upon the property of the debtor he has no concern with his frauds. On the strength of settled authorities I shall accordingly grant the motion for dissolving the injunction." See also Weinland v. Cochran, 9 Neb. 480; Weil v. Lankins, 3 id. 384; Holdrege v. Gwynne, 3 C. E. Green, 26; Young v. Frier, 1 Stock. 465; Uhl v. Dillon, 10 Md. 500; Rich v. Levy, 16 id. 74; Phelps v. Foster, 18 II. 309; Bigelow v. Andres, 31 id. 322; Rhodes v. Cousins, 6 Raud. 188. Crowell v. Horack. Opinion by Maxwell, J.

[Decided April 25, 1882.]

LIEN-RIGHTS OF LIENORS AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES.-Where there are several creditors having a common debtor who has several funds, all of which can be reached by one creditor, and only a part of the funds by the others, the former shall take payment out of the fund to which he can resort exclusively, so that all may receive payment. Ex parte Kent, 17 Ves. 520; Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 id. 382; Dorr v. Shaw, 4 Johns. Ch. 17; Cheesebrough v. Milard, 1 id. 413; Lanz v. Duke of Athol, 2 Atk. 445; Everston v. Booth, 19 Johns. 486; Besley v. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 581; Wilder v. Keeler, 3 id. 167; Purdy v. Doyle, 1 id. 558; Willard, Eq. Jur. 338. The principle rests upon the nature of equity, that one person shall not so use the rights which he possesses as unnecessarily to prejudice the rights or remedies of others. The law permits the creditor having more than one fund to be paid in full, but requires him to apply, so far as it will go, the fund upon which he has an exclusive lien, in payment of his debt. But to entitle a party to this relief he and the parties against whom relief is sought must be creditors of a common debtor. Lee v. Gregory. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J. [Decided January 4, 1882.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

ATTORNEY -CLIENT NOT LIABLE FOR DIRECTION TO SHERIFF.-A solicitor of a judgment creditor issuing a fi. fa. has no such implied authority to direct the sheriff as to what goods he should seize as to render his client liable. Q. B. Div. March 28, 1882. Smith v. Keal. Opinions by Manisty, J. and Pollock, B. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S. 770.)

EXTRADITION

· FOREIGNER COMMITTING CRIME PRO TANTO SUBJECT OF THAT COUNTRY-NATURE OF

WARRANT.-G., the fugitive was alleged to have committed an offense in the Netherlands for which he might be extradited. The Government of the Netherlands applied for his surrender. On his apprehension in England he produced letters of naturalization granted to him by the United States, and claimed to be a subject of the United States and not of the Netherlands, which could not lawfully demand his surrender. The warrant for G.'s arrest was a duly signed and authenticated copy of a decree entered in the official book of a competent tribunal in the Netherlands ordering his arrest. G. was taken into custody and an application for a writ of habeas corpus was made on his behalf. On the argument it was contended, that being a naturalized citizen of the United States, he was not within the terms of the treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands, and could not be delivered up at the request of the Government of the Netherlands. Also that the warrant of his arrest was not in form or substance within the meaning of the English term "warrant," and was besides bad and insufficient by reason of its being a mere copy, and not an original document. Held, that a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of a particular country is pro tanto a subject of that country

which can rightly demand his extradition on escape, unless there are treaty arrangements to the contrary. Held, further, that a foreign warrant need not be of the same kind of description as an English warrant, and that any foreign judicial document purporting to be duly signed and authenticated which orders the arrest of a person, is a sufficient warrant upon which the committing magistrate in England can order the surrender of that person as a fugitive criminal. Q. B. Div.,March 30, 1882. Regina v. Ganz. Opinions by Pollock, B., and Manisty, J. (46 L. J. Rep. 592.)

