and second, that it was not the intention of the statute to make the wrong-doer pay damages twice for the same wrongful act, but only to prevent him from being freed from liability by the death of the party injured. The authority of this case is not shaken by subsequent English cases. See Payne v. Great North. R. Co., 2 Barb. & S. 761; S. C., 4 id. 397. Bradshaw v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co, L. R., 10 C.¡P. 189. Leggatt v. Great North. R. Co., L. R., 1 Q. B. D. 599. Barnett v. Lucas, 5 Irish (C. L.) 140; S. C., on appeal, 6 id 247. Judgment affirmed. Littlewood v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided April 25, 1882.]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ABSTRACT.*

NAME PERSON MAY CHANGE AT COMMON LAW MISNOMER.- At common law a man may lawfully change his name, and he is bound by any contract into which he may enter in his adopted or reputed name, and by his known and recognized name he may sue and be sued. In a suit by husband and wife, in her behalf, a plea which alleges that the surname in which they sue is not the husband's real name, but which does not deny that it is his known and recognized name, is bad. Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ald. 544; King v. Inhabitants of Billingshurst, 3 M. & S. 250; Petrie v. Woodworth, 3 Cai. 219; In re Snook, 2 Pittsb. R. 26. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Pennyslvania, Mar. 11, 1882. Linton v. First National Bank of Kittanning. Opinion by Acheson, D. J.

CORPORATION-TRANSFER OF SECURITY BY BANK OFFICER IN COURSE OF BUSINESS PASSES TITLE THOUGH

FRAUDULENT.- Where the treasurer of a savings bank, having the authority to do so, executed an assignment of a mortgage in the name of the bank in due form, and indorsed the note to a bona fide purchaser, the title passes notwithstanding he perpetrated a fraud upon the bank and converted to his own use the purchase money. A corporation is estopped to prove, as against bona fide purchasers, either irregularity or fraud upon the part of its officers when acting within their authority. An English statute provided that unless certain things were done, no shares of a joint stock company should be issued excepting for cash, and all which should be issued otherwise should be subject to assessment. Shares were issued as "paid up" and were bought by a bona fide purchaser. The company and its liquidator were held estopped to prove that the statute had not been followed. In re British, etc., Co., 7 Ch. D. 533; S. C., nom. Burkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 App. Cas, 1004. In that case (p. 1026) a very able judge says that the doctrine of estoppel in pais is a most equitable doctrine, and one without which the law of the country could not be satisfactorily administered. This doctrine has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a large class of cases where the facts are much more open to public observation than are the votes of a private corporation, in which counties and towns having power to issue bonds upon certain terms and conditions are held estopped to prove, as against bona fide purchasers, either irregularity or fraud on the part of their own officers in issuing the bonds, especially if they contain upon their face a certificate that the terms of the law have been complied with. These decisions do not depend upon the negotiable character of the bonds, excepting when there is a question of notice. Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Moran v. Com. of Miami, 2 Black, 722; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 id. 355; Commissioners v. January, 94 U. S. 202; San *Appearing in 10 Federal Reporter.

Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 id. 312; County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 id. 96. So if a cashier has authority to certify a check, the bank is estopped to say that his certificate is false in fact. Merchants' Bank v. State Bauk, 10 Wall. 604. If a company has issued a certificate of shares, it is estopped to prove against one who has bought the shares in good faith, or even one who has paid one call or assessment to a third person on the strength of the certificate, that it was issued improvidently. In re Bahia, etc., Co. L. R., 3 Q. B. 584; Hart v. Frontino, etc., Co. L. R., 5 Exch. 111. Where the president, who was also transfer agent of a railroad company, issued an immense amount of false and fraudulent certificates of shares, beyond the whole capital, the company after "a decade of litigation" was held bound to indemnify the honest purchasers. New York & New Haven R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30. U. S. Circ. Ct., Massachusetts, Jany. 31, 1882. Whiting v. Wellington. Opinion by Lowell, D. J.

