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and material evidence. The testimony referred to was not, in our opinion, of that character, but well calculated to prejudice the jury against the party who was then the defendant. For this manifest error the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

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PEACE BY LAWFUL ACT NOT

CRIMINAL.

endangering of the public peace. On several occasions previous to the 23d of March last, the procession of the Salvation Army, accompanied by such a mob as aforesaid, has come into collision with the said Skeleton Army and other persons who are antagonistic to the Salvation Army, and thereupon a free fight, great uproar, blows, tumults, stone-throwing and disorder have ensued. On the 23d of March last the Salvation Army formed their aforesaid procession and paraded the streets and places, accompanied by a disorderly and BREACH OF riotous mob of over 2,000 persons who had been collected as the Salvation Army proceeded. In the midst of the said mob were fighting and great disturbance, stone-throwing and noise. The police were for a long time overpowered and unable to cope with the disturbance, and the Salvation Army forced their way through several public streets to a public place called the Railway parade, where a general fight occurred. The appellant Beatty led and directed the Salvation Army on this occasion, but neither he nor the other appellants were seen to commit any overt act of violence. The police were ultimately reinforced and the crowd then dispersed. In all probability bloodshed and injury were prevented by the interference of the police.

ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, JUNE 13, 1882.

BEATTY V. GILLBANKS. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S. 194.) Knowledge by persons peaceably assembling for a lawful object that their assembly will be forcibly opposed by other persons, under circumstances likely to lead to a breach of the peace on the part of such other persons, does not render such assembly unlawful. The appellants, with a considerable number of other persons, forming a body called the "Salvation Army," assembled together in the streets of a town for a lawful object, and with no intention of carrying out their object unlawfully, or by the use of physical force, but knowing that their assembly would be opposed and resisted by other persons in such a way as would in all probability tend to the committing of a breach of the peace on the part of such opposing persons. A disturbance of the peace having been created by the forcible opposition of a number of persons to the assembly and procession through the streets of the appellants and the Salvation Army, who themselves used no force or violence, it was held, that the appellants had not been guilty of "unlawfully and tumultuously assembling," etc., and could not therefore be convicted of that offense, nor be bound over to keep the peace.

CASE

ASE stated. The appellants were convicted of a breach of the peace and recognizances to keep the peace required of them, and they appealed from the decision. The following facts were found by the justices below: The Salvation Army is an organized body of persons who are and have for some time been in the habit of forming themselves into processions of more than one hundred persons, and in such processions parading the principal streets and public places of the town. These processions are formed at the hall of the Salvation Army, and after their formation, proceed, headed by a musical band and flags and banners, through the streets, collecting, and for the purpose of collecting as they go, a mob of persons with whom, attended by much shouting and singing, uproar and noise, they eventually return to the hall, where a meeting is then held. The appellant Beatty is captain and a leader of the Salvation Army, and organizes and directs these processions and meetings. The other appellants, Mullins and Bowden, are also leaders of the Salvation Army, and assist in organizing and directing the processions and meetings. There is another organized band of persons at Weston-super-Mare, called the Skeleton Army, which also parades the streets and is antagonistic to the Salvation Army and its processions. There are numbers of other persons at Weston-super-Mare, who as soon as the Salvation Army has formed for the purpose of thus parading the streets as aforesaid, are in the habit of assembling in a mob of great numbers about and around and in front of the procession of the Salvation Army. Some of these, together with the Skeleton Army, assemble to dispute the passage of the Salvation Army through the said streets and places, some to encourage such passage, with shouting, singing, uproar and noise, to the great terror, disturbance, annoyance and inconvenience of the peaceable inhabitants of the town and to the

The matters set out in the last paragraph caused great terror and alarm in the minds of the peaceable inhabitants of the said place, who believed, and bad good reason to believe, that the aforesaid processions would lead to a repetition of the aforesaid disturbances, and would endanger life, property and the public peace; and who in consequence brought the matter to the notice of the sergeant of police in charge of the peace of the town, and made complaints to him thereupon.

