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71,000 men.12 Throughout the first day of the battle the results were indecisive.13 Early on the morning of the second day the fight was renewed and the Federal troops were driven back in consequence of an ill-considered order of Rosecrans by which a gap was made in the Union center. Quickly discovering this, Longstreet massed his troops into the opening, drove back the Union right, and sent them flying panic-stricken toward Chattanooga. The day seemed hopelessly lost, and Rosecrans so telegraphed to Halleck; but at this juncture General George H. Thomas, who commanded the Union left, retrieved the disaster which the right had suffered and saved the day. He held his position unshaken against the repeated assaults of the enemy and repulsed them with great slaughter. The fighting was unexcelled and the spectacle was one of the most magnificent of the war. The losses of the Union army amounted to about 16,000 men in killed, wounded, and captured; those of the Confederates were about 17,800.14 Thomas after his heroic stand was popularly christened the "Rock of Chickamauga." Like Scott, Thomas was a native of Virginia who had refused to "go with his State" at the outbreak of the war, but continued to follow the old flag. By the concurrent testimony of military critics he was one of the ablest officers produced on either side during the war.

After holding his own at Chickamauga from noon until dark, Thomas withdrew to Chattanooga, where he joined Rosecrans, who with part of the army had already preceeded thereto in the afternoon. The Confederates next occupied Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, two elevations just south and west of Chattanooga. The effect of this movement was to virtually shut up Rosecrans's army in the town and cut off his source of supplies. Although receiving large reënforcements, his provisions were soon exhausted, his mules died by the thousands, and the army was on the verge of starvation. 15 In this critical situation Rosecrans was relieved and Thomas put in command, while General Grant was appointed as commander of all the armies between

12" Battles and Leaders," vol. iii. pp. 673–676. General Longstreet declares that the strength of the two armies was substantially the same about 60,000"From Manassas to Appomattox," p. 458.

18 Rhodes, "History of the United States," vol. iv. p. 397. 14" Battles and Leaders," vol. iii. pp. 673, 675.

15 Rhodes, "History of the United States," vol. iv. p. 400.

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the Alleghanies and the Mississippi River, and was ordered to Chattanooga, where he arrived November 15.

Grant and Thomas began to lay plans for the extrication of the Union army from its critical position. The difficulty of the problem was lessened by the blunder of General Bragg in detaching 20,000 of his men to attack Burnside at Knoxville. Grant accordingly sent Sherman, on November 23, with four divisions to sweep the Confederates from Missionary Ridge, and at the same time dispatched "Fighting Joe" Hooker to dislodge the enemy from Lookout Mountain. As Sherman proceeded southward along the crest of the Ridge he found unexpected topographical obstacles which made it impossible for him to drive the Confederates back. Assault after assault on their columns was heroically repulsed. In this situation, late in the afternoon of November 25, Grant ordered Thomas to make a general advance to capture the rifle pits at the base of the Ridge. Promptly the troops sprang from their trenches, formed a line a mile in length, and swept up to the base of the Ridge into the face of the batteries, which poured a deadly fire into their ranks, drove the Confederates back from their first line of intrenchments and threw them into panic and confusion. They had executed their orders, but the rewards of further pursuit seemed too great to stop, and so again, without orders in fact in the face of orders they swept up the hill until the crest of the Ridge was in their possession and the Confederates were in full retreat.16 Meantime, Hooker had scaled the heights of Lookout Mountain and had planted the Stars and Stripes on its highest crest. Here" above the clouds " a picturesque battle was fought on November 24, resulting in a victory for the Union troops.

In the battles around Chattanooga the Union army had lost about 6,000 men; that of the Confederates nearly 7,000,17 but the results were wholly in favor of the Federals. Bragg's army had been completely defeated and was greatly demoralized. The last link in the chain of Western posts had been broken and all the gateways to the lower South stood open. The fall of Chattanooga and Knoxville was scarcely of less importance to the Confederates than the fall of New Orleans.

16 General Grant in "Battles and Leaders," vol. iii. pp. 707-725; Rhodes, "History of the United States," vol. iv. p. 406.

17" Battles and Leaders," vol. iii. pp. 729, 730; Nicolay and Hay, "Life of Lincoln," vol. viii. p. 155.

Chapter XXXIII

LAST YEAR OF THE WAR. 1864-1865

I

GRANT AND LEE IN THE WILDERNESS

ROM now until the close of the war military operations were centered chiefly in two great and final campaigns, one in the East against Lee and the other in the West against Joseph E. Johnston, who had been placed in command in that quarter after Bragg's reverses in the Chattanooga campaign.

In recognition of Grant's many successes, culminating in the Chattanooga victory, Congress revived the grade of lieutenant general, and to this office President Lincoln promptly nominated him and the Senate confirmed the appointment. For some time the eyes of the North had been gradually turning toward this commander as the one man who was capable of crushing the army of General Lee, and he was in fact the most popular man in the country.1 Placed in command of all the armies of the United States, he proceeded to Washington, by direction of the President to assume immediate direction of the army that was destined to do what others had failed to do.

