This conclusion would seem naturally to lead to assigning criminal punishments to the domain of Retributive Justice. But here he parts company with Kant. Punishment, he argues, cannot be justly retributive, because judges and juries are not omniscient (pp. 334, 341). They cannot read the mind. They cannot allow for temptation. They cannot know the whole of the criminal's history, and training, and defects of inheritance. Only God can punish by way of retribution, for only He can rightly measure guilt.

This savors of sophistry. The premises do not justify the conclusion. As well say with the anarchist, that no human government has a right to exist, because it is necessarily imperfect in scheme and execution.

All the affairs of life are regulated by probabilities. A contested law suit is decided for one side or the other according to the bare preponderance of evidence. The judges may hesitate long before determining which witnesses to believe, which view of a man's intention in using a particular phrase to take, what inference to draw from silence on an occasion when it would have been natural to speak. But when the decision is once made and announced, it ends the matter. Thenceforth the state of facts which has been judicially ascertained becomes indisputable. Whatever is adjudged, the world takes as true.

It is a very human method of getting at the truth. But that the judge may be wrong does not render his judgment unjust. It is to be accepted as just because it is the final word of remedial justice administered by men. If the State is a divine agency towards securing social order, the judgment has a certain divine authority. So has every criminal sentence, and with us by even greater right, because no man can be convicted of crime in an American court except on proof so strong as to exclude any reasonable doubt of guilt.

Professor Willoughby agrees with Kidd that the social order of the future will be regulated and redeemed by a spirit of altruism. They differ as to the way in which this will be worked out. Kidd deems the struggle for existence to belong properly to the brute, and yet to be necessary in human society under any working plan of government from which good results can be expected. Therefore he regards social progress as inimical to individual interests, so far as the majority of men are concerned. Professor Willoughby denies this (pp. 299, 304), asserting that human competition may

be something nobler than the mere struggle for existence, and that religion is not the only means of making it nobler (p. 298). It is a beneficent force, and the only way in which a man can effectually realize himself. He would simply have the game fairly and kindly played, and under rules which the State prescribes or sanctions. Rough it must be, but it need not be uncourteous. All forfeits may not be claimed. We may even sometimes owe it to a feeble or unskilled adversary to let him win; but it will be as when we allow a lady to carry off the palm at tennis,—a matter of good will and good feeling.

Whoever proposes transcendental remedies for the ills of life has the disadvantage of being unable to lay down any particular and definite rules. The vagueness inherent in his theme Professor Willoughby has intensified by the frequent use of unfamiliar not to say pedantic terms. Such words as "propaedeutic," "sacrosanct," "epistemology," "posit," purposive," deterministic," of frequent occurrence, and the more noticeable because the volume is largely made up of quotations from authors like Godwin, Huxley, Mill and Adam Smith, who knew well that short and common words are the most effective, however profound may be the subject under consideration.

The book is a summation of university lectures, and chiefly valuable as a compendious statement of the literary history of abstract socialism.

In one instance the author has added a generalization of his own, which would be important, if true. It is that penal laws have proved efficient only to the extent of preventing the increase of crime. But while this may be true of penal laws in modern times, how was it with those first promulgated in early societies? We have no exact statistics of crime dating back far enough to justify a categorical answer to this question, and yet it is the vital and fundamental one. Probably, however, penal laws were, from the first, found to lessen crime, and hence, in great part, their general adoption.

Yale University.

SIMEON E. BALDWIN.

Politics and Administration: A Study in Government. By Frank J. Goodnow, A.M., LL.D., Professor of Administrative Law in Columbia University. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1900—pp. xiii, 270.

The writer who undertakes to analyze our political institutions, not merely to describe them, has set for himself no easy task. He needs to be fully equipped for his work, not only by a thorough

knowledge of the existing political organization and political conditions, but also by an extended experience in the practical working of political parties. It hardly needs to be said that Professor Goodnow possesses such an equipment to an unusual degree. Therefore the student of politics who finds time to turn to his work on "Politics and Administration," may not unnaturally look forward to a treat-and, whether he agree with the writer's conclusions or not, he will not be disappointed.

The writer's analysis leads him to believe that statesmen and publicists have been befogged in their political thinking by Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers. Consequently in attempting to apply this theory to practical politics they have met with failure, unexpected to be sure but entirely natural. Evidently a new analysis is necessary. Beginning at the fundamental query, what are the primary functions of the state, the author answers his own question as follows: "The action of the state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary to the expression of its will, or in operations necessary to the execution of that will. The will of the state or sovereign must be made up and formulated before political action can be had. The will of the state or sovereign must be executed, after it has been formulated, if that will is to result in governmental action. . These two functions of government may for purposes of convenience be designated respectively as Politics and Administration. Politics has to do with policies or expressions of the state will. Administration has to do with the execution of these policies" (pages 9 and 18).