In consequence of these matters a notice was issued signed by two of the magistrates, and copies of it were placarded in conspicuous parts of the said town and were served on the principal appellant Beatty, in these terms:

PUBLIC NOTICE.-Whereas it hath been made to appear unto us, the undersigned, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Somerset, acting in and for the division of Axbridge in the same county, upon the oath of divers persons, that a riotous and tumultuous assembly did take place on the night of the 23d of March, in certain public streets at Weston superMare in the said county, and further that there are reasonable grounds for apprehending a repetition of such riotous and tumultuous assembly in the public streets of Weston-super-Mare as aforesaid; we do therefore hereby require, order and direct all persons to abstain from assembling to the disturbance of the public peace within the said parish.-Given under our hands and seals at Weston-super-Mare aforesaid this 24th of March, 1882. (Signed by two magistrates.)

On Sunday, the 26th of March, at 10:30 A. M., whilst numbers of the inhabitants of the said town were proceeding to their respective places of worship, the Salvation Army, under the direction of the appellants, was formed into a procession of one hundred or more persons, and having been so formed, commenced to march away from their hall, through the aforesaid streets and public places of the said town. The appellants marched at the head of the procession, which was surrounded by a tumultuous and shouting mob of some hundred persons, which rapidly increased as the procession passed on.

The said police sergeant met the procession (after it had paraded through certain principal public streets) in a public street called Walliscote street, aud with others of the police force stopped the advance of the procession, and asked the appellaut Beatty if he was leading the procession, and if he had received a copy of the notice. The appellant Beatty admitted that he

was leading the procession and had received the notice. The sergeant of police told him that he must obey the notice, and must desist from leading the procession, and must disperse at once or he would be arrested. The appellant Beatty refused to comply and marched on at the head of the procession some twenty yards further, and told the sergeant that he should still proceed, and thereupon he was arrested. After he was arrested he shouted to the procession to proceed. The other appellants, Mullins and Bowden, then took the direction of the procession and persisted in leading it on, whereupon they also were arrested. Neither of the appellants were guilty of any overt act of violence other than the acts aforesaid, and submitted quietly to their arrest.

The aforesaid assembling of the Salvation Army and march of the said procession and collection of the said mob was a terror to the peaceable inhabitants of the said town, and to those who were going to their places of worship as aforesaid, and was calculated to endanger and did endanger, and was calculated to cause a breach of the public peace; and there was good and sufficient cause for the inhabitants to suppose, and any rational person knowing the aforesaid circumstances would suppose, that unless the procession and mob were dispersed, there would be a repetition of the aforesaid violent and tumultuous acts, and that there would be a breach of the peace.

The appellants intended to parade their procession through the principal streets and public places of the town, and to collect on their march a large mob of persons to accompany them; and they had good reason to expect that they would come into collision with the said Skeleton Army and other persons antagonistic to the procession, and they had good reason to expect that there would be the same fighting, stone-throwing and disturbance, as there had been on previous occasions, and intended on meeting such opposition to force their way through the said streets and places as they had done on previous occasions. It was contended for the appellants that there had not been any unlawful and tumultuous assembling on their part, that they had not been guilty of the charge and complaint made against them, and that their arrest had been unlawful, and that they should be discharged. The magistrates however thought that the charge had been made out, and decided against the appellants as above stated.

The questions of law stated for the opinion of the court, were whether these facts so found to be proved as aforesaid constituted the offense charged in the complaint, and whether the order made-that the de. fendants should find sureties to keep the peace-was valid.

Edward Clarke, Q. C., for the appellants, submitted that there was no evidence of any unlawful or tumultuous assembly, or any conduct on the part of the appellants amounting to a disturbance of the public peace, or causing terror to the inhabitants of the town. It was not suggested that there was any riot. To make an assembly unlawful, it must be an assembly for an unlawful purpose, or if the purpose for which the persons assemble is a lawful one, the assembly itself must be conducted in a disorderly and tumultuous manner. In the present case it was clear from the evidence in the case itself that the purpose was a perfectly innocent and lawful one, and that the assembly itself was peaceable and orderly. The argument on the respondent's part is that because some other persons objected to the Salvation Army parading quietly through the streets and turned out to forcibly oppose them, therefore the appellants were guilty of unlawfully assembling. [Cave, J. That is to say, because others unlawfully opposed their assembling, therefore their assembling was unlawful.] An unlawful assembly is defined as an assembly of persons with in

