State v. Tomlin, 5 Dutch. 13; Parsons v. Hughes, 9 Paige, 591; Adams v. Sage, 28 N. Y. 103; Baker v. Spencer, 47 id. 562. Ackerman v. Ackerman. Opinion by Depue, J.

MARRIED WOMAN CONTRACT OF. If the contract of a married woman be such as a married woman is by law incapable of entering into, her warrant of attorney to enter judgment upon it is a nullity, and judgment entered thereon will be vacated. But if the contract

be one that a married woman is able to make, and on which she may be sued at law by force of the Married Woman's act, she may bind herself by a warrant of attorney for the confession of a judgment on such a contract, and the judgment entered in pursuance thereof will be good. See Salkeld, 117, 399; Shower, 91; Marder v. Lee, 3 Burr, 1469; Hartford v. Mattingly, 2 Chitty, 117; Metcalfe v. Boote, 6 D. & R. 46, and Staples v. Purser, 3 M. & S. 800; Caudell v. Shaw, 3 T. R.1392; Swing v. Woodruff, 12 Vroom, 469; First Nat. Bank v. Garlinghouse, 53 Barb. 615. Heywood v. Shreve. Opinion by Depue, J.

MARRIED WOMAN

(3)

SURETYSHIP AGENCY- SEAL. -(1) Even though the covenant of a married woman be held void for coverture, the covenant of her surety is enforceable. Kimball v. Newell, 7 Hill1, 16; Remsen v. Graves, 41 N. Y. 471. (2) Where it is essential to the validity of a writing that it be executed under seal, authority to an agent to execute it must be likewise under seal. But where a seal is not vital to the contract, and the agent has power to execute it without seal, it operates as a simple contract, although executed under seal. Long v. Hartwell, 5 Vroom, 116. A written lease purporting to be under seal, but by reason of want of authority in the agent executing it was in effect an agreement not under seal. On it the surety had written an agreement under seal that he would pay the rent in default of payment by the lessee. This suit against the surety for the rent was brought after the lapse of more than six years from the due-day of the rent. Held, that although the principal debtor might have pleaded in bar actio non accrevit infra sex annos, on his contract not under seal, the action against the surety on his contract under seal will not be barred until the lapse of sixteen years. The surety may have the benefit of any defense which the principal debtor may set up, showing that the contract never was legal or that it has been annulled. To that extent the rule prevails that the extinction of the liability of the principal debtor discharges the liability of the surety; the accessory obligation falls with the principal. As a general rule the liability of principal and surety is co-extensive. There are exceptions, as in case of coverture and infancy, in which the contract cannot be enforced against the principal. But when the principal is discharged from his obligation by payment, accord and satisfaction or release, recourse cannot be had to the surety. In all these instances in which both principal and surety are exonerated, the defense either shows in fact, or in contemplation of law implies an actual satisfaction of the obligation which the former has assumed. In this case the debt is not discharged or satisfied by the lapse of the limitation time; the remedy only to enforce it against the principal debtor is taken away. In Spears v. Hartly, 3 Esp. 81, Lord Eldon said that the debt is not discharged by the operation of the statute limitations; it was the remedy only, and that the creditor could hold goods on which he had obtained a lien for his claim, although the statute had run against it. To the same effect are Morse v. Williams, 3 Camp. 418, and Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413. See also Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. 535; Balch v. Onion, 4 Cush. 559; Wiswell v. Baxter, 20 Wis. 680; Borst v. Corey, 15 N. Y. 505; Reed v. Shepley, 6 Vt. 602; Gardiner v. Nutting, 5 Me. 140; Dean v. Monroe,

32 Ga. 28; Guild v. Butler, 122 Mass. 498; Ellis v. Wilmot, L. R., 10 Exch. 10. Wagoner v. Watts. Opinion by Van Syckel, J.

CRIMINAL LAW.

CONFESSION-SILENCE WHERE STATEMENTS CRIMINATORY MADE IN PRESENCE.- At a trial for murder the court charged thus: "If you are satisfied by the evidence that Horine, in defendant's presence and hearing, did make statements concerning the transactions which tended to criminate him, and that defendant made no denial or explanation of the statements, you should consider them in determining the circumstances of the transaction, giving them such weight and importance as you think them fairly entitled to." Certain statements to which this instruction was applicable were made after the arrest of defendant and while he was in the custody of the officers. Held, that the instruction was error. Under the circumstances his silence and failure to deny statements against him cannot be interpreted as an admission of their truth. Commonwealth v. Kinney, 12 Metc. 235; Commonwealth v. Walker, 13 Allen, 570; Commonwealth v. McDermott, 123 Mass. 440. Iowa Sup. Ct., March 24, 1882. State of Iowa v. Weaver. Opinion by Beck, J.

