V. even a less quantity. It matters not, in this view, what proportion of the water which his acts contributed to the stream he seeks to divert from a lower proprietor, so that the fact remains that the water so contributed by him had become intermingled with the water of the stream and passed upon the land of another. Evans v. Merriweather, 3 Scam. 492; Plumleigh v. Dawson, 1 Gilm. 544; Havens v. Canal Trustees, 11 Ill. 554; Batavia Manf. Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 id. 230; Wood v. Ward, 3 Exch. 748; Webb v. Portland Mauf. Co., 3 Sumn. 189; Tourtelot Phelps, 4 Gray, 370; Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249. See also Elliot v. Fitchburg R. Co., 10 Cush. 191, Whittier v. Cocheco Manf. Co., N. H. 454; Society for, etc., Manf. v. Morris Canal Co., Saxton (N. J.), 157; Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46; Butte v. Vaughn, 11 id. 143; Barnett v. Whitesides, 15 id. 35; Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall. 507; Basey et al. v. Gallagher, id. 670, Jenison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453; Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140; Davis v. Gale, 32 id. 26. Druley v. Adam. Opinio by Schofield, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CARRIERCONTRACT WITH, LIMITING LIABILITY.B. brought an action in the County Court against the .M., S., and L. Railway Company, to recover the sum of 61. 10s. for damage and loss caused by delay in delivery of some fish carried by the defendants from Great Grimsby to London. B. signed a "risk note," by which the railway company were to be free from all liability for loss or damage by delay in transit, or from whatever cause arising, and the rates charged were to be one-fifth lower than where no such contract was entered into, and where the company were not freed from their liability as common carriers. The railway company carried goods at the ordinary rate without any condition respecting their liability, and B. knew of this when he signed the "risk note." Held, that B. was not entitled to recover; that the contract was just and reasonable, because B. had an alternative, and the railway company were willing and offered to carry the fish with all the liability of common carriers at the ordinary rate. Q. B. Div., April 4, 1882. Brown v. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway Co. Opinion by Matthew, J. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S., 389.)] EASEMENT-LATERAL SUPPORT. In the case of two ancient adjoining buildings the owner of the one can claim an easement of support from the other. The principle in Dalton v. Angus (44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 844; L. Rep. 6 App. Cas. 740) adopted. The acquisition under the Prescription Act (2 and 3 Will. 4, ch. 71, § 2) of such an easement is not affected by the circumstance of the servient tenement being property belonging to an ecclesiastical corporation. See Earl De La Warr v. Miles, 44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 487, Ch. Div, Dec. 5, 1881. Lemaitre v. Davis. Opinion by Hall, V. C. (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 407). EVIDENCE-QUESTION CRIMINATING WITNESS.-A witness is not the sole judge whether a question put to him may tend to criminate him. To entitle a witness to the privilege of silence the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called upon to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer; but if the fact of the witness being in danger he once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question. Reg. v. Boyes, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 147; 1 B. & S. 311 approved. The decision of Bacon, C. J. 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 143'affirmed. Ct. of Appeal, March 16, 1882. Ex parte Reynolds. Opinions by Jessel, M. R. and Cotton and Lindlay, L. JJ., 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 508. RUMORS. LIBEL -EVIDENCE-BAD CHARACTER In an action for libel, in publishing that the plaintiff had extorted money from G. under dishonorable circumstances, the defendant pleaded that the same was true. In support of the plea, and for the purpose of reducing the damages, the defendant tendered (1) evidence of the plaintiff's general bad character; (2) evidence of rumors that the plaintiff bad done what was charged in the libel, and that those rumors were in general circulation before the publication; and (3) evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff tending to show his character and disposition. Held, that the evidence of the rumors, and of the particular acts of misconduct, was not admissible. But held, that evidence of general bad character was admissible as being material in mitigation of damages; such evidence however will not be admitted unless a statement of the material facts relied on is set out in the statement of defense. Q. B. Div., March 20, 1882. Scott v. Sampson. Opinions by Mathew and Cave, JJ., 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 412. LIMITATIONS - — FRAUD. — In an action for fraudulent representation, a reply to the defense of the Statute of Limitations,stating that plaintiff did not discover, and could not by reasonable diligence have discovered, defendant's fraud until within six years before action, and that defendant actively and deliberately concealed the fraud until six years before action, is good. Judgment of Field, J. affirmed by Lord Coleridge, C. J. and Brett, L. J. (Holker, L. J. dissenting). Authorities referred to: Hunter v. Gibbons, 1 H. & N. 459; Imperial Gas, etc., Co. v. London Gas, etc., Co., 10 Ex. 39; Booth v. Earl of Warrington, 4 Bro. P. C. 163; South Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms. 143; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 428; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 id. 629, Ct. of App., March 16, 1882. Gibbs v. Guild, 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 248. INSURANCE LAW. ATTACHMENT - INSURANCE DEPARTMENT FUNDS NOT LIABLE TO.