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REMOVAL OF CAUSE - JUDICIARY ACT PREJUDICE AND LOCAL INFLUENCE ACT OF 1867.-The eleventh and twelfth sections of the judiciary act are to be read independently, and a removal may be had although the suit could not originally have been begun in the Federal court; but no suit can be removed which might not, so far as the constitutional provisions are concerned, have been begun in the Federal courts. It seems that the act of 1867 with regard to removals is still in force, and it is not supplanted by the second section of the act of March 3, 1875. The restriction in

the eleventh section of the judiciary act does not apply

to cases transferred under the act of 1867, and that act being designed to amend section 12 of the judiciary act, must be treated as independent of a subsequent act passed to supply the place of section 11. The conditions of the power of removal under the act of 1867 are a diverse citizenship, a cause of action exceeding $500, an affidavit of prejudice or local influence, and a proper bond; and the restriction in the act of March 3, 1875, as to the assignee of a chose in action, does not apply. Authorities referred to: Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484; Bushell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387; Ayres v. Western R. Co., 45 N. Y. 260; Winans v. McKean R. Co., 6 Batchf. 215; City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; Johnson v. Monell, 1 Woolw. 390; Beede v. Cheeney, 5 Fed. Rep. 388; Kaeiser v. Railroad Co., 6 id. 1. See also Sands v. Smith, Dill. 290; Barklay v. Levee Com'rs, 1 Woods, 254. U. S. Circ. Ct., Michigan, January 16, 1882. Hobby v. Allison. Opinion by Brown, D. J.

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CHINESE EMIGRATION LAW OF 1882- CHINESE MERCHANT - CERTIFICATE.— Chinese merchants who resided, on the passage of the act of Congress of May 6, 1882, in other countries than China, on arriving on a vessel in a port of the United States are not required by said act to produce certificates of the Chinese government establishing their character as merchants as a condition of their being allowed to land. Their character as such merchants

can be established by parol evidence. The certificate mentioned in section 6 of that act is evidently de

signed to facilitate proof by Chinese, other than laborers, coming from China and desiring to enter the United States, that they were not of the prohibited class. The particulars which the certificate must contain show that it was to be given by the Chinese government to those then residing there, as their place of residence in China is to be stated. The act of May 6, 1882, was intended to carry out the provisions of the supplementary treaty of November, 1880, modifying the treaty of 1868 between China and the United States, and its purpose must be held to be what the treaty authorized,- to put a restriction upon the emigration of laborers, including those skilled in any art or trade,- and not to interfere with the commercial relations between China and this country, by excluding Chinese merchants, or putting unnecessary and embarrassing restrictions upon their coming to this country. All laws are to be so construed as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion, and general terms are to be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. Whether a Chinese merchant, teacher, etc., arriving from China and failing to produce the certificate required by section 6, could by satisfactory evidence of his real character overcome the presump. tion that he is a laborer raised by the absence of the certificate, and establish the right secured by the treaty to go and come of his own free will and accord, it is not necessary to decide in this case. U. S. Circ. Ct., California, Sept. 5, 1882. Re Low Yam Chow. Opinions by Field, J., and Hoffman, D. J.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CONFLICT OF LAW STATUTE OF STATE AS TO PRACTICE BINDING ON FEDERAL COURTS — EJECTMENT NEW TRIAL.-Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Colorado grants as of right, without cause shown, one new trial to each party, as it may in turn have a verdict or judgment rendered against it in an action of ejectment. The law of the State in that

