of August, 1875, lost his life and died, leaving him surviving a wife and children."

The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the death of Scheffer was not due to the negligence of the railroad company in the judicial sense which made it liable under the statute. That the relation of such negligence was too remote as a cause of death to justify recovery, the proximate cause being the suicide of the decedent-his death by his own immediate act.

In this opinion we concur.

Two cases are cited by counsel, decided in this court, on the subject of the remote and proximate causes of acts where the liability of the party sued depends on whether the act is held to be the one or the other; and though relied on by plaintiffs in error, we think they both sustain the judgment of the Circuit Court.

The first of these is that of Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44.

In that case a policy of fire insurance contained the usual clause of exception from liability for any loss which might occur "by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot or civil commotion, or any military or usurped power, explosion, earthquake or hurricane." An explosion took place in the Marshall warehouse, which threw down the walls of the Alabama warehouse -the one insured, situated across the street from Marshall warehouse-and by this means, and by the sparks from the Eagle Mill, also fired by the explosion, facilitated by the direction of the wind, the Alabama warehouse was burned. This court held that the explosion was the proximate cause of the loss of the Alabama warehouse, because the fire extended at once from the Marshall warehouse, where the explosion occurred. The court said that no new or intervening cause occurred between the explosion and the burning of the Alabama warehouse. That if a new force or power had intervened, sufficient of itself to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered as too remote.

This case went to the verge of the sound doctrine in holding the explosion to be the proximate cause of the loss of the Alabama warehouse; but it rested on the ground that no other proximate cause was found.

In the case of Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, the sparks from a steam ferry-boat of the company had set fire to an elevator, and the sparks from the elevator had set fire to Kellogg's sawmill and lumber-yard, which were from three to four hundred feet from the elevator. The court below was requested to charge the jury that the sparks from the

Bringing the case before us to the test of these principles it presents no difficulty. The proximate cause of the death of Scheffer was his own act of self-destruction. It was within the rule in both these cases a new cause, and a sufficient cause of death.

The argument is not sound which seeks to trace this immediate cause of the death through the previous stages of mental aberration, physical suffering and eight months' disease and medical treatment to the original accident on the railroad. Such a course of possible or even logical argument, would lead back to that "great first cause least understood," in which the train of all causation ends.

The suicide of Scheffer was not a result naturally and reasonably to be expected from the injury received on the train. It was not the natural and probable consequence, and could not have been foreseen in the light of the circumstances attending the negligence of the officers in charge of the train.

His insanity as a cause of his final destruction was as little the natural or probable result of the negligence of the railway officials as his suicide, and each of these was a casual or unexpected cause, intervening between the act which injured him and his death.

Judgment affirmed.

LOT OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY FROM ICE ON ADJOINING SIDEWALK.

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS, JANUARY TERM, 1881.

CITY OF HARTFORD V. TALCOTT.*

The owner or occupant of a building bordering on a street with a graded or paved sidewalk is not liable for an injury resulting from a neglect to remove snow or ice from such sidewalk, even though the neglect is in violation of a city ordinance requiring him under a penalty to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk.

Such a proprietor owes no duty to the public in reference to the way except to remove from it all property of his own that obstructs it and to refrain from doing any thing to render it unsafe for travellers. So far as defects in it re sult wholly from the operations of nature he is without responsibility for them.

It is the duty of a city to keep its streets open and safe for public travel and this duty extends to that portion used exclusively by foot passengers. And it cannot by ordinance transfer the liability for a neglect of that duty to an individual.

NIVIL action to recover of the defendants the amount

was too remote.

Instead of this the court submitted to the jury to find "whether the burning of the mill and lumber was the result naturally and reasonably to be expected from the burning of the elevator; whether it was a result which under the circumstances would not naturally follow from the burning of the elevator, and whether it was the result of the continued effect of the sparks from the steamboat without the aid of other causes not reasonably to be expected."

