or did, or failed to say or do. There is no estoppel where the silence is the result of ignorance of the facts, unless the party is guilty of gross negligence in not knowing the facts. The rule of estoppel relating to negotiable instruments does not apply. Boynton v. Braley. Opinion by Veazey, J. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MARCH, 1882. -MEANING 46 JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF BENEVOLENT CONSTRUCTION OF WILL.-The word "benevolent," as applied to objects or purposes, may refer to those which are in their nature charitable, and may also have a broader meaning, and include objects and purposes not charitable in the legal sense of that word. Acts of kindness, friendship, forethought or good will might properly be described as benevolent. Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267; James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17. In those cases the word benevolent was the only word used in describing the purposes to which the gifts were to be devoted. But where it is used in connection with other words explanatory of its meaning, and indicating the intent of the donor to limit it to purposes strictly charitable, it has been held to be synonymous with or equivalent to "charitable." Saltonstall v. Sandors, 11 Allen, 446, 468, 470. See Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431. In the case at bar the testator gives to trustees a residuary fund, and directs them to pay the income of the same, in their discretion, first, to assist, relieve and benefit poor and necessitous persons; and second, "to assist and co-operate with any such charitable, benevolent, religious, literary and scientific societies and associations, or any or either of them as shall appear to the trustees or trustee for the time best to deserve such assistance or co-operation." The meaning of the word "benevolent is here modified and limited by other words in connection with which it is used; and it is plain that the testator used the word as synonymous with "charitable," and intended to create a charity in its strict legal sense. Suter v. Hilliard. Opinion by Endicott, J. PRACTICE INTERPLEADER ONLY WHEN PARTIES IN PRIVITY.-The bill alleged that B. delivered a draft to the plaintiff bank for collection, that it collected the draft and placed the amount to the credit of B. who had an open account with the bank; that the defendant Lumber Company claim that the draft was held by B. as its agent and was its property, and that the proceeds belong to it; and that the executrix of B., who has deceased, claims that the proceeds belong to his estate. Held, not a proper case for a bill of interpleader. There is no privity between the plaintiff and the Lumber Company. That corporation does not claim the fund in the hands of the plaintiff through any privity with B. but by a title paramount and adverse to his. The bank is not a mere stakeholder, but is the debtor of B. standing in privity with him alone. Carr v. National Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45. The authorities support the rule that in such a case a bill of interpleader will not lie, but the remedy of the parties is at law. Such a bill will lie only when two parties claim of a third the same duty or debt by virtue of some privity existing between them. 2 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 816, 817; Dungrey v. Congone, 2 Ves. Jr. 304; Cowtan v. Williams, 9 Ves. 107; Clark v. Byne, 13 id. 383; Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige. 339. "The true doctrine supported by the authorities would seem to be that in cases of adverse independent titles, the party holding the property must defend himself as well as he can at law; and he is not entitled to the assistance of a Court of Equity, for that would be to assume the right to try merely legal titles upon a controversy between different parties, where there is no privity of contract between them and the third person who calls for an interpleader." 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 820. This rule is applicable in the case at bar. The only relation of the plaintiff to the defendants is that it is the debtor of one of them. A debtor cannot deprive his creditor of his remedy at law and force him into equity, merely because a third person claims the fund or debt by a title not derived from the creditor. His remedy is at law; and it would seem that if either of the claimants should sue him, he could protect himself by notifying the other claimant to come in and defend the suit, and that he, being the real party in interest, would be bound by the judgment. Third National Bank v. Skillings, Whitney & Barnes Lumber Co. Opinion by Morton, C. J. WILL-CONSTRUCTION -DEVISEE AUTHORIZED TO DISPOSE OF LAND MAY DEED RESERVING LIFE INTEREST. - By the will of P. premises were devised to his wife "to have and to hold the same to her and her heirs and assigns forever." He also bequeathed to her all the household furniture, utensils and chattels contained in the dwelling-house situated thereon, and the sum of $1,500 per annum during her life; these gifts to