respect is binding on the Circuit Court of the United States in cases tried in that State. The court say: "A title to real estate has under the traditions of the common law been held, in all the States where that law prevailed, to be too important, we might almost say too sacred, to be concluded forever by the result of those States which, by abolishing the fictions of the one action between the contesting parties. Hence, action at the common law, and substituting a direct suit between the parties actually claiming under conflicting titles, which according to the nature of this new proceeding would end in a judgment concluding both parties, have found it necessary to provide for new trials to such extent as each State Legislature has thought sound policy to require. These provisions for new trials in actions of ejectment are not the same in all the States, but it is believed that almost all of them which have abolished the common law action have made provision for one or more new trials as a matter of right. We are of opinion that when an action of ejectment is tried in a Circuit Court of the United States according to the statutory mode of proceeding, that court is governed by the provisions concerning new trials as it is by the other provisions of the State statute. There is no reason why the Federal court should disregard one of the rules by which the State Legislature has guarded the transfer of the possession and title to real estate within its jurisdiction. See Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 99." Judgment of U. S. Circ. Ct., Colorado, reversed. Equator Mining & Smelting Co. v. Hall. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Nov. 13, 1882.]

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MUNICIPAL BONDS -RECITALS— WHAT NOT PLIED IN.- Bonds issued in the name of an independent school district, in the State of Iowa, contained these recitals: This bond is issued by the board of school directors by authority of an election of the voters of said school district held on the thirty-first day of July, 1869, in conformity with the provisions of chapter 98 of acts 12th general assembly of the State of Iowa." Held, that these recitals implied as well that the bonds were issued by authority of the election, as that the election was held in conformity with the statute, but did not necessarily or clearly import a compliance with those provisions of the statute which, following substantially the words of the State Constitution, prohibited independent school districts from incurring indebtedness to an amount in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of its taxable property, to be ascertained by the last State and county tax lists previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. Consequently the district, in a suit on the bonds, is not estopped by the recitals from showing that the bonds were not enforceable obligations, by reason of the fact that the indebtedness, of which they were evidence, exceeded the amount limited by the Constitution and laws of the State. Cases upon the subject referred to: Town of Colomo v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484; Town of Venice v. Murdock, id. 494; Converse v. City of Fort Scott, id. 504; Marcy v. Township of Oswego, id. 638; Com'rs v. Bolls, 94 id. 104; Com'rs v. Jannay, id. 204; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 id. 278. Judgment of U. S. Circ. Ct., Iowa, reversed. Independent

School District of Steamboat Rock v. Stone. Opinion by Harlan, J.

[Decided Nov. 6, 1882.]

PARTIES-JOINT PARTIES TO COVENANT.-In an action upon a covenant-contained in an agreement between the covenantor and "S. and such other parties as he may associate with him under the name of S. & Company," signed and sealed by the covenantor, and signed "S. & Co." by the hand of S., acting in behalf and by authority of the partnershipto pay to "the said S. & Company, parties of the second part," for work to be done by them, all those who are partners at the time of the signing of the agreement may join. In an action upon a covenant made with two or more persons, all the covenantees must join, although only one of them seals the agreement. Petrie v.Bury, 5 D.& R. 152; S. C., 3 B. & C. 353; Philadelphia, Wilm. & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307. It is not necessary that all of them should be named in the coutract; it is sufficient that they are so described therein that they can be identified. Shep. Touchst. 236; Gresty v. Gibson, L. R., 1 Ex. 112; Reeves v. Watts, L. R.. 1 Q. B. 412; S. C., 7 B. & S. 523; M'Laren v. Baxter, L. R., 2 C. P. 559. And upon a covenant with a partnership by its partnership name only, all who are partners at the time of its execution may sue. Hoffman v. Porter, 2 Brock. 156; Brown v. Bostian, 6 Jones (N. C.) 1; 1 Lindley Partnership (4th ed.) 476. Judgment of U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. North Carolina, reversed. Seymour v. Western Railroad Co. Opinion by Gray, J.

[Decided Nov. 13, 1882.].