The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, and in commenting on the difficulty in ascertaining in each case the line between the proximate and remote causes of a wrong for which a remedy is sought, says: "It is admitted that the ruling is difficult. But it is generally held that in order to warrant a finding that negligence or an act not amounting to wanton wrong is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances." To the same effect is the language of the court in McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 294.

ages for an injury caused by ice upon a sidewalk in front of their premises; brought in the Hartford Common Pleas.

Snow

The defendants were proprietors of premises fronting on Asylum street in the city of Hartford. and ice had accumulated and for several days been allowed to remain upon the sidewalk in front, rendering the walk dangerous for persons passing over it. A foot passenger slipped upon it and was injured, and in a suit against the city recovered judgment for damages. This judgment the city paid and brought suit to recover the amount from the defendants.

The case was reserved for the advice of this court. C. E. Perkins, for plaintiffs.

E. B. Bennett, for defendants.

PARDEE, J. The State places upon municipal corporations the burden of keeping the highways within their respective limits in a reasonably safe condition for public travel; and in cities and boroughs this duty is co-extensive with the width of the street, including

* Appearing in 48 Connecticut Reports.

that portion used by foot passengers exclusively. As both the carriage and foot-ways are for the convenience of the public, and not for the especial use or benefit of adjoining proprietors under the general law, the money expended in maintaining and in making compensations for injuries resulting from neglect to maintain them, is to be paid by the public from taxes assessed equally upon all property. The ownership of land upon a way does not carry with it the burden of an unequal contribution to either branch of these expenditures. The individual owes no duty to the public in reference to the way except to remove therefrom all property of his own which obstructs it, and to refrain from doing or placing any thing thereon dangerous to the traveller. So far as defects in it result wholly from the operations of nature, the proprietor at whose front they exist is without responsibility for them. Therefore where ice has accumulated upon the sidewalk to a dangerous extent it is the duty of the municipality to remove or cover it within a reasonable time after its formation.

The charter authorizes the council to make an ordinance regulating the keeping "open and safe for public use and travel, and free from encroachment and obstruction, the streets, highways, passways and public grounds and places in said city." But there is in this language no grant of power to the council to change the general law and transfer the responsibility for injuries resulting from defects in the way from the public to an individual who is not responsible for their existence. The utmost reach of it is only to authorize the enactment of an ordinance requiring each proprietor upon the way to assist the city in restoring the walk to a condition of safety, with a fixed and reasonable penalty for disobedience.

The council enacted the following ordinance: "Section 11. The owner or owners, occupant or occupants, private corporation, or any person having the care of any building or lot of land bordering on any street, square or public place within the city where there is a sidewalk graded, or graded and paved, shall cause to be removed therefrom any and all snow, sleet and ice within two hours after the same shall have fallen, been deposited or found, or within three hours after sunrise when the same shall have fallen in the night season.

"Section 12. Whenever the sidewalk or any part thereof adjoining or fronting any building or lot of land, or any street, square or public place, shall be covered with ice, it shall be the duty of the owner or owners, occupant or occupants, private corporation, or any person having the care of such building or lot, to cause such sidewalk to be made safe and convenient by removing the ice therefrom, or by covering the same with sand or some other suitable substance; and in case such owner or owners or other persons shall neglect so to do for the space of one hour during the daytime, the person or persons whose legal duty it shall be to so clear the said sidewalk and so neglecting shall be liable to the penalty named in the succeeding section.

"Section 13. The owner or owners, occupant or occupants, private corporation, or any person having the care of any building or lot of land, and whose duty it is to clear the same, who shall violate any of the provisions of the eleventh or twelfth sections of this ordinance, or refuse or neglect to comply with the same, shall pay a penalty of two dollars for every twelve hours such person, owner or owners, occupant or occupants, shall neglect to comply with said provisions, or any of them, after notice from any policeman of said city.

sidewalk and legally liable to clear the same; and if such sidewalk is not thoroughly cleared within twentyfour hours after such notice shall have been given, or properly covered with sand or some other suitable substance, the chief of police shall cause the same to be cleared, and collect the expense thereof of such owner or other persons; and the city attorney shall, at the request of the chief of police, collect by suit such expense as a debt due the city."