DAMAGES- -ON BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR MANUFACTURED ARTICLE.- Defendants ordered plaintiffs to manufacture a certain water-wheel, to be shipped to them by a certain date, agreeing to pay for the same in money and notes. Plaintiffs fulfilled their contract and tendered delivery, but defendants refused to receive the goods or pay for them, they having had the opportunity to inspect them, and making no point that the goods were not perfect. Held, that plaintiffs are entitled to recover as their true measure of damages for non fulfillment, the contract price of the article, though no title had passed. See Thorndike v. Locke, 98 Mass. 199; Pearson v. Mason, 120 id. 53; Gordon v. Norris, 49 N. H. 376. Bement v. Smith, 15 Wend. 493; Ballentine v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177; Shawhan v. Vanpest, 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 153. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Wisconsin, Jan. 21, 1882. Bookwalter v. Clark. Opinion by Buun, D. J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CREDITOR'S BILL AGAINST. A municipal corporation may be held to answer a creditor's bill upon a judgment against a creditor of such corporation. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Illinois, Nov., 1881. Hinsdale Doyle Granite Co. v. Tilley. Opinion by Blodgett, D. J.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT ABSTRACT.*

CARRIER - LIABLE TO PASSENGER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF INDEPENDENT CARRIER EMPLOYED BY HIM - LIABILITY OF SEVERAL TORT-FEASORS.-Where several tort-feasors are each and all liable for the same wrongful act, a separate suit for damages may be maintained against each of them. A common carrier is liable to a passenger whom it has contracted to convey to a particular point, if he is injured while being so conveyed, through the negligence or unskilfulness of employes of a corporation with which such carrier has contracted for motive power. In such cases the corporation furnishing the motive power is also liable to the passenger if the injury is sustained through the direct negligence or unskillfulness of its employees. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Missouri, Feb. 13, 1882. Keep v. Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. Opinion by Treat, D. J.

CARRIER -AGENT FOR SEVERAL LINES RUN AS ONE BUT NOT JOINTLY, AGENT FOR EACH SEVERALLY.— Where several boats are severally owned by different corporations, and are all run each for its own account in one "line," which line is itself another corporation, and all the corporations are represented by the same

*Appearing in 10 Federal Reporter.

person as agent, who signs bills of lading for goods shipped upon one of the boats as agent for the "line," held, that said agent was a common agent for all, but in his representative capacity acted separately for each, and that hence there was no joint interest and no joint liability, and for goods shipped by one boat the owners of the other boats could not be held liable, as they did not undertake the safe carriage thereof. An agent, though he have power to transact the joint business of many, cannot therefore bind one of his principals in the separate business of another principal. Champion v. Bostwick, 11 Wend. 571; S. C., 18 id, 175; Fairchild v. Slocum, 19 id. 329; S. C., 7 Hill, 292; Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb. 222; Bonsteel v. Vanderbilt, 21 id. 26; St. Louis Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 13 Cent. L. J.468. U. S. Dist. Ct. E. D. Louisiana. Feb. 20, 1882. Citizens Insurance Co. v. Kountz Line. Opinion by Billings, D. J.