FALSE REPRESENTATIONS - WHAT NECESSARY ΤΟ SUSTAIN ACTION FOR- VALUE OF PROPERTY

PROSPECTUS OF COMPANY.-A plaintiff, in order to succeed in an action of deceit, must show that statements made by the defendant were untrue to his knowledge or made recklessly without knowledge of the facts; that the misstatements were material to induce the plaintiff to enter on the contract; that he relied on them to his prejudice. The mere non-discovery of a slight mistake in documents in a man's possession is not such recklessness as to make him liable for stating that which is incorrect if he believed it to be true. A misstatement as to the amount of a valuation of property to the extent of 3,000l. out of a total of 301,000l. is not a material misstatement. If a statement as to the contents of a written document is altogether true but imperfect, and gives a reference to the full copy, the omission is not such a withholding as to make what is stated absolutely false, so as to be the ground of an action of deceit. A misstatement, if made under the belief that it is true, and if based on the report of an expert, will not support an action of deceit. When a representation is capable of two meanings, the plaintiff in an action of deceit is bound to tell the court in his pleading which meaning he attached to it. The false statement in a prospectus that one of several persons named is a director, is not of itself a material misstatement. The plaintiff took shares in a company on the faith of certain statements contained in a prospectus issued by the defendants. Some days after the shares had been taken the plaintiff received from the defendant a circular containing other information as to the company. Held, that the circular could not be treated as a contemporaneous document for the purpose of construing the prospectus. The decision of Fry, J., reversed. Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925. Ct. of Appeal, March 17, 1882. Smith v. Chadwick. Opinions by Jessell, M. R. and Cotton, L.T. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S., 702. INJUNCTION -COURT WILL NOT ORDER DEFENDANT TO INSTITUTE ACTION TO PROCURE Plaintiff, the owner of land bounded by a stream, into which was discharged a sewer within the district of a rural sanitary authority, alleged that the sewer was vested in the sanitary authority, that the sewer was being used not only by persons who had a prescriptive right to discharge their drains into it, but by persons who had no such right, and that such user had become a public and private nuisance, which was constantly increasing. He prayed an injunction to restrain the defendants from causing or permitting the sewage of the district to be conveyed through the sewer into the stream, other than sewage so conveyed by prescriptive right before the commencement of the action. It was in evidence that the defendants had been endeavoring ever since the passing of the Public Health Act, 1872, to provide a system of drainage for the district, but hitherto without success. Held, assuming the above allegations (which the defendant denied) to be true, that the plaintiff had no right to an injunction, and decision of Hall, V. C. affirmed. Inasmuch as the defendants could not prevent owners with prescriptive rights from using the sewer, and consequently could

See

NUISANCE.

not stop up the sewer as against them, the court would not order the defendants to put an end to a nuisance; which they could only put an end to, if at all, by bringing an injunction action. Glossop v. Heston and Isleworth Board of Health (40 L. T. Rep. 736; 12 Ch. Div. 102) followed. Ct. of App., March 24, 1882. Attorney-General v. Guardians of Dorking Union. Opinion by Jessel, M. R. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S., 573.)

GENERAL SHIP NOT

MARITIME LAW GOODS IN LIABLE TO LIEN CREATED BY.-The goods of a shipper in a general ship are not affected by a clause in a charter-party of which he has no notice or knowledge, giving the ship-owner a lien on all cargo and freight for arrears of hire due under the charter-party. Semble the fact that no bills of lading were given for the goods makes no difference in this respect as to the rights and liabilities of the parties. T. hired a ship from M., and by the charter-party gave M. a lien on all cargo and freight for arrears of hire. T. advertised the ship as a general ship, and gave no notice of the charter-party. B. shipped goods and obtained a receipt, but no bill of lading. The hire being in arrears, M. detained the goods of B. for the whole of the arrears. Held, that M. was not entitled to detain the goods of B., and that B. was entitled to damages for their detention. Probate, etc., Div., March 22, 1882. The Stornoway. Opinion by Sir R. Phillimore. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S., 773.)

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY- STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU — RIGHT EXISTS TILL GOODS HAVE REACHED

DESTINATION.-The right of an unpaid vendor to stop delivery of goods while in transit is not determined until the goods have been actually delivered to the purchaser or his agent to keep the goods. Delivery to a railway company, though nominated and employed by the purchaser to carry the goods, is not such a delivery. Goods carried by a railway company and warehoused on arrival at the risk of an agent instructed by the purchaser to ship them, is not such a delivery. A purchaser ordered goods to be sent by rail to G., and at the same time (unknown to the vendor) instructed M. & Co. to ship the goods on their arrival at G. to R. Some delay occurred at G., owing to there being no ship ready to take the goods, and they were warehoused by the railway company at M. & Co.'s risk. Whilst there, they were stopped. Held, that as M. & Co. were merely the agents to forward the goods, and as the purchaser did not intend to take possession of the goods till their arrival at R. the transitus was not at an end, and the vendor had therefore duly exercised his right of stoppage in transitu. The true rule is that laid down by James, L.J., in Ex parte Rosevear China Clay Company; Re Cock (40 L. T. Rep., N. S., 730; 11 Ch. Div. 560), viz., the vendor has a right to stop in transitu until the goods have actually got home into the hands of the purchaser, or of some one who receives them in the character of his servant or agent. That is the cardinal principle. Q. B. Div., May 26, 1882. Kendall v. Marshall. Mathew, J. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S., 693.)

