1861 they had an active leader in Governor Jackson. His reply to Lincoln's call for troops was: "Your requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with." He was supported in his attitude by the legislature, and under its direction he organized an army to repel the invasion of the Union troops and undertook to get possession of the United States arsenal at St. Louis. The Union party had an equally alert leader in Francis P. Blair, Jr., a brother of President Lincoln's Postmaster General, a young man of courage and influence. The party as a whole received an accession of strength in the large German element of Missouri, which probably turned the scale. Blair was ably assisted by General Nathaniel Lyon, commander of the United States forces at St. Louis, and for the next few months the history of Missouri was the history of a contest between these two leaders on the one side and Governor Jackson on the other. Blair and Lyon, however, foiled the attempts of the secessionists to get possession of the arsenal at St. Louis, and in May captured the Confederate post, Camp Jackson, with a quantity of arms and ammunition. Meanwhile the secessionists were making preparations for war; the governor called for 50,000 men to resist the "unconstitutional edicts of the military despotism" at Washington, but the responses were few, and on June 15 the capital of the State fell into the hands of the United States military authorities. In July the convention which had resolved against secession in March now reassembled, deposed Governor Jackson and established a Unionist government. Thus Missouri was lost to the Confederacy. Next to Maryland, Kentucky of all the border States afforded the Federal authorities most concern, because of its central position and hence its strategical value. The people of this State, divided as they were in their sympathies, believed that it would be possible for them to maintain an attitude of neutrality toward both contestants, and they endeavored to prevent the troops of either belligerent from occupying their territory. At first both governments gave a quasi recognition to Kentucky's neutrality, but in the end it proved impossible on account of the geographical position of the State. The governor, Beriah Magoffin, was a staunch secessionist, and he replied, to Lincoln's requisition, that Kentucky would furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister States. Subsequently he issued a proclamation warning the authorities of the 1861 United States and of the Confederacy not to occupy any place or post in the State with troops, and forbidding all citizens from making hostile demonstrations against the authority of either belligerent, but in the meantime to prepare for defense against invasion from any quarter. Soon, however, Union troops were pouring in from the North, and the Confederates with equal promptness occupied the southern part of the State. The governor solemnly protested and urged their withdrawal, but to no avail. Major Robert Anderson and Generals Nelson and Rousseau were sent into the State by President Lincoln to organize and command the Union forces, and through their activity Kentucky was soon under Union influence. The legislature refused to order a State convention, declined to coöperate with the governor in his military preparations, and passed various measures intended to establish the loyalty of the State. At the congressional elections in July the Unionists won nine of the ten seats, and in August a Union legislature was chosen. Late in the year the secessionists held a "sovereignty convention" at Russellville, which adopted a declaration of independence and an ordinance of secession and elected a 1861 provisional government, but the occupation of the State by Union troops made the whole procedure a farce.1 In the meantime preparations were astir on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line for the impending conflict. The call of Jefferson Davis for privateers to prey on the commerce of the United States was followed by a proclamation from Lincoln on April 19, declaring the Southern ports in a state of blockade and announcing that all persons acting as privateers under the "pretended authority" of the Confederate States would be treated as pirates whenever they should fall into the hands of the Federal authorities. In his message of April 29 Mr. Davis adverted to this proclamation as the announcement of a paper blockade" in violation of the law of nations and calculated to inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides. The enlistment of privateers proved to be one of the Confederacy's chief sources of strength, and Lincoln's threatened punishment was never resorted to on account of Davis's threat that the Confederate authorities would retaliate on an equal number of Union soldiers whom they might capture. The proclamation of the blockade by the President of the United States was equivalent to a recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent, and it was soon followed by a proclamation of neutrality by the Queen of Great Britain, which was likewise a recognition of the belligerency of the South. The United States Government protested vigorously against the action of the British Government in according belligerent rights to the Confederates, but there is no longer any doubt that it was clearly justified by the law of nations. It was necessary both for the protection of British interests on the high seas and as a warning to British subjects of their duties as neutrals.2 The recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate Government gave it substantial advantages. It changed the status of those who took out letters of marque and reprisal from privates to privateers, assured to Confederate captives the right to be treated as prisoners of war, rather than as rebels, and otherwise gave the Confederacy an international standing which aided it in negotiating loans. While the United States was disposed for a time at least to regard the act of the British Government as an evidence of unfriendliness, chiefly on account of the undue haste with which the recognition had been accorded, the 1 Read Shaler, "Kentucky," in the American Commonwealth Series. 2 Hall, "International Law," 4th ed. p. 39. 1861 Federal authorities were reminded that the United States Government, almost alone among the great nations of the world, had refused in 1856 to become a party to the Declaration of Paris that "privateering is abolished." The example of Great Britain in recognizing the belligerency of the Confederacy was soon followed by that of practically all of the other important powers of Europe. But while the commissioners sent abroad by the Confederate Government bestirred themselves actively at the various European capitals to secure a recognition of the independence of the Confederacy, their efforts were without success. II COMPARATIVE STRENGTH AND RESOURCES Before taking up the military operations of the war it is worth our while to examine briefly the comparative resources of the two belligerents with a view to ascertaining their elements of strength and of weakness for the great contest which was about to ensue. So far as numbers were concerned the North had the overwhelming advantage. According to the census of 1860 the population of the eleven seceding States was 9,103,014, of whom 4,000,000 were negroes, mostly slaves. The population of the non-seceding States was 22,045,557, the odds thus being more than four to one in favor of the North so far as white population was concerned.3 The military population of the two belligerents was about 4,600,000 in the North and 1,065,000 in the South. This disproportion of numbers was a serious drawback to the Confederacy. It was only by the most rigorous conscription that it was able to recruit its armies during the later years of the war, and even then it frequently happened that the regiments were filled with mere boys of sixteen and seventeen and even decrepit old men. Hardly at any time during the war were the Confederate enlistments more than one-half those of the United States. The following is a statement by a well known military historian of the comparative strength of each army at different periods of the war: 4 8 Of course in counting the border slave States, which did not secede, among the resources of the Union, the fact must not be overlooked that they furnished large military contingents to the Confederacy. 4 Dodge, "Bird's-eye View of the Civil War,” p. 323. From a printed statement issued by the War Department in January, 1892, showing the number of men called for by the President and the number of men furnished by each State and Territory during the Civil War, it appears that the number of men furnished by the several States and Territories for the Union army and navy during the war was 2,778,304. It should be borne in mind, however, that this number represents enlistments (credits) and not the actual number of individuals in the service, which latter has never been officially determined, no compilation ever having been made of the number of reënlistments. It is estimated by the Record and Pension office, however, from the best data obtainable, that the number of individuals in the service in the Union army and navy during the war was 2,213,365, without regard to length of service. No compilation has ever been prepared by the department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation, because of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in the possession of the department. In Livermore's "Numbers and Losses " their strength is estimated by various authorities at from 600,000 to 1,500,000. Rhodes estimates that the number of men in the Union army was equivalent to 1,556,678 serving three years; in the Confederate army 1,082,119.5 Of the Union enlistments, 178,000 were whites from the slave States and 99,000 negroes, mostly from the same States. But the advantage which the North enjoyed in numbers was to some Rhodes, "History of the United States," vol. v. p. 186. Printed statement of the Record and Pension Office of January, 1892, p. 8. |