EVIDENCE -OF REPUTATION OF BAWDY HOUSEIDENTITY OF KEEPER - ACTS OF DEFENDANT - HOUSE NEED NOT BE KEPT FOR PROFIT.—(1) Upon a trial on indictment for keeping a house of ill-fame, resorted to for purposes of prostitution, evidence of the general reputation of the house is competent. "The term house of ill-fame" is no doubt a mere synonym for 'bawdy house," having no reference to the fame of the place, but denoting the fact. It may not be necessary to prove the repute of the house. Yet in matters of evidence, proof of the fact may be aided by the fame. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, 1088; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, 1451; O'Brien v. People, 28 Mich. 213; State v. Brunell, 29 Wis. 435; State v. McDowell, Dudley (S. C), 346; Morris v. State, 38 Tex. 603. There is some conflict of authority as to the competency of such evidence, and its admission might seem in violation of the rule excluding hearsay evidence. The weight of authority however seems to be in favor of its competency. The difficulty in obtaining direct evidence in such cases has perhaps rendered its admission a necessity; and its receipt is not likely to operate unjustly, for it very rarely, if indeed ever, occurs that a place acquires the general reputation of being a bawdy house without being one in fact. The court does not hold however that evidence of general reputation alone would be sufficient to establish the character of the place. (2) A lease of the alleged bawdy house from the owner of the property to defendant, and executed by both parties. This, taken in connection with the other facts also shown in evidence that defendant was personally present and living in the house, and exercising acts of control over it and its imates, held, competent evidence tending to show that she was the keeper of the house. (3) Evidence of the personal lewd and indecent acts of defendant herself in the house, in presence of inmates and visitors, held, comptent as tending to show her knowledge of the character of the house, and her assent to its use as a house of ill-fame. State v. Wells, 46 Iowa, 662; Mahalovitch v. State, 54 Ga. 217. (4) To constitute the crime of keeping a house of ill-fame, resorted to for purposes of prostitution, the illicit intercourse of the sexes therein need not be for purposes of gain or hire. The offense consists in the public nuisance, and the form of the corrupt mo

tive is not material. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, 1086; 2 Bish. Crim. Proc. 108, 274; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, 1457; State v. Bailey, 21 N. H. 343; State v. Nixon, 18 Vt. 70; State v. Homer, 40 Me. 438; Commonwealth v. Ashley, 2 Gray, 356; Commonwealth v. Ward, 97 Mass. 225. Minnesota Sup. Ct., June 7, 1882. State of Minnesota v. Smith. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

INTENT-WHEN IT NEED AND WHEN IT NEED NOT BE PROVED.- Where an act forbidden by law is intentionally done, the intent to do the act is the criminal intent which imparts to it the character of an offense, and hence on trial for an affray, a party cannot be heard to say that he did not intend to bring about a breach of the peace. But where the act becomes criminal only by reason of the intent, then, unless the intent is proved, the offense is not proved. State v. Grady, 83 N. C. 643; State v. Perry, 5 Jones, 9. In Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N.Y. 568, under a statute which says that the question of fraudulent intent in making an assignment or transfer "shall be a question of fact and not of law," the assignor was allowed to say upon his examination that it was not his purpose in making the conveyance to delay or defraud his creditors; and this was again ruled in Griffin v. Marquardt, 21 N. Y. 121, and Forbes v. Waller, 25 N. Y. 430. In Miller v. People, 5 Barb. 203, where the defendant was charged with an indecent exposure of his person, and the proof was that he was seen undressed in the back yard of his own premises, he was allowed to show that the exposure was not intentional, and the rule is thus declared by the court: “It is a general rule of evidence that a man shall be taken to intend that which he does or which is the immediate and natural consequence of the act. But when an act in itself indifferent becomes criminal, if it be done with a particular intent, then the intent must be alleged and proved." In Willard v. Herkimer County, 44 N. Y. 22, a case growing out of a statute which subjected to the penalty of fifty dollars any person who removed a pauper from one county to another without legal authority, and there left him, when the removal was made with intent to charge the county to which the pauper was removed with his support, the court while adhering to previous decisions on the maxim stare decisis, nevertheless say: "Were we without any direct authority in this court adjudging the admissibility of such an inquiry (of intent) to be put to the accused party, I should be very unwilling now to concede it. Intent is to be judged of usually by the light of surrounding facts and circumstances. These afford a satisfactory test which all can know and consider as well as the witness." North Carolina Sup. Ct., February term, 1882. State of North Carolina v. King. Opinion by Smith, C. J. (84 N. C. 603.)

