universe. Above, below, and beyond their reach, even when aided by the most powerful instruments, it is probable that the greater part of the universe exists. We stand on the borders of the infinite, and the constant outcroppings or projections from that infinite into this world of vision and sensation dem

onstrate that it is plethoric in rich realities. The atoms constitute a part of the "unscen universe," and while "the things that are seen are temporal, the things that are unseen are eternal." Such is the constitution of nature that substance, per se, or being of every order, is shrouded in the mystery of mysteries. Facts, realities, and phenomena we may know; but the essence of all things belongs to the infinite, ad is to us a matter of intellectual discernment. We have no more authority for denying the reality of the atomic elements because they and their essence elude our observation, than we have for denying the reality of the existence of the mind or of God, because unseen.

If the idealist will bring together his unextended mathematical points in sufficient quantity to make an ounce of sugar; then work them into a lump, and permit us to see and taste the lump; then take the lump and work it back into molecules, then into atoms, and finally into the unextended points whence he started, he will by that process produce the only proof which can give respectability to his theory. By that feat he will also not only get rid of the obnoxious "lump," but he will demonstrate that all lumps, masses, and orbs of matter which exist in space are unreal, and nothing but mere appearances. We insist upon a recognition of the facts of nature in this discussion, because the idealist cannot get along at all only by ignoring them, and reducing man's knowing capacity almost to zero.

Idealism levies another heavy tax upon us in demanding that we abandon our ideas of space considered as a sui generis external reality. We may see in this requirement that he is making a laudable effort to preserve his logic; of course, if there are no lumps nor masses of matter there can be no demand for space. What is space? Ontologically it is, per se, nothing, but it affords room for something, and something extended. Kant gave the world two different but harmonious expositions of space-the metaphysical and the empirical. Mind and space are related to each other in the respect that one may know the other. What is the mind's capacity is a question of psychology,

what its conceptions of space are is a question of metaphysics. As a question of metaphysics, Kant teaches that in order to represent something without me, not merely as without and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist in the mind as a foundation;" just as the photograph's plate must exist before it can receive your image. This idea of space is consequently a pure intuition, and does not include the relation of things in space. Kant represents space as an infinite given quantity, though it may be divid ed into a multitude of sections. This conception of space seems to be clear and faultless as far as it goes, but it is purely subjective, and the idealist has seized upon it and appropriated it as if it were his entire representation. In this way the great name of Kant has been unjustly pressed into the service of idealism; but he puts us on our guard against the abuse of his psychological representation of space in the following language:

We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomenon, and by no means as a determination dependent upon them, and is a representation, á priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena.

In other words, we cannot imagine that space never was, that it will ever cease to be, that in extent it is less than infinite, that it is dependent upon any substance existing in it, or is in any way affected or "determined" by such things; but it is that "which necessarily supplies the basis," affords room, “for physical phenomena."

The idealist tumbles this whole subject into chaos as follows:

And first we need to know what is the relation of space as existing to that fundamental reality God (1) considered as a factor in metaphysics, which is the source of all things. If the two be independent, we collide (2) with the demand of reason for unity in the fundamental reality. We should be equally at a loss to express the ontological relation of these two independent existences. The space which is declared to be real would at the same time be so like the negation of existence that the only possible relation between the two would be that space contains the reality, or the reality is in space. But here, again, we should be unable to tell what difference such a relation would make to either, and hence to tell what we mean by it. If the space does nothing

to the being and the being does nothing to space, the two seem to be out of relation. Moreover, if we allow the fundamental reality [God] to be in space, we collide also with its unity; for whatever is in space must be subject to the laws of space, must be extended, therefore, and hence has parts, and is no proper unit. The affirmation, then, of the mutual independence of space and being makes it absurd to predicate any relation (3) between them. On the other hand, it is impossible to view space as the source of being, or being as the creator of space, viewed as something real and the essential affirmation [of idealism] is, that space is only (4) a form of experience, or the form of phenomena, and hence is absurd and impossible when abstracted from consciousness as its fundamental condition. . . . It has no extra-mental existence, and in this sense is subjective.

...

On the above we remark as follows:

1. God is unknown and incomprehensible, and when we make him an element of metaphysics, or "a factor" in argument, we introduce into it an uncertain and unmanageable quantity. If the elements of an equation are indefinable, their significance cannot be ascertained, and any conclusion we may reach in its reduction will be of no value. In conception, as well as in language, the idealist undeifies God, and makes him the factor needed to fit in with other factors of his argument so as to reach the desired conclusion. Against this whole proceeding we protest as irreverent if not impious, and as the extreme of sophistical reasoning.