tent to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in a tumultuous way, or so as to excite public terror. That is the largest definition of it, but there is nothing to be found in any case or text-book to the effect that where persons are lawfully doing a certain act, the unlawful interference therewith by other persons can make that lawful act unlawful. The law interferes to check the wrong-doer, and not the person acting lawfully. The wrong-doers here were the Skeleton Army. The rule

and the law relating to and regulating such assemblies have been well and clearly stated in various cases. In Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. P. 91, Alderson, B., at p. 109, lays it down as law that any meeting assembled under circumstances, which in the opinion of rational and firm men, are likely to be dangerous to the peace of the neighborhood is unlawful; but he goes on to say, that "the alarm must not be merely such as would frighten foolish and timid persons, but must be such as would alarm persons of reasonable firmness and courage." To the same effect are the rulings of Littledale, J., in Reg. v. Neale, 9 C. & P. 431, and Holroyd, J., in Redford v. Burley and others, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 76. The object of the appellants here was both laudable and lawful, and the manner of carrying it out was peaceable and orderly. The case finds no act of violence ou their part, and though the information alleges that the peace would be broken by them, nothing of that sort happened. The only noise and violence that occurred were on the side of the Skeleton Army. The merely walking four abreast through the streets was not unlawful in itself, nor in the conduct of the Salvation Army was there any thing to produce terror or alarm. [Field, J. Suppose the appel nts knew that their procession would be opposed, and that violence might probably ensue, and they still proceeded with it?] The answer to that is that their procession being law. ful they were entitled to be and ought to have been protected by the authorities from such opposition. If it were not so, mob rule would soon take the place of law and order. It is disorderly rowdies and riotous roughs whom the police should put down, and not lawful and peaceable processionists. He referred also to Dalton's Country Justice, cap. 136, sec. 1, and Hawk, P. C., book 1, cap. 28, sec. 10.

A. R. Poole, for the respondent, contra, submitted that the cases cited for the appellants were very different from the present one; but that if not, still the words there describing an unlawful assembly were amply sufficient to cover the case now before the court. Here however the appellants have not been indicted or punished for unlawfully assembling, but simply bound over to keep the peace and be of good behavior. [Field, J. No persons can be forced to find sureties to keep the peace without having done something to render them liable to be so bouud.] Bearing in mind what had so recently before happened, the justices were justified, even if the assembly were not absolutely unlawful, in calling on the appellants to find sureties for the peace. [Cave, J. In what does the procession of the Salvation Army differ from that of every village club in the kingdom?] They parade the streets intending to collect a mob. [Field, J. Surely not a "mob" in the evil sense of the word. Their object is to awaken some sense of religion in the lower classes, and with that view they go through the streets singing hymns in order to induce the people to follow them to their meeting house and join in their religious services. Can that fairly be called "collecting a mob?"] As a fact, they do collect together the roughest and lowest classes. and however meritorious may be their object in itself, they know that it causes disturbances. They may not desire to fight or throw stones, but they know such things will probably follow their gathering. [Cave, J. Am I forced to stay within doors because I know that a man intends to knock me down if I go out? and if I

sureties to keep the peace, in the absence of any evidence of their having broken it. It was of course necessary that the justices should find that some unlawful act had been committed by the appellants in order to justify the magistrates in binding them over. The offense charged against them is "unlawfully and tumultuously assembling with others to the disturbance of the public peace, and against the peace of the Queen," and of course before they can be convicted upon the charge clear proof must be adduced that the specific offense charged has been committed. Now was that charge sustained? There is no doubt that the