But by passing this ordinance the city has not relieved itself from responsibility for the safety of travellers; it remains answerable for injuries resulting either from the negligence of the individual or its own omission to act. The labor performed by those who obey and the fines and expenses paid by those who do not, measure the extent of the advantages to be derived from the exercise of the power to pass it.

Moreover there not being upon the individual any liability at common-law for injuries resulting from obstructions in the way wholly the effects of natural causes, such liability is not brought into existence by force of declarations in the ordinance that the obstructions are nuisances, or that it is his duty to remove them; for as the liability is the creation of the ordinance, it can be no greater than that specifically named therein; and as in the one before us, the council measured it by a fine with cost of removal, the city has thereby barred itself from enforcing an unnamed and unlimited liability beyond. In the matter of statutory penalties the expression of a certainty prevents the existence of an uncertainty.

In support of his position counsel for the plaintiff has cited Robbins v. City of Chicago, 4 Wall. 657; Portland v. Richardson, 54 Maine, 46; Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 23 Pick. 24, and Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475-but these are instances of excavations made and negligently left open in the way by the defendants. Boston v. Worthington, 10 Gray, 496, and Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165-instances of bellar-ways opening into the street and negligently left unprotected-practically daily digging and leaving open a dangerous excavation in the street; Milford v. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17-negligently permitting an awning to fall; Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149; negligently permitting a chimney to fall; Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535-digging and negligently leaving unprotected an excavation on the defendant's land, but so dangerously near and open to the street as to be in effect an excavation therein. In each case the defendant placed a dangerous obstruction in the way, and of course for a time after doing the act was upon every principle responsible for the consequences, and that irrespective of any city ordinance.

The Court of Common Pleas is advised to render jugment for the defendants.

NOTE.-See as sustaining the doctrine of this case City of Keokuk v. Independent District, 53 Iowa, 352; Kirby v. Boylston Market Assoc., 14 Gray, 252; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 461; Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 325.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. MAY 30, 1882.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN INVOLVES COMPENSATION PAID OR SECURED-UNCERTAIN FUND NOT COMPENSATION-DIRECTION TO CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE CITY TO PAY OVER TO CITY-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-RIGHT OF STATE TO ACT FOR-STATU

TORY CONSTRUCTION.—(1) It is one of the principles of government that a provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant upon the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individual of his property under the right of eminent domain.

A

Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 John's Ch. 168. The courts have held that compensation need not be concurrent with the taking, but that it is sufficient if the law authorizing the taking also provides a sure, sufficient and convenient remedy by which the owner can subsequently coerce payment. The law making the appropriation is invalid if such provision is not made. law authorizing the taking of a man's land and remitting him for his sole remedy for compensation to a fund to be obtained by taxation of certain specified lands in a limited district according to benefits is not a sure and adequate provision dependent on no hazard, etc., such as law and justice require to meet the constitutional obligations. (2) A public street in a city, though opened and the lands taken therefor under a special legislative enactment and placed in charge of a commission, and out of the ordinary city authorities, held, not to render the work a State and not a local improvement so as to render the State and not the city liable for the lands taken. A municipal corporation is the creation of the State deriving its public faculties and political powers from the legislature. The legislature may, in place of remitting the question to the direction of the city authorities, prescribe what local improvement shall be made and create special agencies for their execution. It is not required to commit their execution to the ordinary representatives of the municipal body, and it may charge the expense of such improvements upon the locality. The compensation for land appropriated in widening Sackett street, Brooklyn, provided for by Laws 1868, chap. 631, although by the act provision is made for an assessment of the expense upon property found to be benefited by a commission, held to be by statute a charge upon the city of Brooklyn and the city liable therefor. (3) A direction to the chief financial officer of a city, State, or of the general government, to pay money for a public purpose is a direction that the government, State or municipality pay the sum stated. This is especially so in a case where the direction is found in a charter act and relates to a duty of a public character, New York, etc., Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Andrews, C. J. and Tracy, JJ., concur. sent.