be "in full of all her interest in my estate, and in lieu and bar of dower." Following these provisions is this clause: "It is also my will that if any of the above named property should remain undisposed of by my wife at her decease, the same shall descend and belong to my heirs-at-law." The wife was appointed executrix. Thereafter more than three years before her death she conveyed to C. and others, the tenants, the premises and household furniture above described, in trust for the following uses and purposes: "During my natural life I am to have, hold and enjoy the full and sole use and benefit and improvement of all said real and personal estate, at my decease said real and personal estate shall be distributed aud given as follows." She then disposes of certain articles of personal property, and directs the sale of the real estate and provides for the distribution of the proceeds. This deed was not to take effect in futuro and was delivered to the tenants, who paid to her the consideration of one dollar therein named; and the statement of facts recites that she "on the same day made livery of seisin of said demanded premises to said tenants." Held, that the wife could dispose of the premises during her lifetime, and only in the contingency of her failure to do so could his heirs-at-law take any interest therein at her decease. Taft v. Taft, 130 Mass. 461. And that the deed in question was a valid disposition of the premises, and C. and the other tenants took title thereto against the heir-at-law of P. It is well settled that the owner of property may make a voluntary conveyance to trustees, reserving to himself an equitable life estate therein, with provisions for the distribution of the fund upon his decease. Sewall v Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227, Davis v Ney, 125 Mass. 590. Perry v. Cross. Opinion by Eudicott, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CONTRACT- -FOR SERVICE- HIRING FOR A YEAR.A hiring at a salary of 500l. a year is prima facie, and in the absence of any custom to the contrary, a hiring for a year certain. Plaintiff was employed as engineer to the defendants at a salary of 500l. a year, and was dismissed at a three months' notice. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover salary for the unexpired portion of the year. Q. B. Div., June 21, 1882. Buckingham v. Surrey & Hants Canal Co. Opinion by Grove, J. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S. 885.) EASEMENT-BY NECESSITY NEED NOT BE RESERVED IN DEED.- Where an easement is in the nature of an easement of necessity, there is no need of an express reservation of such easement in a conveyance of the property to be affected by the easement; and such reservation is a matter of legal presumption, to be implied from the nature of the transaction between the grantor and grantee. See Wheeldon v. Burrows, 39 L. T. Rep., N. S. 558. Q. B. Div., May 23, 1882. Sherbrook v. Tufnell. Opinion by Manisty and Watkin Williams, JJ. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S. 886.) EASEMENT CONSTRUCTION OF DEED OF RIGHT OF WAY-MEANING OF GRANT OF RIGHT OF INGRESS, EGRESS, AND REGRESS."- A grant of a right of "ingress, egress, and regress " is a grant of a right of way from the locus a quo to the locus ad quem, and from the locus ad quem forth to any other spot to which the grantee may lawfully go, or back to the locus a quo. By a deed of conveyance from a railroad company of a close of land the grantee was given a right of free "ingress, egress, and regress," to and from certain private roads which bounded the close and led to the railway station and on to public highways. Held, that the grantee was entitled to pass from the close to the private roads, and thence to the public highways, or in the reverse direction, and was not limited to passing from the close to the railway station, or vice versa. Q. B. Div., June 17, 1882. Somerset v. Great Western Railway Co. Opinion by Fry, J. (46 L. T. Rep., N. S. 883.) INSURANCE LAW. FIRE POLICY -- CONDITIONS IN-VACANCY OF PREMISES-WHEN DWELLING-HOUSE UNOCCUPIED.- Defendant in January, 1881, issued to plaintiff a policy of insurance on his household furniture contained in a frame building, to be occupied as a private summer residence. In the body of the policy immediately following the description, was inserted in writing the following provision: "It is hereby understood and agreed that the said premises are not to be used as a hotel or boarding-house, and that they are not to be left unoccupied any portion of the year." At the time plaintiff purchased, an employe of the former owner lived in,and with his family occupied four rooms in one wing of the building, and continued to live there until April 5th, 1881. In March, plaintiff employed H. to take charge of the place as gardener; he was to remove there and occupy the same rooms in the wing. On March 22, 1881, H. went to the place and engaged board at a neighbor's, his family not accompanying him, owing to the sickness of his wife. H. slept at his boarding-house, but had the keys of the house and assumed general charge of the place. On