go out am I guilty of provoking a breach of the peace? Field, J. And who in such a case ought to be bound over?] The appellants assembled in large numbers, which is unlawful. [Cave, J. What is an unlawful number?] As many as are likely to lead to a disturbance. In Russell on Crimes, p. 387, 4th ed., citing Hawk, P. C., it is said that the assembling of a man's friends for the defense of his person against those who threaten to beat him if he go to such a market is unlawful, though they may lawfully assemble to defend him in his house against a threatened assault, for it is added, "a man's house is looked upon as his castle." It may be admitted that the Salvationists did not in-appellants did assemble together with other persons in tend to force their way against opposition by fighting their opponents, but they intended to force their way by pushing on, and that would inevitably lead to disturbance and violence. By that persistence, though not themselves guilty of any riotous and tumultuous acts, they were the cause of them, and were properly called on to find sureties. Under the circumstances stated in the case the assembly, whatever the object of the appellants might be, was from its very commencement unlawful, and the magistrates were justified in the course they adopted. He referred also to the cases cited for the appellants, and relied on them as showing the assembly was an unlawful one.

FIELD, J. I am of opinion that this order cannot be supported, and must therefore be discharged. The appellants, it appears, together with a large number of other people, belong to a body of persons called the Salvation Army, who are associated together for a purpose which cannot be said to be otherwise than lawful and laudable, or at all events cannot be called unlawful, their object and intention being to induce a class of persons who have little or no knowledge of religion and no taste or disposition for religious exercises or for going to places of worship, to join them in their processions, and so to get them together to attend and take part in their religious exercises, in the hope that they may be reclaimed and drawn away from vicious and irreligious habits and courses of life, and that a kind of revival in the matter of religion may be brought about amongst those who were previously dead to any such influences. That undoubtedly is the object of the Salvation Army, and of the appellants, and no other object or intention has been or can be imputed to them; and as has been said by their learned counsel, and doubtless with perfect truth, so far are they from desiring to carry out that object by means of any force or violence, their principles are directly and entirely opposed to any conduct of that kind, or to the exercise or employment of any thing like physical force; and indeed it appears that on the occasion in question they used no personal force or violence, but on the contrary, when arrested by the police, they submitted quietly without the exhibition of any resistance either on their own parts or on that of any other mem. ber of their body. Such being their lawful object and intention, and having no desire or intention of using force or violence of any kind, it appeared that on this 26th of March they assembled, as they had previously done on other occasions, in considerable numbers at their hall, and proceeded to march thence in procession through the streets of the town of Weston-super-Mare. Now that in itself was certainly not an unlawful thing to do, nor can such an assembly be said to be an unlawful one. Numerous instances might be mentioned of large bodies of persons assembling in much larger numbers, and marching, accompanied by banners and bands of music, through the public streets, and no one has ever doubted that such processions were perfectly lawful. Now the appellants complain that for having 80 assembled as I have before stated, they have been adjudged guilty of the offense of holding an unlawful assembly, and have in consequence been ordered to find

great numbers, but that alone is insufficient. The assembly must be a "tumultuous assembly," and "against the peace," in order to render it an unlawful one. But there was nothing so far as the appellants were concerned to show that their conduct was in the least degree "tumultuous" or "against the peace." All that they did was to assemble together to walk through the town, and it is admitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, that as regards the appellants themselves there was no disturbance of the peace, and that their conduct was quiet and peaceable. But then it is argued that as in fact their line of conduct now was the same as had on previous similar occasions led to tumultuous and riotous proceedings with stonethrowing and fighting, causing a disturbance of the public peace and terror to the inhabitants of the town, and as on the present occasion like results would in all probability be produced, therefore the appellauts, being well aware of the likelihood of such results again occurring, were guilty of the offense charged against them. Now, without doubt, as a general rule it must be taken that every person intends what are the natural and necessary consequences of his own acts, and if in the present case it had been their intention, or if it had been the natural and necessary consequence of their acts, to produce the disturbance of the peace which occurred, then the appellants would have been responsible for it, and the magistrates would have been right in binding them over to keep the peace. But the evidence as set forth in the case shows, that so far from that being the case, the acts and conduct of the appellants caused nothing of the kind, but on the contrary, that the disturbance that did take place was caused entirely by the unlawful and unjustifiable interference of the Skeleton Army, a body of persons opposed to the religious views of the appellants and the Salvation Army, and that but for the opposition and molestation offered to the Salvationists by these other persons, no disturbance of any kind would have taken place. The appellants were guilty of no offense in their passing through the streets, and why should other persons interfere with or molest them? What right had they to do so? If they were doing any thing unlawful it was for the magistrates and police, the appointed guardians of law and order, to interpose. The law relating to unlawful assemblies, as laid down in the books and the cases, affords no support to the view of the matter for which the learned counsel for the respondent was obliged to contend, viz.: That persons acting lawfully are to be held responsible and punished merely because other persons are thereby induced to act unlawfully and create a disturbance. In Russell on Crimes (4th ed., p. 387), an unlawful assembly is defined as follows: "An unlawful assembly, according to the common opinion, is a disturbance of the peace by persons barely assembling together with the intention to do a thing, which if it were executed would make them rioters, but neither actually executing it nor making a motion toward the execution of it." It is clear that according to this definition of the offense, the appellants were not guilty, for it is not pretended that they had, but on the contrary, it is