CORPORATION

-GUARANTY OF DIVIDENDS OF ONE BY ANOTHER-POWER OF DIRECTORS TO MODIFY CON

TRACT.-An agreement between two corporations whereby one guaranties the other a certain specified annual dividend on its capital stock, is not a guaranty to its stockholders severally, but to the corporation, and the power to modify the terms of such guaranty is in the directors of such corporations, not in the stockholders. Where such power is fairly exercised by the directors in view of all the circumstances and in good faith, a court will not interfere even though on the same facts it might have arrived at a different conclusion. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. New York, Dec. 21, 1881. Flagg v. Manhattan Railway Co. Opinion by Blatchford, C. J.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING CONNECTED WITH ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.-Where a supplemental proceeding is a mere mode of execution or relief inseparably connected with the original judgment or decree, it cannot be removed, although some new controversy or issue between plaintiff in the origiual action and a new party may arise out of the proceeding. But where such proceeding is not a mere mode of execution or relief, but involves an independent controversy with a new or different party, it may be removed into the Federal court. Where the plaintiff in a suit in a State court obtained judgment against the defendant, garnished certain parties, and after taking issue upon the answer of the garnishees, removed the issues thus made to the Circuit Court of the United States, held, on motion by the original defendant and the garnishees to remand the cause, that the motion be maintained on the ground that the proceeding are a mere mode of execution or relief inseparably connected with the original judgment. Webber v. Humphreys, 5 Dill. 223; Chapman v. Barger, 4 id. 557. U. S. [Circ. Ct. Iowa, Nov. term, 1881. Buford v. Strother. Opinion by Love, D. J.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-WHEN INTERVENORS MAY REMOVE.-Where the intervening petition charges fraud, and is not in the nature of a bill charging errors or irregularities merely, or where it charges want of jurisdiction and want of notice to complainants, and where no attack is made on any final judgment but only on interlocutory orders still within the control of the State court, intervenors may remove the cause. Where there has been no final trial or hearing, intervenors may remove the cause on the ground of local prejudice, on compliance with the provisions of the act of Congress. The filing of the petition in the State court ipso facto removes the cause. The petition of intervention is in the nature of a suit for relief as against defendants therein named, and the right of removal is not affected by the fact that a receiver had been appointed by the State court to wind up the affairs of the corporation. The right of intervenors to

a preliminary injunction to restrain further proceedings until there can be a hearing on the merits, follows as a matter of course. Authorities referred to. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; Barron v. Hunter, 99 id. 80; Osgood v. Railroad Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 273; Merchants' Bk. v. Wheeler, 13 Blatchf. 218; Connor v. Scott, 4 Dill. 242; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485. U. S. Circ. Ct. Iowa, January, 1882. In re Iowa and Minnesota Construction Co. Opinion by McCrary, C. J.

LEGACY PAYMENT OF SCALING AMOUNT OF. — -A legacy of one thousand "dollars" given in a will executed in June, 1863, the testator dying soon afterwards, is subject to the legislative scale of depreciation which is also applicable to payments made thereon in Confederate money, according to the date of each. In Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that it was competent to show in an action brought on a promissory note executed in Alabama in November, 1864, for the payment of ten thousand dollars, that Confederate treasury notes constituted the currency at that time in the State, and they were intended in the contract. The rule seems to be that when a currency is designated, that which is in universal use in the country where the contract is made will be deemed to be the intended medium of payment. And the same rule is applied in the construction of pecuniary legacies, with slight modifications. A legacy must be paid, says Mr. Toller, in the currency of the country in which the testator was resident at the time. Toller Ex. 321. Thus it is held that an annuity charged upon lands in Ireland, in a will executed by a testator residing in England, must be paid in England. Wallis v. Brightwell, 2 Per. Wms., 88. If a bond be given at Dublin or a note at Jamaica, it must be paid in the current money. So if in either place there is a sum of money left by will, it shall be paid to the legatee in current money. Lord Hardwicke in Saunders v. Drake, 2 Atk. 465. See also Barham v. Gregory, Phil. Eq. 243; Alexander v. Summey, 66 N. C. 577; Robertson v. Wall, 85 N. C. 283. Wilson v. Powell. Opinion by Smith, C. J.

-MARITIME LAW-MASTER PRESUMED TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT FOR FITTING OUT, ETC., VESSEL. - A contract made by the master of a vessel for fitting out, victualling and repairing, and which personally binds him, binds the owner also, unless it is clearly shown that the credit is given to the one exclusive of the other. The very nature of the office of master furnishes presumptive evidence, that he is authorized by the owner of the vessel to act for him in such matters, subject to be rebutted by proof to the contrary. So Mason, J., delivering the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Provost v. Patchin, 5 Seld. 235, uses this language; "But as I understand the master's power as agent for the owners in the home port, he may bind them for all reasonable contracts for fitting out, victualling and repairing the ship, unless it be shown that the owners themselves, or a ship's husband, managed the vessel, and the party contracting with the master was aware of this. To same effect are Rich v. Cox, Cowper, 636, aud Farmer v. Davis, 1 Term, 109. Williams v. Windley. Opinion by Smith, C. J.