Sage v. City of Brooklyn. Miller, Danforth, Finch Earl and Rapallo, JJ., dis

CORPORATION-ACTION AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS FOR DEBTS-RETURN OF EXECUTION UNSATISFIED.-The provision of the general manufacturing law (Laws 1848, chap. 40), that the return of an execution unsatified is a condition precedent to the right of a creditor to bring an action against a stockholder is not complied with by the issue of an execution in another State against specific property of the corporation. The statute means that an execution shall have been issued out of a court of this State of general jurisdiction. See Tarbell v. Griggs, 3 Paige, 207; Dix v. Briggs, 9 id. 595; Crippen v. Hudson, 13 N. Y. 161; Thomas v. Merchants' Bank, 9 Paige, 216. Judgment approved. Rocky Mountain National Bank v. Bliss, Opinion by Rapallo, J.

FRAUD-PROVISIONS OF LAW INTENDED TO PREVENT CANNOT BE INVOKED TO PERPETUATE-IMPLIED TRUST EQUITABLE ACTION.-Provisions of law intended to prevent fraud cannot be successfully invoked to secure to a wrong-doer the fruits of his iniquity. Defendant in 1869 for $100,000 purchased real estate, which was, by his direction, conveyed to one who accepted it upon an oral understanding that he would hold it subject to the order of defendant. In 1871, at the request of defendant, F. conveyed the property to plaintiff, defendant's son, who gave no consideration therefor. Defendant was in the habit of having property transferred to plaintiff in trust and confidence,

that plaintiff would dispose of it for the use and benefit of defendant as he might direct, and on this occasion defendant agreed, though not in writing, to hold the title of the premises for the use and benefit and subject to the order of defendant. In 1872, at the request of defendant and for his benefit, plaintiff conveyed the premises to one S. for the consideration expressed of $100,000. In part payment two mortgages were executed by the purchaser to plaintiff. One of these mortgages plaintiff subsequently assigned as directed by defendant the other defendant took into his possession. In 1879 plaintiff demanded possession of this mortgage and being denied, brought this action for the purpose of having it adjudged that he is the sole owner and entitled to the immediate possession of this same. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the statute (1 R. S. 728, § 51), which declares that where a grant for a valuable consideration shall be made to one person and the consideration thereof shall be paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such payment shall be made, but the title shall vest in the person named as the alienee in such conveyance," or the statute (2 R. S. 134, § 6), prescribing that certain interests on lands cannot be created, "except by a writing, declaring the trust and subscribed," etc. The court has always adhered to this principle that the statute should never be understood to protect fraud. Resch v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. Sr. 123; Nelson v. Worral, 20 Iowa, 469; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 469; Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 id. 227. Plaintiff is not entitled to have the statute strained in his favor, and taken literally, it does not cover his case. It covered the conveyance to F., but not that from F. to plaintiff. Besides, plaintiff executed his trust as to the real estate and the mortgages he took for payment he took as trustee for defendant by implication of law if not by agreement. Those securities were personal property, and the statute does not apply. Judgment reversed. Robbins v. Robbins. Opinion by Danforth, J.

HIGHWAY-RAILROAD CROSSING-THOUGH IMPEDING TRAVEL SOMEWHAT, NOT UNLAWFUL OR A NUIS

at

ANCE.-Under the provision of a railroad charter (Laws 1846, chap. 195, § 5), requiring the railroad company where crossing a highway with its road to restore the highway as near as may be to its former state so as not unnecessarily to impair its usefulness" it is not necessary upon a country road which is crossed below grade so as to require a bridge, to construct the bridge of the full width of the road and the construction of a bridge of less width is not per se a nuisance. It would depend upon the circumstances, the location of the bridge, whether in a populous district or not, the extent of the use of the highway, etc. At the trial of an indictment against the railroad company for maintaining an improperly constructed bridge upon a highway a railroad crossing, the court charged that if the bridge obstructed or hindered the enjoyment of the public in the highway it was a nuisance, and defendant was guilty under the indictment, and further, that the question to be passed upon by the jury was whether the bridge is so constructed as not to impair the usefulness of the road and to interfere with the enjoyment or safety of the public in their right to travel upon the road. Held, that the charge was erroneous in omitting the proper qualifications. The court should have submitted it to the jury to find upon all the circumstances whether the defendant unnecessarily impaired the usefulness of the highway by the manner of constructing the bridge. That a railroad crossing will, to some extent, impair the usefulness of a highway is implied in the language of the statute. Judgment affirmed. People of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. Opinion by Andrews, C. J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