PATENT METALLIC COTTON BALE TIES. The plaintiffs were the owners of patents for improvements in metallic cotton bale ties, each tie consisting of a buckle and a band. They granted no licenses to make the ties, but themselves made them and supplied the market. They stamped in the metal of the buckle the words, "Licensed to use once only." The defendants bought as scrap-iron the buckles and bands at the cotton mills, after the bands had been severed to release the bale, and rolled and straightened the pieces of the bands, and riveted together their ends, and cut them into proper lengths for ties, and sold them, with the buckles to be used as ties, nothing being done to the buckles. Held, that the defendants had infringed the patents. It was not decided that they were liable as infringers merely because they had sold the buckle considered apart from the band or from the entire structure as a tie. The case Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109, distinguished. The principle of that case was: that temporary parts wearing out in a machine might be replaced to preserve the machine, in accordance with the intention of the vendor, without amounting to a reconstruction of the machine. See Saxe v. Hammond, 1 Holmes, 456; Bowker v. Dows, Bann. & Ard. 518. Decree of U. S. Circ. Ct., Rhode Island, reversed. American Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons. Opinion by Blatchford, J.

[Decided Nov. 6, 1882.]

FINANCIAL LAW.

CONFLICT OF LAW-LOAN BY A CITIZEN OF ONE STATE TO CITIZEN OF ANOTHER.-A citizen of one State may loan money to a citizen of another State, and contract for the rate of interest allowed by the laws of the latter State, although the legal rate of interest allowed is greater in such State than in the State where the contract is made, and in which it is to be performed. Where it appears upon the face of the contract that such was the intention of the parties, it

constitutes an exception to the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made must govern in expounding and enforcing it. Where a citizen of New York loaned money to a citizen of Nebraska, secured by bond and mortgage on land in Nebraska, the money being furnished in New York and the mortgage being executed in Nebraska, and the statute of New York limiting the right to interest on loans at 6 per cent per annum, and being highly penal, while the statute of Nebraska allowed the rate of 10 per cent per annum, held, that the contract reserving 10 per cent interest, the legal rate in Nebraska, was not usurious, notwithstanding that it was made in New York and was to be performed in that State. See Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194; Newman v. Kershaw, 10 Wis. 333; Vliet v. Camp, 13 id. 221; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Barr. 1077. U. S. Circ. Ct., Nebraska, January, 1881. Kellogg v. Miller. Opinion by McCrary, C. J. (13 Fed. Rep. 198.)

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TRANSFER BY ASSIGN

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT MENT. Where the holder of a negotiable instrument payable to his order instead of indorsing it transfers title to it by a separate instrument which purports to "assign, sell, transfer and set over" the instrument, the assignee does not take the note freed from the equities, but it is subject to the same defenses that existed against it in the hands of the assignor. The note was transferable by indorsement and was not transferred in that way but by assignment. The assignee obtained no title to enable him to sue except in the name of the payee. Redmond v. Stansbury, 24 Mich. 445; Robinson v. Wilkinson, 38 id. 299; Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 id. 171. And hence no title sufficient to preclude the maker from setting up equities coeval with the inception of the paper. Gibson v. Miller, 29 Mich. 355; Franklin Bank v. Raymond, 3 Wend. 69; Hedges v. Sealey, 9 Barb. 214; Muller v. Ponder, 55 N. Y. 325; Trust Co. v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 68; Moore v. Miller, 6 Or. 254; 25 Am. R. 518; Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468; Clark v. Whitaker, 50 N. H. 474; 9 Am. R. 286; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 18; Whistler v. Forster, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248. Michigan Sup. Ct., April 5, 1882. Spinning v. Sullivan. Opinion by Graves, C. J.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-AMOUNT IN BODY LEFT BLANK.-The body of a promissory note read thus: "Fifteen months after date I promise to pay to the order of Richard Thomas - dollars." The margin of the note contained this $200." Held, that the figures were not sufficient to authorize the reformation of the instrument so as read as a note for two hundred dollars. The figures in the margin of the note are no part of the instrument; they constitute a mere memorandum. They cannot supply the blank left for insertion of the amount the maker agreed to pay. Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398. It follows that there can be no recovery upon the note, for it is not a promise to pay any sum. Iowa Sup. Ct., October 5, 1882. Hollen v. Davis. Opinion by Beck, J.