In March he arrived at Washington and met for the first time in his life the Commander-in-Chief, who expressed his satisfaction with Grant's services in the past, assured him that he should have a free hand in the direction of the campaign, and said in conclusion, "If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you." 2 With this carte blanche Grant selected Sherman to lead the army in the West with Atlanta as the objective point, while he looked after the affairs in the East. He announced that the main feature of his

1 Rhodes, "History of the United States," vol. iv. p. 436.

2 For Grant's account of his first interview with Lincoln see his Personal Memoirs," vol. ii. p. 122.

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campaign in Virginia would be the continuous and unceasing hammering of the adversary with superior forces until by mere "attrition" his strength should be worn out.3 He had come to the conclusion that strategy and maneuvering of positions would never avail against Lee. Only the outright destruction of his army by the momentum of numbers would suffice. Grant's critics pronounced this a brutal theory of war, and so it was, but there can probably be no question as to its fairness and legitimacy. It required unlimited numbers and resources, but they were cheerfully promised, and in time were supplied by the government. Vast quantities of arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, medical stores, forage, horses, mules, wagons, railroad iron, locomotives, and cars, bridge timber, telegraph and cable wire, and all the paraphernalia for the transportation and support of armies were placed at Grant's disposal. The States were called upon for additional volunteers, while the draft was vigorously resorted to for securing recruits. Everything that a powerful and generous government could do was done to enable its commander to carry out successfully his campaign of "attrition."

The Army of the Potomac, on April 30, consisted of 122,140 men, mostly seasoned veterans; the opposing Confederate army consisted of 61,953 men, not counting teamsters, cooks, and the like. While Lee enjoyed the advantage of fighting on the defensive and over familiar ground, he was at a great disadvantage, not only as to numbers, but in the paucity of supplies. His men were poorly clad and fed, were in fact on the verge of starvation. The position of the two armies was the same as that which they had taken after the battle of Gettysburg, the Union army being posted north of the Rapidan River, the Confederates facing them on the south bank.

On May 4, 1864, the Union army, with four thousand wagons, began crossing the Rapidan to begin the attack. Within two days the passage had been completed and the army plunged into a dense forest or swamp known as "the Wilderness," which was inter

P. 4.

3 Dodge, "Bird's-eye View," p. 198; "Official Records," vol. xxxvi., pt. 1,

Nicolay and Hay, "Life of Lincoln," vol. viii. p. 352; in "Battles and Leaders," vol. iv. p. 182, the effective Union strength in the Battle of the Wilderness is placed at 118,000 men, that of Lee (p. 184) at "not less than 61,000." Dodge, "Bird's-eye View," p. 199, places the Union strength at 122,000; that of the Confederates at "not far from 70,000."

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spersed with a thick undergrowth, making the employment of cavalry and artillery impracticable, while maneuvering was possible only with the greatest difficulty. In the midst of this jungle Lee fell upon Grant on May 5 and an all-day fight ensued, in the course of which the Federals were driven back with considerable loss as often as they attempted to advance. At two o'clock next morning Longstreet aroused his sleeping men from their bivouac and marched them to the battlefield. Soon the contest was raging again. At eleven o'clock he suddenly attacked Grant's left and drove it back in confusion. At this juncture Longstreet, while galloping forward, was badly wounded by his own men, who mistook him for one of the enemy's fugitives, and the demoralization which this event occasioned in the Confederate ranks gave the Federals an opportunity to reform their lines and repulse the Confederate advance. All day a terrible battle raged; saplings and even trees of considerable size were cut down by flying bullets, giving the battle-ground the appearance of a newly cleared field. During the two days of carnage the Federals lost 17,666 men, of whom over 2,000 were killed on the field. The Confederate loss was about one-half that of the Union army.

Grant, apparently becoming somewhat less confident of his policy of "attrition," now determined to resort to maneuvering with the purpose of routing Lee's army from its position by a flank movement. Instead, therefore, of advancing directly in the front of the enemy he resolved to make an effort to turn their right flank and get possession of Spottsylvania Court House. But Lee divined the purpose of his adversary and rapidly pushed his army to Spottsylvania ahead of Grant and placed it directly between him and Richmond. An incident of this movement was the loss to the Confederacy of General J. E. B. Stuart, the ablest cavalry leader of the Confederate army. An expedition of Federal cavalry, consisting of 10,000 men commanded by General Sheridan, had been sent around to make a dash upon Lee's flank nearest Richmond. They worked enormous destruction upon Confederate railroads, depots, etc., but were desperately harrassed by Stuart's cavalry. At a place called Yellow Tavern, near Ashland, six miles from Richmond, they were attacked by Stuart, and while leading a desperate charge General Stuart himself received a wound from which he died

"Battles and Leaders," vol. iv. p. 182. For a good account of the Battle of the Wilderness see Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65,” ch. ii.