- A public officer, charged with a trust created by a public statute in respect to funds in his possession, cannot be made liable in respect to them by an attachment in favor of a person not claiming under the trust. Under the requirements of a statute of the State of New York, defendant, a Virginia corporation, had deposited certain bonds with the superintendent of insurance, to be held to pay liabilities upon insurance policies made in favor of citizens of New York, which said bonds were to be returned to defendant by said superintendent upon satisfactory evidence that all such liabilities had been satisfied or terminated. Plaintiff, a Rhode Island corporation, brought suit on a policy of insurance issued to it by defendant, and levied an attachment upon the bonds in the hands of the superintendent. Held, upon a motion to vacate such attachment, that the bonds were not subject to such levy, they being held by a public officer by authority of law under a specified trust, in which plaintiff's claim was not included. See Brooks v. Cook, 8 Mass. 247; Colby v. Coates, 6 Cush. 558; Columbian Book Co. v. DeGolyer, 115 Mass. 67; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20; Rollo v. Andes Ins. Co., 23 Gratt. 509, a case like the one at bar. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. New York, March 13, 1882. Providence & Stonington Steamship Co. v. Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Opinion by Blatchford, C. J. (11 Fed. Rep. 284.) property insured, or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written upou the policy, in such case the policy should be void. There was at the time of the issuance of the policy, insurance upon the property in another company to the amount of $700. The agent who issued the policy was also agent of the other company aud knew of the $700 insurance. He wrote upon the policy: "Seven hundred dollars additional insurance permitted." Held to refer to the existing insurance of that amount and not to authorize subsequent insurance to the amount of $700. It has been held that the words "other insurance," when used in a permit indorsed upon a policy, mean prior as well as subsequent insurance. Kimball v. Howard Ins. Co., 8 Gray, 33; Blake v. Exchange Ins. Co.. 12 Gray, 265; Benedict v. Ocean Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 389. See also as to the words "additional insurance," Hygum v. Ætua Ins. Co., 11 Jowa, 20; Simpson v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 38 Penu. St. 250; May, Ins., § 365. Iowa Sup. Ct. April 5, 1882. Behrens v. Germania Insurance Co. Opinion by Adams, J. REMOVAL OF CAUSE BY FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY.-- A foreign insurance company doing business in this State (New Hampshire), and accepting service of process in conformity to the laws of the State, is not thereby deprived of the right of removal to the Federal courts of an action commenced against it in the State court by a citizen of this State. It is a general principle, that the right to remove causes into the Federal court, where the terms upon which the right is given by the acts of Congress in that behalf are complied with, cannot be defeated by State legislation. "Therefore a State statute, which allows an insurance company to do business in the State only on condition that it will agree not to remove suits against it to the Federal courts, is unconstitutional, and such an agreement, though entered into by the company, is void." Dillon Remov. Caus. §. 12; Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 208. See also ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, New Hampshire Sup. Ct. Quimby v. Penn Insurance Co. Opinion by Clark, J. (58 N. H. 495). PAYING A MAN TO DO HIS DUTY Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The recent case of "Plunger "Walton of New York city, who was found to have paid money to a horse jockey to win a race, raises anew the question raised long ago by Lord Bacon, who admitting that he was bribed, endeavored to relieve himself from any odium by stating that he was bribed to do his duty. Mr. Walton is undoubtedly in a better position than Lord Bacon, since the former paid and the latter received the bribe. The receiver of a bribe to do what he already is bound legally to do, admits at once that he is ready to act wrongly, but he will only be certain to act rightly if he receives additional reward. He says in other words, "I may not do my duty; perhaps I prefer not to do it; what will you give to insure my acting rightly?" The cases of pure contract law hold generally that if A. refuses to perform