the power of the Union; the second section of the sixth article of the federal Constitution declaring that, "The constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." This provision necessarily makes the States subordinate to the government of the Union, in all matters which, by the federal charter, fall within the demesne of Congress; and the supremacy of the federal government, in these respects, is maintained and enforced, as we shall hereafter see, by the Supreme Court of the United States. While discussing the question of the territorial effect of statutes, we have also to notice an interesting question which has been presented in this country with reference to the jurisdiction of the States over criminal acts, planned or contrived in a State of which the of fending party is a citizen, but consummated in another, and without the culprit ever being actually present in the latter State. It is well settled, as a general rule that penal laws have no extra-territorial effect.* And so a State cannot pass an act making the offense of counterfeiting its current bills, committed out of the State, indictable and punishable in its courts. But, on the other hand, it is equally well settled, that in the case put, where the offense is contrived in one State and executed in another, the party is liable to the * Scoville vs. Canfield, 14 J. R., 338. † State vs. Knight, Taylor's N. C. Rep., 65. criminal jurisdiction of the State where the offense is consummated, though he have never himself been within the limits of the latter State. So, where an indictment was found in Massachusetts against a resident of New York for uttering forged notes in the first-mentioned State, through an innocent agent, the defendant remaining all the while in New York, the defendant was held guilty in Massachusetts.* So again, where one was indicted in New York for obtaining money by fraudulent pretenses from a firm in that State, by exhibiting to them fictitious receipts for property signed by a person in Ohio, although the defendant was a citizen of Ohio and had never been in New York, and the receipts were drawn and signed in Ohio, and the offense was committed by the receipts being presented in New York by innocent agents' employed by the parties in Ohio, it was held that the culprit was liable to the civil jurisdiction of New York. It will be observed that these are cases which apply to mala per se, to offenses against persons or property which are such in all civilized countries; and it may well be doubted whether the rule would hold good as to mere mala prohibita, as, for instance, laws to protect the revenue or the currency, of which the alleged offender may be not merely ignorant, but not chargeable with knowledge. An interesting question connected with the present * Commonwealth rs. Harvey, 8 Am. Jur., 69. People vs. Adams, 3 Denio, 190; S. C. on appeal, 1 Coms. 173. See, to the same point, State vs. Ellis, 3 Conn., 185; Barkhamstead vs. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1; Commonwealth vs. Gillespie, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 469; People vs. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509. In England, the rule that the offense is considered to be committed where it is consummated, holds good as between the different counties, and as between Ireland and England.-King ts. Brisac, 4 East, 164; Rex vs. Johnson, 6 East., 583; S. C., 7 id. 65. branch of our subject arises, as to the time when statutes are to take effect. The old English rule was, that if the act was not directed to operate from any particular time, it took effect from the first day of the session at which it passed, though this date was purely fictitious, and might be weeks or indeed months before the act was assented to by the sovereign, or, in fact, even before the bill was brought in; and this extraordinary application of the doctrine of relation was actually adhered to and acted upon in England as late as the latter part of the last century.* The rule was finally altered by the statute 33 George III., c. 13, which declared that laws shall operate from the time of their receiving the royal assent. Where two statutes, passed in the same session and to come into operation on the same day, are repugnant to each other, it is held that the act which last received the royal assent must prevail.+ This affords a curious instance how difficult it is to make the ancient rules of law conform to those of logic and reason. It is very plain that both of these provi * 33 Henry VI., 18 Bro., 33; 1 Lev., 91. Attorney General vs. Panter, 6 Bro. P. C., 486. Latless vs. Holmes, 4 T. R., 486. Dwarris on Stat., p. 544. R. vs. Bailey, R. & R. C. C. 1; 1 Russ., C. & M., 109. The severity of the old English rule is well illustrated by the trial of Sir William Parkyns for high treason, in 1695, before Lord C. J. Holt, Lord C. J. Treby, and Mr. Justice Rokeby. He prayed to be allowed counsel, but was refused, because the statute, 7 William III. c. 3, allowing counsel to persons indicted for treason, did not go into effect till the next day after that on which he was tried. It was in vain that the prisoner quoted a part of the preamble, which said that such an allowance was just and reasonable. The reply of Lord C. J. Holt was, that he must administer the law as he found it, and could not anticipate the operation of an act of parliament by even a single day. Sir William Parkyns was convicted and executed. See the case reported in the thirteenth volume of the State Trials, Howell's ed. and cited in Mr. Lieber's Hermeneutics, p. 118. See also, Kent's Com., vol. i., p. 456. + Rex vs. Justices of Middlesex, 2 B. & A. 818; 2 Bing. N. C. 682. Dwarris, p. 544. sions are contrary to common sense, and may often produce great injustice. It is impossible that the citizens or subjects of an extensive and populous country, can obtain any accurate knowledge of the purport of an act on the day of its passage; and the doctrine that the act last signed is to prevail over one assented to a few hours previous, is obviously arbitrary and unreliable. The evils likely to result from the first of these rules are now often obviated by a section declaring when the act shall go into effect; and on a clause of this kind it has been decided, that although in an act it is expressly declared that it shall commence and take effect from a day named, yet if the royal assent be not obtained till a day subsequent, the provisions of a particular section, in its terms prospective, do not take effect till such subsequent day.* The Code Napoleon first established the true principle as to when laws should take effect. It declared laws to be binding from the moment that their promulgation should be known; and that the promulgation should be considered as known in the department of the consular or imperial residence one day after the promulgation, and in each of the departments after the expiration of the same space of time, augmented by as many days as there were distances of twenty leagues between the seat of government and the place.† In this country, the mischievous results of the original English rule are usually obviated either by constitutional or statutory provisions. So in Michigan, a constitutional provision declares that "no public act shall take effect or be in force until the expiration of * Burn vs. Carvalho, 4 Nev. and Man, 889. ninety days from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house." In Mississippi, the constitution provides, "that no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided for, shall be enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof."* And in New York it is declared, by a general statute,† that "every law, unless a different time shall be prescribed therein, shall commence and take effect throughout the State, on and not before the twentieth day after the day of its final passage, as certified by the secretary of state." But, in regard to federal legislation, the rule is supposed to be identical with that now in force in England: that every law takes effect on the day of its passage. This subject is of no small consequence, as the law is assumed to be known by every citizen from the time fixed for it to go into operation; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. This maxim has, however, no more than the laws themselves any extra-territorial application; for the doctrine has been declared to be, that citizens of another country, and even, in America, of another State of the Union, are not chargeable with a knowledge of the laws emanating from any jurisdiction, except that to which they belong. This, however, must be certainly taken with the qualification in regard to mala prohibita and mala per se, to which I have already referred, and also with the general limitation that it is to apply rather to civil than to criminal law.§ *Cons. Art. vii. § 6. 1 R. S. 157, Part i. Ch. vii. Tit. v. § 13. Matthews vs. Zane, 7 Wheaton, 164; The Ann, 1 Gallison, 62; 1 Kent's Com. 455. But see 1 Paine, 23. § Curtis cs. Leavitt, 17 Barb., 312, 317; and Merchants' Bank vs. Spalding, Court of Appeals; cited in the same. |