April 19th, the building took fire from leaves H. was burning on the grounds, and was entirely consumed, with the insured furniture. In an action on the policy, held, that the building was unoccupied within the meaning of the policy, which was therefore forfeited by the breach of the warranty. According to well settled rules of construction the written agreement in this policy, as to the use and occupation of the premises containing the insured property, must be construed as an express promissory warranty on the part of the plaintiff, in the nature of the condition precedent. An actual and literal compliance with this condition and warranty is essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery. May on Ins., § 156; Wood on Fire Ins., § 165; Flanders on Fire Ins. 226; Dewees v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 5 Vroom, 244; Carson v. Jersey City F. Ins. Co., 14 id. 300. A dwelling-house is only occupied within such a condition, when human beings habitually reside in it, and it is unoccupied when no one lives or dwells in it. The phrase "left unoccupied" will not be construed as implying an abandonment or willful vacation of the premises, leaving them uncared for. Herrman v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 184; Herrman v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 85 id. 162. New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, March Term, 1882. Sonneborn v. Manufacturers Insurance Co. Opinion by Green, J. (15 Vroom, 220). FIRE POLICY - WARRANTY INCUMBRANCES.- An application was made for insurance under the regulations of the company. It required that the questions put therein should be truly answered as a preliminary to the issuing of the policy. The application contained among others the following questions: "Is there any incumbrance on the property?" and this was followed by the requisition, "If mortgaged, state the amount." Over against the question the agent of the company wrote, "Expects to borrow $2,500 and use the policy as collateral," and opposite the following requisition he wrote nothing, but made a dash only. When the application was made the property was subject to four mortgages, amounting to $3,700. Held, that the policy having been issued upon an application in which the question as to the incumbrances had been left unanswered, without intention, to deceive, there was no warranty upon that subject. New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, March Term, 1882. Jersey City Insurance Co. v. Carson. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor (15 Vroom, 210). MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION LIFE POLICY REMEDY. If a mutual benefit association fails to pay the amount due upon the death of a member whom it has agreed to insure to the extent of a certain sum for each certificate in force, the remedy is by an action for breach of contract, especially if the liability is disputed; and not by mandamus to compel the company to assess its members in order to make up the amount due. A private corporation cannot, by entering into a peculiar form of contract, avoid an action at law for its breach, or give an appellate court original jurisdiction for the collection thereunder of money demands against it; nor will its insolvency, or the fact that it cannot make such demands until it has raised the necessary funds, confer such jurisdiction. Michigan Sup. Ct., January 11, 1882. Burland v. Northwestern Mutual Benefit Association. Opinion by Marston, J. CORRESPONDENCE. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The question whether a homestead exempt under chap. 260 of Laws 1850 is exempt from taxation has, it seems to me, been determined by the courts. 1. By 1 R. S. 388, § 4, sub. 9; 1 Edm. St. 361, All property exempted by law from execution" is exempt from taxation. 2. Chapter 260 of Laws 1850 exempts a homestead from sale on execution for debts hereafter contracted." Section 1397 of the Code of Civil Procedure uses the same language. This does not exempt it from sale on execution, but only from sale on execution for "debts contracted"-exemption from a specified class of executions. Lathrop v. Singer, 39 Barb. 396; Schouten v. Kilmer, 8 How. Pr. 527. Nor does it exempt for a debt contracted before the notice was filed. Rice v. Davis, 7 Lans. 393. The Revised Statute only exempts property from taxation which is generally exempt, or exempt from all executions. The law of 1850 does not so exempt a homestead, and it RAPALJE'S JUDICIAL CRITICISMS. A Table of American and English Cases which have been affirmed, applied, commented on, compared, changed by statute, denied, disapproved, distinguished, doubted, explained, followed, limited, modified, not followed, opposed overruled, questioned, reconciled, reversed, or otherwise criticised or cited, in reported decisions of the American, English, Canadian and Nova Scotian courts. Volume I. Covering the decisions published during the year 1881. By Stewart Rapalje and Robert L. Lawrence. Jersey City: F. D. Linn & Co., 1882. Pp. xxx, 844. This publication, one can see from the title page, must be