ΤΑΧΑΤΙΟΝ -CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROVISION AS TO UNIFORMITY DOES NOT APPLY TO LOCAL ASSESS*To appear in 86 North Carolina Reports.

MENT. The constitutional provision that taxation shall be equal, uniform and within certain limits, does not apply to local assessments imposed upon owners of property, who in respect to such ownership are to derive a special benefit in the local improvements for which the tax is expended. In this case the assessment was for building a county fence,-under a State law providing for the erection of a fence by commissioners around a town or county, voting for such fence and assessing the expense upon the taxable property of such town or county so voting. "A constitutional provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State does not apply to local assessments upon private property to pay for local improvements." 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., $ 617. To like effect, Burroughs Tex., § 39. In Morse v. Stocker, 1 Allen, 150, Hoar, J., lays down the rule in these words: When the assessment is made upon persons in respect of their ownership of a particular species of property which receives a peculiar benefit from the expenditure of the tax, it is valid, although it does not operate upon all persons and property in the community." Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223. In People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, N. Y. 419, the court declared: "The amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty, and for that reason a property tax is adopted instead of an estimate of benefits. In local taxation however for special purposes, the local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced and estimated with reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and assumed to be true by the Legislature, whose duty it is to prescribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose determination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful power, is conclusive. "The reasoning in this case," is the comment of Judge Cooley, "has been generally accepted as satisfactory, and followed in subsequent cases, which are referred to in the margin. Cooley Const. Lim. 506. Cain v. Commissioners of Davie County. Opinion by Smith, C. J.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. NOVEMBER. 1881.

EMINENT DOMAIN-EXERCISE FOR PRIVATE BENEFIT NOT ALLOWABLE - DRAINAGE OF LANDS.-An act authorizing "any number of persons not less than three, being owners of lands wet or liable to be overflowed," to organize a company for the purpose of draining, reclaiming, and protecting such lands, which shall have power to straighten, deepen, and make new channels for the whole or any part of a river or watercourse, and to construct any dykes, drains, levees and breakwaters, and to enter upon and appropriate land of individuals upon paying compensation, held invalid as authorizing the appropriation of private property for private purposes. Blackstone says: "The third absolute right is that of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. The laws of England are therefore in point of honor and justice extremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter has declared that no freeman shall be disseized or divested of his freehold or of his liberties or free customs, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land." 1 Blackst. Com. 137. Section 21, art. 1 of the Nebraska Constitution provides that "the property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor." The Legislature possesses no authority, however, to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even when full compensa

tion is made. Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 90; Reeves v. Treasurer, 8 Ohio St. 346; Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 393; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. The law guaranties to every one the free use and enjoyment of his property, and he can be required to surrender it only when it is required for public use, and upon full compensation being made. Jenel v. Green Island Drain Co. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