his contract with B., and C., who may be interested in A.'s performing such contract promises to pay A. a pecuniary reward in addition to the consideration offered by B., if A. will complete the contract, such further promise is made on good consideration. A. may recover B.'s consideration and also that of C. The case of Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 298, holds, Wilde, B.: "I am also of the opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. The plaintiffs say that in consideration that they would deliver to the defendant a cargo of coals from their ship, the defendant promised to discharge the cargo in a certain way. The defendant, in answer says: You made a previous contract with other persons that they should discharge the cargo in the same way, and therefore there is no consideration for my promise.' But why is there no consideration? It is said because the plaintiffs in delivering coals are only performing what they are already bound to do. But to say that there is no consideration is to say that it is not possible for one man to have an interest in the performance of a contract made by another. But if a person chooses to promise to pay a sum of money in order to induce another to perform that which he has already contracted with a third person to do, I confess I cannot see why such a promise should not be binding. * ** I accede to the proposition that if a person contracts with another to do a certain thing he cannot make the performance of it a consideration for a new promise to the same individnal."* 'Plunger " Walton and Lord Bacon's cases are not wholly sounding in contract, but what law is in conflict with their reasoning? Both the Lord and the jockey held public positions. They owed a duty to the public, the one in the administration of justice between man and man, and the other, we may say, between horse and horse! The jockey was not simply bound by contract with his employer, but by his public office as well. Here lies the viciousness of the bribe. It is necessarily a persuasive force acting upon the jockey, affecting his judgment and intentions, and therefore contrary to public policy. It matters not that it was a force in the line of right conduct. Public policy forbids such bribes. What a condition our Supreme Bench would be in, if they followed Lord Bacon's specious plea, and openly received money simply to be just! (See If Mr. 46 Plunger "Walton, the jockey and the jockey's master, were the only persons present and interested, and the race had been against time, then indeed there may not have been any thing unjust in the payment of an additional sum to the jockey, for the duty would have been to a sole third person, and the argument based on public policy does not apply. Pollock on Contracts, pp., 62-3-4.) It is not likely that any court would construe the statute (§ 57, p. 1973, vol. 3, Bank's, 7th ed.), which reads, "every person who shall contribute * * ** any money to be given to the * * rider of any animal * * shall forfeit twenty-five dollars," to apply to Mr. Walton's case. For ought we can see he is statutorily guiltless. But query, can the jockey sue and recover if the "Plunger" perchance has not paid the sum promised in full? NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. COLBY'S NEW YORK RAILROAD LAWS. LEX. The Statute Railroad Laws of the State of New York, codifled and arranged under appropriate titles, with notes of judicial decisions; together with an appendix of forms, and a table of existing railroad corporations and local enactments affecting the same. By John H. *See Cooke v. Murphy, 70 Ill. 96, and Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388, holding a contrary view to this last proposition. T Colby, Counsellor at Law, Albany, N. Y.; Weare C. HIS volume contains a compilation of the entire statutory law of New York, relating to railroads or incidental to their operation. It embraces the enactments regulating the formations of railroad corporations, their powers and liabilities, the powers, duties and liabilities of officers, the rights and liabilities of stockholders, the building of railroads, and various other matters, such as liens of laborers, sale of tickets, transportation of passengers, mortgages, municipal aid, proceedings against railroad corporations, taxation or railroads, etc. All decisions of the courts of the State bearing upon these statutes, or upon the law affecting railroads not in statutory form, are referred to, making the work a complete manual of the law of the State upon the subject of railroads and their operatiou. A somewhat thorough examination of the volume satisfies us that the work of the compiler has been done with care and judgment. As on other topics, the statute law in respect to the matters included here is widely scattered, and even if avoidable is inconvenient for reference to those interested, while the judicial decisions appertaining thereto cannot without much labor be ascertained. Mr. Colby has done a work here that we are confident will be appreciated by all who have dealings with railroads, or who are connected with their management, or entitled to share in their profits of their business. We know of no other work covering the same ground, and this one is so well done that it is probable no other will appear that undertakes to do so. The appendix to the volume includes the statute laws of 1882. The index is fairly done and the book reasonably well printed and bound. 