2. This is the finest specimen we have ever met of what Warburton characterizes as "the learned obscurity arising from the collision of contrary false principles." The idea is, that God as an entity cannot connote with space as an entity; that reason demands that God and space, whatever it may be, must be regarded as a unit. In this business the trouble arises from two sources (1) God is not only undeified, but in thought he is clothed with the attributes of matter; (2) to space is given an ontological character, then it is conceived as a lump, and then, of course, there are two infinite substances or lumps in the field, whereas there should be but one. There is not only a collision with reason, but two such infinite and independent existences of the same order must necessarily be in a state of constant collision with each other; or rather, as such they cannot exist. But let us look at the facts in the case. God is God, and in no sense can he be classified as an element of science. As an

Infinite Spirit he is distinguished and eternally separated from the universe he made by the fact that in nature or essence he is divine, and the only divine Being there can be. The realm of the divine can be occupied only by divinity. Thus in an important sense-by his divine nature-is God isolated from, and yet closely associated with, the universe. He exists in space because the non-existence of space is inconceivable. It is one of the unchangeable eternities. Space affects nothing and nothing affects space. It is independent, and neither in nor out of relation with any thing. Because of space things may be, and be related to each other. The divine, the self-existent, independent Spirit, alone in his divinity, is "the fundamental reality demanded by reason." An ontological character cannot belong to space, for if it did then it must pertain to every part of it; and if that were so, then the universe would be one solid "lump:" but space being devoid of all substantive qualities it is possible for any kind, or order, or form of being to exist in it. We know but little of the constitution of the universe, and nothing of the nature of any kind of substance. The old notion that there are but two kinds of substance, matter and spirit, ought to be abandoned forever. There are at least sixty-five kinds of substance called matter; God is a substance; we believe there are myriads of angelic substances; the supposed ether and electricity may yet be proved to be substances; and we are justified in holding that creation is rich in realities. Space may be an inconceivable kind of substance, but apparently it is an infinite void, in which is inclosed all things else, and which makes an infinite universe possible.

3. Between things and space there can be no relation whatever, that is, they have no effect upon each other. Were the universe annihilated, space would not be affected by its absence, and the destruction of space is inconceivable. Space is infinite inexistence, except as an absolute void. As space, it is real, positive, and eternal. Space is the same whether occupied or empty.

4. We concede with Kant that the idea of space has a special subjective signification, that is, it is "formless" as regards both "experience" and "phenomena." Things have form in space, but it is supreme nonsense to affirm that space can be wrought into different shapes. Things in space may divide it into sections large and small, and of an infinite variety of forms, but

these things produce not the slightest effect upon space itself. All the differences of form are in the things and the space they occupy. According to idealism I must school myself to think of the supposed space my inkstand occupies as nothing but the "form" my "experience" takes on in regard to a phenomenon. which has been developed in my mind. But the fact is, our intuition of space, per se, is of a formless void, and our experience is, that things have form in space.

To assure ourselves that we have not mistaken the meaning of this philosophy let the following from an apostle of idealism be considered:

The more we study perception as an effect the plainer it becomes that the ontological and independent existence of the apparent object is no necessary factor of it. All that is needed is an orderly excitation of sensation, and if our present set of sensations were continued, no matter how, the assumed world of things might fall away without our ever missing them, or without in any way modifying the apparent world.

Here we have another materialistic, mechanical, and very gross conception of the mind and of operations upon it. The paper before me passively secures as "effects" the characters traced by the pen, and in a similar manner the mind is subject. "to an orderly excitation of sensations," and all that it really knows are these "excited sensations." Should these continue, and "the world of things fall away, we would not miss it." Hume never wrote any thing more obnoxious to Christianity than these sentiments. On another page we have shown that sensations are vital; that they originate in the life of the organisin, and are cognized by the mind as things external to it. It is a wretched philosophy which would limit the sweep of the mind's powers and activities to bodily sensations. Idealism does the utmost that can be done to make man a non-intelligence; in many particulars it reduces him below the brutes, as his sensations are far less acute. To shatter this philosophy it is only necessary to glance at the mind as it exists in its own consciousness; an intelligence of the spirit-order, ever active, selfdirecting, and aggressive. The idea that perception is an effect, the result of a stimulus, or a sensation, may be true in regard to swine and a low order of beasts, but it is a slander when applied to human kind. But this is only one of many devices