MORTGAGE BY INSOLVENT DEBTOR TO CREDITOR WHO CONCEALS INSOL

VENCY TO GIVE CREDIT.- A mortgage executed by au insolvent mortgagor and covering his entire estate to his creditor, who knows of his insolvency, and who, for the purpose of giving him a fictitious credit, conceals the mortgage and withholds it from the record, and represents the mortgagor as having a large estate and unlimited credit by which means the latter is enabled to contract other debts which he cannot pay, is void at common law. It is not enough in order to support a settlement against creditors, that it be made for a valuable consideration. It must be also bona fide. If it be made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, it is void as against them, although there may be in the strictest sense a valuable or even an adequate consideration. Twyne's case, 3 Co. Rep. 81; Holmes v. Penney, 3 Kay & J. 99; Craig v. Martin., 12 Allen; Brady v. Briscoe, J. J. Marsh, 212; Bozman v. Draughn, 3 Stew. 343; Farmers' Bank v. Douglass, 11 Sme. & Mar. 469; Burn v. Ahl, 29 Penn. St. 99; Root v. Reynolds, 32 Vt. 139; Kempner v. Churchill, 8 Wall. 362; Kerr, Fraud and Mist. 200. As long ago as Hungerford v. Earle, 2 Vern. 260, it was held that "a deed not at first fraudulent may afterward become so by being concealed or not pursued, by which means creditors are drawn in to lend their money." This doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed. Chancellor Kent, in Hildreth v. Sands, 2 Johns. Ch. 35; Scrivener v. Scrivener, 7 B. Monr. 374; Bank of United States v. Hineman, 6 Paige, 526. In Coates v. Gerlach, 44 Penn. St. 43, a deed of land had been made directly by a husband to his wife. The deed bore date March 23, 1857, but was not filed for record until December 2, 1857. On January, 21, 1858, the husband professing to act for his wife, sold the land to a third party. The creditors of the husband attached the unpaid part of the purchase-money in the hands of the vendees, and between them and the wife a contest arose on the question which had the better right to the proceeds of the sale. Touching this controversy Strong, J., said: "There is another aspect of the case not at all favorable to the wife. It is that she withheld the deed of her husband from record until December 2, 1857. In asking that a deed void at law should be sustained in equity she is met with the fact that she asserted no right under it, in fact concealed its existence until after her husband had contracted the debts against which she now seeks to set it up. There appears to have been no abandonment of possession by the husband. Even if the deed was delivered on the day of its date, the supineness of the wife gave to the husband a false credit, and equity will not aid her at the expense of those who have been misled by her laches." So in Hilliard v. Cagle, 46 Miss. 309, it was held that a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, valid on its face, and not made or received with any intent to defeat existing or future creditors, may nevertheless be held to be fraudulent and void as to all creditors, existing and future, by evidence aliunde showing the conduct of the parties in their dealings in reference to the deed. The principal circumstance relied on in this case to avoid the deed was the fact that the grantor retained possession of the property, and the deed was withheld from record, and the mortgagor was thereby enabled to contract debts upon the presumption that the property was unincumbered. court declared that "the natural and logical effect of the agreement and assignment, and the conduct of the parties thereto, was to mislead and deceive the public, and induce credit to be given to the mortgagor, which he could not have obtained if the truth had been known