36th AMERICAN DECISIONS. We do not deem it necessary to speak of each succeeding volume of this excellent series. There is no perceptible falling-off in quality in any point of view. The present volume contains 196 cases from 26 volumes, namely: 1 Iredell, 10 Ohio, 9, 10 Watts, 6 Wharton, 1 Rhode Island, 1 McMullen (Law), 1 McMullen (Equity), 2 Humphrey, 12 Vermont, 11 Leigh, 2, 3 Alabama, 3 Arkansas, 14 Connecticut, 3 Scammon, 5, 6 Blackford, 1, 2 B. Monroe, 17, 18, 19 Louisiana, 1 Robinson, 18, 19 Maine, coming down to 1840 and 1841. The volume also has very exhaustive notes on disabilities under the statute of limitations; notice to agent of corporation, when imputed to principal; employer's liability to servant for injury by negligence of co-servant; unexecuted will, how far valid; insanity as a defense for crime; opinions as ground of challenge of jurors; proof of marriage in criminal cases. Here are some half-dozen monographs on as many subjects of everyday frequency and interest, any one of which is worth the price of the volume to a practitioner who is seeking for light on the particular point. There are unmistakable evidences of great intelligence and industry in the conduct of this work. liar," fives times repeated, and another curse iu these words, "You are a— - coward," five times repeated, he then being a gentleman. The bench considered the charge sustained by the evidence produced, and fined the vicar 5 shillings for every curse and costs. This was done under the authority of 19 Geo. 2, c. 21. Old Jacobs in his interesting dictionary says of swearing: "There are several good laws and statutes for punishing this crime. The 21 Jac. 1, c. 20 enacts: That if any person shall profanely swear or curse in the presence of a justice of the peace, or the same shall be proved before a justice, he shall forfeit one shilling for every offense to the use of the poor to be levied by distress; and for want of a distress the offender to be set in the stocks, etc. By the stat. 19 Geo. 2, c. 21. If any person shall profanely curse or swear, and be convicted by the oath of any one witness before any justice of peace, etc., he shall forfeit as follows, viz.: Every day laborer, common soldier, common sailor and common seaman, 1 shilling; every other person under the degree of a gentleman, 2 shilling; every person of or above the degree of a gentleman, 5 shillings; a second offense double and every other offense treble." This act was to be read in all churches four times a year under a penalty of £5. The Kentucky Law Journal for July, contains the following leading articles: The Federal Judiciary, eighty years ago, by C. E. Merrill; Woman under Kentucky law. by Laura Clay (daughter of Cassius M. Clay); the doctrine of Implied Malice, by C. B. Seymour, and Rufus Choate, by Willoughby Rodman. The best monograph on Irregular Indorsers that we have seen is in the Central Law Journal of August 4, by Joseph A. Joyce.-It seems to us that vice-chancellor Bacon of England, is getting reversed a great deal of late. -The Washington Law Reporter is publishing a series of good articles on Criminal Conspiracies and Combinations.-The Virginia Law Journal for August contains an exhaustive article by William Archer Cooke, on Dicey's Law of Domicil,and the principles of American law on that subject. We think the writer errs in saying that Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, is in conflict with People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78; S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 274. The latter decided that a divorce granted in Ohio, without notice to or appearance by the defendant, a resident of New York, is of no effect in New York. The former decided that a marriage in New Jersey, by a resident of New York, divorced and forbidden by a decree of New York to marry again during the life of his former wife is valid in New York, although the party went to New Jersey to evade the decree. We see nothing inconsistent in these rulings.-The Kentucky Law Journal for August contains five papers and addresses read or delivered before the Kentucky Bar Association.-Scarlett, in a breach of promise case (Foote v. Green) was for the defendant, who was supposed to have been cajoled into the engagement by the plaintiff's mother, afterward the Countess of Harrington. The mother as a witness completely baffled Scarlett, who, on behalf of the defendant, cross-examined her; but by one of his happiest strokes of advocacy he turned his failure into a success. "You saw, gentlemen of the jury, that I was but a child in her hands. What must my client have been?"- -Lord Wellesley's aide-de-camp, Keppel, wrote a book of travels and called it his Personal Narrative. Lord Wellesley was quizzing it, and said to Lord Plunket: "Personal narrative-what is a personal narrative, Lord Plunket? What should you say a personal narrative meant?" Plunket answered, "My Lord, you know we lawyers always understand personal as contradistinguished from real.”— James' Curiosities of Law and Lawyers." The Albany Law Journal. W ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1882. CURRENT TOPICS. funds; and therefore, reasoning from precedents of directions to city and county officers, to require her officials to levy taxes to pay debts. 