FINANCIAL LAW.

Opinion by

BAILMENT - PLEDGE OF STOCKS-DUTY OF PLEDGEE.- The pledgee of stocks, in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, is entitled to a transfer of the stock to his own name. When so transferred, the particular shares become indistinguishable from the great mass of other stock, and the pledgor has no right to demand the return of any particular certificates. It is enough if the pledgee have at all times shares sufficient in number to answer the pledgor's demand upon repayment by the pledgor of

the loan made to him. A share of stock is without earmarks, and cannot be distinguished from other shares of the same corporation and issue. The certificates bearing dates and numbers are but evidence of title. Nourse v. Prime, 4 Johns. Ch. 490; Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill, 593; Gilpin v. Howell, 5 Barr. 41. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Pennsylvania, Jan. 23, 1882. Hubbell v. Drexel. (11 Fed. Rep. 115.)

CORPORATION - SALE OF STOCK INDUCED BY THREAT OF ASSESSMENT.- Where defendant and other directors of a corporation levied an assessment upon stock of a corporation, upon which but a small proportion of the par value had been paid, and threatened future assessments for the purposes of the corporation, whereby plaintiff was induced to sell and transfer his stock, held, that such sale was not so tainted with fraud as to render it void. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. New York, March 21, 1882. Grant v. Attrill. Opinion by Wheeler, D. J. (11 Fed. Rep. 469.)

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENT -NOTE то SETTLE FRAUDULENT CLAIM-HOLDER IN BAD FAITH.- A note given to settle a fraudulent claim, one wholly without foundation, and known by both parties to be such, under threats of suit, is without consideration and void; and cannot be collected by a third party, though purchased before due when such party was not only put upon inquiry, but also acted in bad faith in buying, he being a general purchaser of the payee's notes and knowing his dishonest methods in obtaining them. Vermont Sup. Ct., October term, 1881. Ormsbee v. Howe. Opinion by Veazey, J. (54 Vt. 182.)

TIME NO RELEASE OF SURETY.- By the Maine statutes an agreement to pay interest at a greater rate than six per cent per annum must be in writing. Held, that a parol agreement by the principal to pay interest for a year at eight per cent is not a good consideration for an agreement by the holder of a note with the principal to extend the time of payment one year after it became due, and such an agreement based on such a consideration does not discharge a surety on the note. Berry v. Pullen, 69 Me. 101. Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., May 29, 1882. Turner v. Williams. Opinion by Libbey, J. (73 Me. 466.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

A QUESTION OF DOWER. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In connection with Van Voorhis v. Brintnall 86 N. Y. 18, a question suggests itself as to the admeasurement of dower upon the happening of a not improbable series of events. The supposed case may be stated in this way: A. is a married man living with his wife, B., let us say for his convenience, in New York city. B. procures an absolute divorce by reason of A.'s adultery. A. then goes over into Connecticut and contracts a valid marriage with C., with intent and purpose as in the case above, and returns to New York. Shortly afterward C. procures an absolute divorce after the manner of B. Thereupon A. goes through the same performance with D., and has just married E. when he dies leaving a circle of sorrowing families. These latter marriages are not necessarily contracted in Connecticut, but in other States where they may be permitted. During all this time the only property to which a wife's right of dower might attach is a piece of land in New York of which he was seised at the time of his marriage with B., and from thence uninterruptedly until his death.

Question. How would dower in the piece of land be

ROBINSON'S ELEMENTARY LAW.

This is an addition to Little, Brown & Co.'s "Student's Series," by William C. Robinson, of Yale Law School. It professes to be exclusively for students. It gives succinct statements of general elementary principles in 522 sections, and under each section are recommendations as to the proper course of reading. Thus it essays only to be a guide, not a commentator. The principles are admirably stated, and the book goes far to demonstrate the practicability of general codification. Doubtless it will prove an excellent text book. We regard it and Judge Smith's as the best of the class.