ENTICE TWO

CHARGING ATTEMPTS TO

PLEADING -DUPLICITY CHILDREN.— An information charging that defendant attempted to take and entice away two children, held, not bad as charging two offenses, i. e., taking away two children. The commission of the offense does not consist in the number, whether one or more, but in the act and intent constituting an attempt. It was the attempt for which the defendant was prosecuted, not the consummation. The attempt was but a single fact, though it may have embraced several steps and may have included in its object more than one person. A count in an indictment, charging an endeavor or conspiracy to procure the commission of two offenses, is not bad for duplicity, because the endeavor is the offense charged." Whart. Cr. Pl., § 253; Rex v. Byderdyke, 1 M. & Rob. 179. A person may, by a single act, endeavor to accomplish two or more criminal results. "In such a case," says Mr. Bishop," there can be no doubt that if the indict

ment sets forth the act, and the intent to commit the two or more offenses, according to the fact, it will not be open to the objection of duplicity. There is but one attempt, though the object aimed at is multifarious. Bishop's Crim. Pro. 570; King v. Fuller, 1 Bos. & Pull. 180. California Sup. Ct., January 24, 1882. People of California v. Miller. Opinion by the court.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

MARITIME LAW-GENERAL AVERAGE.- Where a ship caught fire in harbor while discharging her cargo, and in order to extinguish the fire, water was poured down the hold on the part of the cargo that remained on board, held (affirming the judgment of Pollock B.), that the shipowners were liable to a claim for general average contribution by the owner of the cargo in respect of damage to the cargo caused by the water. Ct. of Appeal, March 28, 1882. Whitecross Wire & Iron Co v. Savill Opinions by Lord Coleridge, C. J. and Brett, L. J.

MARITIME LAW · BOTTOMRY CONTRACT AND CARGO SUBJECT TO SHIP'S FLAG.-A contract of bottomry, covering the cargo as well as the ship, is governed by the law of the flag, i. e., by the law of the country to which the ship on which the bond is given belongs. When cargo is shipped on board a foreign vessel it becomes subject to the law of the flag of the ship in which it is shipped in incidents arising out of the contract of shipment, and with regard to which the contract is silent. "He who ships goods on board a foreign ship puts them on board to be dealt with by the law of the country of the ship, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." The Hamburg (Br. & Lush. 253) explained. Ct. of Appeal, May 26, 1882. The Gætano and Maria. Opinions by Brett and Cotton, L. JJ. (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 835.)

WILL EXECUTION OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SIGNATURE.-There is not a sufficient acknowledgment within the Wills Act 1837, of signature of a will by a testator, unless the witnesses see, or might have seen, the testator's signature on the document, although there may be evidence sufficient to satisfy the court that the signature was there when the testator purported to acknowledge it. Beckett v. Howe, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S.400; L. Rep. 2 Prob. & Div. 1 not followed. Where a testatrix did not sign the document afterward propounded as her will in the presence of the witnesses, but having signed it called the witnesses in, and purported to acknowledge her signature, without giving them an opportunity of seeing the signature, held, that the acknowledgment was not sufficient, and that the execution was defective. Ct. of Appeal, Feb Blake v. Blake. Opinions by Jessel, M. R. 14, 1882. and Brett, L. J. (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 641.)

LIBEL-OF FRIENDLY SOCIETY - INJUNCTION.- An injunction will be granted upon an interlocutory application to restrain the publication of matter tending to injure a friendly society. Semble, the same rule will apply to the case of a libel upon a joint-stock company. An honorary member of a friendly society issued a circular amongst the clergymen of the parishes in which the society had district lodges, stating in the circular matters which were untrue at the time of framing and issuing the circular, and were calculated to injure the business interests of the society. Upon motion in an action by the trustees of the society against the honorary member, held, that an injunction must be granted restraining the issue of the circular until the trial of the action. Ch. Div., July 12, 1882. Hill v. Hart-Davis. Opinion by Kay, J. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S. 82.)