EMINENT DOMAIN-MEASURE OF COMPENSATION OF LAND OWNER.-The owner of land taken for a railroad is entitled to recover, in any event, as one item of damage, the fair value of the portion actually taken (Wagner v. Gage County, 3 Neb. 237); and in addition to this, he should have allowed to him a reasonable compensation for whatever damage the evidence shows must necessarily be done to the residue of the tract from the proper construction and future careful operation of the road. Where the evidence shows that the land-owner will be specially benefited by the location of the road, such benefit may go to reduce the damages to the residue of the land, but cannot be set off against the value of the part actually taken. But those benefits which are common and shared in by others as well cannot be considered to reduce his damages. But damages from a supposed insufficiency of a culvert to the owner's remaining land in case of high water, and the possible destruction of property by fire and otherwise through the carelessness of the company's agent in operating the road, are too uncertain and remote to be taken into the estimate, and valuations of the land based in part thereon are entitled to no weight with the jury. King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 Iowa, 455; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Lazarus, 28 Penn. St. 203; Patton v. Northam C. R. Co., 33 id. 426; Fleming v. C., D. & M. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 353. Damages to be paid by the company upon the condemnation do not cover those caused by injuries resulting from negligence or unskilfulness in either the construction or operation of the road. Delaware, Lack. & West. R. Co. v. Salman, 23 Am. Rep. 214; 10 Vroom, 299. And even if they were in fact included in the assessment their payment would be no bar to future actions brought for such injuries. The damages for which the law provides, and proper to be included in the assessment, for the right of way, are simply those which it can be said with reasonable certainty the owner of the land will sustain by reason of its appropriation; in other words, such damages as are necessarily incident to the proper construction and careful management of the road, leaving injuries resulting from negligence to be compensated for by action whenever they occur. Id. Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad Co. v. Whalen. Opinion by Lake, J.

TAXATION LICENSE FEE FOR SALE OF SPIRITS NOT A TAX-UNIFORMITY OF TAX-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

-A license fee imposed upon persons conducting the liquor traffic is not a tax in the constitutional sense of the term as applied to a provision requiring taxation to be uniform, especially where it is apparent that the leading motive of the Legislature in imposing the fee was not to raise revenue, but was to regulate and as far as possible suppress the traffic as tending to produce pauperism and crime. To justify a court in pronouncing an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, it must be clear and free from reasonable doubt that it is so. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas, 14; Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 21 Penn. 147; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340; City of Lexington v. McQuillan, 9 Dana, 513; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. County Judge, 2 id. 280; Telfair v. McGin, 1 Gray, 1; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 333; Hill v. Highdan, 5 Ohio St. 243. In Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, au act for the local taxation of the liquor

traffic was held not a State tax within the meaning of the Constitution. Being put to the use of the community which paid it, it was in no proper sense any thing more than a local tax; and that the constitutional requirement of uniformity was satisfied by the tax being levied upon all dealers alike, without discrimination on account of the amount of business done. See also upon this point City of New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 Am. Rep. 328, and 29 La. Ann. 283; State v. Rolle, 31 Am. Rep. 234, and 30 La. Aun. 991. From these authorities it would seem that even if the exaction of this money were to be regarded as a species of taxation simply, the constitutional rule of uniformity would not be broken so long as within the particular district no discrimination is made in the amounts required from persons applying for licenses. In the case of People v. Marbee, 13 Ill. 554, the court, in considering the effect of a provision of the Constitution of that State which requires that the mode of levying taxes should be by valuation, "so that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the valuation of the property which he or she may have in his or her possession," and whether it applied to a certain license law, said: "It has never been doubted that the word 'tax,' as here used means the tax which is imposed on a person on account of the property which he has, and has never been held to deprive the Legislature of the power to inhibit persons from exercising certain callings, franchises or privileges, without a license or authority for so doing, which they may withhold entirely or until pecuniary compensation shall be paid into either the State or some town, city, or county treasury." And in East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392, it is said to be settled that "a license is not a tax in the constitutional meaning of that term." In Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199, the court, in construing a constitutional provision which declared that the Legislature shall provide for a "uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation," held that it did not apply to certain local taxes levied for draining purposes, and said that "it did not prohibit indirect taxation by way of licenses upon particular pursuits. Such indirect taxation may be made effectual as a police regulation." And in Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, it is said that this constitutional provision is a "restriction upon the otherwise discretionary powers of the Legislature, and prescribes the rule for its government in authorizing the levy of taxes, and it must be governed by that rule whether the levy be for the State at large or for a minor subdivision. Indirect taxes imposed not merely for the purposes of revenue, but in restraint of a particular business or calling, or as a license on particular pursuits, or as a mere police regulation, do not come within the spirit or meaning of the provision of the Constitution referred to." To the same effect are Com'rs of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 27 Am. Rep. 101, and Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347. See also Baker v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Thompson v. State, 15 Ind. 443; Bank v. City of New Albany, 11 id. 139; Trustees of Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 660. See also as to impositions held to be taxes, Kipp v. City of Patterson, 26 N. J. L. 298; Mayor of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Migs v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Collins v. City of Louisville, 2 B. Monr. 134; Wendover v. City of Lexington, 15 id. 258. Pleuler v. State of Nebraska. Opinion by Lake, J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CORPORATION -CLAIM OF ULTRA VIRES NOT AVAILABLE EXCEPT TO STATE OR TO PARTY INTERESTED IN CORPORATION.-E., who was the assignor of the wharf