EWELL'S BLACKSTONE.

Blackstone's Commentaries. For the use of students at law and the general reader; obsolete and unimportant matter being eliminated. By Marshall D. Ewell. Boston: Soule & Bugbee, 1882. Pp. xii, 612. 12mo.

Prof. Ewell is known to our profession as a law writer and editor of experience and accuracy. We cannot now undertake to pronounce how judicious his omissions here have been. As he himself well says, it is a difficult task to determine what to omit. But his arrangement seems excellent. Very important matter is put in large type, subordinate matter in small of two different sizes, according to importance. Obsolete matter incapable of excision has been put in brackets and labelled "obsolete." New matter is also bracketed. All notes are omitted. The original paging is preserved. There is an index. The typography is nice, save that the smallest type is very minute, but perhaps it will do for young students. We have confidence, from our knowledge of Prof. Ewell's qualifications and publications, that this work has been judiciously performed.

CONKLING'S EXECUTIVE POWERS.

The Powers of the Executive Department of the Government of the United States, and the Political Institutions and Constitutional Law of the United States. By Alfred Conkling. Albany: W. C. Little & Co., 1882. Pp. 195. 18mo.

The character of this tract is shown in the motto on

the title page: "Better to be awakened by the alarmbell than to perish in the flames."-Burke. It is sadly pessimistic. It is easy to go about pulling the fire alarms and getting out the fire department, but everybody knows that the vast majority of such alarms are false, and set off by timid, impulsive or unreflecting citizens. We read such books with respect and patience, but while they generally contain some grains of sound judgment, we think their effect if they have auy-is

usually bad. False alarms excite the community, disturb their healthful slumber, expose their health and try their patience. We think we have remarked that those who lose faith in the government are usually those of the party and personnel out of office, and that their confidence is restored the moment they get in. This is one reason why we believe in rotation in office if not of parties. Mr. Conkling has here said nothing new, but he has pulled a new alarm-bell, and its tone has the merit of difference.

V. REDFIELD'S REPORTS (Surrogate's Court). This volume is of the usual character and average interest of its predecessors. The series is valuable to practitioners in this court. Published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.

THE

NOTES.

THE Cornhill Magazine presents the following nice points of "French justice": A man wishing to steal fowls clambers over a garden wall at night and breaks into a fowl-house. He has a bludgeon or crowbar in his hand, but makes no use of either to inflict bodily hurt on those who capture him. Nevertheless this man is a felon who has committed a burglary which the quatre circonstances aggravantés, that is, in the night, with escalade (climbing over walls), with efraction (breaking open a door), and a main armée (with a weapon in his hand). He can only be tried at the assizes, and if convicted on the four counts must get eight years' seclusion or twenty years' transportation. On the other hand, take a man who by false pretenses obtains admission to a house or shop intending to commit a robbery there. He lays hands on some valuables and being surprised in the act, catches up a poker and knocks his detector down inflicting a serious wound. This man's crime is evidently worse than that of the other who went after the fowls - bis is only a misdemeanor however, for he gained admittance to the house without violence and was unarmed; his catching up the poker, although it may have been a premeditated act, inasmuch as he intended from the first to defend himself somehow if caught, was equally speaking, only an act of impulse committed on the spur of the moment and without malice prepense. Therefore this man can only be tried by a correctional court, and cannot get more than five years' imprisonment. Again, if a man wishing to inflict on an enemy some grievous bodily harm, walks into a café, says a few angry words to him and disfigures him by smashing a decanter upon his face, it is a misdemeanor extenuated by the apparent absence of premeditation. The man walked into the café unarmed, and in the heat of quarrel picked up the first weapon that came to his hand. It might fairly be alleged that the man knew that he should find a decanter in the café, and that his quarrel was purposely entered into, but the law will not take account of this. If on the contrary the man entered his enemy's house with a loaded stick in his band and assaulted his enemy with that stick, he would be a felon who must go to the assizes on a charge of attempted murder. It might be that the man had taken the stick without reflecting that it had a leaden knob, but the onus of proving that his intentions were not murderous, and that in fact when he entered the room he did not even propose to commit a common assault, would rest upon himself. A jury would probably judge his case according to his antecedents, and if it were shown that his past life was not blameless, he might fail to get extenuating circumstances, and might receive 20 years' transportation.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, OCTOBER 14, 1882.