PRACTICE GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL.-The ordinary reasoning according to which the verdict of a jury on a question of fact ought not to be disturbed, unless the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict be strong and clear, does not apply to cases in which the verdict depends upon a question of science which is not fully solved, but is still within the region of bona fide controversy. The importance of the verdict to others besides the parties to the litigation, and also the novelty of the question at issue, are elements to be taken into consideration in deciding whether a new trial should be granted or not. House of Lords, May 22d, 1882. Managers of Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill. Opinions by Lord Ch. Selborne and Lords O'Hagan and Watson. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S., 29.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

INDORSEMENT OF WARRANT OF ARREST.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Concerning the requisites of a warrant of arrest the second sentence of section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, among other matter as follows: It must also state an offense in respect to which the magistrate has authority to issue the warrant."

Prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, § 3, title 2, chap. 2, part 4 of the Revised Statutes, provided as follows: "If it shall appear from such examination that," etc., "the magistrate shall issue a proper warraut, under his hand, with or without seal, reciting the accusation, and commanding, etc."

Recently, acting as a justice of the peace for the county of Otsego, I issued a warrant of arrest upon a charge of petit larceny, and in designating the offense in the warrant I used only the words "petit larceny," without stating the time or place of the commission of the alleged crime, or the kind or value of the property alleged to have been stolen.

The officer holding the warrant presented it to a police justice in the city of New York for indorsement for execution there; but indorsement was refused upon the ground that the statement of the offense in the warrant was insufficient.

I have but to ask whether, in your opinion, the designation of the offense was in compliance with the requirements of section 152, supra.

OTSEGO, N. Y., Oct. 16, 1882.

T. BLAKELY.

nations, and considered war to be a contest between all the individuals of the two nations.

Puffendorf does not vary materially from Grotius, although he considers forays in an enemy's country to be unlawful without authorization from the sovereign.

Vattel, who wrote a century later than Grotius agrees with him in theory, that the individuals of hostile nations are at war with each other, but he states that it has become customary only for troops commissioned by the State to participate, except in certain special cases.

The author considers that these views arose from a false idea of the State, which should be considered as existing independently of the individuals who compose the nation; hence, following Holtzendorf, Bluntschli and Mr. David Dudley Field, he deems that the armies of belligerent States are actively and passively hostile, while individuals are only passively hostile. The difference between the individual and the soldier is that the latter is expressly anthorized by the State. Practically however the most important question is, how is such authorization to be proved? During the Franco-Prussian war, the Germans demanded that every franc-tireur must prove that he was regularly enlisted by the government; but this proof is naturally often difficult to preserve in war time. Hence the author considers that a uniform, visible at a sufficient distance and not liable to be easily changed, should be presumed to be evidence of such authorization.

The author then gives a sketch of the Conference at Brussels in 1874 and of the proposition discussed at that meeting, and appears to attach great weight to them, although they were not formally adapted by the nations represented.

We doubt however whether at present theoretical rules would guide belligerents at least in this hemisphere.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. GRENADER'S RIGHT TO BE CONSIDERED A SOLDIER IN WAR.

Sur les conditions nécessaires, selon le droit des gens, pour avoir en guerre le droit d'être considéré et traité comme soldat, par B. Kr. Grenader. Paris, Libraire H. Maresq, âiné, 20 Rue Soufflot, 1882.

MR. B. KR. GRENADER, in his French treatise,

translated from the Swedish, on "The Right to be Considered a Soldier in War," gives first a brief notice of the opinions entertained in former times by the fathers of international law. After the Christian international comity of the Middle Ages had been ended by the dissensions of Christendom, which followed the Renaissance, Grotius was the first writer who, moved by the horrors of the Thirty-years War, endeavored to re-establish international observances more consonant with the natural sympathies of European nations. He however failed to recognize any distinction between citizens and soldiers of belligerent

THE

NOTES.

HE American Law Register for October contains a leading article on Right to counsel in a criminal case, by Hampton L. Carson. Also the following cases in full: Goddard v. O'Brien (Q. B. Div.), on accord and satisfaction-accepting check for less than debt, with note by Edmund H. Bennett; Howard v. Park (New York Supreme Court), on trade-markassignment of firm name to successor, with note by Hugh Weightman; Hesketh v. Murphy (New Jersey Chancery), on validity of trust for charity, with note by John H. Stewart; Jones v. Jones (Pennsylvania), on insanity avoiding deed, with note by Marshall D. Ewell. The Kentucky Law Journal for October, 1882, contains an interesting editorial on Growth of the Legal Press, and the following contributions: What is a Trade-mark? by Temple Bodley; Admission to the Bar, by J. S. Golladay; The Bench, by Isaac Caldwell.

The Albany Law Journal.