admitted that they had not, any intention to create a riot, or to commit any riotous or other unlawful act. Many examples of what are unlawful assemblies are given in Hawkins' Plea of the Crown, book 1, cap. 28, sections 9 and 10, in all of which the necessary circumstances of terror are present in the assembly itself, either as regards the object for which it is gathered together, or in the manner of its assembling and proceeding to carry out that object. The present case however differs from the cases there stated; for here the only terror that existed was caused by the unlawful resistance willfully and designedly offered to the proceedings of the Salvation Army by an unlawful organization outside and distinct from them, called the Skeleton Army. It was suggested by the respondent's counsel that if these Salvation processions were allowed similar opposition would be offered to them in future, and that similar disturbances would ensue. But I cannot believe that that will be so. I hope, and I cannot but think, that when the Skeleton Army, and all other persons who are opposed to the proceedings of the Salvation Army come to learn, as they surely will learn, that they have no possible right to interfere with or in any way to obstruct the Salvation Army in their lawful and peaceable processions, they will abstain from opposing or disturbing them. It is usual happily in this country for people to respect and obey the law when once declared and understood, and I hope aud have no doubt that it will be so in the present case. But if it should not be so, there is no doubt that the magistrates and police, both at Weston-super-Mare and everywhere else, will understand their duty and not fail to do it efficiently, or hesitate, should the necessity arise, to deal with the Skeleton Army and other disturbers of the public peace as they did in the present instance with the appellants, for no one can doubt that the authorities are only anxious to do their duty, and to prevent a disturbance of the public peace. The present decision of the justices however amounts to this, that a man may be punished for acting lawfully if he knows that his so doing may induce another man to act unlawfully-a proposition without any authority whatever to support it. Under these circumstances, the questions put to us by the justices must be negatively answered, and the order appealed against be discharged.

The

CAVE, J. I am entirely of the same opinion. question in this case is whether these persons were guilty of the offense of unlawfully and tumultuously assembling together to the disturbance of the public peace and that of the Queen, and I am of opinion that they were not. The learning on the subject of "unlawful assemblies " is to be found in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown and Dalton's Country Justice. In the firstmentioned authority the definition of an unlawful assembly is given, which my brother Field has referred to in his judgment; but it is there further said: "This seems to be much too narrow a definition; for any meeting whatever of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror as cannot but endanger the public peace and raise fear and jealousies among the king's subjects, seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly, as when great numbers, complaining of a common grievance, meet together, armed in a warlike manner, in order to consult together concerning the most proper means for the recovery of their interests, for no man can foresee what may be the event of such an assembly;" and further it is said: "Also an assembly of a man's friends for the defense of his person against those who threaten to beat him if he go to such a market, etc., is unlawful, for he who is in fear of such assaults must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the persons by whom he is threatened and not make use of such violent methods, which cannot but be attended with the danger of rais

