Quatrième Congrès de L'Alliance Coopérative Internationale. (Recent RANDOLPH, CARMAN F. The Law and Policy of Annexation, with special reference to the Philippines, together with Observations on the Statutes of Cuba. (Roger Foster.) RANKIN, REGINALD. The Marquis D'Argenson and Richard II. (Recent REYNOLDS, J. B., FISHER, S. H., and WRIGHT, H. B., Editors. Two Cen- ROBERTS, PETER The Anthracite Coal Industry. (John Graham Brooks.) 437 Ross, EDWARD ALSWORTH. Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations ... 446 SAINT-LÉON, E. MARTIN. Le Compagnonnage, son Histoire, ses Cou- SAYOUS, ANDRÉ E. Les Banques de Dépot, les Banques de Crédit et les SPAHR, CHARLES B. America's Working People. (H. W'. F.) .......... 224 334 THOMAS, WILLIAM HANNIBAL The American Negro; What He Was, 112 104 227 TUNELL, GEORGE G. Railway Mail Service: A Comparative Study of Railway Rates and Services. (Recent Literature.). VINCENT, JOHN MARTIN. Government in Switzerland. (Recent Litera- WATT, W. A. A Study of Social Morality. (W. F. B.) 227 (Simeon E. Baldwin.) 91 (Recent Literature.).. 114 THE YALE REVIEW. MAY, 1901. COMMENT. The Russian Sugar Bounty and the American Tariff; Export Statistics; Applied Sociology. THE recent imposition of a countervailing duty upon beet sugar imported from Russia and the subsequent retaliatory measure of the Russian government largely increasing the duties upon imported American iron and steel manufactures, open a new chapter in our country's commercial policy which may lead to serious complications. The Dingley Tariff of July, 1897, levied an import duty of 1.65 cent a pound on raw and 1.95 on refined sugar. An additional duty equal to the amount of bounty upon the export of the sugar paid by the foreign country was imposed. It was left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to ascertain the amount of the bounty and fix the countervailing import duty accordingly. In the determination of the extent of the bounty policy of foreign countries, a task which the Brussels Beet Sugar Conference of 1898 found extremely difficult,-the Secretary of the Treasury did not adopt a consistent policy. In April, 1900, the then existing countervailing duty on Russian sugar was suspended on the ground that the Russian government did not grant a subsidy to the sugar industry. It was claimed that this action was taken at the instigation of the American exporters, who pointed out to the Secretary the insignificant amount of imported Russian sugar as compared with the large export trade with that country, actual and prospective. The repeal of the countervailing duty led to an increase in the amount of Russian sugar imported. The actual amount imported remained insignificant,-about one-third of I per cent. of the total importation of sugar during the calendar year 1900-but the fact of its increase aroused the various sugar interests, the cane sugar interest of Louisiana, the beet sugar interest of the Western States, and the refiners. Pressure was brought to bear in Washington and, as a result, the question was reopened. After some consultation with those familiar with the matter either commercially or as experts, the Secretary on February 12, 1901, decided that the Russian policy of remitting the internal tax upon exported sugar is tantamount to a bounty upon its export, and directed the collection of a corresponding duty upon its importation into this country, amounting in the case of refined sugar to 0.692 cent per pound in addition to the usual duty of 1.95, or a total of 2.642 cents. The Secretary's action has been endorsed by the Board of General Appraisers, but will doubtless be reviewed by the Federal courts. Everything hinges on the proper interpretation of the Russian laws providing for state control of the beet sugar industry and the remission of the internal tax upon exported sugar, an intricate matter on which there is no general agreement. The undoubted sincerity of our government in regarding the Russian practice as equivalent to the payment of a bounty must not obscure the fact that two opposing interests are involved in the question, and that each has sought to secure government action favorable to itself. The sugar interests have strenuously urged the imposition of the countervailing duty so as to prevent their being undersold by the foreigner. The iron and steel manufacturers have been equally anxious to remove the duty and with it the danger of deranging our commercial relations with Russia, where they are building up a large market for their products. Both these interests have in time past been strong supporters of a high tariff; nowadays the change in their industry is compelling the iron and steel manufacturer to favor a low tariff. During the last decade he has been indifferent to changes in the iron and steel schedule; a few more such conflicts of interest may drive him into the camp of the tariff reformers. The manufacturers' warning that a countervailing duty would result in Russian retaliation was ridiculed, but turned out to be well founded. Immediately upon the Secretary's taking action, the Russian government replied with a large increase of duty upon imported American goods, affecting disastrously especially machinery and other iron manufactures. Similar skirmishes in a possibly impending commercial war with Continental Europe have occurred and are occurring elsewhere. With the constant growth of our export trade, especially in domestic manufactures, such a derangement of our commercial relations could only do harm. But, politically, we may count confidently upon one result from the disturbance, namely the re-opening of the tariff question, which has been slumbering, but has now been rudely awakened, even in Congress, by the cry of those who hereafter will have all to gain and nothing to lose by removing the barriers to trade which they helped to build in time past. The discussion of the Russian sugar bounty has emphasized the extent of our trade relations with that country. The insignificant amount of Russian sugar that was imported and competed with our own, was constantly referred to. On the other hand, the extent of our export trade to Russia was stated in large figures. Thirty millions of dollars worth of iron manufactures were said to have been exported to that country in 1900. However, according to the figures of the Treasury Department, the total exports from the United States to Russia during last year were only 81⁄2 millions. The explanation of this discrepancy throws light on the inaccurate export statistics of that Department. The value and destination of exported goods are based on the clearances received from the transporter. These in many cases make the foreign port of landing appear as the final destination. of the particular article. Hence American exports to those countries which have no seaports or for various reasons must be reached by way of ports in other countries are grossly understated. Switzerland sent us 171⁄2 millions of dollars worth of goods during the calendar year 1900, but we apparently exported less than $300,000 worth to that country. On the other hand, our exports to countries in which are the leading ports of transshipment are correspondingly overstated. Our exports to Belgium and the Netherlands in 1900 were put at 126 millions of dollars worth; our imports from there at only 32 millions. The preponderance of exports to Great Britain (602 millions) over imports from there (152 millions) is similarly exaggerated. Such official misstatements are not confined to the United States. British exports to Russia and Russian exports to the United States are similarly underestimated by the officials of those countries. American exports to Russia have been grossly understated in the official publications, on account of the customary transshipment of goods in some English or Continental ports before they reach their destination in Russia. During the last calendar year we are supposed to have exported to Russia only 81⁄2 millions of dollars worth; the Russian figures for the imports from the United States in 1897 were nearly five times as large as the corresponding American figures. Presumably the iron and steel exports to Russia actually approached the figure claimed in 1900, namely 30 millions of dollars worth. There is unfortunately little likelihood of the official figures being more accurate in the future. We shall not know with any degree of accuracy how our exports are actually divided among the countries of the world until we can provide for an international statistical clearing-house, which is perhaps, not too visionary an institution to hope for, the forerunners of which we already see in various Congresses and International Institutes. The establishment of an Institute for Sociology in Brussels by M. Solvay, together with the almost simultaneous founding of a social museum in Lyons, are significant signs of the times. The two institutions do not seem to be exactly alike in their aim or in their organization. M. Solvay's institute is intended to be something more than a simple museum of sociology. There is to be a large working room open to the public and equipped with a large library. There will also be apartments for seminaries, and for private scientific work. A number of prominent men, among them Prof. Denis, Prof. Vandervelde, and others, are |