 Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania presented an amendment providing for the payment of the principal and interest of the public debt by the imposition of duties on imports, but that the annual current expenses of the Government of the United States should be assessed upon the several States and Territories. All questions as to the good faith of the nation have long since been set at rest.

146. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SURPLUS

An earlier set of amendments had been called out by the fact that there was likely to be no debt to pay. The legisla ture of Georgia, in 1833, suggested in their call for a constitutional convention the advisability of so amending the Constitution that it may prescribe what disposition shall be made of the surplus revenue, when such revenue is found to be on hand. Two years later, when an actual surplus began to accumulate, Mr. Calhoun made a more definite proposition. Twice during the year 1835 he introduced an amendment for the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States until 1843.* This date was fixed upon as the limit; for by the compromise tariff of 1833 the duties would be reduced to the minimum rate of 20 per cent in that year, and this would cause a corresponding reduction of the revenue. Without waiting for the formality of a constitutional amendment, the acts of 1836 caused the deposit of $27,000,000 with the States, and the bad results of that action have prevented the presentation of any similar propositions.5

147. EXPENDITURES-APPROPRIATION BILLS.

Except in the case of the surplus, no amendments have been suggested to change the objects of expenditure. The increas

App., Nos. 1138, 1149, 1161, 1175b, 1180. The two amendments made by Senator Dixon and Mr. Ashley, as referred to in the previous paragraph, also contained the provision guaranteeing the United States debt. App., Nos. 1200, 1213e, 1221.

2 App., No. 1363. It stipulated that the debt should be consolidated at a uniform rate of interest, or should be extinguished by the payment of $50,000,000 of the principal annually. See ante, par. 140.

3 App., No. 621.

4 App., Nos. 643, 647.

5 Bourne's Surplus Revenue. See ante, par. 95.

ing extravagance of the appropriation bills, and the manner in which they are urged through in conference, suggested a reform. In 1876 Mr. Cook proposed an amendment to limit the power of Congress to make appropriations" over and above the estimates sent to Congress by the executive department."1 In the early eighties Mr. Turner of Kentucky presented to the consideration of three successive Congresses an amendment requiring that the yeas and nays should be recorded on all appropriations exceeding $10,000. The provision requiring the vote of each member to be recorded would tend to cause each member to become better informed and weigh the subject well before giving his vote.3 Although the principle of the amendment is a good one, in practice it would probably be made a means of fillibustering.

Other amendments have been introduced either suggesting reforms in the method of administering the finances or in the manner of making appropriations. To prevent the growing practice of inserting clauses appropriating money in bills of an entirely foreign nature, and of attaching "riders" upon general appropriation bills and other measures, it has twice been proposed, in recent years, to so amend the Constitution as to require that every act shall embrace but one subjectmatter, and the matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be embraced in the title.5

148. PROTECTIVE TARIFFS.

No one subject except slavery has caused so much debate in Congress as the tariff; yet although there have been frequent discussions over the constitutionality of a protective tariff, especially in the earlier years, only three attempts have been made to settle the controversy by means of a constitutional amendment.

The legislature of Georgia, in 1833, in its application to Congress to call a convention, declared that the experience of the past had clearly proved that the Constitution needed amend

1 App., No. 1422a.

"This restriction shall not prevent Congress from diminishing the said estimates if they think proper."

App., Nos. 1512, 1540, 1591.

3 A similar provision is found in many of the constitutions of the States, and their experience seems to have demonstrated the wisdom of the provision.

4 App., Nos. 1062, 1481a, 1567. The latter provided that all bills appropriating money should specify the exact amount of each appropriation, and the purpose for which it was made.