4. Where her contracts are involved, her immunity from direct suit is simply a name; she may be substantially sued even by citizens, and therefore when that technical immunity is, by the plain words of the Constitution, inapplicable, where a State produces the obligation and complies with every requirement of inter-State delicacy and fastidiousness, direction may properly be substituted for indirection. 5. That the courts of the United States do not hesitate to deal with the contract obligations of the States, and set aside laws hostile to their efficacy and force, in the same manner whether private suitors or the States themselves are affected. 6. Every decision has been favorable to a beneficial interpretation to provide a remedy for the enforcement of a right where otherwise none would exist." --- E have read with a good deal of interest Attorney-General Russell's argument before the United States Supreme Court, in State of New York v. State of Louisiana, on the question, may one State implead another in that court to recover upon a repudiated obligation of the defendant, assigned to the plaintiff by its citizen? That a citizen of one State might sue another State was settled in Chisholm v. Georgia, but a subsequent constitutional amendment prohibited this. The question now is, can the prohibited object be accomplished by assignment of the citizen's cause of action to the State and suit by the State? The attorney-general's argument is a model of compactness and brevity. He The latest social tragedy of any moment is the sums up substantially in the following conclusions: | Garland-Addison-Hatchett affair, in Virginia, a sort "1. The intent of the Constitution, in the term of triangular or tri-partite complication. Miss 'controversies,' was not limited to those subjects| Hatchett was young, silly, and accused of being litwhich had in the world's jurisprudence in any sense erary- none of your hack writers (in spite of her become juridical as applied to those States, because name) but a fervid genius who illuminated the local the forum of contentions between the States was newspaper. She had two admirers, Garland and not juridical, but conventional or warlike. 2. What Addison, who were naturally jealous of each other, should be the subject of State controversies was in- but had never met. The girl set them by the ears, definite, and therefore the term used was purposely because somebody told her that Garland said she expansive to substitute a peaceful for a bloody rem- flirted, and they appointed a meeting to get acedy. 3. Were the construction more limited, the quainted with one another; not a duel, because that result here would be the same, for the right of re- is unlawful, even in Virginia, but a sort of shoot-asprisal against a State for the payment of its obliga-you-please arrrangement. (It would have been tions was fully recognized by the civilized nations of the earth. 4. The judges of this court of 1793, including one of the authors of the Federalist, knew the unexpressed thoughts, motives and assumptions of the people of the Union better than we; construing the Constitution in such a light, and witnesses of its birth, they solemnly pronounced its purpose to be the allowance of peaceful process to compel a State to pay her money debts and redeem her honor. The opposing counsel recognize that they must ask the complete overthrow of this precedent. 5. When one of the States of this Union, jealous of her own honor, for the redemption of her own promises to creditors accumulates a sinking fund of the solemn covenants of a sister State, the constitutional right of controversy with that other State gives her the right of any suitor in a controversy to implead her debtor in the forum provided. 6. A right to a standing in this court depends upon a party's occupying the position named in the Constitution, irrespective of motive." He adds the following logical sequences of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, aside from the case of Chis-leged laws of Virginia, he ought to have had a few holm v. Georgia: "1. The constitutional clause applies or not as the State is or is not a party to the record. 2. Though under cover of the form of action the State is in fact attacked, her immunity does not exist. 3. Process lies to compel her governor to act or not to act; her treasurer to pay out her VOL. 26-No. 10. more sensible in the young men to have buried the Hatchett.) Addison seems to have been the aggressor, if not the challenger. The result was that Addison was killed and Garland was wounded. In his last moments, we believe, Addison acquitted Garland of blame. At all events, the fight was fair," as such things go. The "Spectator" summoned his step-son to his death-bed, to "see how a Christian could die." This Addison might well have called on the world to witness how a fool dies. Now Garland has been on trial for his life, and the sharp Miss Hatchett has run away to chew the gum of sweet and bitter fancies among the pines of North Carolina- her feelings are such. It is of course a case for "flowers." Miss Hatchett sends flowers and regrets to the Addison family. Other women send flowers and congratulations to Garland. We