In the case of the individual, the will is formulated and executed by the same entity; in the case of the political body, the execution of the state's will must necessarily be intrusted in a large measure to a different organ from that which expresses it. Hence it follows that in the state, in order that there may not be political paralysis, a certain harmony, or coördination, must be established between the organs whose duty it is to express the will of the state and those organs entrusted with the expression of that will. Necessarily such coordination increases in difficulty with the development of popular government. The necessary coördination may be secured either by (1) subjecting the political organ to the administrative organ, or (2) by subjecting the latter to the former. Since, from the nature of the work to be accomplished, the administration must be centralized to a considerable degree at least, popular government exists only when the administration is under the control of the legislative

department. The administration may be subjected to the legislative organ in one of two ways: (1) within the governmental system, or (2) outside the government, that is through the instrumentality of the political party. The English system has secured harmony through the first method; the American, constructed on Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers, is attempting to secure the coördination of the political and administrative functions through the organization of political parties. The absence of strong political parties in Germany enables the Crown to hold the legislature in check, while in France and Italy the same lack of well-organized parties, under the cabinet system, permits self-interest in the ministry to disregard the popular will. The existence of two strong, well developed political parties is desirable under any form of government and the real question for statesmen to solve is not how to destroy the political party with its machine and the boss, but how to make it more expressive of the public will (page 147). The answer is (1) centralize the administration so that it may work effectively and harmoniously, and (2) make the party and the party leader responsible to the people.

The author is of the opinion that we may not expect much help from either the adoption of the referendum or the extension of the cabinet system, at least in the United States. He does expect substantial progress to be made in extending our legal system to include within its sanctions the registration of voters, the regulation of the ballot, and the whole machinery of primary elections. The treatment of the methods by which we may hope to secure legal control of the party organization and thus make the party and the boss responsive to the public will, is especially worthy of attention.

Yale University.

MAURICE ROBINSON.

Monopolies and Trusts. By Richard T. Ely, Ph.D., LL.D. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1900-pp. xi, 278.

The Trust Problem. By Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, Ph.D. New York, McClure, Phillips & Co., 1900—pp. xix, 281.

In his Monopolies and Trusts Professor Ely presents, in a form intended to appeal to the general reader as well as the economist, the theory of monopoly in its application to present-day problems. The essence of monopoly is found to be "substantial and controlling unity of action," special stress being laid on the distinction between

monopolies on the one hand and the mere possession of a differential advantage, production on a large scale, and combination on the other. There can be little question in regard to the soundness of this view if we are to give to the term "monopoly" a sufficiently definite meaning to make it of use in the discussion of what is meant to-day by the monopoly problem. Professor Ely's analysis of the causes which produce monopoly1 leads him to the conclusion that mere massing of capital cannot of itself be a cause of monopoly. In his view the only industries in which monopoly tends to supplant competition are those which have come to be generally regarded as natural monopolies and those which owe their monopoly character to act of government or to favoritism shown to individual producers by legal or natural monopolies. Over the greater part of the field, not only of agriculture, but of manufactures and of commerce, there is no reason to believe that monopoly will secure control unless artificially supported. The argument in support of this position is clear and able; it constitutes, indeed, one of the best portions of the book; but, while experience alone can show whether it is correct, it may be questioned whether Professor Ely recognizes sufficiently the influences other than capacity to produce at a low cost which may contribute to give monopoly power to a great combination covering practically a whole field of industry, or the influence of concentration of production in making such combinations possible. Certainly if we recognize the possibility of degrees in monopoly, i. e., the existence of partial monopoly, as Professor Ely does in several places, it would seem evident, in the light of recent events, that massing of capital can at least secure a monopoly of this sort.

The view of the field of monopoly, just outlined, leads, in the discussion of what is popularly regarded as the monopoly problem, to a sharp distinction between the monopoly problem proper and the trust problem, the elements of which are concentration of production and concentration of wealth. Our author's view in regard to the proper treatment of monopolies, and the effect such treatment would have in keeping intact the field of competition, are well known. Suffice it to say that they are presented here, if not with less force, yet with a clearer perception of the difficulties involved, than in earlier writings. The attitude taken toward trusts is distinctly conservative, the remedies definitely suggested being education, suppression of favoritism by government and monopolies proper, reform of 'Professor Ely's classification of monopoly has been discussed at some length in this REVIEW for November, 1900.