A

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 4, 1882.

CURRENT TOPICS.

CONSTITUTIONAL amendment of the judiciary article is pending to be voted on at our State election next week. The suggested amendment provides for one additional justice of the Supreme Court in the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth judicial districts respectively, and for two in the First, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth judicial districts respectively. It is reported that through inadvertence the last Legislature neglected to provide for printing ballots on this question, and it is feared that the amendment may fail in consequence. This amendment is of great importance to the public and to our profession. There is no doubt that our judicial business is sadly in arrear. There is no court except the Court of Appeals that does or can keep up with its business. The latter court is only enabled to do so by the most laborious, unremitting, and detrimental exertion. The trial courts and the General Terms of the Supreme Court are greatly overweighted and overworked. It is true that there are several justices at the present time considerably disabled by long-continued sickness, but their disability has been caused by overwork, and the result would not be very materially different if the judges were all in health. There is more work than our judges can do at all, not to say do well. The consequence is delay, vexation and loss to suitors, and frequently a less careful and considerate examination of cases than litigants have a right to expect. It is high time that this necessity should be recognized and provided for. There is in some quarters a vague sort of notion that the judges have fat places and an easy time, but nothing could be more erroThere is no class of men in the country more assiduous, conscientious and intelligent, and at the same time more cruelly overloaded. Health, strength and spirit give out in the hopeless and cheerless Sisyphean task. It is folly to contrast our State with England without a correct understanding of the facts. There are as many judicial officers in England as in this country - probably more. For proof of this, see 22 Alb. Law Jour. 298. And as we have more than once affirmed, we now reiterate, the mass of litigation in this State is larger than in England. Whether this is the fault of our system or the peculiarity of our people, we need not inquire. We do not think our system wrong, nor do we think our people are to be blamed for settling their differences in court rather than by violence. We simply know that our judicial force is inadequate to the demand, and that it must be increased or the public interests must suffer, and with them the professional reputation and usefulness must receive detriment. It is to be hoped that the profession will see that this amendment is voted on, and that the means of voting on it are furnished in convenient form.

neous.

VOL. 26-No. 19.

The Court of Appeals have recently without much ceremony reversed the holding of the New York city Circuit and General Term that a wife may maintain an action against her husband for assault and battery. See 25 Alb. Law Jour. 302. "Without much ceremony means that there was no opinion to express the prevailing view. Judge Danforth dissented and wrote a long and exhaustive opinion, for which, if the women could see it, they would doubtless call him blessed. If we believed in publishing dissenting opinions at all, anywhere, under any circumstances, we should certainly publish this, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Earl in the Elevated Railway case.

When Mr. Justice Field wrote his celebrated opinion vindicating the sacredness of the Chinaman's queue, he was doubtless looked upon by the wanderers from the Celestial empire now sojourning in the midst of us as a second Confucius come to judgment. Perhaps the almond-eyed race will abate a jot of their admiration when they read his opinion in a recent case arising under the California act restricting the importation of Chinese laborers. In this case he remarked that the reason for this legislation was that the Chinese by their "dissimilarity of manners, habits, religion and physical characteristics, cannot assimilate with our people, but must forever remain a distinct race, creating by their presence enmities and conflicts, disturbing to the peace and injurious to the interests of the country." We do not know that we should go so far as the Western Jurist, which says of this utterance: "Evidently the judicial ermine is no assurance of the absence of the common prejudices of the race, or of the weakness that bends to the beck and call of public clamor to secure the popular favor." But we must remark the logical defect of the learned justice's dictum. It is not the "dissimilarity of manners, habits, religion and physical characteristics," but it is the "distinctness of race" alone that raises antipathy. The Chinese may cut off their queues and put on trousers, as they do, but this only excites the greater ridicule and hatred. The Jews have no marked dissimilarity from the rest of the community except their religion, and even for that the greater part of the Christians care very little, but the race feeling is strong against them in many places. The more closely the negro imitates the white man the more he is laughed at and scorned. The truth is that we ourselves are guilty of the same silly bigotry of race for which we ridicule the Chinese. They are to us the same "outside barbarians" that we are to them. We ought either to lay aside this notion, or else to stop canting about our country as the asylum for the despised and down-trodden of all nations, and all the other twaddle of our fourth of July orators. acknowledge that the race-prejudice is a natural one, but let us own up to it frankly, and not assume virtues that do not belong to us. Just so long as we can keep these objectionable races servient and useful, just so long we can endure them; but the

We

moment a "nigger" or a Chinaman becomes a competitor in labor, trade or politics, that moment forsooth he must be "taught his place." The negroes are good enough to till our rice and cotton plantations, the Chinese to do up our linen, and the Irish to build our railroads, but they must not own land, nor carry on business, nor acquire political power, unless we can make money or get office by their means. This is the popular prejudice, unjust and foolish, we believe, but inherent in race-distinctions, and not the offspring of differences of "manners, habits, religion or physical characteristics."