very useful if well executed, and that the editorial work is thoroughly done, the reputation of the editors is a sufficient assurance. There are tables of reports and abbreviations, and the volume is handsomely printed. SCHOULER'S DOMESTIC RELATIONS. In announcing the third edition of this work, we cannot do better than to reiterate our opinion, more than once expressed, that it is out of sight the best work on this interesting subject. Although the topic has received many judicial illustrations of late, yet Mr. Schouler has kept his volume within the moderate limit of 800 pages. With this and his recent treatise on Husband and Wife the practitioner is thoroughly equipped. The publishers, Little, Brown & Co., have printed the book in their best style. HACKETT'S GENEVA AWARD ACTS. The Geneva Award Acts, with notes and references to decisions of the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims. By Frank W. Hackett, of the Washington (D. C.) Bar. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1882. Pp. xiv, 207. This volume has considerable historical interest, and may prove important to those who lost their chests, chronometers, and other things, by the depredations of the celebrated corsair. The author was secretary of Mr. Evarts on the original arbitration, and thus has a large acquaintance with the entire subject. He has appended a form of "petition by sailor for loss of personal effects," etc., and if he has carried out the ruling prices, we are sorry that we did not lose something by the "Alabama." Our "working coat" certainly is not worth $25, and $18 strikes us as rather high for a sailor's "6 white shirts." But our old friend, the author, is a humorist, the originator of our old-time "Obiter Dicta," and he has perhaps given his fancy play. THOMPSON AND MERRIAM ON JURIES. NEW YORK CITY LAWS. New York City Consolidation Act of 1882 An act to consolidate into one act and to declare the special and local laws affecting public and local interests in the city of New York, being Chapter 410 of the Laws of 1882. This ponderous quarto of 800 pages represents a vast amount of useful labor skillfully performed by the commission of which Mr. Bliss was chairman. Mr. Bliss has done a great deal of professional work, some praiseworthy, some otherwise, and we have never hesitated to express our opinion of the latter. Of this work we have heretofore spoken in praise, and it gives us pleasure to reiterate that opinion It is a great and indispensable task most admirably and conscientiously performed, so far as appears on the surface. Mr Bliss deserves public thanks for his zeal and industry. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS THE 'HE following decisions were handed down, Tuesday, October 17, 1882. Judgment affirmed with costs-Robinson v. Brennan; Sage v. Roberts; Stearns v. Field; Howard v. Hayes; Beattie v. The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company; Sharkey v. Manfietd.Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Story v. The New York Elevated Railroad Company.—Judgment modified by striking the Clark claim, with interest, from the record, and as 80 modified affirmed without costs in this court to either party - Wakefield v. Fargo (Nos. 1 and 2). Orders of General and Special Terms reversed, with costs-Goddard V. Stiles.Orders of General Term reversed. Judgment on trials at Circuit affirmed with costs - Burleigh v. Gebhard Fire Insurance Company; Burleigh v. Adriatic Fire Insurance Company.— Order affirmed without costs - In re Tinsley.-- Order of General Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed with costs-The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. Arthur; Dodd v. Neilson. Order affirmed with costs-Howell v. Leavitt.- - Order affirmed - Tabor v. The People.Motion to put cause on calendar as preferred. Denied without costs-Bertles v. Nunan; Crooke v. County of Kings, Crooke v. Prince; Hynes v. McDermott.Motion to amend return denied without costs - In re New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company v. Cottle. Motion to revive suit granted; ten dollars costs of motion to abide event of action - Candee v. Smith.- Motion denied - In re Percy. NOTES. A Treatise on the Organization, Custody and Conduct of MR. SHERMAN S. ROGERS may be hailed as a Juries, including Grand Juries. By Seymour D. Thompson and Edwin G. Merriam. St. Louis, Mo.: William H Stevenson, 1882. Pp. iii, 782. This book, the work of one celebrated law-writer, and of another who has displayed excellent abilities in the same field, seems to be constructed with method, thoroughness and discrimination. It is marked by the excellent arrangement that uniformly characterizes Judge Thompson's work. The subject is one of every-day importance and continually growing interest. It is probable that ever since Mr. Proffatt's excellent work on the same subject a fair place has been made for another, and that this volume is well entitled to occupy it. It would seem that an index of 32 pages ought to be exhaustive, but we look in vain in it for "polling the jury." The subject is treated, but there seems to be no definite direction to it in the index. The book is admirably printed, great discoverer. He has discovered that Mr. Grover Cleveland is in every way equal as a lawyer to exchief judge Secretary Folger!