ing tumults and disorder to the disturbance of the public peace. Yet an assembly of a man's friends in his own house for the defense of the possession thereof, against those who threaten to make an unlawful entry therein, to or for the defense of his person against those who threaten to beat him therein, is indulged by law, for a man's house is looked upon as his castle." Hawk. P. C., book 1, cap. 28, sections 9, 10. So far Hawkins; but Dalton, in his Country Justice, goes further, where in cap. 136, sec. 1, it is said: "An unlawful assembly, riot or rout, is where three or more shall gather together, come, or meet in one place, to do some unlawful act with violence, and that unlawful act must be malum in se and not malum prohibitum. As when three persons or more shall come and assemble themselves together to the intent to do any unlawful act with force or violence against the person of another, his possessions or goods; as to kill, beat or otherways to hurt or to imprison a man; to pull down a house, wall, pale, hedge or ditch; wrongfully to enter upon or into another man's possession, house or land, or to cut or take away corn, grass, wood or other goods wrongfully, or to hunt unlawfully in any park or warren, or to do any other unlawful act with force or violence, against the peace or to the manifest terror of the people; if they only meet to such a purpose or intent, although they shall after depart of their own accord without doing any thing, yet this is an unlawful assembly." Now putting these several passages from these old authorities together, it seems to me to be impossible to hold that the appellants here have been brought within them as being guilty of unlawfully and tumultuously assembling. The meeting or assembly of the Salvation Army was for a purpose not unlawful. Was there an intention on their part to use violence? If though their meeting was in itself lawful, they intended, if opposed, to meet force by force, that would render their meeting an unlawful assembly; but it does not appear that they entertained any such intention. On the contrary, when met and resisted by the Skeleton Army, they used no violence of any kind, and manifested no intention of meeting their opponents with like violence to that which the latter offered to them. I come therefore to the conclusion that the appellants were not guilty of unlawfully assembling, and that for the reasons and on the grounds before mentioned, the judgment of the court should be pro. nounced in their favor.

Judgment for the appellants with costs.

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

In

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. If earth used in grading a street under a contract with the city be permitted to roll down upon the premises of an adjoining proprietor, to his damage, the city will be liable. jury so done is a taking of private property within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution, which forbids the taking of private property without just compensation. 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., § 990; Cooley Coust. Lim. (4th ed.) 680, et seq.; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Hooker v. New Haven & North Hampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; Arimond v. Green Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; S. C., 24 Am. Rep. 552; Eaton v. Railroad Co., 51 N. H. 504; S. C., 12 Am. Rep. 147. Broadwell v. City of Kansas. Opinion by Sherwood, C. J. NEGLIGENCE

CONTRIBUTORY IN CROSSING RAILROAD TRACK WITHOUT LOOKING FOR TRAINSRUNNING TRAIN AT UNLAWFUL SPEED.- (1) It is well settled that it is such negligence for one to attempt to

*To appear in 75 Missouri Reports.

cross or get upon a railway track at a public crossing or elsewhere, without looking and listening for an approaching train, as precludes a recovery for an injury sustained by him from a passing train or locomotive, whether the company's negligence also contributed directly to produce the injury or not; but there is this qualification to this rule: If the negligence of the company, which contributed directly to cause the injury, occurred after the party injured was, or by the exercise of proper care might have been, discovered on the track by the company's trainmen in time to stop the train and avert the calamity, the company is liable, however gross the negligence of the injured party may have been in placing himself in danger. (2) The mere fact that a train is run through a city at a greater rate of speed than is allowed by ordinance, will not authorize a party injured to recover. There must be evidence connecting the violation of the ordinance with the injury as a cause. (3) The same is true as to failure to comply with the law requiring the bell to be rung. (4) It is not sufficient to exonerate a party from a charge of contributory negligence in attempting to cross a railway track in the face of an approaching locomotive, to show that he might reasonably have supposed that if the locomotive ran at its usual and lawful rate of speed for that place he could cross without harm. He has no more right to presume that the men in charge of the locomotive will obey the requirements of the law than they have that he will obey the instinct of self-preservation and not unnecessarily thrust himself into danger. Kelley v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co. Opinion by Henry, J.

MUNICIPAL LICENSES-TAXATION-UNIFORMITY OF - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A license fee imposed by a city upon the keepers of meat-shops is a tax; and the constitutional provision that "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax" applies, and requires that the fee shall be uniform throughout the city. An ordinance therefore which requires a license fee of $100 in one part of the city and $25 in the rest, is void. Citing Dillon Mun. Corp., § 768; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Cooley Const. Lim., 201, 494; North Hudson v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; Cooley Taxation, 403, et seq.; Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675; St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 id. 289; Burlington v. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 102; Muhlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 364; S. C., 36 Am. Rep. 518. City of St. Louis v. Spiegel. Opinion by Sherwood, C. J.