In connection with this subject we must express our gratification that the students of Columbia Law School have "voted almost unanimously not to ask the faculty to expel the colored student over whose admission trouble has arisen." This is a resolution that evinces the common sense and the desire of fair play which should characterize the legal profession. It would be ludicrous to see two hundred white young men of liberal education thrown into a paroxysm of terror and jealousy by the admission among them of one black young man. The jealousy of the colored cadets at West Point has a show of reason in comparison with this, because there the black man might be put in temporary authority over the white, and their association is necessarily intimate. But in a college there can be no such objections, and the professional world is wide enough, and we hope magnanimous enough, to tolerate colored men and white women.

Dr. Beard is rapidly demolishing his own reputation for good sense by his extravagant conduct in respect to the Guiteau case. He accuses the attorney-general of lying. He speaks of Guiteau's "terribly insane death." He says that nine hundred and ninety-nine in a thousand believe Guiteau insane. We suspect that the community will prefer to believe that Dr. Beard is mad with excess of zeal rather than that the attorney-general is a liar. Guiteau's death was no more insane than that of scores of other murderers. His conduct on the scaffold simply exhibited the same hysterical excitement which has frequently characterized the execution of other criminals, and was no more insane than the utterances and demeanor of the ordinary revival-exhorter and the average wicked man "convicted of sin” at camp-meeting. Doubtless the majority of people, expert and non-expert, believe Guiteau to have been insane, but the same majority believe him to have been legally accountable. It is well for the safety of the community to hang all such lunatics, and to notify them beforehand that they will be hanged if they do not refrain from murder. Dr. Beard and those who sympathize with him are doing much to render human life unsafe by promulgating these foolish doctrines.

NOTES OF CASES.

IN Reif v. Paige, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Octo

ber 10, 1882, 13 N. W. Rep. 473, A. made an offer, "I will give $5,000 to any person who will bring the body of my wife from that building, dead or alive," and B., on the faith of the offer, and for the purpose of earning the reward, rescued the body of A.'s wife from the burning building in which it then was. B. was a member of the paid fire department, but the act in question was at the imminent danger of his own life. Held, (1) that B. was not bound to give notice of acceptance of the offer as a condition precedent to recovery; (2) that he was not bound to perform the service as a fireman, and therefore might recover the reward. The court said: "The offer of a reward by the defendant for rescuing the body of his wife, and the rescue of her remains by the plaintiff, with knowledge of such offer, and with a view to obtaining the reward offered, constituted a contract between the parties, which was fully and completely executed by the plaintiff. The offer, which the proofs tend to show the defendent made, was, in substance, 'I will give $5,000 to any person who will bring the body of my wife out of that building, dead or alive.' There were no restrictions or limitations to the offer, and no additional requirement upon the claimant of the offered bounty. Hence, when the plaintiff, with a view of obtaining the offered reward, rescued the body of Mrs. Paige, he had done all that the offer required him to do, and if he has any cause of action it was then complete. There may be a conflict of authority on this question, but it seems to us that the better reasons are with the cases cited on behalf of the plaintiff, holding that in such case the giving of the notice is not a prerequisite to maintaining an action for the reward. The soldiers' bounty cases in this court, cited in opposition to this view, are not in point, because in those cases it was absolutely necessary that the towns or municipalities should know when their quotas were full. Hence the necessity that each person who enlisted for the bounty should promptly notify the proper authorities of the town or city to which he was credited of the fact of his enlistment. No such reason exists here for requiring notice. There is no more hardship in this rule than in the rule which allows the indorser and holder of an overdue negotiable promissory note to sue the maker thereon without giving him an opportunity to pay it without suit. The maker may have been ready and anxious to pay it at the time it became due, had he known where it was. Yet the holder may sue it at his leisure, and compel the maker to pay costs, and in general, the accrued interest as well. That hardship is possible because the contract evidenced by the note is complete, and nothing remains to be done by the holder after the note becomes due to give him a right of action upon it. On precisely the same principles we think in this case that after the plaintiff had performed the only condition stipu lated for in the alleged offer, his right of action was