USURY

ESTOPPEL-RELEASE AT TIME OF LOAN, NOT. A sealed release or receipt, "in full settlement and payment for all extra or unlawful interest," executed at the time the money was loaned, and a part of the transaction of borrowing, is not a bar to a recovery of the usury. If such a device as this is allowed to avail, resort would be had to it in all cases, and the statute thereby practically repealed. This is a very different case from releasing usury after a man's embarrassments have passed, and he has ceased to be a peculiar subject for the protection of the statute. Bosler v. Rheem, 72 Penn. St. 54. Vermont Sup. Ct., January Term, 1882. Herrick v. Dean. Opinion by Rowell, J. (54 Vt. 568.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

SOME DEFECTS AND INCONGRUITIES Of the Code OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Having during the short time that the Code of Criminal Procedure has been in operation discovered various defects, which in my judgment, ought to be remedied by the next Legislature, I beg leave to call attention to some of them.

Section 211 is inconsistent with section 56 as amended. The defendant cannot "require to be tried by a jury after indictment," nor can he "be held to answer to a court having authority to inquire by the intervention of a grand jury" in cases provided for by section 56. How can the prisoner elect where the court of special sessions has exclusive jurisdiction in the first` instance?

The provision of section 189, requiring the magistrate to send a peace officer to take a message to counsel named by defendant, and requiring the officer "without fee" to perform that duty is impracticable, and an injustice to the peace officer, whose fee for the arrest and detention in many cases would not cover the actual expense of going for counsel. The law as it has heretofore existed is the much better rule, and it is

covered by the first clause of that section. By section

190 no distinction is made between cases of which a
court of special sessions has exclusive jurisdiction in
the first instance, and cases of which such court has no
jurisdiction as to an examination, and the same may
be said as to sections 194, 209, 211. By sections 699, 700,
701 and 702, no preliminary examination of the case
seems to be contemplated in cases triable before a
court of special sessions, but section 732 again raises the
doubt by providing, "when the defendant, upon being
brought before the magistrate, requests a trial by a
court of special sessions, the preliminary examination
of the case is dispensed with." The defendant's re
quests have but little to do with the jurisdiction of that
court since the amendment of section 56.
The ques-

tion has arisen, and is likely to arise, whether as the
law now stands the defendant in a case of which a court
of special sessions has exclusive jurisdiction in the first
instance (whether he requests or not) may require that
an examination be had before proceeding to trial, and
also whether in case the defendant does not waive the
examination, he must not be examined and held to trial
in order to legally put him on his trial. It would seem
that in minor offenses the ex parte inquiry after an in-
formation laid, made by the magistrate, and his issuing
a warrant thereon, might well take the place of the
indictment in courts of record.

special sessions in Essex jurisdiction, or must the defendant be prosecuted by indictment, if prosecuted at all in Essex? The same jurisdictional questions arise under the other sections referred to in part 4. See section 4, subdivision 4. If courts of special sessions have jurisdiction in such cases it is exclusive in the first instance, and the defendant would be discharged if indicted; if no jurisdiction then in one of the cases mentioned in section 56, would not the people be likely to be defeated on the indictment if it should appear that the offense was within the bounds of the county?

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Still another question has arisen under section 56, and it has been held both ways by trial courts. For the offense of assault and battery committed before Dec. 1st, 1882, may the defendant be indicted? One court has held that prior to Dec. 1st there was no such crime "assault in the third degree," and as a court of special sessions has no jurisdiction but that mentioned in section 56, the crime of assault and battery must be prosecuted by indictment. Another holding has been that the words "assault in the third degree" may be interpreted to mean what it is defined to be by the Penal Code, which may be consulted to determine what was meant, and that it is simply an assault without aggravating circumstances. This leads to the conclusion that courts of special sessions have exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 849 does not provide for an adjournment on the application of the superintendent of the poor in bastardy cases. This is unlike the former statute, and it is not apparent why the right should not be retained. If the woman was about to be delivered at the time of the arrest, and the defendant should not apply for an adjournment, and the justices found no authority to adjourn, the superintendent would be somewhat em

barrassed.

