he fell into a painless and refreshing sleep. On the following Monday, a near friend came from a distance to see him, who, believing in faith-cure, offered to pray for his restoration. Christlieb replied that he was prepared to go home to heaven, but that even if he (his friend) would pray for his restoration, "it must always be done with the proviso: Thy will, O Lord, be done!"" In the presence of his two grown-up sons and a few friends, prayer was offered to God in his behalf, under the imposition of hands. To the astonishment of all, the pain ceased, and for a few days he appeared to gain strength. But it was only for a brief time; but during this time he learned, as never before, the Christian virtue of patience, for during his well days, he was often quick and impatient. During these painless intervals his soul was fully prepared for the final catastrophe; for he was not to survive that terrible disease. One night, a few days before his death, was spent by him in alternate prayers and thanksgiving. The day of the 15th of August he spent comparatively free from pain, walked a little in his room, and chatted cheerfully with his family, when in the evening, at nine o'clock, he died, from the immediate effects of a stroke of paralysis of the brain, leaving a widow and six children; of whom a son is already a pastor, and a daughter is married to an English missionary physician in Bagdad. Among the many who sent telegrams of condolence to the family were the German emperor and empress. The funeral was large, and many wreaths of flowers were sent from far and near. Christlieb was highly re- spected in life and truly mourned in death by the whole Christian world. Requiescat in pace.

M. J. leramer

ART. III.-UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

THE General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. is "a constitutional legislative body," and is not, like the British Parliament, a supreme legislative body. The British Parliament has no constitution to limit its acts; what it does is final. It is not supposed to derive its power from the will of the governed, but has "unlimited legislative, executive, and judicial powers," and "may act as it pleases." Not so with the Methodist General Conference. It has a constitution with explicit limitations. It derives its authority to legislate from the ministers and members of the Church, and can act only within its constitutional limitations. These constitutional limitations grow out of necessities as developed by human experience; that is, "human foresight being fallible, men do not foresee what influences may be brought to bear upon them to do things. upon the spur of the moment which after cool deliberation they would not have done, and greatly desire undone. Limitations to legislation prevent hasty doing, thus averting disaster and securing the happiest results. Every well-ordered government, whether civil or ecclesiastical, has these limitations."*

The power of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church is circumscribed by six restrictive rules, or limitations, but is otherwise "unlimited over all matters pertinent to church government." Bishop Hamline, in his great speech before the General Conference of 1844, rather unguardedly affirmed the absolute supremacy of the General Conference in such sentences as these: "Its supremacy is universal. It has legislative, judicial, and executive supremacy.' But when pushed upon this point by Dr. Smith, he arose and conceded that "this body is responsible to the constitution," a concession which, indeed, he could not avoid making in the face of the authorizing clause of the constitution, which reads: "The General Conference shall have full powers to make rules and regulations for our Church, under the following limitations and restrictions." But constitutional safeguards do not always

*Curtiss: Constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church, p. 51.
Perrine: Principles of Church Government, pp. 204, 209.

serve the purpose of preventing injudicious legislation. There are found in almost every legislative body ambitious, impulsive, or thoughtless men, who, in their collective capacity, seem disposed to ignore restrictions, override barriers, and act in all things in accordance with their own notions of propriety and wisdom. This fact has been cited as a good reason why the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, like most other legislative bodies, should be divided into two distinct, separate, and concurrent houses.

Chancellor Kent affirms, that the one great object of two houses in legislation is "to destroy the effects of sudden and strong excitements, and of precipitate measures springing from passion, caprice, prejudice, personal influence, and party intrigue, which have been found by sad experience to exercise a potent and dangerous sway in single assemblies." The late Dr. W. II. Perrine contended for this idea with all the sturdy vehemence and ability of his nature, and did much to convince the Church that the division of the General Conference into two branches is demanded for the more effectual protection of our free constitution from the encroachments of the legislative body.†

Under an elective system of government one of the greatest drawbacks to wise, safe, and constitutional legislation is the indisposition of representatives chosen by the people to acquaint themselves with the limitations of the constitution under which

they are to act. In the Methodist Episcopal Church the legis lative body meets only once in four years, and at every session it is found that large numbers of the delegates are new men, unused to legislative methods, and without that practical experience in the consideration of questions having constitutional bearings which would enable them to proceed always with intelligence and safety. Indeed, it is often found that the greatest experience possible to any delegate in a quadrennial assembly of only twenty-five or thirty days' duration does not preclude liability to err or a strong tendency to overleap constitutional barriers.