CURRENT TOPICS.

WE point, with great pleasure, to Mr. Bacon's ex

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fully complains of the "wounds" we inflicted in our remarks on his essay, the question is suggested, which does he regard as wounding - the blame or the praise ? —for as he seems to deplore the depravity of the profession, he may privately reproach himself for belonging to it, and regard our characterizing him as witty, clever, brilliant, learned and honest as so many covert stabs. Perhaps the main fault of Mr. Bacon's paper was that it lacked perspective, and that he was compelled from want of time to make the foreground of fault-finding too prominent. A few extracts will illustrate our meaning: "Now I venture, with all deference to the organic law of this body, to put to it the question whether, after all, there is any need whatever for a fraternal feeling among lawyers simply because they are lawyers; and whether a primary object of a bar association might not properly be the discouragement and suppression of professional comity? It is popularly believed (with what degree of justice, I need not discuss) that this 'spirit of brotherhood' in the bar is already developed to a ripeness that is far from beneficent to outsiders subjected to its influence. An opinion is widely entertained that whenever the professional relation is in question, lawyers may be depended upon to stand by one another. Not very many men would expect to contest unsuccessfully a lawyer's bill, unless the issues could be tried by a jury; not many men would doubt that by the active sympathy of judges who once were lawyers, and soon may be again, a jury would have little chance to pass upon the issues; not many men would expect a lawyer to scrutinize narrowly, even in his client's interests, an adverse bill of charges, still less to struggle against the plundering of a fund in courts by counsel co-operating with conniving judges. And it may reasonably be doubted whether any single cause gives greater vehemence and bitterness to the common denunciations of which you and I, innocent as we are, have to bear our share, than this prevalent conviction that our esprit de corps forbids justice to be done upon one of our number. But 'the sum of the whole matter,' as it presents itself to me upon much meditation, may be stated in one or two propositions, hastily put together, needing limitation and qualification, but believed to be substantially sound. The legal profession, although containing many learned men, has ceased to be a learned profession. It contains innumerable members whose general acquirements are greater (sic) than one may expect to find behind the counter of a country grocery or on a tailor's bench. The title of counsellor no longer implies membership in a self-disciplined VOL. 26-No. 16.

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On the contrary,

in the case of two shoemakers. both the profession and the community suffer from the want of a healthy, fearless hatred by lawyers of the shortcomings of lawyers." These assertions we regard as quite too sweeping, and as "needing limitation and qualification" almost to the extent of a general denial. We no more believe that Mr. Bacon correctly states general public opinion of lawyers, than we believe that clergymen are hypocrites or physicians are quacks because some are and are so regarded. As to Mr. Bacon's argument against "fraternal feeling," he might as well urge that such a feeling is to be discouraged among christians because some are "wolves in sheep's clothing." If there is to be no fraternity between good lawyers there will be neither motive nor means for punishing and discarding the bad.

The report of the national commissioner of education, for 1880, contains brief statements upon the work of law schools (p. 150) and upon the causes of litigation in school matters (p. 257). There are 48 law schools in the country, having 229 instructors, and 3,134 students. All are departments of universities. The average time devoted in them to lectures and recitations in course is three hours a day; to special lectures and moot courts, five hours a week. The course of study is usually two years in length. The authors adopted by the greatest number of schools are, general law, Blackstone and Kent; torts, Bigelow and Cooley; criminal law, Bishop and Wharton; domestic relations, Schouler; corporations, Angell and Ames; real property, Washburne and Williams (the former being much more generally used); contracts, Bishop and Parsons; mercantile law, Smith; agency, Story; bills, Byle, Parsons and Story; equity, Bispham and Story (the former more commonly); pleading, Stephen; evidence, Greenleaf and Stephen (preference being given to Greenleaf); constitutional law, Cooley; international law, Woolsey; admiralty, Conkling and Parsons. The leading causes of litigation are stated to be the breach of contracts, the exercise of unauthorized power by school committees, unconstitutional legislation, and the failure of teachers to procure a license. There are also local causes of litigation, as the alteration of school districts in the older States, the State debt in Virginia, and the levying of taxes in Pennsylvania. The commissioner says: "Incomplete, defective or exacting laws are principal causes of litigation; and when any part of the school law is frequently before the courts, the presumption is that it is either unequal,