If I have overlooked any provisions which remove grounds for doubt as to the matters referred to, I shall be gratified by having the error pointed out. I approve of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole, and I am satisfied that it will supply a want long felt. but it needs many amendments, and the Legislature cannot be too careful in amending it. The criminal practice is only confused, rather than simplified, by crude and poorly studied amendments. L. C. LANG.

Dated BRUSHED FALLS, N. Y., Dec. 4, 1882.

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Judgment affirmed, with costs. - Armour v. The Transatlantic Insurance Company, Trimmer v. Trimmer, Low v. Hart, Ellis v. Horrman, Hughes v. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Andrews v. Keeler, Farwell v. The Importers and Traders' National Bank of New York; Frazier v.

Section 558 provides that "the defendant may be admitted to bail by one of the officers having authority to admit to bail in the case, as provided in the second | subdivision of the last section. The Legislature of 1882 did not observe that by the amendment to the last section, it is deprived of any "second subdivision," | Trow's Printing and Book Binding Company, Smillie v, and therefore section 558 refers to what does not exist. Section 580 also refers to the same absent "second subdivision." Section 56 limits the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by it to the offenses mentioned "committed within their respective counties." By sections 134, 135, 136 and 137, jurisdiction is given to "other counties than that in which the offense was committed. These sections are under part 4, which is entitled, "of the proceedings in criminal actions prosecuted by indictment."

The inquiry is raised whether courts of special sessions have "exclusive jurisdiction," or no jurisdiction of such offenses if they belong to the class mentioned in section 56. If the crime of petit larceny charged as a first offense is committed in Clinton county, but within five hundred yards of Essex, have courts of

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Quinn, Pringle v. Woolworth, Brusso v. City of Buffalo. -Judgment reversed and new trial granted; costs to abide event- - Manning v. Gould. Orders of Special and General Terms reversed, with costs-Barclay v. Scofield.- Judgment affirmed - Hall v. The People, Boland v. The People.-Orders of General Term and surrogate reversed, with costs In re estate of Hood.- -Order affirmed, with costs- Walsh v. Walsh, Woodruff v. The Imperial Fire Insurance Company, The Irving National Bank v. Adams. - Appeal dismissed, with costs-Nicoll v. Boyd.- Motion to correct returns. Granted without prejudice - McIntyre v. Strong.- Motion to advance cause denied, with $10 costs - Canfield v. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. Motion to dismiss appeal, granted, with costs - Pierce v. Waters.

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The Albany Law Journal.

E

ALBANY, DECEMBER 23, 1882.

CURRENT TOPICS.

VERY editor receives more or less advice from his subscribers as to the proper mode of conducting his journal - generally more rather than less. In our short editorial service of three years we have received very little-only two letters. Whether to attribute this to indifference and inattention, or to satisfaction, we do not know, but we give ourselves the benefit of the doubt and choose the pleasanter alternative. One letter which we received some time ago suggested so many and such radical changes and "improvements" that as we could not in any sense comply we did not reply. But a recent letter from a Canada subscriber shows such critical reading of this journal and makes suggestions so apparently reasonable that we feel moved to give it a public answer. Our correspondent of course chides us for repeating the case of Backus v. Detroit. For that error we had already apologized as well as we could. Our correspondent continues: "I have been grumbling over your fashion of first publishing a case in full, and then re-publishing a great part of it in some sort of an article or note." Now this seldom occurs; so seldom that it cannot reasonably be called a "fashion," and so briefly that it cannot reasonably be described as "great part;" but when it does occur it is done purposely, for the sake of comment and comparison, and to save inconvenient reference. This we have supposed to be an excellence, and we think we should no more be scolded for it than a clergyman should be for repeating his text. But our correspondent continues: "I took your paper in great part because its editor was also editor of the American Reports. I see in his editorials he generally adds a reference to the American Reports and the American Decisions. Why not have this done whenever it can be in the cases reported in full and the abstracts? It would be considerable work, but it would, to me at least — and I presume there are plenty like me-double the value of your paper." That we have inserted references to the American Decisions is news to us. Our insertion of references to the American Reports has been an act of grace. It would be a great labor and involve considerable expense to comply with our correspondent's suggestion, and while it might "double the value of the paper" it is not likely that any subscriber would be willing to be assessed for it.