rights of a city having the franchise of maintaining wharves and charging wharfage dues, sought to restrain a railroad company from using its wharf as a public wharf. Held, that E. could not object to the use by the railroad company of its wharf in competition with him on the ground that it was ultra vires. The legal interest which-qualifies a complainant other than the State itself to sue in such a case is a pecuniary interest in preventing the defendant from doing an act where the injury alleged flows from its quality and character as a breach of some legal or equitable duty. A stockholder of the company has such an interest in restraining it within the limits of the enterprise for which it was formed, because that is to enforce his contract of membership. The State has a legal interest in preventing the usurpation and perversion of its franchises, because it is a trustee of its powers for uses strictly public. In these questions the appellant has no interest, and he cannot raise them in order, under that cover, to create and protect a monopoly which the law does not give him. The only injury of which he can be heard in a judicial tribunal to complain is the invasion of some legal or equitable right. If he asserts that the competition of the railroad company damages him, the answer is that it does not abridge or impair any such right. If he alleges that the railroad company is acting beyond the warrant of the law, the answer is that a violation of its charter does not of itself injuriously affect any of his rights. The company is not shown to owe him any duty which it has not performed. This was the principle on which this court proceeded in City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Peters, 91. It is applied in Mayor of Liverpool v. Chorley Waterworks Co., 2 DeG, M. & G. 852; Stockport District Waterworks v. Mayor of Manchester, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 266; Pudsley Coal Gas Co. v. Corp. of Bradford, L. R., 15 Eq. 167. Decree of U. S. Circ. Ct., Louisiana, reversed. New Orleans, Mobile & Texas Railroad Co. V. Ellerman, Opinion by Matthews, J.

[Decided March 20, 1882.]

MUNICIPAL AID BONDS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION -CONFLICT OF LAW WHEN FEDERAL WILL NOT ADOPT CONSTRUCTION OF STATE COURTS AS TO STATE STATUTES. (1) A statute of Michigan declared it lawful, within prescribed limits as to amount, for any city or township-a majority of its electors voting, at a meeting called for that purpose, assenting-to pledge its aid, "by loan or donation, with or without conditions, "in the construction of any railroad by a corporation organized under the laws of Michigan. The electors of Y., a city, voted to a corporation of the character mentioned, aid to the extent of $50,000 in bonds of the city, upon condition that the company should have and continue the eastern terminus of its road in the city, or connect, within its limits, with the M. C. railroad; and upon the further condition that if any citizen of Y. should subscribe and pay for any share in the stock of the company, the latter "shall deliver to the persons so subscribing and paying for such share the bond or bonds of said city equal to the amount so subscribed and paid for, not exceeding in all the amount of bonds issued by said city to said railroad company; and that citizens of said city shall have the right to subscribe to the stock of said railroad company to an amount not exceeding $50,000 for thirty days after such aid shall have been voted. " were issued upon these conditions. Held, that the donation of the bonds was within the provisions of the statute. (2) In 1869, when the statute mentioned was passed, the legislative and executive departments of Michigan had by their action recognized the validity of statutes authorizing municipal aid to railroads, and a constitutional convention charged with the duty of revising the Constitution, inserted sections declaring

Bonds