App., Nos. 1375a, 1501. Suggested by the contest between President Hayes and Congress. Mason, Veto Power, p. 48; ante, p. 133.

ment; they asked that the principle involved in a tariff for the direct protection of domestic industry might be settled, and also "that a system of Federal taxation may be established which shall be equal in its operation upon the whole people and in all sections of the country." The question of protection had recently forced itself upon the attention of the country through the success of the protectionists in passing the tariff of 1828. The States of Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia protested against it as unjust and unconstitutional; these protests proving to be of no effect, South Carolina had attempted to put in force the doctrine of nullification.2

It was over thirty years before the next proposition on this subject was introduced. In 1864 Senator Saulsbury included in the series of amendments proposed by him, as a substitute for the thirteenth amendment, one which provided that duties on imports might be imposed for revenue, but should not be prohibitory or excessive in amount. The last of these amendments, presented in 1871, proposed the abolition of duties on imports and excises and the substitution of a direct tax instead.+

149. PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION.

The great increase in recent years in the amount of special and private legislation has led to several attempts to counteract this evil by means of a constitutional provision. Some thirteen resolutions of this character have been introduced since 1876.5 The first of these was presented in that year by Mr. Springer of Illinois, prohibiting Congress passing any special law in a long list of enumerated cases, among which were included the granting of pensions, land or prize money, or relief to any person, or authorizing the payment of any claims against the United States, except to pay the judgments of courts or commissions. It also forbade the granting to any corporation any special or exclusive privileges, subsidy, immunity, or franchise," and in all cases where a general law could

App., Nos. 615, 616.

2 For protests see post, par. 156, note; also, Journal of Senate of Pennsylvania (1829-30), pp. 30, 31; Ibid. (1832-33), pp. 307, 308. Canning is said to have declared that he would make the people of America reduce their tariff or dissolve the Union." Bishop, Hist. of Manufact., II, pp. 333-334.

3 App., No. 1019.

4App., No. 1338. See ante, par. 140.

G

App., Nos. 1415, 1462, 1472, 1473, 1483, 1488, 1528, 1583, 1606, 1642, 1653, 1673, 1693.
App., No. 1415.

be made applicable no special law should be enacted. A similar resolution has been proposed by Mr. Springer at eight different times since, the aim of which was to limit the legislative power “to enactment of laws general in their application and effect to all sections and persons within the jurisdiction of this Constitution."

Mr. Beach of New York, who was also very active in urging an amendment which should prevent Congress from passing private bills, in addition has presented two propositions to prohibit the giving or loaning of public property or credit in aid of private or corporate enterprises. Two amendments of a similar nature had previously been proposed. One of these, presented in 1869, forbade Congress passing any "law granting subsidies to corporations or companies to aid in the construction of railroads, canals, or other public improvements," as long as the national debt shall exceed the sum of $500,000,000. The other, introduced in 1873, prohibited Congress guaranteeing or paying the indebtedness of any State, Territory, District, or any municipal corporation.*

5

The prohibition proposed by these various amendments is analogous to the restrictions in many of the recent State constitutions, and is prompted by the unwillingness of the people to trust their representatives. It is contrary to the longaccepted practice of the United States, and possibly would tend to reduce the feeling of Congressional responsibility. Perhaps a more effective remedy would be the severe application of the veto to doubtful cases."

150. STATUS OF FINANCIAL LEGISLATION.

Since the early years there has been little disposition shown to restrict, by means of amendments, the power of the General Government over the collection of the revenue, except in regard to the imposition and collection of direct taxes, and in a slight degree the customs. Likewise there has been little effort to

App., Nos. 1472, 1488, 1528, 1583, 1642, 1673, 1693.

2 App., Nos. 1607, 1653.

3 App., No. 1316. Except to complete such as are already commenced in which the United States has a large interest." The Union Pacific Railroad doubtless suggested this. 4 App., No. 1375.

Bryce, I, pp. 491, 552-553; Hitchcock, Am. State Const., pp. 34-44.

6 President Cleveland applied this remedy during his first term to nearly three hundred cases. See Mason's Veto Power, App. A, Nos. 133 to 433; also pp. 90-93, 128-129, 132–133. See ante, par. 58, for disenssion of the proposition to give the President power to veto items in appropriation bills.