- -The American Law Review for October contains the following leading articles: Charter-Parties, by Orlando F. Bump; Conflict between Federal and State Decisions, by J. B. Heiskell; Three Kinds of Law Books by Charles W. Storey. --The Law Magazine and Review for August contains the following articles: The Channel Tunnel from the point of view of International Law, by H. J. W. Coulson; the Criminal Liability of the Hundred, by F. W. Maitland; the United States Supreme Court on Bills of Lading; Scrutin de Liste, as modified in the Italian Parliament, by Tomasse Tittoni; the Law of Nations in time of Peace and War.- Redfield's Reports are published by Banks & Brothers, of this city, and not by Baker, Voorhis & Co., as we announced last week. to suit him without also putting the judges "out of The Albany Law Journal.politics," that is to say, he would abolish the jury, ALBANY, OCTOBER 28, 1882. CURRENT TOPICS. THERE are two topics of which we are heartily these are the "insanity" of Guiteau and the "failure" of the jury system. But if learned men will keep on writing about them, and apparently getting pay for so doing, we feel called on to continue to raise our feeble voice in the debate. Dr. Beard has issued a little book, called "The Psychology of Salem Witchcraft of 1692, and its Practical Application to our own time," which latter phrase means the Guiteau case. The learned doctor combats the legal test of knowledge of right from wrong, and says "it is dying out in England, where it originated, and will die in America," and "is disregarded in important cases." Of course we cannot say he is wrong in his prediction, although the signs are all against him; but as to his assertion, he is completely mistaken; there is not the slightest indication to support him. It is quite unfair in him to instance the case of Maclean, who fired at the Queen, because there was not the slightest attempt to controvert the proof of insanity. The courts of England and this country cling more determinedly every day to the capacity to tell right from wrong as the test of legal accountability, and so they ought. The doctor shows a sadly illogical mind in instancing the case of Freeman, the negro, defended by Seward. That criminal was an apparent idiot, and the post mortem disclosed that his brain was so diseased that he could have had no sense. Guiteau was a remarkably acute and cunning man, displaying on the trial and all his life much more admira ble mental powers than Dr. Beard displays in his book, and the post mortem showed that his brain was almost perfectly healthy and normal, Guiteau was no more insane, legally speaking, than Damiens, Ravaillac, Gerard, Felton, or Charlotte Corday. He may possibly have been a fanatic, like these, although we do not believe it from the evidence, but he was legally accountable and was justly hanged. What Salem witchcraft has to do with the question nobody but a professional expert on insanity could imagine. On the jury system there are no less than three recent deliverances, one in favor, by Mr. Foster, in the last North American Review, and two against, by Mr. Arthur Stickney and Mr. Robert Jones, in the last Century magazine. There is nothing specially new in either of the two former articles. Mr. Foster argues for the modification and improvement of the system by adopting a majority verdict and a more stringent method of selecting juries. Mr. Stickney, who is familiary known as a gentleman who finds very little that suits him in the world as it is organized, cannot get the jury quite VOL. 26-No. 18. appoint the judges, and have the judges act as which the equity judges try issues of fact. He ap- This is best for courts and citizens. But all this There is the least chance of bias or corruption, and In another column we give in full the prevailing opinion of our Court of Appeals in the Elevated Railway case. The views adopted by the majority of the court are presented with great force and clearness by Judge Tracey. There is singularly little adjudication on the precise question at issue. The most nearly in point of recent cases is Stanley v. City of Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 216, holding that a city has no inherent right to authorize or permit the use of steam-motors upon railways in streets, where the fee of the streets is in the city in trust for public purposes. This cannot be done without legislative authority. And we suppose it follows, not without compensation to adjoining property owners. We meant to enter our protest, last week, against the idea of "Swearing by Telephone," which our correspondent seemed to approve. There is a good deal of room for deception and imposition in such a practice. No one can be absolutely certain of the human voice thus communicated. A forged affidavit may be sent to the officer, and an impostor may swear to it by telephone, and a fraud may thus be perpetrated. If a photograph