то BREAK

TORT WILLFULLY CAUSING HORSES AWAY - DAMAGE BY COLLISION.- Defendant finding a team of horses hitched to a post in the street in front of his premises, willfully and intentionally threw a stream of water from a hose upon them, whereby they were frightened and breaking away ran down the street and collided with plaintiff's team. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover of defendant the damage caused by the collision. Citing Redfield Negligence, § 188; Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403. Distinguishing Illidge v. Goodwin, Carr. & P. 190. Forney v. Geldmacher. Opinion by Henry, J.

SURETYSHIP -BANK OFFICER'S BOND - ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT.-The fact that the bookkeeper of a bank performs the duties of teller also, will not relieve the sureties in his bond given for the faithful performance of his duties as bookkeeper, from liability for errors committed by him in that capacity, unless the errors were in some way connected with some improper act on his part as teller, or were superinduced by his employment as such. Skillett v. Fletcher, L. R., 2 C. P. 469. Home Savings Bank v. Traube. Opinion by Hough, J.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. SEPTEMBER, 1882.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--TITLE OF ACT AND CONTENTS.- An act of Legislature was entitled thus: "An act regulating the herding and driving of stock." Held, that under a constitutional provision that the title of an act must express the subject the title could not be made to comprehend a provision that a person castrating an animal permitted by law to run at large should be liable for the value of such animal. In White v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 515, it is said: "The object of this conditional provision is to prevent surreptitious legislation by incorporating into bills obnoxious provisions which have no connection with the general object of the bill and of which the title gives no indication. It will be sufficient however if the bill have but one general object, which is fairly expressed in the title." See also Tecumseh v. Phillips, id. 311; Lincoln Ass'n v. Graham, 7 Neb. 179; Dawson County v. McNamar, 10 id. 279; Miller v. Herford, 11 id. 381. The condition makes the title the index of the legisla tive intention as to the subject-matter of the bill, and this cannot be enlarged by the courts. Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 181-2. In Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524, the title of the act was "An act to incorporate the village of High Forrest, in the county of Olmsted, Minnesota." It was held that a provision for the division of the village, and the organization of a new village, was not within the title and was void. See also Weaver v. Lapsey, 43 Ala. 229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 id. 9. Ives v. Norris. Opinion by the court.

DOMICILE -COMING INTO STATE UNACCOMPANIED BY WIFE ATTACHMENT.-S. came into Nebraska in May, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident thereof. His wife remained at their former home in Illinois until October when she came to Nebraska to live with him. Held, that he and his wife were not non-residents of Nebraska in June so as to authorize an attachment in an action against them on that ground. In People v. McClay, 2 Neb. 7, it was held that a person who came to this State with the intention of becoming a resident, and who has no intention of removing therefrom, was entitled to the benefit of the exemption law; and the fact that his family did not accompany him was held to be of no consequence, so long as he came with the settled purpose of abandoning his foreign residence and of bringing his family here. And in Chesney v. Francisco, 12 Neb. 626, the same rule was applied to a person who had removed to this State with his family with the intention of residing here. If a person go to a place with the intention of residing there, he acquires a domicile whether his residence be long or short, provided it appears that he took up his abode with the intention of remaining. Thus in the case of Wells v. People, 40 Ill. 40, one Wells, formerly a resident of the State of New York, came to Illinois and purchased a farm therein, which he cultivated and lived upon from 1861 to August, 1864, but his wife continued to reside in New York. In May, 1864, his property was attached upon the ground that he was a non-resident of Illinois. The court held that the facts and circumstances showed that he was a resident, and that the attachment would not lie. In Brown v. Ashbrough, 40 How. Pr. 260, one Ashbrough left Hamilton, Canada, where he had resided and done business for several years, on the 24th of September, 1870, and went to the State of New York, with the intention of taking up his residence there; but his wife still remained in Canada. On the third of October of that year, an attachment was issued against him, in New York, upon the ground that he was a non-resident. It was held that the defendant

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