We think we give our money's worth as the matter stands; certainly from a quarter to a half more than any other similar journal in the country. | Beside, the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL is in no sense a tender to the AMERICAN REPORTS. Our correspondent concludes: A little more legal gossip thrown in, stories about big retainers, odd cases, etc., etc., would be an improvement." No doubt some stories about "big retainers," especially if the stories were VOL. 26-No. 26.

true, would be interesting, but such occurrences are extremely rare. As to "gossip" we respectfully but firmly decline to devote any more space to it when there is so much of the solid and practical that we cannot find room for. If our correspondent would send us a subscription list warranting the undertaking we might issue an "Albany Law Journal Comic Almanac" annually, but we fear that if we acceded to our correspondent's request we should have more "grumbling" from other quarters than Canada, After all, our correspondent, like everybody else, wants a journal just to suit him, whereas we can only undertake to suit the average or the majority.

We once remarked in another place: "It is à popular idea that the offspring of great men are usually degenerate. The idea probably owes its currency to the prominence of the instances in which it has occurred, but that it is fallacious will be apparent from the review of the biographies of the distinguished men of the world. Philip and Alexander; the long line of Scipios; Hamilcar and Hannibal; the succession of Martel, Pepin and Charlemagne, father, son and grandson; Henry the Second, of England, and Richard the First; Henry the Eighth and Elizabeth; Sir John More and Sir Thomas More; Bacon, the lord-keeper, and Bacon, the philosopher; William, Prince of Orange, and Prince Maurice, of Nassau, one of the greatest captains of his time; the three Holbeins, grandfather, father and son, painters, to say nothing of several brothers and uncles; David Teniers, and his sons David and Abraham, painters; Julius Scaliger, the second of scholars and critics, his son Joseph being the first; Frederick William and Frederick the Great; Moses Mendelssohn, the philosopher, and his greater grandson, Felix Mendelssohn, the musician; and coming down to our own country and times, the distinguished family of Adams, which has furnished in father and son two actual presidents, and in grandson one permanently contingent president" (and we may add, distinguished and able men further down the line); "Ebenezer Webster and his son Daniel; Chief Justice Parsons and his son, Professor Parsons; Chancellor Kent and his son, Judge William Kent; President Van Buren and his brilliant son John; all these instances are too marked to give any countenance to the theory that genius is not hereditary, and fairly establish the theory that talents descend in arts, in letters, in arms, in law, and in statesmanship." To these we might have added, Col. Thomas Marshall and his son John, the great chief justice; and Joseph Story and his son William, law-writer, poet and sculptor. And we

may now add, Oliver Wendell Holmes, the wittiest of Americans, and his son Oliver Wendell, distinguished as a lawyer and law-writer, and just now, at the age of forty-one, appointed to a seat on the supreme bench of Massachusetts, as great an honor as can be conferred on any lawyer, short of the Federal chief justiceship. This honor is fitly bestowed, as all men will say. Few men are so peculiarly adapted to the judicial office as Judge Holmes, by

temperament, by talents, and by acquirements. The only regret in connection with his appointment is that what the State will gain legal literature will lose, and especially that the professorship at Harvard Law School, so recently endowed for him, must, as we suppose, now be filled by some one else.