The

and therefore the whole scheme was fraudulent as to subsequent creditors, as much so as if it had been contrived from that motive and for that object." In Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270, the court decided that a party cannot be permitted to take a bill of sale or mortgage of chattels from another for his own security, leave the mortgagor in possession and ostensibly the owner, and at his request and to keep the public from a knowledge of its existence withhold it from record for an indefinite period, renewing it periodically, and then receive the benefit of it by placing the last renewal upon record to the prejudice of others whom the possession and ostensible ownership of that very property by the mortgagor have induced to confide in him. The mortgage which was in controversy in this case was therefore declared void. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decree for the reasons assigned by the chancellor. So in Hafuer v. Irwin, 1 Ired. 490, which grew out of the making of a deed of trust by one Dwight to Hafner, to secure certain creditors named thereon, it was said, "There was evidence tending to show that it was a condition of this instrument, and as understood between the parties thereto, that it should not be registered nor put in use, but kept a secret from the world until after the 20th of February ensuing the date. There was also evidence tending to show that it was a further part of the agreement between the parties that the transaction should be kept secret, at all events until the debtor should escape beyond the reach of the process of his creditors. We need not and cannot lay

down as a rule of law that those who take securities from a debtor about to abscond must apprise creditors of his intention to place himself beyond their reach under penalty of forfeiting such securities, but we feel ourselves justified in holding that when secrecy is part of the consideration of such securities, the securities are contaminated thereby, and ought not to be regarded as given bona fide." In Hildeburn v. Brown, 17 B. Monr. 779, where a mortgage was executed by one Sherwood to the plaintiffs, which they withheld from record, the court said: "The petition of appellants avows that the arrangements between their agents and Sherwood was to withhold the mortgage from registration for the purpose of sustaining the latter in business, and not to record the same unless there was danger of Sherwood's failure. The effect of this arrangement, though it may not have originated in any actual fraudulent or evil purpose, was to secrete from the public eye the true condition of the debtor, and thereby enable him under the semblance of being the owner of uniucumbered real estate to deceive and mislead other persons by inducing them, upon the faith of his supposed unembarrassed condition, to give him credit which would otherwise have been withheld. Such contrivances or acts, though not designed to perpetrate an actual fraud upon other persons have an inevitable tendency that way, and are obviously opposed to the general policy of the law requiring the public registration of all liens and incumbrances upon property permitted to be retained and claimed by debtors. If not directly within that class of acts which the law denominates constructive frauds, it approximates so nearly to it that the party avowing himself a participant in such transaction ought not to receive the countenance or aid of the chancellor in enforcing any lien or claim growing out of it as against a third person." The case of Neslin v. Wells, decided by this court at the present term, arose in the territory of Utah, where the law permitted, but did not require the registration of mortgages, but where there was a general custom to record such instruments. Neslin, the vendor of land, took from Smith, his vendee, a mortgage to secure a part of the purchase-money, but did not file it for record until after a subsequent mortgage, executed by the vendee on the same land to one Kerr had been filed for record,

Kerr having no notice, actual or constructive, of the prior mortgage to Neslin. It was held that "under the circumstances of the case there arose a duty on the part of Neslin, the vendor, to record his purchasemoney mortgage toward all who might become subsequent purchasers for value in good faith, a breach of which in respect to Kerr, the subsequent mortgagee, without notice, constituted such negligence and laches as in equity requires that the loss which in consequence thereof must fall on one of the two, shall be borne by him by whose fault it was occasioned." See also, Worseley v. DeMattos, 1 Burr. 467, and Tarback v. Marbury, 2 Vern. 510. Decree of U. S. Circ. Ct., Iowa, affirmed. Blennerhassett v. Sherman. Opinion by

Woods, J.

[Decided May 1, 1882.]

PATENT -INVALID FOR WANT OF NOVELTY.- - A patent which covered only the process of cooking meat by boiling, and while it is still warm pressing it compactly in cases, and sealing it up air-tight, and which would not be infringed if any other process of cooking the meat except boiling was adopted. Held, invalid for want of novelty. A change in the mode of cooking the meat from broiling, roasting or steaming to boiling, all the other parts of the process remaining unchanged, cannot be called invention, and entitle the party who suggests the change to a patent for the process. "All improvement is not invention, and entitled to protection as such. Thus to entitle it, it must be the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties, and it must involve something more than what is obvious to persons skilled in the art." Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U. S. 112. See also, Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498; Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248; Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. 117. Decree of U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Illinois, affirmed. Wilson Packing Co. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co. Opinion by Woods, J.