have rather more sympathy with Garland than we know how to account for. We are glad it was the other man who got killed. Garland seems to have been a fool, too, but rather put upon; still as he was breaking the known laws of God and the al years in the penitentiary for study and reflection, and his supply of flowers should have been cut off. But having been triumphantly acquitted, he is in a fair way of becoming a spoiled hero. Addison is out of the way; that is all right. As for the quasi-hysterical, ultra-poetical, vapidly-gushing sent to American lawyers, who are accustomed and skilled to distinguish and appreciate the relative merits of the different State reports, so overwhelm Miss Hatchett, let her dull the edge of her "sorrow" in an idiot asylum, and let her be restrained from receiving flowers, writing poetry, and particularly from lecturing. We would strenuously insisting an amount of learning as it does to us; but on "no flowers, please," in every such case. But we prophesy that this "new-born Helen in a gingham gown" will soon emit a volume of verses, entitled Sighings from the Pines," or "Chippings from the Forest," or something of that sort, which will be fervently admired by the southern people. She has a great capital to start on in the way of a Sorrow, of her own manufacture, and she can make any number of sorry verses out of it. We suppose these chivalric tournaments are still to be the fashion in the State of Virginia. The only blame attached to this affair by the Richmond press seems to be that it was not strictly conducted according to the "Code." We commend to our readers the biographical sketch of Pettigru, in another column, extracted from Mr. Lawson's annual address before the American Bar Association at their late meeting. We shall follow this with his sketch of Legare. These are very felicitous sketches, and give a comprehensive view of two men of genius, little known at the north, but who being known must be admired. Our excellent neighbor, the Western Jurist, observes: "In response to Mr. High's question, in the June number of the American Law Review, 'What shall be done with the Reports?' our esteemed contempory, the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, answers: 'Simplify them, condense them, and make them funny.' Now our experience among the opinions of many of our courts in these latter days has been that they are altogether too simple, so condensed that the writers find no room for their reasons for some very singular rulings, and so funny because of their ludicrous statements for law as to become serious. While we agree that the judge however the matter is looked at, the total mass is still enormous." The amount of learning," we fear, is not so great as the amount of padding by the reporters, and quotation, reiteration and prolix argument by the judges. Still, the English reports of this century are very little if any better than our own, so far as the reporting goes. Our reporters are at least never guilty of introducing every remark of the judges on the argument, which remarks seldom tend to edification, and are merely the "staggerings of the mind" of the judges, to borrow a phrase of President Garfield. It is probable that the New York State Bar Assoand have its sessions continue during two days— ciation this year will follow its own example of 1879 the 19th and 20th of September. The committee of arrangements have made earnest efforts to give great and enduring interest to this meeting; and it will be impossible to do justice to the invited guests and to the subjects which are to come before the association for its action, and have the association's dinner or reception, all in one day. The August meeting at Saratoga of the American Bar Association, whose membership is not as large as that of our State association, occupied four days. The meeting of the State Medical Society at Albany always takes up several days. It is better, both for the profession at large and for the association as an organization, that it should take time enough to do its work well. United States Attorney-General Brewster, the official head of the bar of the whole country, is a very accomplished gentleman, and an eloquent speaker. The lawyers throughout the State ought to come to Albany and greet him in numbers and with hearty courtesy commensurate with the deference that he pays to them in advance, in making a long journey, and suspending the discharge of his onerous official duties, in order to appear among them. IT NOTES OF CASES. T has been judicially determined that it is not immoral for a man to have his shirt washed, at his own volition, even in California. This was in the habeas corpus case of Quong Woo. The board of supervisors of San Francisco passed an ordinance prohibiting the establishing, maintaining or carrying on of any laundry, within certain specified limits in that city, except on the recommendation of twelve citizens and tax payers in the block. Mr. Justice Field and Judge Sawyer, in the United States Circuit Court, have held that ordinance void. Of course it was aimed at the heathen Chinee. The court point out that if such an ordinance is valid, it is competent to require the assent of any greater number, even the unanimous assent, of the citizens, and to relegate the assent to any particular race, as |