In the recent case, at St. Louis, of Alleon, convicted of sending improper matter through the mail, Judge Treat commented with deserved severity on the conduct of the Society for the Suppression of Crime, whose agent sent a decoy letter which drew out the letter in question. He said: "Who caused the statute to be violated? What right under the statute had the society's agent to exploit in that manner and violate the statute? Did not this amount to manufacturing crime? It matters not how guilty the convicted man is, it matters not for the purposes of this branch of the inquiry whether the mails were used by quacks, humbugs, and worse people. The point is a violation of the Federal statute touching the use of the mails for circulating indecent matter who provoked the commission of the crime? The State courts were open for the punishment of evil-doers. Ought the Federal court to be used to aid manufactured crime? The society, no doubt, was composed of excellent persons interested in the moral welfare of the people, but it did not know all the agencies employed to bring the prosecutions about. The parties had gone to the wrong forum. The State courts dealt with quacks, specialists, etc. There was another questionwhether printed matter that might be construed indecent when mailed to a school girl could be considered so when forwarded to a woman of mature age or professional men? The whole matter deserves careful consideration when such cases are brought to the Federal court for treatment under the Federal statutes." The good Book we believe condemns the doing of evil that good may come. There are perhaps cases in which decoys are warrantapie, as for example the case of illegally selling intoxicating drinks, or the case of putting marked coin in a till. But in the case of a crime like that in question we think the man who decoys is only a shade less dirty than the criminal. The pretense of promoting the cause of piety and virtue cannot cover up the inherent nastiness of such men.

The cases involving the construction and constitutionality of the Sunday laws, argued before Judge Arnoux on Tuesday last, are among the most important of recent times. We shall await his decision with great interest, and while we have no doubt he will construe the law strictly, we do not believe he will be found on the side of the heathen. The heathen may just as well understand now as later that we are going to have a quiet and christian Sunday in this country, and if they do not like it they can emigrate to the heathen countries from which most of them came. We are determined to

have one day of rest and of general suspension of work and business; for rest's sake, primarily; for religion's sake, secondarily. A Jew, who keeps Saturday, may work on Sunday so that he does not disturb christians, but he may not open his shop for trade on that day. If he might, some other sect might insist on some other day. There are a few necessary shops which may be kept open a reasonable length of time on Sunday morning to enable people to get supplies of food. The cars must run; livery stables perhaps should be open all day, and so of drug-shops. We do not object to news-boys early on Sunday morning if they are quiet. For ourselves we do not object to opening libraries on Sunday. We do not insist that people shall go to church. But we insist that every man should have a fair opportunity of rest on Sunday, and that those who go to church shall not be disturbed or shocked. Especially we insist that every avenue to hell, such as rumshops, shall be shut on that day. The Penal Code, so much abused and so little understood by the Satanic press, is the mildest and most reasonable of any body of statutes in this country on the subject of Sunday observance. In many States a promissory note made on Sunday is void, although it does not dirturb anybody. In Indiana a church subscription on Sunday is void. It used to be against the law in this State to ride more than twenty miles to church on Sunday. In Massachusetts they recently sent a poor shoemaker to prison for hoeing a few hills of corn early on Sunday morning, and another for gathering some seaweed on a lonely beach late on Sunday night. In Georgia Sabbath-breaking is punishable by putting in the chain-gang for two years. But our Code has made a reasonable rule on this subject, and we do not believe that the courts are going to evade it by misconstruction nor that the legislature are going to defeat it by repeal. If the legislature should repeal or seriously modify its provisions on this subject, and the Governor should approve their action, he would go out of office with as much unanimity as he came in with. But we need not afflict ourselves with forebodings. This is a christian country. God established our Sunday. He did not ordain that men should go to church on that day, but He did ordain that they should rest then from their labors. Keeping Sunday is not a mere Puritanic tradition, but it is obedience to the law of God and of the physical well-being of mankind, and until this country determines to go to the devil, as France did a century ago, it will cling to its Sunday laws.

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Gen. Curtis have affirmed the constitutionality of the law prohibiting certain officers and employees of the United States from giving or receiving contributions for party purposes. Mr. Justice Bradley dissents, but although we have not seen his opinion, we cannot doubt that the decision is right. The New York Times remarks that his opinion "confirms but too well the popular impression regarding Justice Bradley's fitness for the position which he

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