is inadmissible in evidence without proof of the accuracy of the process by the photographer, certainly we cannot repose upon the sound of the human voice communicated over a mile of wire. Even if the officer were acquainted with the voice there would be room for deception. Moreover the form of taking an oath is thus subordinated to the laziness or convenience of the deponent in a manner quite uncongenial with good ideas of the sanctity and solemnity of oaths and the decorum of public justice. The verdict in the case of Miss Prescott, the actress, against the American News Company, has excited a good deal of astonishment. As we once before took occasion to say, we see no reason why a news-dealer who sells and circulates a malicious libel, for profit, should not be held in reasonable damages, although he may be ignorant of the fact of the libel. He must be careful at his own hazard. The citizen is entitled to protection against irresponsible newspaper libellers, and those who sell such wares must look out venditor caveat. In this particular case, if the defendant had confined itself to proof of its ignorance of the fact of the libel, it probably would have got off for nominal damages, or for some small amount. But very foolishly and unnecessarily the defendant justified by reiterating and undertaking to prove the matter charged in the libel. The result is a verdict of $12,500 damages. Perhaps the verdict may be thought excessive, but we have no great fault to find with it. It is bad enough for a man innocently to sell and circulate a newspaper charging a respectable woman with being an adulteress, and that she has been the mistress of twelve different men; but when on being called to account it essays to prove the truth of such a charge, it takes up the sword, and must succeed or perish by the sword. The verdict is all right. The talk of Miss Prescott's attorneys about bringing a new action for the libel contained in the justification in the answer in this case is of course sheer nonsense. We wish Miss Prescott would now have her newspaper defamers indicted and set at sawing stone or making shoes, and thus made to render a little useful service to the State. It is high time that the dirty mercenaries of the press should be restrained by law, and every such attempt should be encouraged and applauded. This is the true way to effect such a reform, and it is altogether more effectual and laudable than the St. Louis plan. We have more than once remarked on the resignation with which the English give up old ideas when once convinced that they are inconvenient or improvable. But the calmness with which they resign Westminster hall gives us a surprise. The London Law Times says: "The opening of the new courts by the Queen is contemplated with peculiar satisfaction by the Times, because it will compensate to some extent for the loss of the prestige conferred by the ancient traditions of Westminster hall! These are not days in which to attach much prestige to ancient legal traditions. Chief justices and barons and vice-chancellors, special pleading and general technicality, have all gone overboard within a very short period; and we are sure that what is left of the old state of things will not suffer by transplantation to courts where business will be conducted free from the offensive presence of dirty crowds of idlers which invariably at Westminster mingle with the profession, and make the time spent in court a severe test of strong constitutions. We bid farewell to prestige bought at such a price with all our heart." We suppose the old hall will be preserved for coronations and such childish spectacles, and as a sort of show-house, like the Tower. It would now be a good idea to abolish the lawyers' wigs and gowns, and keep a few suits of them on show in Westminster hall, as old suits of armor are kept on exhibition in the Tower. It also occurs to us that the surrender of this hallowed place should teach us resignation in parting with the vaulted stone ceiling of the Assembly chamber in our new capitol, and reconcile us to having a safe structure in which whatever is said, however silly or unimportant, can be heard. NOTES OF CASES. TN Cohn v. Kahn, Hamilton (Ohio) Common Pleas, "The Original Misfit Clothing Parlor," is not an infringement upon the sign, "Misfit Parlors." The court said: "The plaintiff rented a residence in this city last March, and turned the parlors into a salesroom for clothing, which, he alleges, is purchased by him from various merchant tailors throughout the country, and is known to the trade as misfits, and has given his place of business the name 'Misfit Parlors.' The defendants have recently opened a similar place of business at the corner of the next street, and given it the name 'The Original Misfit Clothing Parlor,' for the purpose, the petition alleges, of depriving the plaintiff of the good-will of his business, and inducing the public to believe that the goods furnished by them are those of the misfit parlors of which he is the proprietor. It is further alleged that they have copied his signs, notices, cards, circulars and other |