[Decided May 8, 1882.]

REMOVAL OF CAUSE SUITS AGAINST REVENUE OFFICERS.- (1) Section 643 of the U. S. Revised Statutes, providing for removal from State Courts of civil suits against revenue officers is not superseded by the act of March 3, 1875. "If by any reasonable construction the two statutes can stand together, they must so stand. If harmony is impossible, and only in that event, the former law is repealed in part or wholly as the case may be." State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 431. Judgment of U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Virginia, affirmed. Venable v. Richards. Opinion by Harlan, J. [Decided May 8, 1882.]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ABSTRACT.*

CONFLICT OF LAW-FEDERAL COURT MAY NOT ENJOIN SUIT IN STATE COURT.-The Circuit Court has no authority to control the proceedings of a State court, or to stay the prosecution of a suit therein, by injunction or otherwise; this power can only be allowed to a tribunal of general jurisdiction under the same government. City Bank v. Skelton, 2 Blatchf. 142, U. S. Circ. Ct., Connecticut, March 7, 1882. Harrison Wire Co. v. Wheeler. Opinion by Shipman, D. J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROVISION AS TO CREDIT BY ONE STATE TO PUBLIC ACTS OF ANOTHER-DOES NOT INCLUDE DECISIONS OF STATE COURT AS TO ITS STA

effect of the judgments rendered in one State when proved in another. The duty of the courts of one State to follow the decisions of another, upon questions arising upon the construction of the statutes of the latter, is a duty resting upon comity, and is not imposed by the Federal Constitution. Where two corporations, organized under the laws of Illinois, executed a contract to be performed in that State, which, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State, they had no power to make, and which, according to said decisions, was void, and one of the contracting parties brought suit in a court of the State of Missouri, the Supreme Court of which had previously, in a suit between the same parties, held the contract valid, held, that the cause could not be removed to this court because of said failure of the Supreme Court of Missouri to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the case not resting on a Federal law. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Missouri, April 10, 1882. Wiggins' Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. Opinion by McCrary, C. J.

CONTRACT-ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSITION TO BIND MUST BE UNQUALIFIED.-The acceptance of a proposition must be comprehensive, unqualified and unconditional to make a binding contract. The proposition must also be accepted within a reasonable time. A person who has once accepted a proposition with modifications, which are declined by the other party, cannot afterward accept unconditionally, and hold the other party to his original offer. Hence, where A. offered to sell B. a lot of standing timber upon certain terms, "if it can be arranged to make a finish of it now," and B. accepted, but with material qualifications, and A. made no answer, but proceeded to negotiate with other parties, and after the lapse of a fortnight B. accepted unconditionally, it was held that B. could not maintain a bill for specific performance of A.'s original proposition. Hyde v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 384; Fox v. Turner, 1 Bradw. 153; U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Michigan, February 20, 1882. Ortman v. Weaver, Opinion by Brown, D. J.

NEGLIGENCE - PRESUMED FROM EXPLOSION OF BOILER.-Negligence may be inferred from the fact of the explosion of a boiler, whether there be any relation between the owner of the boiler and the party injured or not. The presumption originates from the nature of the act, and not from the nature of the relations between the parties. Where an accident happens, as in the bursting of a boiler, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, negligence will be presumed, and the burden is cast upon the owner to disprove it. In Scott v. London & St. C. Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596, plaintiff, as he was passing by a warehouse of defendant, was injured by bags of sugar falling from a crane by which they were lowered to the ground. The court said there must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. This case is cited, with approbation, in Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129. In Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, plaintiff, who was upon a street sidewalk, was injured by the fall of an unoccupied building owned by defendant; and it was held, that from the happening of such an accident, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, negligence should be presumed and the burden cast upon the owner to disprove it. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. New York, March 9, 1882. Rose v. Stephens & Condit Transportation Co. Opinion by Wallace, D. J.