I now propose to cite from the history of our General Conference legislation two or three instances wherein the constitutional limitations of the body have been severely strained, if

*Kent: Commentaries, vol. i, p. 224.

Perrine: Principles of Church Government. Hunt & Eaton, New York.

not grossly violated. To go no farther back than 1844, we find that the "supremacy speech" by Dr. Hamline produced an impression the practical result of which was to imperil the constitution of the General Conference. Under the sixth restrictive rule, the General Conference has no power to appropriate the produce of the Book Concern nor of the Chartered Fund to any purpose other than for the benefit of the traveling, supernumerary, superannuated and worn-out preachers, their wives, widows, and children. Yet the General Conference of 1844 actually did something else with the produce of the Book Concern. What was that? Let one who studiously traversed the whole question, and graphically describes the result, answer this question:

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The record tells us that at the conclusion of Dr. Hamline's speech, in which he maintained the supremacy of the General Conference, "nearly every body was ready to shout." Ay, sir, that formula fell on eager ears." It touched responsive chords in human nature. In short, it was in perfect consonance with what Chief-Justice Story calls so justly "the strong propensity of all public bodies to accumulate all power, patronage, and influence in their own hands." Sir, with the General Conference it was a very popular speech. Who wonders that they were "ready to shout -were ready to smile on the author and utterer of so many most agreeable sentiments, so many exquisite and most acceptable compliments-were ready to do a handsome thing in return? The orator gave the Conference all he would-"legislative, judicial, and executive supremacy," "universal supremacy!" And the General Conference gave the orator all they could-their suffrages made him a bishop! And what wonder, sir, that while the exhilarating effect of that intoxicating draught of "universal supremacy" was still tingling the blood, vibrating along all the nerves, bracing the will with a feeling of puissance akin to conscious omnipotence, this body, within twenty-four hours after it had shaken out its honors on the head of the very complimentary orator, proceeded to such a stretch of General Conference prerogative in the enactment of the so-called "plan of separation," as has covered not only its enactors, the General Conference of 1844, but the entire Church, with confusion, humiliation, and shame. Alfred Griffith and a few others lifted up the voice of warning, but under the whip of the previous question this well-nigh omnipotent body drove on. It was the work of a few hours, but it has given us abundant leisure for repentance, and the end is not yet. We would, sir, infinitely prefer to go backward and throw the veil of oblivion over that saddest of all the chapters of our legislative history; but fidelity to the interests of the Church, yet imperiled by this universal supremacy" dogma, impels us to speak. The

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keen-eyed South saw its advantage. With that so-called “plan of separation" as a deep-laid keel, they proceeded to key and bolt in the mighty ribs of "legislative, judicial, and executive supremacy," and, roofed with the identical "universal supremacy" rails of "the great speech," and beaked with the "General Conference supremacy" decisions of Judge Nelson in the United States Court, they sent their Confederate ram with flying colors crashing through the broadsides of our constitution, severing not only "a few slender restrictions," but cleaving the Church in twain, and carrying away with this General Conference supremacy craft the accumulated spoils of the Book Concern.*

As another illustration of the tendency of the General Conference (constituted as it is of a single house, and, for the most part, of delegates inexperienced in legislation) to err on constitutional grounds, let its action on a question of boundaries in 1880 be cited. Judge Cooley, on Constitutional Limitations, says that "one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred on the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to another body or authority."+ Dr. Curtiss says, that

When a legislative body is considering any question in the Committee of the Whole, it cannot enact any rule or law, but its conclusions must be reported to the legislative body in regular session, and then and there be acted upon, or it is without force and void. It follows, logically, that the General Conference has no authority to confide to any committee a supposed power to enact laws without subsequently reviewing said acts, and passing upon them.

Yet the General Conference of 1880 proceeded to legislate contrary to this analogical limitation. The law enacted was the following:

The General Conference shall appoint a committee on boundaries consisting of one member from each Annual Conference, to be nominated by the delegations severally, over which one of the bishops shall preside, and of which one of the General Conference secretaries shall be the secretary, and of which committee twenty-five shall be a quorum. All matters pertaining to Conference lines shall be referred to this committee, and its decision shall be final. Dr. Curtiss, in his Study of our Church Constitution, states the result:

The boundary committee on the 28th of May, 1880, presented their report, which was not acted upon, but was printed in *For an extended statement of the whole case, see Principles of Church Government, by Dr. Perrine, pp. 211-215. Page 116, third ed.